Certainty and Normativity from a Phenomenological Point of View by Zanetti, Luca
Alma Mater Studiorum – Università di Bologna
DOTTORATO DI RICERCA IN
Philosophy, Science, Cognition, Semiotics (PSCS)
Ciclo XXX
Settore Concorsuale: 11 C4
Settore Scientifico Disciplinare: m-fil 05
Certainty and Normativity 
from a Phenomenological Point of  View
Presentata da: Luca Zanetti
Coordinatore Dottorato    Supervisore
Marco Beretta Sebastiano Moruzzi
Esame finale anno 2018
1
Table of  Contents
Introduction   8
Chapter I Absolute Certainty  17
§1.1 Absolute certainty  17
§1.2 The Ground Principle  19
§1.3 Inferentialism about certainty  25
§1.4 Infallibility and Reflexivity  28
§1.5 The problem of  certainty  31
Chapter II Eidetic Phenomenology  35
§2.1 Terminological preliminaries  36
§2.2 Eidetic variation and constitutive commitments  45
§2.3 Objections to eidetic phenomenology  48
§2.4 Epistemology needs phenomenology  51
Chapter III Judgment  58
§3.1 Being certain  58
§3.2 Alethically committed mental phenomena  62
§3.3 To judge that p is to be committed to p's being true  65
§3.4 To judge that p is to be committed to there being grounds for  65
judging that p 
§3.5 Five models about the relationship between a mental state and  67
its commitments
§3.6 To judge that p is to be committed to there being conclusive  70
grounds for judging that p
§3.7 On the idea that commitments are implicit I  73
§3.8 On the idea that commitments are implicit II  76
§3.9 Objection from the impossibility of  irrationality  81
§3.10 Doubt as incompatible with judgment  81
§3.11 Failures to integrate one's own thoughts into a unified perspective  82
§3.12 To judge that p is to be committed to one's having an access to  84
there being conclusive grounds for judging that p 
§3.13 Judgment, degrees of  belief, outright belief  88
§3.14 Phenomenology and linguistic data  92
2
Chapter IV Suspension of  Judgment  98
§4.1 Preliminary distinctions  98
§4.2 Suspension of  judgment and mere absence of  judgment 100
§4.3 Absence of  judgment and open-mindedness 100
§4.4 Suspension of  judgment and open-mindedness 101
§4.5 Suspension of  judgment as a move within inquiry 103
§4.6 Ignorance and mystery 104
§4.7 Suspension of  judgment about p is uncotenable with judging that p 106
§4.8 Suspending judgment about p commits one to judge that one has 107
grounds for suspending judgment about p
§4.9 Suspending judgment about p commits one to judge that there 109
are no adequate grounds for judging that p
§4.10 Suspending judgment about p commits one to judge that there 110
are no conclusive grounds in favour of  p
§4.11 Suspending judgment about p commits one to judge that one has 110
conclusive grounds for judging that one doesn't have conclusive 
grounds in favour of  p
§4.12 Temporary and definitive suspension of  judgment 111
§4.13 Suspension of  judgment as reducible to judgment about grounds 113
§4.14 Suspension of  judgment and disagreement 115
§4.15 Reply to an objection 116
§4.16 Concluding remarks 118
Chapter V Doubt 120
§5.1 Open and closed questions 120
§5.2 The normative profile of  questioning 122
§5.3 Questioning about an issue is uncotenable with judging any of  123
the recognized candidate answers
§5.4 Questioning about an issue is uncotenable with judging that 128
there are conclusive grounds in favour of  any of  the recognized 130
candidate answers
§5.5 Does wonder about an issue and doubt about p commit one 130
to judge that the question and the doubt are correct or justified?
3
§5.6 Is questioning responsive to alethic considerations only? 131
§5.7 Questioning commits one to judge that there are grounds for 134
questioning
§5.8 Questioning is not reducible to judgment about grounds 136
§5.9 Universal doubt as untenable 137
§5.10 Doubt, the problem of  certainty, and the conditions of  possibility 140
for its solution
Chapter VI Phenomenology and Constitutive Norms 147
§6.1 Constitutive norms of  cognition 147
§6.2 Strong constitutivism about the laws of  logic 149
§6.3 Constitutivism about normativity in the face of  the sceptical 160
challenge
§6.4 Explanatory problem for weak constitutivism 166
§6.5 Explanatory problem for strong constitutivism 173
§6.6 Experience of  rational necessitation and commitments 174
§6.7 Uncotenability within the same mental breath 181
Chapter VII Global Scepticism and 185
Pyrrhonian Scepticism as Untenable
§7.1 Standpoints and propositions 185
§7.2 Ways in which a standpoint might be untenable 188
§7.3 Varieties of  scepticisms 190
§7.4 Arguments for global scepticism 193
§7.5 Global scepticism as untenable 195
§7.6 Pyrrhonian silence 206
§7.6 Tranquillity driven pyrrhonian scepticism as untenable 209
§7.7 Alethically driven pyrrhonian scepticism as untenable 212
Chapter VIII Fallibilism and Externalism as Untenable 220
§8.1 The reflexivity of  the epistemological inquiry 220
§8.2 Fallibilism is untenable 223
§8.3 Externalism is untenable 227
§8.4 Absolute certainty about epistemological truths 234
4
§8.5 From untenability to falsity 236
Chapter IX Truth is the Constitutive Aim of  Cognition 239
§9.1 Personal valuing, sub-personal valuing, transcendental valuing 239
§9.2 Judgment aims at truth 243
§9.3 The minimalist view 245
§9.4 Common-element objection 247
§9.5 Aiming as second-order representation 256
§9.6 Aiming as personally valuing 260
§9.7 Aiming as sub-personally valuing 266
§9.8 Aiming as metaphorical: normativism 268
§9.9 A general  problem for non-minimalist views of  the aim of  272
judgment
§9.10 Exclusivity 276
§9.11 Questioning aims at truth 289
Chapter X Constitutivism about Alethic Normativity 294
§10.1 Constitutivism about normativity 296
§10.2 Alethic Normativity 298
§10.3 The regress argument in favour of  constitutivism 298
§10.4 Constitutivism needs inescapability 301
§10.5 Varieties of  inescapability 303
§10.6 Varieties of  challenges to constitutivism 306
§10.7 Do we need a reason in order to be agents rather than 308
shmagents?
§10.8 Cognitive Shmagency objection I. It is possible for us 309
to be cognitive shmagents and shwonder whether to be 
cognitive agent or cognitive shmagents
§10.9 Cognitive Shmagency Objection II. It is not possible for us 311
to be cognitive shmagents, yet it is conceivable the existence
 of  a cognitive shmagent
§10.10 Defusing, defeating, dissolving 313
§10.11 Cognitive Shmagency Objection III. Should I keep being a 317
cognitive agent? 
5
§10.12 Why should I care about the truth? 318
§10.13 Playing under protest 320
§10.14 There is no practical question and no fact of  the matter 321
as to whether to enter cognition
§10.15 Is it really good to cognize? 327
§10.16 Naturalistic fallacy 328
§10.17 Reflexive distancing and contingency 330
§10.18 Possible sources of  the residual feeling of  arbitrariness 333
§10.19 Reflexive distancing 339
§10.20 On the relationship between truth and other personal values 340
§10.21 Conclusion 341
Chapter XI Constitutivism about Epistemic Normativity 343
§11.1 The argument from exclusivity 345
§11.2 The argument form commitments 347
§11.3 The argument from doubt 348
§11.4 Constitutivism and other views about the source of  epistemic 350
normativity
§11.5 Silencing scepticism concerning certainty as the aim of  inquiry 352
§11.6 Humean and Wittgensteinian moves 358
§11.7 Certainty is not required for knowledge and justification 359
§11.8 Certainty leads to widespread scepticism 362
§11.9 The certainties we have are not central in our lives 365
§11.10 Certainty is valuable only if  the old foundationalist Cartesian 366
enterprise is doable
§11.11 Certainty is impossible to obtain 366
§11.12 Pragmatist objections 367
§11.13 On the nature of  the transcendental defence 368
§11.14 Conclusion 370
Chapter XII Transcendental Hinges 371
§12.1 Hinge epistemology, transcendental arguments, 372
and transcendentalist constitutivism 
§12.2 Empirical hinges and the sceptical challenge 374
6
§12.3 Only transcendental hinges can silence the sceptic 387
§12.4 Doubt as the transcendental bedrock 390
§12.5 Transcendental circularity 391
§12.6 Explanatory step and concluding remarks 393
 
Bibliography 401
7
Introduction
The  central  claim of  this  Dissertation  is  that  the  constitutive  aim  of  cognition  is  to  
discover the truth with certainty. The Dissertation as a whole is an attempt to clarify and  
justify this claim, and to draw some important consequences for epistemology and our  
understanding of  the human mind. The dialectic of  the Dissertation is complicated by the 
fact that in trying to justify the main claim I also attempt to make other important points  
that are connected to the methodology to be used when inquiring about the nature of  the 
mind. In this Introduction I will briefly distinguish the main claims made in each chapter,  
and isolate some of  the debates with which I interact throughout the Dissertation. 
The object of  study of  this  Dissertation is  cognition. By cognition I mean the 
conscious and reflective activity of  asking questions and answering them in the form of  
judgments based on alethic grounds, that is considerations to take the content judged as  
true. It will be a task of  the next chapters to argue that this activity is of  fundamental 
importance for philosophy of  mind and epistemology. Its most important feature is its 
dialectical inescapability1,  namely the fact that in order to evaluate cognition we should 
engage in cognition. Cognition so defined is of  fundamental importance because it is the 
only activity which is dialectical inescapable. Its dialectical inescapability will be important in  
order to draw significant consequences for epistemology, and for the theory of  alethic and 
epistemic normativity.
The  dissertation  as  a  whole  defends  a  philosophical  project  that  we  might  call 
transcendental  constitutivism.  Transcendental  constitutivism  is  the  name  of  a  very  general 
project whose aim is to ground the validity of  norms and/or the truth or justification of 
some judgment on constitutive features of  cognition. In very general terms, this is a useful 
way of  visualising the steps of  a transcendental constitutivist strategy: 
Constitutivity step: it is argued that some properties are constitutive of  cognition. 
Inescapability step: it is argued that cognition is suitably inescapable. 
Transcendental step: some conclusion is drawn on the basis of  the constitutive claims made at  
the constitutivity step. 
Explanatory step: an explanation is provided of  why the constitutive claim made at the first  
steps are true. 
1 I take the expression 'dialectical inescapability' from Ferrero (2009; ms).
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As already indicated, at the inescapability step I will  argue that cognition is dialectically  
inescapable. In order to illustrate the other steps of  this strategy I will now present three 
transcendental constitutivist strategies that I will defend in this Dissertation.
Constitutivism about alethic normativity. At the constitutivity step I will argue that truth is the 
constitutive aim of  cognition in three ways: 1) to judge that p is to present p as true; 2) only 
alethic grounds can be used as grounds for judging; 3) to ask a question is to posit a true 
answer as its form of  satisfaction. On this ground, at the transcendental step I will argue  
that the truth-norm – a judgment that p is (alethically) correct only if  it is true – is a valid 
constitutive norm of  judgment. At the explanatory step I will argue against views which 
explain why truth is  the constitutive aim and norm of  cognition by claiming that  this  
feature of  cognition depends on the fact that our conceptual scheme takes truth to be such 
a constitutive aim and norm of  cognition.
Constitutivism about epistemic normativity. At the constitutivity step, I will argue that when we 
judge we commit ourselves to the possession of  certainty, and that when we raise questions 
and  doubts  we  posit  certainty  as  their  form  of  satisfaction.  On  this  ground,  at  the 
transcendental  step  I  will  argue  that  the  certainty-norm  –  a  judgment  that  p  is 
(epistemically) correct only if  it is certain – is a valid constitutive norm of  judgment. At the 
explanatory step I will again argue against views which relativise the source of  epistemic  
normativity to our conceptual scheme. 
These applications of  the strategy focuses on norms, and attempt to ground their validity on 
what is constitutive of  the sole dialectically inescapable activity, namely cognition. At the  
transcendental  step,  these  two constitutivist  views  put  forward  ambitious  transcendental 
arguments, as contrasted with modest transcendental ones2. From the fact that some feature 
is constitutive of  cognition they do not modestly conclude that some norm is (inescapably)  
constitutive of  cognition, but they rather ambitiously conclude that the norm is in fact 
valid. 
There  is  a  third  transcendental  constitutivist  view  which  I  defend  in  this 
Dissertation.  This  view  doesn't  concern  constitutive  norms,  but  rather  alethic 
commitments, that is, commitments to take further propositions as true or to refrain from 
taking  further  propositions  as  true.  Whereas  the  previous  constitutivist  views  about 
normativity attempt to build an ambitious transcendental argument, this view goes modest 
2 See Stroud (1999), Stern (2000). 
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at the transcendental step.
Transcendental  Hinge Epistemology.  At the constitutivity step I will  argue that  some alethic 
commitments (the hinges) are constitutive of  cognition: e.g., to judge that  p  commits to 
there being grounds for judging  p  to be true, and to judge that  p  commits to  p's being 
certain. On this ground, at the transcendental step I will argue that even though we can't  
ambitiously  conclude that these commitments are true,  we can modestly  conclude that 
these  alethic  commitments  are  immune  from  doubt.  At  the  explanatory  step  I  will 
tentatively  suggest  that  we  can't  understand  the  existence  of  these  constitutive 
commitments as dependent on contingent factors like evolution and history. 
These  are  the  three  main  instances  of  transcendental  constitutivist  views which  I  will  
defend in this Dissertation. 
As the title of  the Dissertation suggests, the work conducted here heavily relies on 
phenomenological descriptions of  the structure of  cognition.
Phenomenological  evidence  is  of  central  importance  in  order  to  vindicate  the 
claims I will make at the constitutivity step of  the transcendental constitutivist strategies. 
Phenomenological evidence will settle that truth and certainty are the constitutive aims of  
cognition, and that the fundamental cognitive act of  judgment triggers some constitutive 
alethic commitments. 
Since the claims defended at the constitutivist step are modal claims about what is  
constitutive of  cognition, phenomenological evidence should provide evidence for making 
claims about the necessary features of  the experience of  cognition. In order to gather this  
evidence I will rely on the so-called method of  eidetic variation, a method described and 
largely used by Edmund Husserl.  It  will  be the task of  next  chapters to vindicate the 
employment of  that method and to show how it can be used in order to discover the 
structural features of  cognition.
The claims defended in  the  three  transcendental  constitutivist  views introduced 
above have highly significant consequences for epistemology. The most important one is 
the fact that the problem of  certainty should be put at the centre of  our epistemological  
agenda.  I  will  defend  the  view that  fallibilist  and  externalist  views  of  justification  are  
ultimately untenable, because they can't be stably held given the constitutive commitments 
of  our cognition. Also, I will argue that contemporary hinge epistemologies that appeal to  
Wittgenstein's work in On Certainty do not have the hoped anti-sceptical weapons to silence 
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the corresponding sceptical attacks.
In Chapter I, Absolute Certainty, I offer an analysis of  absolute certainty and present 
what I take to be the most formidable challenge to the possibility of  possessing absolute 
certainty. The challenge is arguably responsible for the absence of  any serious attempt in 
contemporary  epistemology  to  construct  one's  epistemology around the  Cartesian  and 
Husserlian  aim of  discovering  absolute  certainties.  Yet,  if  I  am right  in  claiming  that 
certainty is the constitutive aim of  cognition, then certainty can't be left out of  the agenda 
of  epistemology, but should rather be put at its centre. 
Chapter II,  Eidetic  Phenomenology  focuses on three aims. First (§2.1),  it  introduces 
some  terminological  distinctions  that  are  important  in  order  to  individuate  the 
phenomenon – cognition – which I am going to focus on throughout the Dissertation. 
Second (§2.2, §2.3), it introduces the method of  eidetic variation and some of  the most 
significant  objections  that  can  levelled  against  this  method.  Finally  (§2.4),  it  offers  an 
argument in favour of  the thesis that we need to engage in phenomenology if  we want to  
answer the first-personal epistemological question: what should I believe?
In Chapter III,  Judgment,  I  begin a systematic study of  the normative profile  of 
cognitive acts. This chapter is entirely devoted to judgment, that is, the conscious act of 
taking some proposition as true. I argue for the highly controversial claim that by judging 
that p we commit ourselves to the possession of  certainty-conferring grounds for p – the 
sort of  grounds for absolute certainty that I have explicated in Chapter I.  The claim is  
grounded  on  phenomenology  with  the  help  of  the  method  of  eidetic  variation.  The 
phenomenological ground consists in the fact that it is impossible, and not only irrational,  
for us to judge at the same time that p and that p (epistemically) might be false. 
In  Chapter  IV,  Suspension  of  Judgment,  I  explore  the  notion  of  suspension  of 
judgment and argue that there is no sui generis mental act that deserves to be so called. To  
suspend judgment about p is reducible to a judgment about the grounds for judging that p. 
This claim is important in order to argue, in Chapter VII, that we can't  be Pyrrhonian  
sceptics. 
Chapter  V,  Doubt,  is  a  very  important  chapter  for  the  economy of  the  overall 
argument I pursue in the Dissertation. There I explore the normative profile of  doubt – 
that is a question as to whether  p  is true – and explain the connection between doubt, 
judgment and certainty. A doubt with respect to p is possible so long as p is uncertain, and 
in this sense doubting that p commits us to take it that p is uncertain, that is, that it might 
be the case that p is false. Since we want to remove doubts in order to give peace to our 
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mind, and since we remove a doubt by taking a stance about the truth value of  the doubted 
proposition, this chapter provides the ground (constitutivity step) on the basis of  which I  
will then argue (transcendental step) in Chapter XI that certainty is the norm of  judgment.  
In this chapter I also partially discuss a condition that must be fulfilled in order to solve the  
problem of  certainty introduced in Chapter I. I also explain how the problem of  certainty  
emerges because of  the nature of  doubt. This is an important result because it shows that 
the problem of  certainty and the desire to have it are rooted in the very structure of  our 
inquiring mind. 
Chapter VI is on Phenomenology and Constitutive Normativity. This chapter contains a 
very  important  discussion  (§6.1,  §6.3,  but  especially  6.4)  that  is  meant  to  provide  a  
motivation  for  the  overall  project  pursued  in  this  Dissertation.  One  of  the  central 
contention of  the present work is the following thesis: 
Claims about constitutive norms of  cognition need phenomenology: if  one wants to claim that 
some norm is constitutive of  cognition, then one needs to rely on phenomenology 
in order to show how the normativity is exhibited in the very phenomenology of  
cognition. 
The archenemy of  the overall spirit that animates the present project is what we might call  
conceptualism about constitutive norms, or conceptualism for short:.
Conceptualism: the view according to which our conceptual scheme is the source of  
some putatively constitutive norms of  cognition. 
Conceptualism comes in many varieties in philosophical discussions. One prototypical way 
of  being a  conceptualist  (within  the  analytic  literature)  is  to claim that  some norm is 
constitutive  of  some  phenomenon  (like  judgment),  because  our  concept of  that 
phenomenon is  such that  the  relevant  norm is  constitutive of  it.  To illustrate with  an 
example which will occupy us a lot throughout the whole Dissertation, some think that the  
truth-norm is constitutive of  judgment  because  our concept of  judgment is such that the 
truth-norm is constitutive for judgment. A conceptualist view might come in many forms,  
and in general it is a view which relativises the source of  some putatively constitutive norm 
on  factors  that  in  some  way  or  another  depend  on  our  human  condition  –  it  might 
relativises the source of  constitutive normativity to factors which are shaped by evolution,  
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history, socialization, culture, education, and so on. This is a methodological chapter in  
which I argue that the claim that some norm is constitutive for cognition is defensible only 
if  it relies on phenomenology by showing that the relevant constitutive norm of  cognition 
can be evinced from the phenomenology of  cognition itself. In order to illustrate my point  
I rely on constitutivism about logical normativity, that is, the idea that some logical laws are 
constitutively normative for cognition either by being laws which we can't fail to respect  
(strong constitutivism) or by being laws such that to be evaluated according to them is  
constitutive of  cognition (weak constitutivism)3. I argue that the latter view doesn't have 
the resources to silence a sceptic about the relevant logical laws, whereas I try to defend  
strong constitutivism about the law of  non-contradiction in order to bring it out how hard 
it is to be strong constitutivist about logical laws. I further argue against conceptualism that 
both  strong  and  weak  constitutivism  are  plausible  only  if  they  are  grounded  on 
phenomenological features of  our cognitive agency. This chapter is strategical in order to 
motivate the need of  phenomenology if  one wants to be a constitutivist about normativity.  
Chapter VII is entitled Global Scepticism and Pyrrhonian Scepticism as Untenable. I argue 
that  given  the  normative  profile  of  cognition  explored  in  the  previous  chapters,  it  is 
impossible  for  us  to  hold  in  a  stable  and coherent  manner  the  view that  there  is  no 
justification for our beliefs,  and the view that purports to remain silent (or to suspend 
judgment) about all propositions. The former is untenable because by endorsing it one is  
committing oneself  to the existence of  good grounds for judging, whereas the latter is 
untenable because there is no such a stance as the one that the Pyrrhonian sceptic is trying  
to occupy.
Chapter  VIII,  Fallibilism  and  Externalism  as  Untenable,  argues  that  fallibilism  and 
externalism  are  untenable.  We  can't  hold  that  at  best  our  judgments  are  only  fallibly 
justified, for by so judging we are both committing ourselves take it that fallibilism is both 
certain and uncertain. Moreover, by the fallibilist own lights, the fallibilist doctrine can be 
doubted, and when one does so one is ipso facto abandoning fallibilism (for doubting 
whether  p  is  true and judging that  p  is  true can't  occur at the same time, as argued in 
Chapter V). The same problem arises for externalism. Since the externalist view is adopted  
on the basis of  beliefs whose justification is secured by the presence of  some relevant 
external condition which is beyond the (internalistically understood) access of  the subject,  
from the subject's own perspective externalism might be unjustified – this happens if  the 
relevant external conditions do not really obtain. By so judging,  one is in a position to  
doubt  the  very  externalist  doctrine,  and  by  so  doubting  one  looses  the  judgment  in 
3 See Leech (2015).
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externalism. The conclusion of  the chapter is that the sole tenable standpoint is the one  
that  countenances the existence of  absolute certainties  – we can't  consistently  hold an 
epistemology that denies the possibility of  absolute certainty. Moreover, and surprisingly, it  
is argued that the sole tenable standpoint also has to make room for the possibility that  
one's own belief  in the fundamental epistemological theory is absolutely certain. In order 
to  satisfy  this  condition,  I  would  have  to  show  that  through  the  phenomenological 
investigation  of  the  normative  profile  of  cognition we  discover  normative  truths  with 
certainty.  In  other  words,  I  would  have  to  show that  the  method  of  eidetic  variation  
delivers absolutely certain knowledge. This is a difficult task which I don't explore in this  
Dissertation but leave for another occasion.
In chapter IX, Truth as the Constitutive Aim of  Cognition, I explain in what sense truth 
is the horizon of  intelligibility of  our cognitive life. I offer a minimalist view of  truth as the  
aim of  judgment according to which truth is the aim of  judgment in the basic sense that to  
judge that p is to regard p as true. I contrast this minimalist view with other existing views. 
Then I extend minimalism to questioning and claim that a question aims at truth because it  
posits a true answer as its form of  satisfaction. Finally, I explain and defend exclusivity, the 
fact that only alethic considerations can be used as grounds for judging. 
Chapter IX provides the starting point for a constitutivist argument to the effect  
that  alethic  normativity  is  grounded  on  the  very  structure  of  cognition  by  being 
constitutive  of  it.  In  Chapter  X,  Constitutivism  about  Alethic  Normativity, I  discuss  this 
constitutivist inference – that is, the ambitious inference from the fact judgment aims at 
truth by regarding its content as true to the fact that truth is the norm of  cognition – and 
partially defends it from objections. The aim of  the chapter is  to show that we should  
distinguish  different  normative  layers,  as  it  were,  one  of  them  being  what  I  call  the 
transcendental  layer of  normativity.  This  is  not a sort  of  normativity that  can ask our 
practical (what should I do?), evaluative (what is good/valuable?), and existential (is there 
anything really meaningful?) questions, but rather it is the normativity that structures the 
very activity that we should use in order to answer these questions. 
In  Chapter  XI  I  extend  the  constitutivist  strategy  to  the  realm  of  epistemic 
normativity. In Chapters III-V I have offered a description of  the committal nature of  
judgment and questioning. This is a description of  the premise of  a constitutivist strategy  
whose aim is to show that certainty is the norm of  cognition because it is constitutive of 
cognition  to  be  committed  to  the  possession  of  certainty-conferring  grounds  for  the 
propositions that one takes as true. I offer several arguments for drawing this conclusion,  
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but the central one relies on the nature of  doubt: since a doubt about p is possible if  p is 
uncertain, and since when doubting whether p is true one can't at the same time judge that 
p is true, a judgment that p is true is epistemically fine only when it is certain, for if  it is not 
certain then it is hostage to doubt. This is, in a nutshell, what I regard as the best argument 
for the claim that certainty is the norm of  cognition. Finally, I discuss the question whether 
it is possible to argue, as many contemporary epistemologists do, that certainty is not a 
valuable aim to be pursued in our inquiry. I explain that any attempt to so argue is bound 
to be dialectically ineffective, and conclude that certainty can't be shown to be valueless. 
In  Chapter  XII  I  conclude  the  Dissertation  by  discussing  the  notion  of 
transcendental hinges. Empirical hinges of  the sort that Wittgenstein was concerned about  
are propositions to which we are committed when we engage in particular  dialectically 
escapable practices. Thus, it might be true that in our ordinary practices we are unavoidably 
committed to take the external world as existing. Yet, these practices are not dialectically  
inescapable because it is possible to doubt these empirical hinges. These empirical hinges 
should therefore be contrasted with transcendental hinges, that is, propositions to which 
we are committed whenever we engage in cognition. I argue against contemporary so-called 
hinge epistemologies that only transcendental hinges can be used in modest transcendental  
arguments, for the appeal to empirical hinges is not enough to silence the sceptic (empirical  
hinges can be coherently doubted), whereas the appeal to transcendental hinges is effective  
in silencing the sceptic (they can't  be coherently doubted, for by doubting them one is  
displaying a commitment to their truth). Finally, I conclude this last chapter by summing up 
the mains claims made in the previous chapters, and by briefly explaining a topic which is  
largely neglected in this Dissertation, namely the explanatory step of  the transcendental  
constitutivist strategy.
The initial plan of  the Dissertation was to argue for the following four main claims: 
1) Truth and certainty are the constitutive aims of  cognition;
2) We do possess some absolute certainties (hence the problem of  certainty discussed 
in Chapter I can be solved); 
3) We do possess absolute certainty that certainty is the norm of  cognition (that is, the 
phenomenological investigation about the structure of  cognition delivers absolutely certain 
modal phenomenological knowledge – that is, knowledge about what is constitutive of  our 
cognitive acts); 
4) Given the previous claims, if  a naturalistic understanding of  cognition  entails  that 
there are no certainties,  then it  follows that a naturalistic understanding of  cognition is  
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untenable (given (1) and (3)) and false (given (2)), and that only some form of  transcendental 
idealism can make sense of  the aim of  cognition and its capacity to satisfy it. 
Unfortunately, I didn't succeed in pursuing this complex strategy. I only tried to defend (1).  
The argument  for  (4)  is  briefly  discussed in  the  concluding section  of  the  last 
chapter in order to explain to the reader the importance of  the explanatory step.  The 
argument is the following. A naturalist understanding of  the mind takes the structure of 
cognition to be dependent on contingent factors (evolution, nature, society, history, …).  
Given the contingency of  these factors, we must judge that our cognition might have been  
structured otherwise. It seems that we can't exclude the possibility that if  it were structured  
otherwise it would have delivered different results, that is, different propositions taken as 
true, and/or an altogether form of  cognition. But if  we think so, then we can't consistently  
regard our actual judgments as absolutely certain. Yet, not only we are committed to there 
being certainties (1), but some truths actually are known with absolute certainty (2) (the  
sum and the cogito, for instance). Thus, to the extent that a naturalistic understanding of 
the mind has the consequence that our actual cognition isn't capable of  absolutely certain 
knowledge, a naturalistic understanding is untenable (given (1) and (3)) and false (given (2)).  
It is untenable because we can't  but be committed to the existence of  certainties (1) – 
when judging that there might be no certainties, we are committing ourselves to it being 
certain that there might be no certainties – and it is false because it entails that there are no  
certainties,  but  there  are  certainties  (2).  This  is  a  very  powerful  challenge  to  our 
contemporary  philosophical  and  intellectual  climate,  and  represents  an  interesting 
argument in favour of  (some forms of) transcendental idealism. Unfortunately,  I  didn't 
succeed in providing a detailed defence of  this argument. But it is useful to have it in mind 
when approaching the Dissertation, for this is the central philosophical agenda that I had 
in mind when working on these issues. 
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Chapter I
Absolute Certainty
In this chapter I will characterize the notion of  absolute certainty and explain why it seems 
impossible for our judgments to possess this kind of  justification. I will call  the problem of  
certainty what I take to be the strongest argument for the conclusion that absolute certainty 
is impossible. 
§1.1 Absolute certainty
We might start to introduce what we are looking for by noticing two ways in which we 
speak about certainty. 
Psychological certainty. Ascription of  certainty as a mental state. I can say 'I am certain that 
p' in order to ascribe to myself  a psychological state, namely the state of  being certain. The 
sort of  conviction that I am self-ascribing when I speak about me being certain  about  p is 
such that I think that I can't be mistaken about whether p is true4.
Epistemic  certainty  or  absolute  certainty.  Ascription of  certainty as an epistemic  property of  
propositions or mental states.  I can say that 'the truth of  a proposition is certain' or that 'this 
proposition is certain' or that 'it is certain that p' or that 'that  p is a certainty' or that 'the 
judgment/belief  that p is certain' meaning that, roughly, given the evidence that I possess, 
the possibility5 that I am wrong about the truth of  that proposition is excluded67. 
In this chapter I am concerned with epistemic certainty or absolute certainty, but 
not with psychological  certainty.  Psychological  certainty is a mental  state.  It  is  an open 
4 In  the  phrase  'p is  true'  'p'  should  be  understood as  referring  to the  proposition  that  p.  So,  strictly 
speaking, instead of  saying 'p  is true' I would have to say 'the proposition that  p  is true'. However, for 
stylistic purposes, I will not use this precise formulation.
5 The possibility is epistemic. Necessary truths satisfy the condition that it is impossible for them to be  
false. Yet, I might or might not know them with certainty,  that is,  I  might or might not possess the 
evidence which puts me in a position to exclude the possibility that they are false. 
6 Compare with Stanley (2008) (by 'subjective certainty' he refers to what I call 'psychological certainty').  
“Though  the  term  “certain”  is  ambiguous  between  subjective  and  epistemic  certainty,  there  are  
constructions in which it only can be read as the former than the latter, and vice-versa. When one speaks 
of  a person being certain of  a proposition, it is subjective certainty that is at issue. In contrast, when one speaks 
of  a proposition being certain, it is epistemic certainty that is at issue. So, in a sentence such as “John is certain 
that Bush is president”, it is subjective certainty that is at issue, whereas when one says “It is certain that  
Bush is president”, what is at issue is the epistemic certainty of  the proposition that Bush is president, 
relative to one’s own body of  evidence”. pp. 36-7.
7 These of  course are not the only ways in which we speak about certainty. Moreover, these two ways of  
speaking need not have the rigid meanings I have attached to them. The same expression could be used to 
express different things. What matters here are the distinctions between the two phenomena they refer to, 
not the way in which we refer to them.
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question whether it  is  a  sui generis  mental state that should be distinguished from other 
mental states like beliefs and judgments.  In the Chapter  On judgment  I will  consider the 
question  whether  psychological  certainty  is  a  sui  generis  mental  state  and I  will  answer 
negatively:  it  is  reducible to belief  and judgment. In this chapter I will  proceed on the  
assumption that this reductivist claim is true8. If  psychological certainty were a sui generis 
mental state it could be, along with belief  and judgment, a bearer of  absolute certainty.  
Since I proceed under the assumption that it is reducible to belief  and judgment, I will  
consider  the  latter  as  the  bearers  of  absolute  certainty.  To  a  first  approximation,  by 
judgment I refer to a conscious act, wheres by belief  I refer to a dispositional unconscious state. 
Since this Dissertation focuses on the phenomenology of  cognition, I am concerned with 
conscious phenomena only, and so I will concentrate on judgment only as the bearer of  
certainty9. 
It is useful to think of  absolute certainty as the sort of  justification for judgments 
that Descartes was after in his Meditations. Descartes begins his Meditations by noticing that 
he holds many opinions, then he points out that for all he knows (or thinks he knows) his  
opinions might be wrong. Since he wants to have opinions that can't fail to be wrong, he 
then looks for a suitable kind of  justification that will give him what he wants. To possess  
this sort of  justification is to possess absolute certainty. 
The task of  this chapter is to individuate principles that capture the conditions that  
must be satisfied in order to possess absolute certainty10. The task is to see what are the 
conditions that Cartesian certainties, if  any, would have to satisfy11. Along the way I will 
explain the way in which contemporary epistemology relates to these principles. Moreover,  
I will argue that if  these principles are true, then certainty is impossible to obtain.
I do believe that there are absolute certainties. So, I do believe that the account of  
absolute certainty that I will give in what follows is wrong. Yet, the purpose of  this chapter 
8 Nothing substantial  will  hinge on that.  If  one  thinks that  psychological  certainty  is  not  reducible  to 
judgments and beliefs,  then one can take psychological  certainty as being a  further  possible bearer of 
absolute certainty. 
9 Nothing substantial will hinge on that. The analysis of  absolute certainty that I offer here can take beliefs  
as bearers as well. 
10 From now on, unless when specified, whenever I speak about certainty I am speaking about absolute 
certainty.
11 Descartes didn't explicitly offer an analysis of  the sort of  absolute certainty he was looking for. I don't  
mean to be capturing here exactly the sort of  epistemic status that Descartes was after in his Meditations, 
though we might refer to absolute certainties as Cartesian certainties, since Descartes is (I think correctly) 
regarded as being engaged with a paradigmatic search for the most perfect knowledge status, absolute 
certainty. The present analysis can be used in order to read Descartes and check the relevant differences, if 
any.  Since  the  analysis  I  offer  here entails  that  absolute  certainty is  impossible  to  achieve,  and since 
Descartes did offer us genuine instances of  certainties, it is useful to have the present analysis in mind  
while looking at Descartes's achievements. Descartes's instances of  absolute certainties should be kept in 
mind in order to find the relevant putative condition for absolute certainty that must be denied in order to 
make for the existence of  certainties.
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is to convince ourselves that it is very difficult to understand what is wrong in the following 
account. If  we try to characterise the most demanding kind of  epistemic justification – the 
sort of  epistemic justification that puts us in a position to claim that we can't be wrong 
about the truth value of  a given proposition – then we plausibly end up with the following  
principles. Any attempt to deny them that I will consider here will prove to be wanting in 
one way or another. Most such attempts clearly change the subject matter of  the analysis,  
rather then being competing analysis of  absolute certainty itself. Since we  do understand 
what it means to have absolute certainty12, I will suggest that we also do understand when a 
given account is changing subject-matter rather than offering a competing articulation of 
absolute certainty. 
§1.2 The Ground Principle
This is the first principle about certainty.
Ground Principle: I am absolutely certain that p only if  I have a ground for judging that p.13 
We can sum it all up in a catch phrase: there cannot be ungrounded certainties. Grounds  
for judging that p is true are grounds that speak in favour of  the truth of  p14. If  I judge that 
nothing whatsoever speaks in favour of  the truth of  p, then I can't rationally take p to be 
true, and a fortiori I can't take it to be certain. Similarly, if  I am open minded as to whether 
there is any ground in favour of  the truth of  p, I can't rationally take it to be true, nor a 
12 The  best  evidence  that  we  possess  absolute  certainties  is  provided  by  citing  instances  of  absolute 
certainties, like I exist, There is something rather nothing, I am having an experience. In fact, given the problem of 
certainty described below, the  sole  possible evidence of  the existence of  absolute certainty can't  come 
from inferential sources, but rather consist in the particular absolute certainties that we happen to possess. 
13 Less loosely, every principle should be intended as having the following form: Necessarily, a subject is  
absolutely certain that p only if  …  Hereafter I will take for granted that they are taken as necessarily true.  
Also, I will take for granted that they apply to any human subject, though I will give them a first-personal 
formulation because it helps us to consider the issue first-personally, rather than third-personally.
14 A terminological note (which will  receive substantial  philosophical  vindication in Chapter  IX,  §9.10). 
There are three notions that I keep firmly distinguished in the Dissertation: evidence, reason, and ground. 
Reasons are only reasons for action, and judging is an act, not an action. Thus, given my own terminology, 
there are no reasons for judging. Grounds are only grounds for judging, namely, as said in the main text,  
considerations that speak in favour of  the truth of  a proposition.. By evidence I loosely refer to all sorts 
of  considerations that can be taken as grounds for judging. Thus, I might judge that something is evidence 
for judging that p, but in my own terminology this is not an actual ground for judging that p, but only a 
potential one: it becomes a  ground  once it is  taken as the basis for judging that  p.  This act of  taking  
something as a ground for judging is therefore not reducible to mere judgment about what counts as evidence 
for a given proposition. 
Sometimes in the main text I will speak loosely of  grounds while intending to refer to potential grounds, that 
is, considerations that will be stricly speaking transformed in grounds once they are taken as such by the  
subject. Since when I do so proceed nothing hinges on this point,  I leave to the context the task as  
making it clear when I am speaking about potential grounds (evidence) and actual grounds. 
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fortiori can I take it to be certain.  If  I am certain I take it that I can't be wrong about the  
truth of  p. But I can't rationally take it that I can't be wrong about the truth of  p if  I have 
no grounds whatsoever for taking p to be true. 
The same point can be noticed if  we think about doxastic deliberation. Suppose I 
wonder whether I should judge that p or not. Can I resolve my doubt by coming to judge 
that p without taking myself  to have any ground for judging that p rather than not judging 
it, and at the same time regard p as certain? No, for the resolution of  the doubt will not 
appear as a resolution at all if  I am incapable of  articulating the grounds for my choice.  
Even if  I can make sense of  the process of  coming to judge that  p  without needing to 
believe to have reasons for that choice (maybe some fancy subliminal process could do the 
trick), I can't make sense of  that judgment as being absolutely certain. If  I have no ground 
for choosing p over not choosing it, why would I ever judge that p? 
Of  course  the  relevant  notion  of  ground  here  has  to  be  understood  along 
internalist  lines. One has a ground only if  the following conditions are met.  First,  one 
should be aware of  the ground. If  in the morning I read in a reliable newspaper that today 
the train stations in my town will be closed, but then I forget that I have read this piece of  
news and yet keep the judgment that the train stations will be closed, then there is a sense 
in which my judgment is well grounded and a sense in which it is not. According to an  
externalist notion of  ground what I read in the newspaper can be regarded as some sort of  
ground for  my belief  even if  I  am no longer  capable  of  appealing  to  it  in  order  to 
consciously endorse what I have read. But there is a clear sense – the only one relevant for  
certainty – in which I no longer have a ground for my judgment. Surely, the failure to  
remember the ground for judging that the train stations will be closed is a failure to possess 
a ground for being absolutely certain that the train stations will be closed. I might believe it,  
but as soon as I wonder 'are they really closed?',  unless I am capable of  articulating a 
ground for judging that they are, I am not in a position to be absolutely certain that they  
are, even if  my disposition to judge that they are is sustained in the proper causal way from 
my previous acquaintance with the news in the newspaper. The point is that if  I am to be 
absolutely certain that  p  then from my own perspective I must be in a position to tell  
whether  p  is  the  case.  To  be  in  such  a  position  is  at  least  to  be  aware  of  some 
considerations that speak in favour of  the truth that p. Otherwise, from my perspective, it 
is  completely  arbitrary  to  judge  that  p,  rather  than  to  judge  any  other  proposition 
incompatible with p.
Awareness of  ground is not enough though. One should be aware of  the ground as 
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such. That is, one should be aware of  the ground as a ground for judging that p. Suppose I 
am aware of  all the relevant considerations that would make it absolutely certain that p is 
true but I fail to take them as grounds for judging that p is true. Then I can't be absolutely 
certain  that  p,  because  if  I  were  to wonder  why  p is  true  I  would  not  be  capable  of 
appealing  to  the  relevant  grounds,  since  I  don't  cognize  them  as  grounds.  Thus,  to 
illustrate,  many  people  who have  never  run  into  Descartes's  Cogito  might  never  have 
considered the question whether they know that they exist, and the question whether they 
know that they think when they do. However, even before reading the Meditations, they have 
been  aware  of  the  relevant  grounds  (their  own  experience)  that  are  sufficient  to  be 
absolutely certain of  the Cogito and the Sum. But it is only when one is aware of  the 
grounds as such that one is in a position to be absolutely certain of  the Cogito and the Sum. 
There is a way in which we can intelligibly speak such that it makes sense to say that people  
who never considered the Sum and the Cogito are already certain of  them. But what we  
mean, really, is that they are in a position to become absolutely certain of  them, for they are 
already aware of  the relevant grounds, they just must recognize that they are grounds for 
these propositions. 
To sum up, for one to possess a ground for judging that p in the relevant internalist 
sense is at least for one to be aware of  the ground and to take it as a ground for judging  
that p15. This notion has to be contrasted with more externalist notions of  ground which 
typically  don't  require  awareness  of  the  ground  in  order  to  have  a  ground  for  one's  
judgment. 
There are various positions in the literature that might be understood as rejecting 
the  Ground  Principle.  In  On  Certainty Wittgenstein  argues  that  what  he  calls  hinge 
propositions are at the same time (kind of) certainties and yet don't need to be grounded – 
but rather are some sort of  presuppositions that make it possible to ask and give evidence 
15 There would be much more to be said about the proper characterization of  internalist grounds. E.g., what 
does taking a ground as such amounts to? For the purposes of  this Chapter, however, we need not to go 
into these details. I will give a richer account of  the act of  taking something as a ground in Chapter IX . 
For an articulation of  this internalist understanding of  ground, see Leite (2008). For a general overview of 
different understandings of  what it means to ground (or to base) a belief  on a ground, see Korcz (2015)  
and the sources mentioned therein. 
Let me add that one need not choose one account of  ground as the only correct account of  ground, for 
we might allow the existence of  different important notions of  ground. I don't want to be committed to 
the claim that the internalist notion is the only correct one. My commitment is weaker, namely that it is 
one notion  that  captures  some  important  phenomenon  that  might  be  reasonably  and  recognizably 
conceptualised as involving the basing of  one's judgments and beliefs on grounds. This is in principle  
compatible with a form of  pluralism about grounds. If  one doesn't like this form of  pluralism because, 
for instance, one is a monist about justification and knowledge and thinks that there is only one correct  
notion of  ground (which is not internalist) that is the one required for her own preferred account of 
justification and knowledge, then, for this person, all I am claiming is that the right notion of  ground for  
the epistemic status of  absolute certainty is the one which is captured along internalist lines. 
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for judging by remaining in the background of  that activity. This might be read in at least 
two ways. One way is to say that a person can judge these hinge propositions as being true 
even if  she doesn't have any ground to judge them. Another option is to say that even if 
one  might  have  some sort  of  ground  for  judging  them,  the  ground  doesn't  play  any 
justificatory role, but a mere psychological one, since hinge propositions elude the realm of 
propositions that can be justified (or they might simply not be in need of  justification). 
The first reading is implausible. Of  course we might have the  disposition to accept 
hinge  propositions  as  true  even  if  we  don't  consciously  take  ourselves  to  have  some 
ground to take them as true. But as soon as the issue of  whether a hinge proposition is 
true or not is consciously raised, then in order to give a conscious assent to their truth one  
needs grounds that speak in favour of  their truth. Thus, if  I consciously raise the question  
whether it is true 'there is an external world', I might of  course be immediately disposed to  
answer affirmatively, without considering explicitly the question whether I have any ground 
for so judging. But if  I raise the more specific question: 'am I absolutely certain that there is 
an external world?' then it won't be intelligible for me to answer affirmatively if  I don't at  
least  take  myself  to have some ground for  so judging.  The ground might also be the 
appearance that there is an external world, even if  the appearance is not a sufficient ground 
for having absolute certainty.  The point here is  about the psychological  conditions for 
claiming to possess an absolute certainty, not about the normative ones: in order to be in a  
position to claim to possess absolute certainty I must have grounds, but of  course my 
grounds might be not enough to have what I claim to possess. 
This point is however independent from the second reading of  the Wittgensteinian 
claim, namely the reading according to which regardless of  what we psychologically need in  
order to consciously endorse a proposition as certain, there is a point to be made about the 
epistemic status of  hinge propositions. Even though their conscious endorsement might 
require grounds, one might try to claim that they elude what we might call the logical space  
of  reasons16,  namely  the  space  to  which  there  belong  those  propositions  that  can  be 
evaluated  as  justified/unjustified,  known/unknown.  These  are  the  specific  sort  of 
certainties that Wittgenstein calls hinge propositions. There is much more to be said about 
these  sorts  of  certainties17.  The  point  we  need  to  bring  home  here  is  simply  that 
Wittgensteinian certainties are not the same thing as Cartesian absolute certainties. They 
simply are two different sort of  things. Among the many respects in which they differ, 
16 Sellars (1956).
17 There is a growing interpretative literature on Wittgenstein's  On certainty. See for instance Coliva (2010), 
Hamilton (2008), Stroll (1994), Moyal-Sharrock (2004).
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Cartesian  certainty  is  characterised  by  the  Ground  Principle  whereas  Wittgensteinian 
certainty  is  not.  The  interesting  point  is  whether  there  could  be  any  Wittgensteinian 
strategy  that  shows that  it  is  wrong to suppose that  to look for  Cartesian  certainty  is  
valuable or intelligible at all. In Chapter XI I argue that there can't be any such successful  
strategy. 
The same general observations apply to contemporary Wittgensteinian accounts of 
justification. Crispin Wright18 argues that there are some propositions that are not in need 
of  evidential justification (i.e., roughly, justification based on the possession of  internalist 
grounds), but can possess a special kind of  epistemic warrant he calls entitlement. These are 
what  he  calls  'cornerstone  propositions'  (Wright's  version  of  Wittgenstein's  hinge 
propositions), propositions like 'there is an external world'. The view is motivated by the  
aim of  responding to the sceptical challenge while maintaining a form of  internalism about  
justification.  Again,  this  and  similarly  structured  views19 need  not  (though  they  might 
independently  want  to)  deny  the  descriptive  point  that  in  order  to  be  psychologically 
certain one needs to have a ground for one's conviction. They will add, however, that this 
ground is not what confers the positive epistemic status (in Wright's case, the entitlement)  
to the cornerstone propositions. 
Now,  in  order  to  characterise  the  sort  of  absolute  certainty  that  is  central  for 
Cartesian epistemology one needs not deny Wright's contention that there is some sort of 
positive epistemic status like entitlement. The only thing that needs to be noticed is that  
entitlement  differs  from  Cartesian  certainty.  We  might  possess  entitlement  for  such 
propositions  like  'there  is  an  external  world',  but  this  doesn't  answer  in  any  way  the 
question whether we have absolute certainty for believing that there is an external world. 
One can however argue that it is unintelligible to look for Cartesian certainty about hinge 
(or cornerstone) propositions. Alternatively, one can argue that even if  it is possible to look 
for Cartesian certainty about these propositions, it is not desirable, or anyway not required:  
that is, we can calm our sceptical anxieties even if  we accept that we can't have absolute  
certainty  for most of  our beliefs.  Both arguments will  be  responded to respectively  in  
Chapter XII, and XI. For now, our sole aim is to elucidate what it takes to possess absolute 
certainty.
Another potential objection to the Ground Principle – which might also be used in 
order to support a Wittgensteinian take on certainty – comes from the realization that there 
seems to be cases of  ungrounded certainties.  There are cases in which  we are strongly 
18 Wright (2004). 
19 Coliva (2015).
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inclined to claim to possess absolute certainty even if, upon reflection, we are apparently  
incapable of  pointing to any ground for having them. Logical, mathematical, and analytic 
truths seem to be cases in point. Are we certain that 2+2=4? I think so. In fact, we are so  
certain of  this truth that it provides a paradigm for understanding the phenomenon of 
certainty. But how do we know that 2+2=4? Is there a ground for believing so? If  so, what  
sort of  ground is it? Or consider cases of  very simple logical inferences like the inference  
from p and q to p. Or the case of  candidate analytic truths like the following: p iff  p is true. 
Or: a bachelor is an unmarried man. What are the grounds for taking these truths to be certain? 
Am I really capable of  pointing to some ground for believing a particular instance of  the 
T-schema, e.g., that if  there is a tree there then it is true that there is a tree there? 
These are very complicated cases. But so long as we keep in mind the fact that for  
something to qualify as a ground is for it to be something that the subject regards as a 
ground,  then  we  can  see  how these  cases  fail  to  be  obvious  counterexamples  to  the 
Ground Principle. In all these cases, even if  we are not capable of  providing an articulated 
and  convincing  story  about  the  grounds  we  have  for  believing  them,  we  surely  have 
something that we might describe, for lack of  a more theoretically respectful name, as a 
seeming  of  correctness  or  as  an  intuition  that  grounds  the  correspondent  judgments.  
There is some form of  experienced understanding that sustains the acceptance of  these  
truths.  All  these  mental  phenomena  could  count  as  grounds  as  much  as  perceptual  
experiences and previous beliefs can. A self-evident truth – like analytic truths and simple  
arithmetical truths – is not ungrounded: the fact that it strikes us as true can count as a  
ground for believing it2021. 
In  order  to  see  the  presence  of  these  seemings  of  correctness  or  intuitions, 
suppose that we didn't find it  obvious, or right, or intuitively correct,  that 2+2=4, and 
suppose  further  that  we  weren't  capable  of  pointing  to  any  ground  whatsoever  for 
believing that  it  is  true.  Would  we then believe  that  2+2=4? This  question  is  hard to 
address, for it is hard to see what it would take to understand that 2+2=4 without finding it 
correct. But consider a quite complicated subtraction like the following: 739,54 – 542,78 = 
20 Audi (1999).
21 Someone might object as follows. What about someone who is not sophisticated enough to entertain 
notions like intuition, seeming, or striking (someone) as true? Can she take herself  to have grounds? 
Suppose the answer is 'no'. Still it seems that she can know that 2+2=4, say. A similar worry applies to  
perceptual beliefs. Most people do not think of  perceptual experiences at all, yet some of  their perceptual  
beliefs amount to knowledge. They have the experience, and they form the relevant belief, but they need 
not  be  capable to articulate the relation.The reply is  that  even if  we have  good reasons to say that  
knowledge doesn't require the possession of  internalist grounds (Burge 2003), still this 'knowledge' does 
not amount to absolute certainty. The point made here is not that absolute certainty is required to have  
knowledge or justification. The point is simply that of  describing what having absolute certainty amounts  
to. 
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196,76. After some reflection you might find it correct. But you won't take yourself  to be 
certain that this is indeed correct if  it doesn't strike you as correct, and to find it correct  
you might need to find various steps intuitively compelling (depending on what you do in  
order to check the subtraction). To see the importance of  grounds in this quite unintuitive  
subtraction allows us to see the presence of  ground even in the case of  simple sums like  
2+2=4. Again,  the point is  not a normative one about what could count as a  sufficient 
ground for being absolutely certain. I am not arguing that a simple feeling of  correctness  
or intuition could be a normatively sufficient ground for believing some proposition with  
certainty.  I  am just  saying that  in  particular  cases  they  count  as  candidate  normatively 
necessary grounds for judging the corresponding proposition.  In these particular  cases, 
were  we  not  to have any ground at  all  for  a  given  proposition,  not  even a  feeling  of 
correctness, we would not be capable of  taking the truth of  that proposition as absolutely 
certain.
§1.3 Inferentialism about certainty
Granted that absolute certainty requires grounds, what characteristics should these grounds 
have in order to do their work? We can roughly distinguish between two sorts of  grounds,  
doxastic and non-doxastic, where the former include beliefs and judgments, whereas the 
latter includes experiences22. Could certainties be grounded on doxastic grounds alone? Or 
should  they  rather  be  grounded  on  non-doxastic  grounds  alone?  Or  should  they  be 
grounded  on  both  sorts  of  grounds?  In  this  paragraph  I  will  introduce  a  couple  of 
principles about doxastic grounds for certainty. 
The first crucial question about doxastic ground is the following: could a belief 
amount to certainty while being grounded on some doxastic ground which is not itself 
justified, or whose justification doesn't contribute at all to the justification for believing the  
certain belief? The answer seems negative. From the first-personal perspective, if  I don't  
take myself  to be justified in holding a belief  which I am then using in order to support  
belief  in something else – maybe a belief  in a proposition which entails or makes probable 
the grounded proposition – then why would I ever rely on that belief  for believing anything 
at all?  The choice of  that  belief  as a ground would be arbitrary (I  could have equally 
chosen another unjustified belief  as ground, but then I would have ended up with different 
beliefs). In  fact,  if  we try  to put  ourselves in  situations in  which we judge to have a  
22 The category of  non-doxastic states is quite broad. It includes experiences of  all sort, even intuitions and 
seemings of  correctness, if  we think of  them as distinct from judgments. 
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certainty grounded on unjustified doxastic grounds we realize that it is impossible for us to 
be in that situation. I can't understand myself  as judging that  p is true while at the same 
time judging that I have no ground at all for believing that p. Hence, I can't believe that I 
have a certainty which is based on a ground which is not itself  justified, for if  I think of  
my ground as not being justified, then I thereby loose it as a belief  of  mine, and if  I loose 
it as a belief  of  mine I also loose it as a doxastic ground for believing. 
The next question is the following: what sort of  justification should be possessed 
by the doxastic ground if  it is to qualify as a ground for a certainty? I propose that the 
ground should itself  be certain. 
Infallibility Principle for Doxastic Grounds : I am absolutely certain that p on the basis  of  the 
doxastic ground that q only if I am absolutely certain that q
Can I be certain that p on the doxastic ground that q if  I take it that q is not certain? If  my 
ground for believing is only fallibly justified and judged to be so, then I also judge that it  
(epistemically) might be false – the justification I have for it is compatible with its being 
false – and I will thereby have to judge my certainty to be only fallibly justified which is 
tantamount to stop considering it as a certainty. Of  course, I might ground a particular  
certainty in a less then certain belief,  but this ground is not what confers the certainty  
enjoyed by the grounded belief. For instance, I believe that I am walking, and from this I  
can infer that I exist. The inferred belief  is certain, but the ground for taking my existence 
as certain is not that I am walking, for this ground is itself  uncertain – I might simply be 
having an hallucination of  a body. That I exist is certain on some independent ground.
The  Ground  Principle  and  the  Infallibility  Principle  for  Doxastic  Grounds  are 
sufficient to see the emergence of  a first problem for an epistemology centred on certainty 
if  we further assume the following principle: 
Inferentialism about Certainty: I am absolutely certain that p only if  my judgment that p is at 
least partially grounded on doxastic grounds. 
(This principle doesn't say that there couldn't be certainties which are partly grounded on  
non-doxastic grounds; it just says that all certainties must be at least partly grounded on 
doxastic grounds)
This principle is enough to see the emergence of  a challenge which is perhaps one of  the 
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most famous challenges to our understanding of  the possibility of  knowledge to be known 
in the whole history of  epistemology, namely what has been variously called, not without  
confusion, the problem of  regress, Agrippa's trilemma, Munchausen's trilemma, or even, 
sometimes, the problem of  the criterion23. The problem is this: since any certainty should 
be doxastically grounded, and since any doxastic ground should itself  be a certainty and 
should respect the doxastic ground principles as well as the ground principles, it follows 
that certainties could be grounded only in these two ways: 
Infinitism about certainty. Infinitism holds that any certainty is grounded in an infinite chain of 
grounds.  Since any ground should itself  be a certainty,  it  should be grounded,  and its 
ground should itself  be a certainty, and the same applies to this latter certainty, and so on  
and so forth, ad infinitum. 
Circularism about certainty. Circularism holds that any certainty is grounded in a finite chain of 
grounds, and that one of  the doxastic grounds in the chain is precisely the certainty that  
the chain grounds. Any certainty is, at least partly, grounded by itself.
 
However, it is extremely hard to see how an infinite chains of  grounds could be a ground 
for a certainty. For, I can't be certain of  something if  I am not capable of  articulating my  
grounds for it (Ground Principle),  and since I am a finite believer I am not capable of  
articulating an infinite chains of  grounds, as a consequence I couldn't have any certainty on 
that  ground.  In  order  to  test  infinitism  about  certainty  it  is  interesting  to  follow  the 
methodology from intelligibility we have used thus far. Imagine you have to take yourself 
as possessing a certainty whose ground is infinitist. But is it possible to take oneself  to have  
an infinity of  grounds while at the same time one knows one's mind to be finite and hence 
23 Often  the  problem is  presented  as  a  trilemma:  either  justification comes  from nothing (ungrounded 
justification), or it comes from an infinite series of  grounds (infinitism), or from a finite circular chain of  
grounds  (circularism).  In  my  presentation  of  the  problem the  option  that  justification  comes  from 
nothing is excluded from the outset by the acceptance of  the Ground Principle about certainty.
The same problem has been presented in various ways in the history of  philosophy, and the choice of  its  
many  labels hasn't always been entirely consistent and faithful to the presentation of  the problem. For 
instance, Agrippa didn't present a trilemma, but rather  five modes, namely discrepancy, infinite regress, 
relativity, hypothesis, and circularity. However, the five modes naturally split in two classes: two challenges 
to justify one's claim, namely the recognition of  discrepancy and relativity, and three modes whose task is 
to show that the challenge to justify one's claims can't be met, namely, infinity, hypothesis, and circularity.  
See Fogelin (1994).
'Munchausen's Trilemma' is the name that Hans Albert gives to Agrippa's trilemma. See Albert  (1968). 
The same problem is also often called the problem of  the regress, though infinite regress is only one of 
the unpalatable options of  the trilemma. The problem is sometimes also presented as the problem of  the  
criterion, though the two are quite different. See Cling (2014) for a detailed discussion of  the relationship 
between the problem of  the criterion and the regress problem.
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incapable of  grasping all of  them? Maybe one can think that there is, in the abstract space of 
reasons, an infinity of  grounds for a given belief, but what is in the abstract space cannot 
be appropriated and used by the subject given the shape of  her finite mind. Hence, infinitism 
cannot be a right principle about grounds for certainty.
There are however some epistemologists who have recently defended an infinitist 
account of  justification24. This is a view about the nature of  justification. Regardless of  the 
merits and demerits of  infinitism as a view about justification, the question we should ask 
is whether infinitism captures anything that can be regarded as Cartesian absolute certainty.  
For the reasons just provided, I think it doesn't. Infinitism about justification may capture  
some  important  kind  of  justification,  but  it  is  not  plausible  as  an  account  of  the  
justification that characterises Cartesian certainty.
With respect to circularism, the problem is different. Since I want to be certain of 
the truth of  some proposition, it doesn't make any sense to presuppose its truth in order to  
become then certain that it is indeed a truth. Again, if  I try to put myself  in the circularist  
situation I will  find it unintelligible for me to claim certainty of  something which I am 
presupposing in order to claim my certainty. Both options, and the mixture of  the two, 
seem just false qua principles about certainty. 
So,  to  sum up,  if  we  assume Inferentialism about  Certainty,  plus  the  previous 
principle about the nature of  doxastic grounds, then we have a problem. This is a very  
well-known point. This is why most plausible accounts of  certainty are non-inferentialist  
about it and this is also why all  people trying to construct an epistemology centred on 
certainty are, like Descartes, foundationalists with experiences and beliefs based on them at  
the foundations. This brings us to a discussion of  non-doxastic grounds. 
§1.4 Infallibility and Reflexivity 
Non-inferentialism about certainty is often called foundationalism. Foundationalism is the 
view that there are beliefs justified on the basis of  experience alone, that is beliefs whose  
justification doesn't require that one grounds them on other justified beliefs. Those beliefs 
whose status as certainty is grounded on non-doxastic grounds alone are also called basic 
beliefs or basic certainties. The question we should then ask about non-doxastic grounds is  
the following25: what are the features that non-doxastic grounds should possess in order to 
24 See Klein (2005).
25 There are other questions, of  course, that should be of  direct concern for any defender of  Cartesian 
epistemology. Just to mention one of  them which is related to the nature of  non-doxastic grounds, one 
should respond to the contention that non-doxastic grounds (i.e., experiences) can't count as grounds for  
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ground certainties? 
Let us reflect  again on the conditions that would make intelligible from a first-
personal point of  view the act of  taking some ground as a ground for one's judgment. It is 
part of  what it means to take something as a ground for judging that p that I regard that 
something as  speaking in  favour  of  the  truth  of  p.  This  is  part  of  the  conditions  of 
intelligibility for taking something as a ground for judging. If  I try to consider myself  as 
judging that p on the basis of  some ground which I do not regard as telling in favour of 
the truth of  p, I realize that I am not imagining anything which can be understood as being 
the act of  relying on a ground for believing that  p is true. I might perhaps try to make 
sense of  a scenario in which I believe some proposition p on the basis of  grounds which I 
don't take to be alethically related to p, though they support the belief  that p for pragmatic or 
moral reasons. But this sort of  phenomenon, if  real26, is not the relevant one here. Notice 
that this point applies both to doxastic and non-doxastic grounds. 
So, taking one's ground as ground for believing that p presupposes that one takes 
the ground as telling in favour of  the truth of  p. However, since we want certainty that p we 
do not simply want our ground to tell  in favour of  p,  we want the ground to speak in 
favour of  the truth of  p in a way that makes it certain that p is true. So, we must take the 
ground to be conclusive, and not just truth-conducive with respect to p. 
Examples. Let's see the distinction as applied to doxastic grounds. Suppose I want  
to justify an inference about the colour of  swans. If  my ground is the recognition that all  
swans in the past were black, then my ground might be truth-conducive with respect to the 
proposition that the colour of  swans is black – since it increases its probability – but it is  
not a conclusive ground, for it doesn't entail the truth that all swans are black, since it is 
conceivable that in the future we will  meet white swans. On the other hand, if  we are 
certain that a, and that a entails b, then the beliefs that a and that a entails b are conclusive 
grounds for  b. The important point is that a truth-conducive ground in favour of  p  is a 
ground the presence of  which merely makes the truth of  a  proposition likely enough,  
whereas a conclusive one in favour of  p is such that its presence is incompatible with the 
falsity of  p.
believing at all. See for the original expression of  this worry, Davidson (1986). More generally one should 
provide an account that explains what are the conditions in which an experience can count as a ground 
for believing that avoids the so-called Myth of  the Given. See Sellars (1956), McDowell (1994).
26 It is almost universally accepted the view according to which doxastic deliberation – that is, deliberation 
about what to believe – could not be guided by considerations other than alethic ones (this is the feature 
of  cognition called 'exclusivity'). There are however attempts to argue that other sort of  considerations – 
like  pragmatic  ones  –  could  be  used  in  doxastic  deliberation.  See,  for  instance,  Reisner  (2009)  and 
Sharadin (2016). More on a defense of  exclusivity in Chapter IX, §9.10. 
29
Now consider cases of  non-doxastic grounds. Suppose I have an experience of 
pain. That ground doesn't merely tell in favour of  the truth that I am experiencing pain, it  
is conclusive with respect to it, in the sense that there being this experience guarantees that 
I am having this experience. It can't be the case that I have that experience of  pain and that  
I don't have that very experience of  pain27. Suppose now instead that the same experience 
of  pain is not used as a ground for believing that I am experiencing pain but rather for  
believing that my body is in pain, where that proposition is committed to the existence of  a 
body beyond the experience that I have of  having one. In this case,  even if  we might 
concede that the experience of  pain speaks in favour of  the proposition that I have a body,  
the experience is clearly not a conclusive ground for the corresponding proposition, for its  
presence is compatible with the falsity of  the proposition.
We  thus  have  a  new  principle  about  grounds  for  certainties,  both  doxastic  and  non-
doxastic: 
Infallibility Principle: I am absolutely certain that p only if  I have a conclusive ground  (either 
doxastic or non-doxastic)for judging that p.
So far, the Infallibility Principle is still not enough to engender any new problem about 
certainty. As stated, it requires that the ground be actually conclusive with respect to p, and 
this might be the case regardless of  whether the subject knows or is justified in believing 
that the ground is actually conclusive. The problem is, however, that certainty seems to 
require the subject to actually be certain that the ground is conclusive with respect to p. This 
is why. If  I am not certain that my ground for believing that p is actually conclusive with 
respect p there is a sense in which I thereby stop taking the ground to be certainty-conducive 
with respect to  p.  For,  if  I am not certain that the ground is certainty-conferring with 
respect to p, then I am committed to take it to be possible that the proposition is merely 
fallibly  supported by the relevant ground,  and thus I no longer take the ground to be  
certainty-conferring with respect to  p and as a consequence I cannot even consider the 
grounded belief  as a certainty. 
Since, for the reasons just provided absolute certainty requires not only a conclusive  
ground but a conclusive ground certainly known to be such, we have this principle about 
certainty: 
27 I might fail to categorize it correctly if  I don't categorize it as being an experience of  pain. But I can't be 
wrong in believing that I am having that experience.
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Reflexivity Principle: I am absolutely certain that p only if  I have absolute certainty that g is a 
conclusive ground (either doxastic or non-doxastic) for p
Now that we also have this last principle about certainty we are in a position to see how  
this analysis captures most of  the platitudes that are associated with Cartesian certainty and 
Cartesian epistemology more generally28. 
Certainty is factive, i.e., if  one's belief  is absolutely certain then it is true. This point 
is  captured  by  the  fact  that  the  sort  of  grounds  required  in  order  to  have  Cartesian 
certainty are conclusive grounds, that is, grounds which guarantee the truth of  the believed  
proposition29. 
Certainty is incorrigible, or unrevisable, or indefeasible, i.e., there is no way in which  
the subject could abandon her certainty on the basis of  new incoming evidence. This is  
secured by the Infallibility and Reflexivity principles. If  the ground is conclusive, then there 
is no possible evidence that will tell against the absolute certainty, for if  there were such 
evidence one's initial evidence will no longer be conclusive. And if  the subject is certain to  
possess such conclusive grounds, then the subject is certain that there will be no possible 
scenario in the future in which she has evidence against her certainty. 
Certainty  is  incompatible  with  doubt.  This  incompatibility  has  two  aspects. 
Certainty is incompatible with grounded doubt, namely a doubt that one has grounds for 
having. Since a ground for doubting is a ground that speaks in favour of  the truth that it is  
correct to doubt, and since it is correct to doubt only if  one's evidence doesn't conclusively 
establish the truth of  the target proposition, it follows that grounded doubt is impossible,  
for to possess certainty for a proposition is to knowingly possess conclusive grounds in  
favour  of  this  proposition.  Certainty  is  also  incompatible  with  mere  ungrounded  (or  
wishfully  grounded)  psychological  doubt.  So  long  as  one  is  consciously  and 
comprehendingly attending to the fact that she possesses conclusive grounds for p, one is 
not in a position to also doubt whether  p is true or not. Of  course, however, when one 
forgets all this, or doesn't attend to it, it is possible for her to doubt the truth of  p. 
§1.5 The problem of  certainty 
28 Descartes didn't explicitly offer an analysis of  certainty. The sort of  analysis I have provided is thus in  
part a reconstruction of  what certainty amounted to in Descartes's work. To sustain this exegetical point 
will require further arguments that go beyond the scope of  the present paper. 
29 Since certainty is factive, the Reflexivity Principle entails the Infallibility Principle and makes the latter 
redundant. It is however useful to have both of  them in view for dialectical and expository purposes. 
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Having clarified the kind of  certainty Descartes was looking for, we are also now in a  
position  to  appreciate  why  certainty  is  thought  to  be  so  hard  to  obtain,  not  only  in 
particular domains (like empirical domains), but in general. The problem of  regress which 
arises in connection with Inferentialism about certainty has typically been solved by moving  
to a Non-inferentialist view about certainty, since this view stops the regress by putting at 
the foundations basic beliefs grounded on non-doxastic states, the sort of  states which are  
not in need to be justified30. However, if  the Reflexivity principle is true we then have the 
same  problem which  reappears  in  a  general  form for  both  doxastic  and non-doxastic  
grounds31. The reason is that any certainty requires the certainty that its ground is certainty-
conferring, but then this certainty must itself  be grounded, and so the regress restarts. As  
before, we might envisage two positive reactions to this problem. 
Infinitism. Any certainty is grounded in an infinite chain of  grounds.
Circularism. Any certainty is grounded in a finite chain of  grounds, and one of  the doxastic  
grounds in the chain is precisely the certainty that the chain grounds. Any certainty is, at  
least partly, grounded by itself. 
If, as before, we further add the following eminently plausible principles about certainty, we 
are then in a position to see the problem of  certainty in its bare bones. 
No Infinite Regress: the sort of  justification possessed by certainties cannot be infinitist, that 
is, the certainty cannot be grounded on a chain of  infinite grounds.
30 The difference between doxastic and non-doxastic states is important for theorizing about certainty and 
justification in general since non-doxastic states are the sort of  states with respect to which it doesn't  
make sense to ask whether they are justified or not. We can ask whether the beliefs we have are justified 
or not. But we can't ask whether the experiences we happen to have are justified or not. This is why they  
are supposed to be the unmoved movers of  the epistemological edifice. We might ask however whether  
experiences are veridical or not (does this experience of  a hand correctly represent an external world 
where there is a hand?), and, more importantly, we might also ask whether experiences are conclusive  
grounds or not for believing what they are supposed to ground (is the experience of  a hand a conclusive  
ground for believing that there is a hand?). 
31 Notice that the reflexivity principle is enough to engender the problem of  regress in a new form even it is 
required that the ground be not certainty-conducive but simply truth-conducive. See  Fumerton (1995) 
where he defends something similar to the spirit of  the Reflexivity Principle without however requiring 
certainty,  and  without  requiring  certainty-conduciveness  but  mere  truth-conduciveness.  In  Fumerton 
(2006), p. 39, he formulates his 'Principle of  Inferential Justification' as follows: “To have justification for 
believing P on the basis  of  E one must  have not  only (1)  justification for believing E, but also (2)  
justification for believing that E makes probable P”. Other defenders of  similar inferentialist principles 
are Hookway (2000a) p. 345, Feldman (2004) p. 115, Rhoda (2008) p. 217 and p. 227, and Leite (2008) p.  
423.
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No Premise-Circularity: the sort of  justification possessed by certainties cannot be premise-
circular, that is, no certainty could figure among the premises of  its certainty-conferring 
argument. 
Given the Reflexivity Principle, we are back to an inferentialist view of  certainty, which 
faces the problem of  regress. 
This is, I think, the most powerful challenge to the possibility of  certainty. It is not 
the purpose of  this Chapter to solve this problem32. It is however interesting to highlight 
the general structure of  the challenge to the possibility of  achieving certainty, for versions  
of  this  challenge  are  often  appealed  to  by  anti-Cartesian  epistemologists  in  order  to 
motivate a departure from a certainty-based epistemology. Since absolute certainty seems 
impossible  to  obtain,  and  anyway  it  is  hardly  obtainable  with  respect  to  most  of  the 
propositions we care about in our life, most people characterise the nature of  justification 
and knowledge in terms that reject some if  not all of  these principles. 
We have already seen Wittgensteinian rejections  of  the  Ground Principle.  With 
respect  to  the  Infallibility  Principle,  it  is  interesting  to  notice  that  most  people 33 – 
internalists and externalists alike – require that one's grounds be simply truth-conducive 
and not  certainty-conducive.  It  is  a well-known point that the mere fact  of  having an  
experience doesn't necessitate that things are as they appear to be. However, it might be 
argued that  having an experience makes it  sufficiently  probable  that  things are as they 
appear to be. If  one desires to preserve as much of  our commonsensical picture of  our  
epistemic  condition  as  possible,  then  one  is  advised  to  require  mere  truth-conducive 
grounds rather than conclusive grounds. 
The sort  of  justification that  is  described by the Reflexivity Principle is  almost 
universally rejected in contemporary accounts of  justification34. The Reflexivity Principle 
captures the spirit of  traditional internalism35, namely the idea that in order to be justified 
32 There are various moves that could be made in order to solve this problem. Descartes's own position in  
the Meditations  could be enlightened by explaining what sort of  resources he had to solve it. I offer my 
own solution to the problem, and an explanation of  Descartes's attempt to solve it, in Zanetti (ms5). For  
some further discussion of  the nature of  the problem and the conditions for its solution, see §, Chapter  
V.
33 According to Stewart Cohen “the acceptance of  fallibilism in epistemology is virtually universal” and 
Baron  Reed  agrees  when  he  says  that  “Fallibilism  is  endorsed  by  virtually  all  contemporary 
epistemologists”. See Cohen (1988) p. 91 and Reed (2002) p. 143.
34 There are at least two notable exceptions. Richard Fumerton's work is explicitly aimed at preserving the  
sort  of  insights  and  problems  that  animated  Descartes's  epistemology.  Though  he  doesn't  explicitly  
describe his own epistemology as being centred on absolute certainty, he surely is an allied of  Cartesian  
epistemology. Lawrence Bonjour is another epistemologist who is trying to preserve Cartesian insights in 
epistemology. See their papers in DePaul (2000).
35 The distinction between internalism and externalism can be framed in various ways. But it is common 
practice to define externalism as the denial of  internalism, and to distinguish internalism in two kinds:  
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in believing a proposition one must have a suitable reflexive access to the adequacy of 
one's grounds for believing. With some few exceptions (see above), most contemporary 
epistemologists don't need that one is justified in believing that (or in knowing that) one's 
grounds for  believing are  epistemically  good.  Thus most internalists  say  that  the  mere 
possession of  truth-conducive grounds is sufficient in order to have justification, without 
requiring that the subject be also justified in believing that her grounds are truth-conducive.  
Similarly,  all  externalist  accounts  reject  the  sort  of  reflexively  accessible  justification 
characterised by the Reflexivity Principle, since even when the possession of  grounds for 
believing is required, it is enough that one's belief  be formed through a suitable process 
(e.g., a reliable one, or a virtuous one) in order for one to have justification for believing.  
Crucially, the subject is not required to know or be justified in believing that the belief-
forming process is reliable or anyway an adequate one. 
We  have  now  completed  the  presentation  of  Cartesian  certainty  and  of  its 
relationship with the contemporary debate. To recap, we might see Cartesian certainty as 
being the combination of  an infallibilist requirement on justification and of  a strong access 
internalism about epistemic justification. As we have seen, there are few if  any authors that  
can be seen as interested in a kind of  justification and knowledge that incorporates both 
elements.  Almost  all  accounts  of  knowledge  and  justification  are  fallibilist  and 
accommodate this fallibilism either within an externalist framework36 or within a modest 
form of  internalism which abandons the requirement of  reflexive access to the adequacy 
of  one's grounds that is captured by the Reflexivity Principle. 
access internalism (the one that aims at capturing the Cartesian epistemological aspirations), according to 
which one should have a suitable reflexive access to the adequacy of  one's grounds for believing; and  
mentalism, the view that doesn't require reflexive access, but requires that one be in possession of  mental 
grounds for believing. See Kornblith (2001) for classical papers on the internalism/externalism debate. 
36 Externalist theories are typically fallibilist ones. One exception is Dutant (2016).
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Chapter II
Eidetic Phenomenology
The aim of  this  Dissertation  is  to  explain  why the  search  of  absolute  certainty  is  an  
inescapable end for our cognition. In order to achieve this aim I need to show that the  
structure of  our cognition is such as to posit for itself  the quest to search for absolute  
certainty. So, what is it in the structure of  cognition that shows that we are inescapably 
committed to search for absolute certainty? In very few words, my answer to this question  
mentions two fundamental facts about cognition: 
1) judging commits to certainty. When we cognize – that is, when we ask questions and try 
to find true answers –, and particularly when we form judgments, we do engender alethic  
commitments – that is, commitments to accept further propositions or to refrain from 
accepting further propositions. Among these alethic commitments, when we judge that p,  
we commit ourselves to the truth of  a further proposition, namely the proposition that the  
truth of  p is absolutely certain. In judging that p we are in some sense taking it to be certain 
that p is true. 
2) doubting is to look for certainty. When we doubt we commit ourselves to the lack of 
certainty about the proposition doubted. We doubt some proposition because we aren't 
certain  of  it  yet.  Since  we can  doubt  the truth of  proposition  p so long as we aren't 
absolutely certain about the truth of  p, and since we want to remove doubt and to have 
judgments, when we doubt we are expressing our desire to possess absolute certainty. 
These two facts are those I am going to rely on in order to argue that certainty is the 
fundamental aim of  cognition. The arguments that establish that these putative facts are 
indeed facts, as well as the arguments that move from the existence of  these facts to the 
conclusion that certainty is indeed the aim of  cognition, are complex arguments that will  
occupy us throughout the Dissertation. 
In the next chapter – Chapter III – I argue that judging commits to certainty. In  
Chapter IV I argue that suspension of  judgment is reducible to judgment (and so that  
suspending judgment also commits to certainty). And in Chapter V I argue that to ask  
questions and have doubts is to look for certainty. A fundamental notion on which I will  
rely a lot in my arguments is the one of  alethic commitment. In this Chapter I want to 
begin to explain what alethic commitments are, and what the methodology I shall use to  
find them is. 
In  §2.1  I  offer  some terminological  distinctions that  will  be important  in  what  
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follows, and begin to explain what it means to say that judgments have a committal nature. 
In §2.2 I introduce the method of  eidetic variation I will use in order to investigate the 
normative profile of  cognition. In §2.3 I discuss a couple of  worries about the possibility  
of  there being an eidetic phenomenology of  cognition, namely a study whose aim is to 
find the nature of  cognitive acts individuated phenomenologically. In §2.4 I explain why a 
phenomenological investigation about the normative profile of  cognition is necessary in  
order  to  answer  the  normative  question  about  what  to  believe  –  in  a  slogan,  in  this 
paragraph I explain why epistemology needs phenomenology. 
§2.1 Terminological preliminaries
We form judgments on the basis of  grounds for thinking that things are thus-and-so. Most 
often we judge on the basis of  grounds without being aware of  them as such. But we do 
sometimes cognize grounds  as such.  One of  the precondition for the emergence of  the 
problem of  certainty is our capacity to take a reflective stance with respect to our grounds 
for judging and to cognize then as such. One of  the first realization that one makes in the 
quest to achieve certain knowledge is that one must have grounds for one's own judgments 
and that these grounds must be of  the appropriate kind. It is the fact that we can become 
aware of  grounds as such that provides the condition of  possibility for raising the question 
of  certainty,  namely  the  question  whether  our  grounds  are  good  enough  to  make  our 
judgment certain. The problem of  certainty is a problem for a mind that is capable of 
cognizing  her  own judgments  as  being  based  on  grounds  that  could  be  or  fail  to  be 
appropriate. This capacity for reflection or 'reflective distance' is central for epistemology, 
and, according to some, is what distinguishes animal from human cognition37.
Reflective distancing can take different forms, but the common factor of  all forms 
of  reflective distancing seems to be that we are capable to raise a question about the target  
of  our reflection.  The sorts of  questions we are interested in here when we deal with  
foundational issues in epistemology are normative questions about whether our grounds 
for judging are good in supporting the truth of  the proposition to be judged.
Interestingly,  there  are  some questions  that  can't  be  intelligibly  raised  about  all  
37 See Korsgaard (2009a,b) and McDowell (1996). There are grounds for judging and reasons for action.  
The same claim about grounds for  judging can be made with respect  to reasons for action.  We can  
cognize our desires, say, as reasons for action, and this a condition of  possibility for the emergence of  the 
moral problem, namely the problem of  knowing what one should do. These problems are not problems 
for animals, for even though they might be aware of  their reasons, they have not the capacity to be aware 
of  their reasons as reasons and their grounds as grounds and so they are not in a position to wonder whether 
their reasons and grounds are good. 
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mental phenomena. One crucial question for epistemology is the question of  justification:  
the question whether I am justified in having a certain mental state. Our judgments and 
beliefs are the sort of  things with respect to which it makes sense to ask whether they are  
justified or unjustified. My present feeling of  fatigue, for instance, is not the sort of  thing 
with respect to which it makes sense to ask whether it is justified or not. The same goes for  
perceptual experiences and experiences more generally.
Let me briefly recall from the previous chapter why the distinction between mental 
phenomena that are targeted by the justificatory question and mental phenomena that are 
not so targeted is important. Defenders of  the possibility of  certainty have always been 
foundationalists  and they  have  tried  to  explain  the  justification  of  the  foundations  by 
appealing to experiences. The reason is that experiences are the sort of  mental phenomena 
that do not require to be themselves justified. If  the grounds for a certainty were beliefs,  
namely the sort of  phenomena with respect to which it makes sense to ask whether they  
are justified or not, then these grounds will not be ultimate, for another ground will be  
needed in order to justify the beliefs, and so on and so forth, unless at some point one can 
ground one's belief  on something that need not itself  to be grounded. And experiences are 
the sort of  things that should play this role. They are the unmoved movers of  the whole 
belief  system. The point is not so much that they can be grounded or justified, though they 
do not need to. The point is rather that it doesn't make any sense to think of  experiences 
as justified/unjustified.
The  distinction  between  grounds  with  respect  to  which  we  can  ask  for  a 
justification  and  grounds  with  respect  to  which  it  doesn't  make  sense  to  ask  for  a  
justification is then one of  the fundamental distinction in our reflection about knowledge 
and our Reason. Let's introduce terms for it. Let us call received grounds the sort of  grounds 
for belief  with respect to which it is nonsensical to ask whether they are justified or not, 
and let us call derivative grounds all those grounds with respect to which it makes sense to ask 
the question of  justification38. To this distinction we can add a parallel distinction about 
mental phenomena in general, regardless of  whether they are used as grounds or not. We  
can call basic received phenomena all those phenomena with respect to which the question of 
justification doesn't arise. And we can call derivative phenomena all those states which support 
38 Notice here the distinction between:  1) something's  being the sort  of  thing with respect to which it  
can/can't be raised the question of  justification; 2) something's being the sort of  thing which requires to 
be justified. Something can be of  the latter sort only if  it is such that the question of  justification can be  
raised with respect to it. However, something with respect to which the question of  justification can be 
raised need not necessarily be in need of  justification according to  all  senses of  justification. There is 
conceptual room for kinds of  justification such that beliefs that support the question of  justification are  
not  in  need  of  it.  Wittgensteinian  epistemologies  of  perceptual  justification  might  appeal  to  this  
distinction in order to sustain their views.
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the question of  justification39. 
Typically  the  distinctions  between  received  and  derivative  grounds/phenomena 
have  been  drawn  in  terms  of  the  distinction  between  doxastic  and  non-doxastic  
grounds/phenomena. The paradigmatic doxastic phenomena are belief  and judgment. The 
paradigmatic non-doxastic phenomenon is experience40. Maybe the two distinctions end up 
dividing  the  mental  space  in  the  same  way,  but  they  are  conceptually different:  the 
received/derivative  distinction  merely  concerns  the  question  whether  a  state  can  be 
evaluated  with  respect  to its  being justified or  not,  whereas  the  doxastic/non-doxastic 
distinction concerns the question whether a state amounts to a belief-state or not41. 
39 How do we know of  the distinction between received and derivative mental states? When we approach 
the nature of  our most basic mental phenomena and realise that their nature shapes the way in which we 
inquiry and the sorts of  epistemological problems and adventures that we face we reach a level where we 
can  raise  almost  unthinkable  questions.  We  have  seen  that  there  is  a  distinction  between  mental  
phenomena that support the question of  justification and mental phenomena that don't. There is a sense 
in which this is a fact about our mental capacity. We are shaped in such a way that we can't ask whether an 
experience is justified (though of  course we can ask whether it is correct, whether it is originated by the 
fact it purports to represent, and many other questions). Maybe that is the way in which we are shaped  
because we are responsive, as it were, to the fact that experience is really such as to elude the question of  
justification. Yet, one might feel the pressure to wonder as follows: does it follow from our incapacity to 
ask the justificatory question that experiences are not the sort of  things that need and are capable of  
having a justification? After all, things might differ from what we think of  them. The space for this sort  
of  question is opened by the thought that things might be different from what our best judgments say of  
them. If  we are capable of  conceiving of  this without inconsistency we are thinking of  a situation in  
which things like experiences might be justified or not, even though we are not even capable of  thinking 
of  them as such. This would be a case where impossibility of  conceiving is not a route to impossibility 
tout court. The trouble is that if  we can't rule out this possibility, then we might fail to be capable of  having 
certainties at all if  certainties need to be founded on the unmoved movers that experiences are supposed  
to be. 
Interestingly, moreover, if  we were to try to rule out this possibility, we would have to appeal to 
experiences themselves. But how can we satisfactorily appeal to them in such a way that we take them to  
be out of  the business of  justification if  we want to appeal to them precisely in order to establish that  
they are out of  the business of  justification?! There is an appearance of  vicious circularity here. The 
problem, in a nutshell,  is  this. As we have seen in the previous Chapter,  certainty needs experiential 
foundations. Experiences can be foundations only if  they elude the question of  justification. But can we 
rule out the possibility that experiences can be justified/unjustified? Surely we have the impression that  
they do elude the question of  justification. But are we justified in trusting this impression? After all, as the 
thought of  objectivity has it, things might be different from what we think of  them. So, how can we rule  
out the possibility that experience can in fact be justified/unjustified? If  we can do so with certainty, we 
must  appeal  to  experiences  as  things  that  elude  the  question  of  justification.  Hence,  there  is  some 
appearance  of  vicious  circularity  here.  This  is  a  form of  circularity  that  occurs  whenever  we try  to 
vindicate the structural features of  cognition, for in trying to vindicate them we have to rely on them, 
since we can't vindicate them without engaging in cognition (See Chapter XII).
40 Armstrong (1968) famously held the view that perceptual experience is identical to belief. Besides the  
many problems this  view has,  it  is  unclear  how it  could capture  the fact that  experiences elude the  
question of  justification. There are views according to which perceptual experience is some non-doxastic  
form of  alethically committed propositional attitude. Notice that even if  these views are right, their point  
should be compatible with the observation that perceptual experience elude the question of  justification.
41 There might be reasons to think that the two are not equivalent. So, suppose that suspension of  judgment 
is a sui  generis  mental state that is  not reducible to belief  and that doesn't  amount to an alethically  
committed propositional attitude. Since it is clearly the sort of  state with respect to which we can raise the  
question of  justification, we would have non-doxastic states which support the question of  justification.  
The same might apply to other potentially non-doxastic states which might seem to support the question 
of  justification, like the state of  doubt, and maybe intuitions. Anyway, I will argue that suspension of 
judgment is reducible to judgment. Also, I will argue that questioning (of  which doubt is a particular  
instance) can be evaluated as justified/unjustified. 
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It is important to notice that even though received phenomena aren't susceptible of 
being  justified/unjustified,  at  least  some  of  them  can  nonetheless  be  evaluated  as  
correct/incorrect.  Consider  experiences.  All  the  experiences  with  a  representational 
content, namely experiences that represent things as being thus-and-so42, can be evaluated 
as  correct  if  they  correctly  represent  what  they  represent  or  incorrect  if  they  don't. 
Similarly, beliefs and judgments can be evaluated as correct if  true, incorrect if  false. In this 
sense they can both be evaluated as correct/incorrect. However, some questions can be 
raised about derivative mental states but not about received mental states. It is fine to ask  
whether I have a ground to hold a particular belief, but it is not fine to ask whether I have a  
ground to have a perceptual experience. 
In what follows I will help myself  with a Kantian vocabulary in order to refer to 
the distinction between the realm of  the mind where the question of  justification applies 
and the realm of  the mind where the question of  justification does not apply. I will say that  
received mental states belong to the realm of  receptivity – hence the choice of  the term 
'received' – whereas I will say that derivative mental states belong to the realm of  spontaneity. 
Here I don't want to put too much theory on this distinction. Yet, I think that it  
usefully indicates the sort of  distinct phenomena we are trying to explore. The realm of 
receptivity  is  the  realm of  passivity,  where  the  mind  passively  receives  suggestions  to 
believe  and act.  Its  being a realm of  passivity offers  some prima facie  indication why 
experiences  are  the  sort  of  things  with  respect  to  which  the  question  of  justification 
doesn't apply: because experiences are not the sort of  things that we do, or that we commit  
ourselves to. Rather, they are suggestions that we receive and with respect to which we are 
asked (if  we become reflective and take distance from them) to take a stance. This taking a 
stance belongs to the realm of  spontaneity. This is the realm of  activity, where the mind 
takes a stance as to how things are43. This is prima facie why acts belonging to spontaneity, 
42 I take no stance on the debate which mental states have and which don't have representational content.  
Moreover, the way in which I speak of  representational content has a mere phenomenological import –  
namely the import of  signalling the difference between states that make a claim, as it were, and states which 
don't – and it is not meant to have any metaphysical import, though it might be taken as a premise for  
conclusion about the metaphysics of  the mind. Importantly,  I wish to remain silent on the following  
issues: (1) whether representational content is propositional content; (2) whether representational content 
is conceptual content; (3) whether the phenomenological feature of  representing things as being thus-
and-so  is  compatible  only  with  representationalist  theories  of  experience,  or  also  with  relationalist  
theories, whether direct or indirect. The literature on these topic is vast. See Crane (2009) about (1), and 
the literature referred to therein. Evans (1982), Peacocke (1992), McDowell (1994) are classics in the  
debate on (2). See Siegel (2016) for an overview of  the issues surrounding (2). For relationalist theories of  
perception,  see Travis  (2004),  Campbell  (2002),  Brewer (2011).  For representationalist  theories  about 
perception see Tye (1995), Siegel (2010), Pautz (2010).
43 Interestingly, our mind is so structured that those acts that belong to spontaneity might slide, as it were, in  
the realm of  passivity. Thus, I might form a judgment that  p,  then take a stance with respect to that 
judgment  such that  I  see it  as something that  I might  have formed on the  wrong grounds,  and by  
conceiving of  my first-order judgment I loose it as a judgment of  mine, and it is then thought of  as some 
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like judgments, are the sorts of  things with respect to which it makes sense to ask whether  
they are justified or not. This is not yet an explanation, it is just an indication of  how to 
think about the distinction in order to see a possible venue for an explanation. 
When I  consciously  and comprehendingly  form a  derivative  mental  state  like  a 
judgment I am thereby committed to the fact that my judgment is correct. If  I judge that p, I 
am also committed to take the judgment that p as correct. Contrast with experience. If  I 
have an experience that  p I  am not committed to take  the  experience as  correct.  The 
experience is something that, as it were, I passively receive. In the case of  experience, it is  
experience that is committed, as it were, to its content being correct, it is not me who is so 
committed. Experience presents the world as being in a certain way, but I am not obliged  
to take the experience at face value. In the case of  experiences and of  received mental  
states more generally, it is the world which makes a claim, as it were, whereas in the case of 
belief  and derivative mental phenomena more generally it is me who makes a claim. In the 
case of  experiences, that something is thus-and-so is something that I receive as a suggestion, as 
it were, whereas in the case of  judgment,  that something is thus-and-so  is a suggestion that I 
make, it is something that I am offering, instead of  something I am receiving44.
sort of  received mental state. Here is a concrete example. Suppose I enter into a room in which a seminar  
is held and judging from the configuration of  the room and the location of  the people in it I judge that a  
man is going to give the talk. An instant later, reflecting on the conversation I just had with a friend on 
gender bias, I might consider my judgment as something that I no longer hold but rather as something I 
have been saddled with. When I do think of  it in this way, I loose it as a judgment of  mine. 
One interesting phenomenological question is whether I can experience a judgment both as mine and as  
something I am saddled with. I think that this is possible for in a fundamental sense it is impossible to 
choose the phenomena one is in, hence any experience can be seen as something I have been thrown in, 
rather as something I have really decided to have. The very experience of  decision, even doxastic decision, 
is an experience I am saddled with, like I am saddled with my existence as a whole. 
44 Here we touch an extremely complicated philosophical problem. On the one hand, we want to say that  
there is a distinction between received and derivative mental states, and we want somehow to draw this  
distinction by appealing to the concept of  passivity in connection with experience and to the concept of 
activity in the case of  thought. On the other hand, however, there is also an important sense in which  
both experiences and thoughts are alike in being states I am saddled with, for it is not me who produces 
the experience of  me being thinking a thought, nor is it really me who is producing the experience of  me being  
wondering whether to think that p. Surely, there is the phenomenon of  me thinking something, and maybe also the 
phenomenon of  me being somehow actively  engaging with thought  production.  But  it  is  not  me – 
whoever this 'me' is here supposed to refer to – who is producing this very phenomenon. This is an 
extremely subtle and profound point. 
Here is another way of  making the same point. To say that there is a distinction between passive and 
active states is to make a phenomenological point about the way things appear as being. My judgment  
appears as being my production, whereas an experience appears as being something that I am saddled 
with. Yet, to accept this point about phenomenology is not yet to be committed about any thesis about 
free  will.  I  might  grant  that  I  am not  free  in  having  those  acts  which  appeared  as  being  my  own 
production. The world might be determined in having states that have the features of  appearing as being 
my  production.  So,  the  point  about  activity  and  passivity  is  just  meant  to  signal  a  fact  about  
phenomenology, and it is not committed to deny any of  these further claims: 1) that a more profound 
phenomenological  reflection  reveals  that  any  phenomenon  (included  the  phenomenon  me-being-
thinking-a-thought-spontaneously) is there irrespective of  my will (for the phenomenon of  my willing 
something is not a phenomenon I have willed!); 2) that a metaphysical reflection about free will reveals  
that there is no free event. 
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The  committal  feature  of  derivative  mental  states,  in  the  case  of  judgment, 
concerns alethic correctness only. Consider your judgment that p. When you judge that p, 
you take the world to be in a certain way. You take it to be in a certain way because you take 
yourself  to have grounds that speak in favour of  the truth of  p. If  you were to think that 
there is no ground for believing that p is true, you would typically not form the judgment 
that p. This is the sense in which you are committed to take your judgment as correct. You 
take it as being the one to have in order to get things right about the world, and the one to  
have given whatever resources you might use in order to figure out how things really are. 
The sort of  correctness in question here is alethic in nature. It is a correctness which is tied 
to the aim of  getting things right, with the aim of  getting the truth45. 
There are no similar commitments to correctness in judgment when correctness is 
not alethic or epistemic. Thus, it is not the case that by judging that p I am committed to 
the fact that my judgment is prudentially correct, or morally correct or aesthetically correct.  
In order to see this, we might look at what happens to one's judgment that  p when one 
discovers that it is not correct. If  I discover that it is not the alethically correct one to have 
– because, say, I discover that my grounds for p are not good, or, more simply, because I 
discover  that  p is  false  –  then  I  will  not  be  in  a  position  to  consciously  and 
comprehendingly  hold  the  judgment.  The  belief  might  survive  as  a  disposition  –  for 
whatever causal reason – but it won't survive conscious reflection. If, however, I discover 
that my belief  that p is not prudentially correct or morally correct – in that it is not the one 
to be had given certain prudential  or moral  aims – I  don't  discover anything that  will  
persuade me to stop thinking that  p is  true.  These  discoveries  might  originate  a  causal 
process  for  getting  rid  of  them,  but  they  won't  affect  in  any  way  my  conscious  and 
thoughtful adherence to the truth of  p46. 
It  is  important to appreciate another difference between received and derivative 
mental  phenomena,  a  difference  which  is  related  to  the  fact  that  derivative  mental 
phenomena  are  committed  in  a  way  in  which  received  mental  phenomena  are  not.  
Derivative mental phenomena respect or are governed by what we might call the law of 
alethic  commitments,  whereas  received  mental  phenomena  are  not. An  alethically 
committed mental state is one which exhibits alethic commitments, that is, by the fact of 
having that mental phenomena, the subject is committed to take a stance (or to refrain  
from taking a stance) about the truth of  further propositions,  at least if  the subject  is  
45 See Chapter IX, in which I offer a minimalist view about the claim that truth is the constitutive aim of  
judgment. 
46 In Chapter IX I will discuss and reject arguments to the effect that there are non-evidential considerations 
that might be used in forming judgments. 
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presented with the relevant proposition and understands how the truth of  that proposition  
relates to other propositions she accepts as true. There are many mental phenomena that 
are so committed. Call these commitments – that is, commitments to take a stance or to 
refrain from taking a stance about the truth of  further propositions –  alethic commitments. 
Judgments are obviously  the sort of  thing that display alethic commitments – e.g.,  the  
judgment that  p  commits me to the fact that there are good grounds for judging p to be 
true. But intentions seem to display alethic commitments as well – e.g., the intention to do 
plan A commits me to take as true the proposition that the intended plan is doable.  
Importantly,  alethic  commitments  come  in  two  broad  varieties:  positive alethic 
commitments,  and  negative  alethic  commitments.  Positive  alethic  commitments  are 
commitments  to  judge  further  propositions  as  true.  Negative  alethic  commitments  are 
commitments to refrain from judging further propositions as true. In what follows I will  
mostly  talk  about  positive  alethic  commitments,  omitting  for  simplicity's  sake  the 
qualification 'positive'. 
Also, it is important to distinguish two kinds of  alethic commitments (which of 
course come in positive and negative varieties). Some commitments are psychologically-binding, 
whereas others are not. Let us start with commitments which are merely  norm-generating and 
are  not  psychologically-binding.  A  norm-generating  (non-psychologically-binding) 
commitment to take  p as true is to be captured by saying that when the commitment is 
triggered one has to respect some norm that says that one should take  p as true in the 
relevant circumstances. The idea is that by performing some cognitive act one is putting 
oneself  under  some norm,  and in  this  sense  one is  committing  oneself  to take  some 
further proposition as true.  By performing a given cognitive act one is putting oneself  
under the norm that says: judge (or do not judge) p to be true, were you to be invited to 
take a stance with respect to p's truth. The exact sense in which one is under that norm, as 
well  as  the  detail  of  the  norm can be  open  to  dispute,  but  the  main  feature  of  this  
understanding of  commitment is the fact that all there is to commitment is the generation 
of  some norm which is going to have an authority for the subject because of  the cognitive  
acts  she  has  performed.  If  one  doesn't  respect  the  norm  one  is  not  fulfilling  one's  
commitments,  and in some sense  one is  not doing correct.  But,  crucially,  this  kind of 
commitment is not psychologically-binding because one can fail to fulfil one's commitment  
while keeping the mental state that engenders the commitment. Using the judgment that p 
as our toy example, and assuming that judging that  p commits one to the possession of 
grounds for p, the present understanding of  commitment has it that one can judge that p 
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even if  one fails  to fulfil  one's commitment, namely even if  one doesn't judge to have 
grounds for  p  when one is invited to take a stance with respect to that proposition. All 
there is to commitment is norm generation, namely the fact that one is doing wrong if  one 
doesn't have grounds for p, given that she judges that p.
Psychologically-binding commitments are different. To be committed in this sense 
to take p as true means that if  one wants to keep having the mental state that triggers that 
commitment one must also take  p as true if  the subject is invited to take a stance with 
respect to  p.  Using again judgment as our toy example, if  judging that  p commits (in a 
psychologically-binding sense) one to take it that there are good grounds for so judging, 
then, if  one is explicitly considering the proposition that there are good grounds for so 
judging,  one can  not keep judging that  p if  she doesn't  also judge that there are good 
grounds for so judging. So, commitments here don't merely engender norms, but they also 
narrow the field of  what is psychologically possible for a mind who wants to keep her 
judgment.
As  presented  here  both  psychologically-binding  commitments  and  non-
psychologically-binding commitments are also norm-generating. The connection between 
commitments and norms is a quite intuitive one: if  I am committing my self  to do some 
thing (like accepting a given proposition as true if  I entertain it), then if  I don't do that  
thing  I  am  doing  wrong,  in  some  sense.  In  the  case  of  non-psychologically-binding 
commitments, it seems that there is nothing left to the notion of  a commitment if  we don't  
understand them as generating some norm under the legislation of  which the subject is  
putting herself  by performing some committal cognitive act. However, when we think of 
psychologically-binding commitments, there is room to ask the following question: does 
the fact that some combination of  mental states is impossible – like judging that p and that 
there are no grounds for p – have anything to do with the existence of  some norm – the 
norm that  says that  judging that  p  is  correct  (if  and) only if  one has grounds for  so 
judging? It seems that it is an intelligible  further question whether the presence of  some 
psychologically-binding commitment  also sustains the  presence of  some corresponding 
norm. That is, it seems to be a further question whether a given psychologically-binding 
commitment also is a norm-generating commitment (or is accompanied by such norm-
generating commitment). To illustrate: suppose again that judging that  p  commits (in the 
psychologically-binding sense) one to take it as true that there are grounds for so judging.  
This means that if  one wants to keep her judgment that p one should also judge that there 
are grounds for so judging when one is invited to take a stance with respect to that issue.  
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But does it also mean that there is a corresponding norm to the effect that a judgment that 
p  is correct only if  there are good grounds for judging that  p? The aim of  subsequent 
chapters is to show that the answer is positive. In fact, the aim is to ground the validity of  
some norms on the psychologically-binding commitments of  cognition. Since the presence 
of  these commitments is argued to be constitutive  of  the corresponding cognitive acts, the 
aim is  to  ground  on  that  basis  the  existence  of  constitutive  norms  for  cognition.  This 
transition from facts about impossible combinations of  mental states and the validity of  
norms is of  course controversial. It seems to be a paradigmatic instance naturalistic fallacy 
or  a  violation  of  Hume's  law  that  prohibits  to  derive  normative  truths  from  merely 
descriptive ones. I will touch on this controversial transition from commitments to norms 
in  Chapter  VI,  and again in  Chapter  XI,  where  I  argue about  how to bridge the  gap 
between  the  presence  of  psychologically-binding  commitments  and  the  corresponding 
norms.
These are two sorts of  commitments. The question then is the following: do both 
sorts  of  commitments exist?  What are the sort  of  alethic  commitments that  cognitive  
mental  states  exhibit?  To  discover  what  are  the  alethic  commitments  we  have  is  to 
investigate  the  normative  profile  of  our  cognitive  life.  I  do  think  that  judgment  and 
questioning display both sort of  commitments, but in the next three chapters I will focus  
exclusively on psychologically-binding commitments (norm-generating commitments will 
be discussed in Chapter V, and again in Chapter X, XI, and XII). In this Chapter I will  
explain  the  methodology  I  will  use  in  order  to  investigate  psychologically-binding 
commitments – from now on when I speak about 'commitments' or 'alethic commitments' 
I will always mean psychologically-binding commitments. 
Notice that the category of  mental states that elicit commitments to take propositions as  
true is a special category of  the broader category of  mental states that elicit commitments 
to do something,  where the deed does not necessarily  need to be a mental  action like  
judgment, suspension of  judgment, and possibly others. E.g.,  promise to do something 
engenders commitments to do further things, like arranging things in such a way that one 
can be in a position to fulfil one's own promise. The law of  alethic commitment is thus a 
particular law which governs states that respect a broader kind of  law we might call the law  
of  commitment,  under  whose  legislation  we  might  place  all  those  mental  states  that  
generate commitments47. 
47 Importantly, as you might have already noticed, within the category of  mental states that have alethic 
commitments, there is a distinction to be made between mental states that are alethically constrained and  
mental  states  that  are  not  alethically  constrained.  Here  is  a  first  characterization  of  the  notion  of 
alethically constrained state: for a state to be alethically constrained is for it to be a state whose conditions  
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§2.2 Eidetic variation and constitutive commitments
How can we find out the commitments of  our cognition? Here is the main idea of  the 
whole methodology. If  there is a commitment which is elicited by a given mental state, 
then one will be in a position to keep one's own mental state only if, were the committed 
proposition to be presented to the subject, she will accept it as true. So, if  the subject is  
asked to take a stance with respect to the truth-value of  a proposition to which she is 
committed,  then the  subject  must judge it  true in  order  to keep one's  own committal 
mental state. There are two ways in which a subject might fail to comply with her alethic 
commitments: one is by judging that these committed propositions are false; the other is by 
being open-minded about their truth-value. So, if  one holds a mental state which commits  
the subject to the truth of  q, if  the subject was presented with q, she would have to judge it 
to be true. If, however, a subject doesn't judge that q (either by disbelieving it or by being 
open minded about it), then the subject will thereby abandon the initial mental state. Given 
the way in which commitments work, we have a natural way of  finding them out: take a  
candidate committed proposition of  given mental state. Put yourself  in that mental state,  
and then ask whether it is possible to be in that mental state while you do not judge that  
the candidate committed proposition is true. If  the proposition is really a commitment of 
the given mental state, then it would be impossible to both be in that mental state and to 
refrain from judging the committed proposition to be true. If, however, the proposition is 
not really a necessary commitment of  that mental state, then it would be entirely possible  
to both be in that mental state and refrain from judging the committed proposition48. 
of  correctness depend on the aim of  getting the truth. This is rough and will be made more precise in the 
next chapters, as we clarify the mechanism of  commitments and doxastic deliberation. The phenomenon 
which the notion of  alethic constraint  is  meant  to capture is  however simple  to refer  to.  States  like 
intentions do engender alethic commitments, yet their primary dimension of  evaluation is not alethic, in 
that it doesn't make any sense to say that an intention is correct only if  it is true, or correctly represents  
what it purports to represent, for intention is not a thing such that it makes a claim about how things are.  
Judgments is primarily evaluated according to whether it is true or not.
48 In  order  to  make  vivid  the  contrast  (or  absence  thereof)  between  a  mental  state  and  a  putative  
commitment of  that mental state it is sometimes useful to try to put oneself  in a situation in which one 
both holds the mental state and actually  disbelieves the candidate commitment (namely judges that it is 
false).  This  is  because  it  makes  the  contrast  sharper  between  the  actual  commitment  and  one's  
relationship to the candidate committed proposition. But this instruction is too strong and doesn't work  
in all cases. Here is one. Does suspending judgment about p commits one to take p as false? To test it, if 
the instruction of  the method was to try to put myself  in a situation in which I hold the initial mental  
state and judge the alethically committed proposition to be false, then I would have to put myself  in this 
situation: a situation in which I suspend judgment about p and also judge that it is false that p is false, and 
so a situation in which I also judge that p is true. If  it is impossible, according to the method I would have 
to judge that the initial candidate alethic commitment was genuine. In fact, it is arguably impossible to 
suspend judgment about p and judge p to be true at the same time. Hence, I would have to conclude that 
to suspend judgment about  p  is  to be committed to the falsity of  p.  But this is also obviously false, 
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This is very roughly how the method works and what is its main rationale. Here are 
a couple of  illustrative applications. A trivial commitment of  a judgment that p is the fact 
that p is true. To test that, I try to put myself  in a state in which I both judge that p and am 
open-minded as to whether p is true (or even judge p to be false). Yet, this is impossible, 
and this is evidence for taking the truth of  p to be an alethic commitment I have when I 
judge that p. 
Another example: consider the claim that when we judge that p we are committed 
to take it that p is grounded on good grounds to take it to be true. To test whether this is  
so, the method asks us to put ourselves in a state in which we judge that  p  but remain 
open-minded as to whether p is grounded or not. If  I try, I can't keep my initial judgment if  
I remain open-minded as to whether I have any ground for taking p to be true. This can be 
taken as evidence for concluding that taking p as grounded on evidence that speaks in its 
favour is a committing we have when we judge that p is true.
This methodology is an instance of  what is called the method of  eidetic variation 
in phenomenological literature49. The method hinges on the conviction that our experience 
(included  our  experience  of  being cognitive  agents)  exhibits  a  certain  structure.  Some 
things are possible, some are not. In order to find out what are the structural features of  
our experience, we should find out which combinations are possible and which are not. In 
order to find out which combinations are not possible, one can engage in the method of 
eidetic  variation.  The method roughly works  as  follows.  One takes the target  of  one's  
phenomenological analysis – e.c., a judgment – and then one tries to modify the experience 
of  judging by modifying the factors that are typically present in the experience of  judging. 
Thus, I might try to judge while changing the kinds of  grounds on the basis of  which the  
judgment is made. Or I might try to judge while changing the contents of  my judgment.  
The method aims at discovering the necessary structure of  the experience of  judgment by  
seeing  which  modifications  are  possible  and  which  are  not  possible.  Here  are  some 
examples:
1) One might discover that by trying to modify the grounds on the basis of  which a 
judgment is made, one cannot use considerations that don't speak in favour of  the truth of  
the content to be judged. Thus, one might try to judge that  p is true on the basis of  the 
because to suspend judgment is precisely neither to judge that p nor to judged that it is not the case that p. 
This is why the instruction of  the method should not be: try to put yourself  in a situation in which you 
judge the candidate alethically committed proposition to be false! It should rather be: try to put yourself 
in  a  situation  I  which  you  do  not  judge  the  alethically  committed  proposition  to  be  true  –  where 
entertaining a proposition without taking a stance about its truth-value is what it takes to be open-minded 
about its truth-value.
49 The method has been introduced and used systematically by Edmund Husserl in his phenomenological 
works. See next paragraph for more on this method.
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consideration that so judging will be pleasurable. Also, one might try to form judgments on 
the basis of  no ground. Yet, if  one finds out that these are not possible scenarios, then one 
has evidence for thinking that it is a structural feature of  judgment the fact that a judgment  
can be made only on the basis of  some ground, and that only alethic grounds can count as 
grounds. (I will in fact defend these claims in Chapter IX).
2) Or  one  might  wonder  whether  in  judging  we  always  take  the  content  of  our 
judgment to be true. In order to discover whether this is indeed the case, one might try to 
modify one's own judging experience in such a way that in judging a proposition one is not 
judging that that proposition is true but rather one is committing himself  to something  
different from the truth of  the proposition judged. As it turns out (and as I will argue in  
Chapter IX) this is not possible: whenever we judge we present the content judged as true. 
3) Or one might wonder whether there can be judgments without contents. By trying 
to  imaginatively  vary  the  experience  of  judging,  one  might  end  up  realising  that  it  is  
impossible to judge without judging some content to be true. At the same time, one might 
also wonder whether it is essential to judgment that it has a particular content (like the  
content that 2+2=4) and one might verify the (trivial) claim that it is in fact possible to  
judge other propositions. 
4) One might also wonder whether there are structural relationships between mental  
states.  Thus,  one might wonder whether the act of  judgment and the act  of  raising a 
question stand in some particular relationships. To illustrate, I might want to know whether 
it is possible to judge that p and at the same time to ask a genuine question as to whether p 
is  true.  As I will  argue in Chapter V, if  we try  to modify the states  of  judgment  and 
questioning in  such a  way that  we end up being at  the  same time judging that  p  and 
questioning whether p is true, we realise that this is not possible.
These are just some illustrations of  how to apply the method to cases which are  
going to concern us later. The point of  engaging in this method is to find out facts about 
impossible combinations of  mental states (like case 4), to consider these cases as instances 
in  which  performing  some  cognitive  act  constitutively  triggers  some  psychologically-
binding commitments,  and finally to ground on the existence of  these psychologically-
binding  commitments  the  claim that  some norm is  constitutive  of  the  corresponding 
cognitive act. 
One might reasonably wonder at this stage what is the connection between claims 
about impossible combinations of  mental states, and claims about commitments. Why is it 
that the impossibility of  judging that p and being open minded about p, say, will have to be 
47
conceptualised as a case in which judging commits one to refrain from being open minded 
about p, say? This is indeed a very good question. The general question that we should ask 
at this juncture is why we are entitled to apply normative concepts to phenomenological  
experience. This is a tough question, and I will come back to it in Chapter VI. From now 
on,  I  will  assume  that  it  makes  good  sense  to  speak  of  psychologically-binding 
commitments in the cases I will describe in the next chapters, but then in Chapter VI I will  
try to say something more in order to vindicate this contention.
§2.3 Objections to eidetic phenomenology
One of  the hypothesis that this philosophical work is meant to explore is whether there are  
essences of  conscious mental states. Since the work is phenomenological, the hypothesis is  
more precisely that there are essences of  mental states whose nature is exhausted by their  
way of  appearing. 
The  hypothesis  might  be  incredible  in  various  ways  in  the  present  intellectual 
climate. Some would probably grant that there are 'things'50 whose nature is exhausted by 
their  phenomenology  –  qualia  or  sense  data,  for  those  who  believe  in  them,  might 
paradigmatically be taken to be things of  this sort. Yet here we are focusing on ingredients 
of  cognition with respect to which there is a natural tendency to regard them as having a  
nature  which  is  partially  constituted  by  facts  that  go  beyond  their  way  of  appearing. 
Questions, judgments and doxastic deliberation more generally are phenomena that  seem 
to be partly responsible for my behaviour and in order for them to be so responsible they 
should be suitably integrated in the process of  the whole organisms that lead to bodily  
movements. When we think of  such integration it is natural therefore to take conscious  
mental acts as having a life that goes on beneath the phenomenological surface. Discussion 
in philosophy of  mind provides us with many models for thinking about the interplay, if  
any, between consciousness and the rest of  the natural order. 
It  would  an interesting  work  to explore  how reflection  in  philosophy of  mind 
provides resources for being sceptic about the possibility of  there being phenomenological  
essences. Here I won't take this complicated route, for it will lead us too far afield from the 
central topic of  our concern. Rather I will point to a couple of  positive reasons why the 
attempt to engage in eidetic phenomenology is justified. 
First, in order to investigate the relationship, if  any, between consciousness and the 
50 Here the talk of  'things' is not meant to be committal to any specific ontology of  things, it is a short hand 
name for a something whose nature we are investigating. 
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rest of  the natural order, we first need to know what are the two relata 51. Thus, to illustrate, 
even if  one were to try to wholly or partially reduce the conscious phenomena themselves,  
one would need to know what it  is that needs to be reduced. Unless I know what the 
experience  of  judging  is,  there  is  no  hope  I  can  satisfactorily  achieve  a  reductionist 
program about judgment.
The second reason is that, simply, our conscious experience exhibits a structure that 
we can attempt to describe. Our experience is not a chaos. The very idea of  a completely 
chaotic  experience  is  unintelligible.  It  will  amount  to  a  lost  of  experience,  not  to  a 
particular kind of  experience, for in the latter case the experience would have a structure,  
namely the structure that is such as to make it possible the experience of  chaos 52. Since the 
mind is  not  chaotic  but  it  rather  exhibits  a  structure,  it  is  possible  to  investigate  this 
structure, and try to discover essences within it.
If  we follow Descartes's invitation53 to consider our life as a dream in which we can 
freely modify and compose reality according to our wishes, we suddenly realize that our 
freedom in this respect is  not without boundaries. There are some things that we can't  
change: we can't perceive, for instance, an uncoloured surface, nor can we see the same 
surface  coloured in  all  its  parts  of  two different  colours  at  the  same time.  These  are 
structures of  perceptual appearances, the sort of  structures that Husserl called material  or 
synthetic apriori, since their source is not formal – like those formal structures, which he calls  
formal or analytic a priori, which are captured by true analytic propositions – and at the same 
time they enjoy some sort of  necessity, since there is some relevant modal reading which 
makes true the claim that we  can't experience uncoloured surfaces, or synchronically and 
uniformly bi-coloured surfaces.
The  case  of  colour  and  space  concerns  necessary  structures  of  perceptual 
experience,  but  there  there are  also other  interesting a priori  structures –  which  aren't 
captured by analytic propositions – which concern, for instance, the nature of  cognition. I 
51 This  argument  is  often  used  by  phenomenologists  in  order  to  motivate  the  engagement  in 
phenomenological reflection in present philosophy of  mind and cognitive science. See Varela (1995) and 
Petitot et al. (1999). 
52 This reason for denying the possibility of  chaos is somehow reminiscent of  Kant's idea that the I think is 
a condition for the unity of  representations. Even if  we really  try to pretend that we are capable of  
thinking or quasi-representing an experience devoid of  structure, we understand that there is a principled reason  
why such a chaotic experience couldn't possibly exist. For it to be given, things in it had to be represented as 
chaotic, or cognized as chaotic, or experienced as chaotic. If  the chaos has to be experienced, then the chaos is 
not absolute, for the recognition that everything is chaotic would not be itself  chaotic. This thetic or representational 
component of  experience will not itself  be chaotic. And this thetic  component is unavoidable: if  we try 
to imagine an experience that would lack it, in order to picture that experience (that is, to try to place  
ourselves in that experience) we would have to have an experience which as such would represent things 
as being one way or another. 
53 See Descartes's first meditation. 
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have given some illustrations in the previous paragraph, where I have introduced some of  
the claims I will make about the phenomenological essences of  cognition. Thus, the simple 
fact that there is a distinction between a question and a judgment suggests that there is 
something  like  the  essence  of  a  question  and  the  essence  of  a  judgment.  The 
phenomenological investigation will have to reveal whether there are essences that justify 
the very  distinction between things like judgments and suppositions, say, or between the 
simple state of  entertaining a proposition and the state of  being wondering about its truth 
value, say. The investigation might reveal that there are more distinctions to be drawn than 
those that are made in folk psychology, or it might reveal that some distinctions that we 
commonsensically make are illusory. Since it  is possible to provide a description of  the 
mental  phenomena that aim at distinguishing essential  from contingent features of  the  
relevant mental phenomena (e.g., that a judgment has a content is essential, whereas it is  
contingent that it has the particular content that it has, say, that it is raining, rather than 
snowing), this work can be executed in a way that is in principle independent from the  
further question about whether the phenomenological essence belongs, as it  were,  to a 
thing whose nature is exhausted by its phenomenology or rather belongs to a thing whose 
nature goes beyond its phenomenology. 
Even if  one has partially vindicated the self-contained focus on phenomenology, 
and has succeeded in persuading the sceptical reader of  phenomenological works to take as 
legitimate an investigation about phenomenological essences that purports to be wholly 
descriptive  (an  investigation  that  avoids  any  appeal  to  facts  that  go  beyond  the 
phenomenology),  one  might  still  be  sceptical  about  the  possibility  of  there  being  any  
means to achieve knowledge about these essences. This scepticism touches the question 
how  we  know  such  phenomenological  essences.  This  is  how  the  problem  can  be 
formulated.  On the one hand, we might want to rely on induction (e.g.,  so far, all  the 
judgments I have seen also had a content), and on this basis make claims about necessity 
(e.g., there is no judgment without content), but this faces Hume's scepticism 5455. On the 
54 This is why Husserl rely on eidetic intuition instead of  relying on induction. Husserl's problem is the same 
Kant was facing in the Critique: how can I obtain knowledge of  universal and necessary truth on the basis 
of  experience? Husserl (1954) argues that Kant's appeal to transcendental deduction is not sufficiently 
critical (in the Kantian sense of  'critical'), for its justificatory source is not given in experience itself, which 
is the sole legitimate source of  evidence that we possess. This is why he had to find in experience the  
source for modal knowledge, and that is the role that eidetic intuition is meant to have. This is also the  
reason  why  he  took  the  modal  knowledge  discovered  through  eidetic  intuition  to  provide  a  new 
understanding  of  Kantian  synthetic  a  priori.  In  Husserl's  terminology,  through  eidetic  intuition  we 
discover  material  a  priori,  that  is,  necessary  structure  of  experience  (hence  the  qualification  'material', 
because they concern the very structure of  experience, rather than our conceptual scheme or categories). 
See Husserl's third logical investigation, in Husserl (1900/1).
55 For critical discussion of  this issue, see, for instance,  Levin (1968), Zaner (1973), Mohanty (1989), and 
Cobb-Stevens (1992). 
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other hand, we might appeal to eidetic intuition as elicited through eidetic variation. Here 
the idea is that by trying to imaginatively modify a given conscious phenomenon whose 
nature is under investigation, we can at some point see that there are some possibilities that 
are foreclosed to this phenomenon. That is, at some point, by trying to conceive possible  
ways in which this phenomenon might be, we end up achieving in a direct, non-inferential 
manner  modal  knowledge  about  its  essence.  To  illustrate  with  the  classic  example  of 
colours and surfaces56, by trying to imaginatively conceive various ways in which colours 
and surfaces  might  interact,  at  some  point  we  see  or  understand that  there  can't  be  an 
experienced  uncoloured  surface.  Yet,  critics  individuate  at  least  two problems with  the 
possibility of  achieving this modal knowledge through eidetic intuition57: the first problem 
is  that  even  if  one  grants  the  possibility  of  achieving  knowledge  about  what  is  
experientially conceivable/inconceivable (this is knowledge that goes beyond the inductive 
generalisation), there is no way of  moving from this to what is possible/impossible (e.g., I  
grant that a judgment is conceivable only if  contentful, but how can I be sure that this is  
not just a limit of  my imagination, instead of  an intuition into the essence of  judgment  
itself ?);  the  second (and,  I  submit,  most  pressing)  problem is  to explain  what  are  the 
enabling conditions of  this eidetic understanding, for the suspicion is that its possibility 
depends  on the particular  concepts  we possess  (it  is  only  because  we possess  a  given 
concept of  judgment that we end up 'seeing' judgment as we see it). But then, if  this is so,  
there is a tension with the idea that the knowledge eidetic variation delivers is knowledge of  
phenomenological essences, rather than of  conceptual essences. 
These  are  very  important  objections.  I  will  briefly  come  back  to  the  second 
objection  –  the  one  from  conceptual  relativity  – in  Chapter  VI,  when  I  argue  against 
conceptualism.  In  general,  in  this  work  I  won't  be  concerned  with  the  epistemological 
problem of  explaining why and how eidetic investigation can deliver modal knowledge of  
phenomenological essences. Yet I hope that actual engagement in the method will convince  
the reader of  its fruitfulness and eventually of  its cogency, despite the many questions that  
remain wide open and that need to be addressed in another occasion.
§2.4 Epistemology needs phenomenology
In concluding this chapter I would like to offer one more argument for the claim that we  
need to engage in phenomenology of  cognition if  we want to answer the questions that 
56 To be found in the third logical investigation, see Husserl (1900/1). 
57 See Kasmier (2010) for a defence of  the method.
51
animate our epistemological concerns. When we deal with epistemological issues, one of 
the central question that we ask is the following: what should I believe? We want to believe  
the truth, and we ask which norms we should follow in order to get what we want. The  
theory of  justification and the theory of  knowledge can be seen as aiming at responding to  
this question: by discovering what it means to have a justification for believing and what it 
means to know, they offer us the content of  the norm or norms that we should follow in  
order to get the truth. Now, here I want to present an argument whose conclusion is that  
we need phenomenology in order to settle the epistemological question what should I believe?. 
The  argument  has  the  following  structure.  First,  it  invites  us  to  think  what  we  could 
possibly achieve through conceptual analysis or natural science. Then it argues that what 
we can achieve doesn't provide a definitive answer to the question  what should I believe?.  
Finally, it suggests that only phenomenology can provide us such guidance.
Suppose we engage in  conceptual  analysis  by  appealing  to  our  intuitions  about 
concept application. The intuitions might be gathered from the armchair or by relying on 
experimental philosophy. The minimal point that both methodologies should share for our 
purposes is  that  they  produce prima facie  evidence for drawing conclusions  about  the 
conditions of  applications of  our epistemic concepts. Here I will focus for simplicity's sake 
on the concept of  justification, but the same considerations can be applied mutatis mutandis  
to other related concepts – like the concepts of  knowledge, evidence, rationality – which 
might be thought of  as relevant in order to frame the answer the the question what should I  
believe?58 
The investigation of  our conceptual repertoire might lead to three results: 
(1) there is only one concept of  justification;
(2) there is more than one concept of  justification; 
(3) our conceptual repertoire is such that there is (are) no concept(s) of  justification  
with clear conditions of  application. 
Let's start with (3). If  our conceptual repertoire doesn't give us  by itself  any concept of 
justification which can then be used in order to orient our thinking about what we should 
believe, then we obviously need more than investigation about our conceptual repertoire in 
58 Our question is what should I believe? and so conceptual investigation is pertinent in so far as it concerns  
concepts which will be needed in order to answer this question. Thus, the assumption here is that the  
concept of  justification is pertinent in as much as it is the case that, roughly, one should believe what one  
is  justified in believing,  and one is  justified in  believing what  one should believe.  If  the concept  of  
justification is totally unconnected to considerations that would answer the first-personal problem about 
what  to  believe,  then  conceptual  investigation  about  that  concept  is  not  enough  for  answering  the  
question, and we should look for investigation about the conditions of  application of  other concepts. I 
will assume for the sake of  the argument that the concept of  justification is tied to the question  what 
should I believe? in the relevant manner. If  it is not, then the same argument can be applied mutatis mutandis 
to whatever concept is deemed as pertinent in order to answer the question what should I believe?
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order to answer our question. 
Suppose  that  (2)  is  the  case,  that  is,  that  we  end  up  having  two  concepts  of  
justification.  If  they  are  significantly  different,  then  they  would  give  us  different 
instructions about what to believe (if  they don't,  then,  for our purposes, this case falls  
within category (1)). But then, how can we choose which one of  them we should follow? 
In order to answer this question, we can't, by hypothesis, appeal to a further independent 
concept of  justification that would allow us to choose among the two others, for in that  
case we would have three and not two concepts of  justification,  contrary to the initial 
hypothesis. So we must decide which concept is to be followed by relying either on concept  
1 or on concept 2. If  we argue in favour of  concept 1 by using concept 1, then we are 
begging the question against the proposal to employ concept 2. If  we use concept 2 in 
order to justify employment of  concept 2, then we beg the question against the proposal to 
employ concept 1. If  we use one concept in order to motivate the use of  the other, then 
our reasoning is  self-defeating.  Hence, again,  we are left with no guidance.  Conceptual 
resources  alone  are not enough to answer the question  what should I believe?  if  they deliver 
two concepts of  justification that compete for being the concept that we should use in 
order to answer our question.
This brings us to (1), the apparently most favourable option. Even if  we put on a  
side the obvious worry that we do not seem to possess only one concept of  justification59, 
there is another serious problem. Suppose that we end up discovering that we do have a 
single concept of  justification according to which we should believe only when conditions 
J obtain. It is still an open question whether we should believe when conditions J obtain, 
that is, whether we should use J in order to orient our thinking or not. The reason is that 
absent any further motivation we have no guarantee that our concept tracks the truth about 
the conditions in which we should believe. The mere fact that we have a given concept of 
justification doesn't entail that the conditions described by that concept are the conditions 
that we should follow in order to believe the truth. But then, suppose we want to settle the 
question whether we should judge according to concept J or not. How are we going to 
answer this question? Either by following J or not. If  we do follow J, then we beg the  
question against potential suggestions to form belief  in other circumstances. If, however,  
we do not follow J, then the proposal that we should judge according to J is self-stultifying. 
One way to solve the problem is to show that it is constitutive of  our reasoning to 
59 Works by experimental philosophers put a lot of  pressure on the monist assumption that we do have a 
single concept of  justification. Moreover, even if  we do not appeal to experimental evidence, reflection  
on the actual employment of  the method of  cases seem to reveal that we do indeed have more than one 
concept of  justification. See Zanetti (ms2) for an argument to that effect. 
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respect conditions specified by J (J provides a strongly constitutive norm) or to show that it 
is constitutive of  our reasoning to be evaluated as correct and incorrect according to a  
norms specified by J. This appeal to constitutive norms is one way to to if  one wants to 
solve  the  problem about  guidance,  but  in  that  case  the  answer  won't  be  provided  by 
conceptual analysis, but through a discovery of  the structure of  cognition itself, and the 
way  in  which  we  discover  what  is  the  structure  of  cognition  itself  is  by  appealing  to 
phenomenological evidence. 
Let me present you the argument with a particular case that makes the problem 
very vivid. Suppose that a modest internalist account of  justification captures our single  
concept of  justification. This will permit us, for instance (and simplifying a bit for the sake  
of  illustration) to believe that  p when I have a perceptual experience that  p. Crucially, I 
don't need to have a  prior  justification for taking my perceptual system to be reliable. I 
understand that I have a concept of  justification such that in these circumstances it is true  
that I am justified in so believing. Yet, the question whether I should believe that p in these 
circumstances is entirely intelligible to me. One way of  asking it is whether I should judge 
according to that concept of  justification. One reason why it is intelligible to so asking is 
that  I  understand that  I  might  judge  according  to  different  instructions  –  and this  is  
intelligible even if  the concept that captures these instructions is not, by hypothesis, the  
concept that conceptual analysis has (somewhat miraculously) baptised as the true concept 
of  justification. Thus, I understand that it is possible for me to refrain from judging that p 
when I am presented with the relevant experience and take myself  to be allowed to judge  
that p only when the evidence for p is conclusive. Given that this question is intelligible, I 
now have a problem: how do I choose between the internalist modest kind of  justification,  
and the instruction to judge only upon conclusive evidence? Since I have this problem,  
conceptual analysis is not enough – if  it were enough I would not have this problem, for 
the question what to judge would be settled by the discovery about the right concept of  
justification. And of  course, there is no non-question begging way of  arguing that I should 
judge  according  to  the  modest  internalist  kind  of  justification.  If  I  use  that  kind  of 
instructions for so concluding, then I am begging the question against the proposal to  
judge only on the basis of  conclusive evidence. If, however, I so conclude on the basis of 
other instructions, then the conclusion is self-stultifying. 
Thus, we need more than investigations about our concepts. What do we need? 
One option is to be a naturalist like Kornblith (2002) and (2007) and to say that what we 
need  is  not  so  much  conceptual  analysis  but  rather  to  isolate  the  natural  kind  of  
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justification (or, in his case, knowledge). Ideally, the natural kind would be provided by our 
best scientific theory (he relies on ethology). The problem with this approach is twofold.  
First,  as  many have pointed out60,  in order to know whether some natural  kind is  the 
natural kind justification or knowledge we should have some prior grasp of  the conditions for 
something  to  be  justification  or  knowledge and  this  prior  grasp  is  precisely  that  which 
conceptual analysis is meant to provide61. Second, the problem is that even if  we accept 
that our single concept tracks some natural kind, this discovery doesn't answer the question 
what should I believe? Again, as argued before, it is still intelligible to ask whether we should  
believe according to that  concept of  justification.  The simple fact  that  this concept of 
justification tracks a natural kind doesn't block the intelligibility of  the question whether we 
should judge according to the instructions provided by the concept, rather than by the  
instructions provided by some other concept. Thus, we need to appeal to something else. 
Here is a natural way in which phenomenology can be seen as necessary to answer 
our normative question about what we should believe62. Judgments are the answers to our 
questions. We want to know the truth, and our desiring it gets fundamentally expressed in 
the form of  the  questions  that we ask. When we ask a question we want a true answer. 
Judgment is the form of  the satisfaction of  our cognitive desires, desires that are expressed 
in the form of  questions. Now, phenomenology tells us what are the conditions in which 
our desires are taken to be satisfied, that is the conditions in which a judgment is taken as 
correct, or justified. If  we can find these conditions for satisfaction as exhibited in the very 
structure  of  cognition,  then  we  can  hope  to  answer  our  question  by  relying  on  a  
phenomenological investigation about the structure of  cognition. If  that were possible, we 
would  not  be  in  a  position  to  intelligibly  raise  the  challenge I  have  raised  against  the 
proposals to appeal to conceptual analysis and/or natural science. The challenge was: in the 
60 See, for instance, Goldman (2005). 
61 One can still think that they are natural kinds, and be a Camberra Planner according to which scientific  
investigation helps us to locate our concepts in the world – and eventually, the discovery of  natural kinds 
help us to restructure our concepts so as to rightly capture them. For Camberra planners's conception of 
conceptual analysis, see Jackson (1998), Smith (1994), and the essays collected in Braddon-Mitchell  & 
Nolan (2009), particularly Nolan (2009). Even if  one follows these lines, this approach still fails to answer 
the question what should I believe?, as argued in the main text. 
62 There is another argument against the appeal to conceptual analysis as a means for answering the question 
what should I believe? The reason is that, simply, concepts are paradigmatically the sort of  things that can be 
changed or lost, and moreover they could have been different from those we actually happen to possess.  
As a result, we can't take a discovery about the concepts we now happen to possess as sufficient for  
answering our question. For we understand that if  we had had different epistemological concepts, we  
would have provided different answers, and so we would have believed differently. But in this case we 
can't give credit to the answer that our actual concepts suggest as the right one. Moreover, the view that  
sees our epistemological concepts as contingent and as the ground for answering our epistemological 
questions is  self-defeating because  it  entails  that  belief  in  that  very view is  licensed by appealing to 
concepts that might have been different – if  they had been different we would have believed a different  
epistemological theory.
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case we have a single  concept,  either we use it  to arrive at our theory about the right 
concept of  justification, or we don't.  If  we do, the strategy is question begging. If  we 
don't, the strategy is self-stultifying. This challenge doesn't apply to the present suggestion 
because if  some norm is constitutive of  cognition then it is inevitable for us to be under 
the legislation of  that norm even when we attempt to ground it. And even when we try to  
make it intelligible to us the possibility to rely on other norms, since this activity is still a  
cognitive one, even this activity will be under the legislation of  the relevant norm that is  
constitutive of  cognition. 
The argument just  presented is  largely  inspired by Christine Korsgaard's  critical 
discussion of  moral  realism. (See, among others of  her works, Korsgaard (2003)).  The 
thought is that normative truths are answers to our (practical) problems. Our problems, in the 
theoretical realm, are our  questions. And our questions are so structured that the form of 
satisfaction of  the desire that they express should be of  a certain kind, that is,  should 
respect particular norms. This is how epistemic norms are grounded in the shape of  our 
theoretical problems. And we discover what these norms are by discovering what it takes to 
solve  our  theoretical  problems  –  that  is,  our  questions.  And  these  discoveries  are 
phenomenological  in  the  sense  that  they  are  gained  through  an  investigation  of  the 
structure and commitments of  our inquiring conscious mind. 
But how is it that an appeal to phenomenology will allow us to answer the question 
what should I believe? – understood as a question about the conditions in which it is justified 
to take a proposition as true? It should show that there are conditions in which we can 
answer satisfactorily the question should I believe according to this standard rather than these other  
standards?. One way of  doing so – and this is the approach I am going to adopt and defend 
in the subsequent chapters – is by showing that whenever we raise a question we posit some 
norm as the one the satisfaction of  which is necessary in order to have an answer, hence a 
justified judgment, to it. To anticipate, I will argue that a question as to whether p is true is 
possible as long as one doesn't have conclusive grounds for  p  (this is a truth discovered 
through the eidetic method). On this ground I will argue that having conclusive grounds is 
a constitutive aim or desire of  cognition. Then,  on this latter ground I will argue that  
having conclusive grounds  is the norm of  judgment, and in that sense the answer to our  
normative question is that we should believe what we have conclusive grounds for.
I will argue that as a matter of  fact the normative profile of  our questions and 
judgments is unitary in such a fashion that whenever we engage in cognition we do want 
conclusive grounds for the propositions to be judged, and in that sense the answer to our 
56
question is quite unitary and straightforward: we should believe what we have conclusive 
grounds for believing. Yet, it is not the case that phenomenological reflection is necessary 
for answering our normative questions only if  it delivers this particular result I am going to 
argue for. The only requirement for a phenomenological reflection to settle our question is  
to discover conditions in which it is no longer intelligible to raise it with respect to a given 
issue. As I will argue, it is no longer intelligible to raise a question as to whether I should 
believe a given p only when I have conclusive grounds for it. But one might argue that this  
is not always so. There might be contexts in which fallible grounds are enough to answer  
our questions in a satisfactory manners. Whether there is this contextual dependence is 
something that will have to be established through phenomenological inquiry. 
Even  though  the  way  our  conscious  mind  is  actually  structured  will  be  what 
motivates the acceptance of  the view that we should believe only what we have conclusive 
grounds for, there is an argument that can be given now to the effect that if  there is no  
unitary norm for our mind, then the possibility of  reflexively stable judgment is in danger.  
Here is how it goes. Suppose that our mind is so structured that sometimes conditions 1 
are enough for justified believing, and sometimes conditions 2 are enough. Suppose further  
that  the  two conditions  license  different  incompatible  beliefs.  Now,  again,  what  norm 
should  we  follow? Well,  this  will  depend  on  the  norm that  applies  to  the  very  latter 
question, a norm which in turns will tell us that in some occasions we will have to follow a  
given  norm.  But  if  the  norms  of  our  questions  vary  from time  to  time,  contexts  to 
contexts, then our answer at a time might be different from our answer at another time. 
And so our doxastic system won't be reflexively stable.
This  is  an  argument  –  indeed  a  very  compressed  one,  which  will  be  further 
discussed later on – for thinking that stability and unity in the normative profile of  our 
inquiring mind is needed in order to have a reflexively stable judgment. Phenomenology 
will settle, or so I will argue, that the mind is actually governed by a single fundamental  
norm – the norm of  judging only what is absolutely certain.
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Chapter III
Judgment
In this Chapter I begin a systematic investigation into the normative profile of  our mental  
states. I will start by focusing on judgment, and will try to establish a very strong claim:  
namely that by judging that p one is committed to it being certain that p. In order to prove 
this claim I will try to prove the following uncotenability claim: namely that it is impossible 
to comprehendingly judge at the same time that p and that p might be false. Both claims are 
highly controversial and we will see how hard it is to defend them from objections. 
I myself  am unsure about whether the latter uncotenability claim is true, but I will 
try my best to persuade you (and myself) that it is. If  it were true it would promise to offer  
the resources to ground epistemic normativity and in particular norms for seeking absolute  
certainty in the very nature of  our mind.  
At the end of  the Chapter I will try to make room for the possibility of  grounding 
the claim that judgment commits to certainty in the nature of  the mind without appealing 
to facts about uncotenability. The strategy will be to say that even if  it is possible to judge 
that p and that p might be false, there still is an experienced normative pressure to reject the  
possibility that p is false, or to reject the truth of  p. 
Grounding normativity in an experience of  normative pressure will  be naturally 
perceived as a suspicious move. What does an experience of  pressure has to do with what I 
should  judge?  The pressure  might  simply  be  a  psychological  tinsel  with  no normative 
import. 
If  this last move doesn't work, I will then ask the reader to wait for Chapter V and 
Chapter XI for a stronger direct argument for the conclusion that judgment commits one 
to certainty and for the more general conclusion that inquiry is aimed at certainty. The 
argument, to anticipate, will be that the possibility of  raising a doubt about the truth-value 
of  a given proposition remains open until  one possesses certainty for that proposition. 
This shows, I will argue, that it is a structural feature of  cognition to posit certainty as the 
ultimate aim to be achieved in order to give peace to the mind. 
§3.1 Being certain 
When we do have absolute certainty, what sort of  thing do we have? Surely, we are in some 
sort of  mental state. There are two questions about it. One concerns the nature of  that  
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mental state. What is it? What does it  feel like to  be  (psychologically) certain? Is it  like 
judging? Or is it some sui generis kind of  mental state which is distinct yet similar to a  
judgment? The other question concerns the sort of  epistemic credentials that this mental 
state should possess in  order to amount to a  justified absolute certainty.  What are the 
conditions that must be satisfied in order to be justified in being in that mental state? (See  
Chapter I for a discussion of  the latter question). 
Typically, when we think of  the interplay between epistemology and reflection on 
the nature and phenomenology of  cognition, we endorse a picture according to which the 
conditions for being justified having a given mental state are not the very same conditions 
that must be satisfied in order to be in that state. Consider judgment. It is platitudinous that 
judgments might be unjustified (and false, of  course). It is therefore entirely possible to 
have  judgments  –  to be  in  a  state  of  judgment  –  even  if  the  conditions  for  justified 
judgment are not satisfied. 
Should the mental state of  certainty be thought of  along the lines of  this picture or 
not? It is fair to say that the standard approach to certainty consists in taking it as a state of  
mind similar if  not equivalent to belief  and judgment, and to signal its specificity by saying  
that  it  is  a  state  of  mind  which  enjoys  a  special  epistemic  pedigree.  Thus, 
phenomenologically speaking, according to a reductivist model, there is no introspectible 
difference between having a judgment that falls short of  certainty and having a judgment  
that amounts to absolute certainty (assuming that judgment is the bearer of  certainty). The 
only difference is in their epistemic credentials. Even if  one were to concede that knowing 
or believing that one's judgment is certain does make a phenomenological difference, the 
difference would not concern the mental  state of  judgment itself.  It  would rather be a  
difference in the way in which one relates to that judgment. The second-order judgment 
that one's first-order judgment is certain might be what accounts for the phenomenological 
difference between having a judgment that one takes to be certain and having a judgment  
that one doesn't take to be certain. Yet, the state of  being psychologically certain itself 
would just be equivalent to the first order judgment. The crucial feature of  this model then 
is the fact that certainty just is a judgment like any other judgment, the only difference 
being in the specific epistemic quality that it possesses. 
Another  way  in  which  one  can  reduce  psychological  certainty  in  terms  of 
judgments is by reducing it not to a single judgment but to a complex of  judgments. One 
might think that it is part of  the conditions for being psychologically certain that p that one 
has  a  first-order  judgment  that  p  and  a  second-order  judgment  that  p  is  certain,  or 
59
something of  the sort. This picture still understands psychological certainty as being just 
like any other judgment, except that it is accompanied by a further judgment that makes it  
different, from the perspective of  the believer, simple judgments and judgments that the 
subject takes to be certain.
If  one was not to think of  certainty according to the two pictures just described, 
one could think of  certainty as being some special mental state which differs from belief 
and judgment even though it shares with them the fact of  being an alethically committed  
mental state, since being certain that p is a way of  taking p to be true. This model will then 
allow  for  two  pictures.  According  to  one  picture,  the  conditions  for  being  in  the 
psychological  state  of  certainty  still  differ  from  the  conditions  for  having  a  justified 
psychological state of  certainty. In this respect, certainty will be like judgments for they 
both  can  be unjustified  (and false).  This  seems to  have some initial  phenomenological 
plausibility, since it seems that we can be certain of  many things that upon reflection reveal  
themselves to fail to be certain.
The other way of  understanding certainty is to understand it as a special state such 
that the conditions for achieving it and the conditions for its justification are the same. 
Whenever one is in that special psychological state that takes p to be true, p is guaranteed to 
be true, and it is guaranteed to be true in such a manner that one can't fail to recognize, as 
it  were,  that  it  is  guaranteed  to  be  true.  This  picture  comes  closer  to  understanding  
certainty as a peculiar revelatory or epiphanic mental state. This picture has some initial  
phenomenological plausibility if  we think of  it against the background of  mystical searches  
for  the  truth63,  where  revelation  of  the  truth  is  closely  tied  with  the  occurrence  of 
experiences that seem to represent a discontinuity from the normal stream of  our mental  
life.  One  respectable  way64 of  resisting  this  picture  while  conceding  its  initial 
63 One need not to look to mystical intellectual contexts, however. Husserl himself, among others, defended 
the  possibility  of  enjoying  particular  intuitive  evidences  with  this  certainty-conferring  self-revelatory 
character. See, for instance, Husserl (1931/1960). 
64 A brief  note on the possibility of  extraordinary experiences that give special access to the truth. In this 
Dissertation I don't discuss the place where I think the most insightful discussions of  certainties are to be 
found,  namely  religious  texts  belonging  to  different  traditions,  mostly  mystical  traditions  or  anyway 
traditions where the  quest  for  truth goes  through a disciplined research.  However,  I  want  to briefly  
present a couple of  obvious reasons to block any sort of  naif  scepticism concerning the possibility of  sui  
generis experiences that give a certainty-conferring access to the truth. First of  all, one can't be certain that 
these experiences don't exist. The fact that one never had (or never recognized) such experiences doesn't  
entail that these experiences don't exist. To think otherwise could be a way of  taking one's own (possibly  
present) limitations to be the standards to use in order to measure our capacity of  knowledge. Second, 
any sort of  argument against the possibility of  such experiences has a great chance to be ineffective qua 
argument whose aim is to establish with certainty the existence of  such experiences. Either such experiences are among 
the evidences relied upon by the argument or they don't.  If  they do, the argument is obviously self-
defeating.  If  they  don't,  the  argument  is  likely  to  be  question-begging.  This  seems  to  be  true  of 
naturalistic arguments against the possibility of  such experiences, and these seem to be the more or less 
articulated arguments that one nowadays has in mind when one quickly dismisses the possibility of  special 
access to the truth. If  the argument relies on the fact that a mind like ours that belong to the natural order 
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phenomenological plausibility is to say that the special state is not the mental state of  being 
certain itself, but rather the source of  evidence for then judging with certainty what has  
been seen, where the judgment is then either understood as being equivalent to everyday 
judgment, or a sui generis kind of  judgment whose conditions of  obtainment, however, are 
not its conditions of  justification. Yet, a defender of  this way of  looking at certainty might 
insist that there are particular experiences where certain knowledge is achieved in a way 
that isn't reducible to the formation of  a judgment on the basis of  experiential evidence 65. 
Here I will put this picture of  certainty on a side, and will concentrate on the other 
models, namely those that understand psychological certainty as reducible to belief  (or set 
of  beliefs) and those that understand psychological certainty as a sui generis kind of  mental  
state where the conditions for being in that state and the conditions for the justification of 
that state can come apart. Whether certainty has to be thought of  according to this special  
model or rather according to the two more traditional models is a question that should be 
settled on phenomenological grounds. Moreover, we need not assume from the outset that 
these models have to be in competition. There might exist both special kinds of  mental  
states that deserve to be called certainties and that are captured by the third model, as well 
as kinds of  mental states that deserve to be called certainties that are captured by one or  
both of  the two more traditional models. 
So, having put on a side for the moment the special model of  certainty according to 
which  certainty  is  a  sui  generis  self-revelatory  mental  state  that  occurs  only  when the 
conditions for its  justification occurs we are left  with two approaches.  One consists  in 
thinking of  the mental state of  certainty as identical with judgment, the other consists in 
thinking of  that mental state as being peculiar yet very similar to judgment, and anyway a  
can't transcend it or somehow have a special access to truths, then one might reasonably complain that 
the appeal to a naturalistic picture presupposes an answer to the very issue that is at stake. Thus, we can't  
quickly dismiss the possibility that there be special experiences which provide a special access to the truth.  
That would be a childish move for a seriously committed seeker of  the truth.
65 I myself  think that this way of  thinking about certainty is true of  many paradigmatic certainties like those  
expressed by the cogito and the sum. In order to solve the problem of  certainty presented in the first 
Chapter one would have to deny the very model of  knowledge which is presupposed by the construction 
of  the necessary and sufficient conditions for absolute certainty: that is, the model according to which  
certainty amounts to a  judgment (or anyways some alethically committal mental act) which is based on 
some ground. Once you have adopted this model, given the principle of  reflexivity, there is no way in 
which one can have certain knowledge. But the model is arguably wrong. To briefly show why it fails, 
consider the case of  the cogito – I am thinking (in the broad 'Cartesian' sense of  thinking which roughly  
means 'having an experience). In order to know that I am thinking, it is not that I first become aware of  a  
ground (my present experience) and then on this basis I judge that I am thinking. This might happen, but 
the way in which certainty is achieved is by having a particular experience which is the experience of 
understanding that this (the very experience I am having now, which also includes the present moment of 
understanding) is what it takes to be thinking. So construed, there is not a separation between the ground 
and that which has to be grounded: the two are one and the same. This is, of  course, very rough, but I  
think that this is  the road to take.  Also, I think it  would be very useful  in this  context to appeal  to 
Husserl's theory of  intuitive fulfilment. But this is work for another occasion. See Husserl (1900/1). 
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mental state that might occur even when its justificatory conditions aren't satisfied66. Our 
question boils  down to this:  is  psychological  certainty identical  with judgment? In this 
Chapter I will argue that judging that  p is in an important sense committed to  p's being 
certain. This provides evidence for thinking that psychological certainty just is judgment. 
§3.2 Alethically committed mental phenomena
What is a judgment? It is part of  the aim of  this chapter to partially answer this question 
by providing an analysis of  the normative profile of  judgment. Before starting to employ 
the method of  eidetic variation, we first need some preliminary observations that help us in 
isolating the sort of  phenomenon we are going to investigate. 
There  are  conscious  and  unconscious  aspects  of  our  mind.  Here  I  am  only 
concerned  with  conscious  phenomena.  There  are  dispositional  and  non-dispositional 
states. Here I am not concerned with dispositional mental states. By 'judgment' I will refer  
to the conscious act consisting in taking a proposition to be true. By 'belief' I will refer to a  
dispositional mental state or to a disposition to form judgments67. 
I am not going to make any hypothesis about the connection between judgment 
and belief, beside the hypothesis that all the conscious phenomena that consist in taking a  
proposition to be true in a committal way (more on this below) are judgments. Let me 
explain. Granted that there are both dispositional beliefs and judgments, one question is 
whether judgments are the only alethically committed mental states that are conscious. One 
might think that within the conscious life of  the mind there appears  both judgment  and 
beliefs.  That is,  the very same thing  which has an unconscious dispositional life (belief  as 
understood as a dispositional state) also sometimes appears at the surface, as it were, along  
with its sister alethically committed mental act of  judgment. Another view will be to argue 
that all conscious alethically committed mental states are judgments, whose nature differs 
from that of  beliefs, which only have an unconscious life. In what follows I will simply 
assume that all conscious occurrences of  phenomena consisting in taking a proposition to 
be true in a fully  committal  way are judgments,  and thus belong to a single kind.  The 
assumption  can  be  argued  for,  though  I  won't  do  it  here,  by  noticing  that 
phenomenologically speaking there is no clear clue that would vindicate the thought that 
66 Another proposal is to think that belief  comes in degrees, and that certainty is belief  with credence 1. I 
will consider and dismiss this proposal at the end of  the Chapter.
67 People who endorse a dispositionalist account of  belief  according to which if  one believes that p, then 
one has the tendency to consciously affirm that p if  one is asked whether p include Cohen (1992), Alston 
(1996), Schwitzgebel (2002), and Smithies (2012). 
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some conscious acts consisting in taking a proposition to be true in a fully committal way 
are  judgments,  whereas other  are  the  conscious manifestations  of  dispositional  beliefs.  
Surely,  some judgments  are  the  manifestation of  one's  dispositional  beliefs,  but  I  won't 
proceed under the assumption that there are no manifestations of  dispositional beliefs that 
are committal in the way judgment is without being of  the same nature of  judgment. Here 
one might either think that these manifestations are the very dispositional beliefs that are 
brought  to  consciousness,  or  one  might  rather  think  that  these  judgments  and  the 
corresponding  dispositional  beliefs  are  just  different  types  of  phenomena,  and  I  will  
proceed by assuming the latter6869. 
Having distinguished belief  from judgment, we should now distinguish judgments 
from mental states that somehow resemble judgment since they consist in the act of  taking 
some proposition to be true70.  The following are  phenomena that  in  some sense  can be 
described  as  acts  that  takes  their  content  as true:  judgment,  assumption,  acceptance, 
supposition, and possibly others.
Judgment should be distinguished from assumption, supposition and acceptance. 
Loosely put, the sort of  difference which I am interested in here is that to judge that p is to 
really  be committed to the truth of  p, whereas to assume, suppose and accept that p is to 
take p as true without really be fully committed to its truth. 
Take assumption and supposition first. Assumption can be done for the sake of  an 
argument, that is, in order to see where the assumption leads one. When I assume that p I 
am not fully committing myself  to its truth, but I am merely treating it as true in order to  
see where it leads. The proof  is that I can at the same time assume that  p is true for the 
sake of  an argument while judging  that it is not. Similar observations apply to supposition. 
I can suppose a proposition to be true in order to engage in a thought experiment. But I  
can at the same time believe and judge that that proposition is indeed false. 
68 According to Crane (2014) belief  understood as a dispositional state can't have both a conscious and an 
unconscious life. I agree, assuming that there is such thing as dispositional beliefs. See Pitt (2016) for  
discussion of  Crane's view. Pitt also agrees that judgments do not have an unconscious life, and argues  
that all there is to our unconscious life are dispositions to believe, and not dispositional beliefs proper. See 
Audi (1994) for the distinction between dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe. Both views are  
compatible with mine. The notion of  a disposition to believe is also sometimes referred to as a tacit  
belief. See for instance Lycan (1986).
69 I take it that there is a phenomenological ground for claiming that all conscious endorsement of  the truth 
of  a  proposition  belong  to  the  same  type.  Phenomenologically  speaking,  there  is  no  introspectible 
difference between the act of  judging that p as a result of  a deliberation on a new issue and judging that p 
when one is by so judging bringing about one's dispositional belief  that p (or when one's judging that p 
comes as the result  of  one being disposed to so judge:  see Audi (1994) for  the distinction between 
dispositional belief  and disposition to belief).
70 I assume that taking a given proposition to be false is reducible to taking it to be true that that proposition 
is false. Though I don't want to argue for it here, I think that phenomenological reflection reveals that 
rejection is not a different mental state from judgment.
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Importantly,  both  assumption  and  supposition  differ  from  the  mere  act  of 
entertaining a proposition for I can entertain a proposition without taking a stance about  
its  truth-value.  Once assumption and supposition are contrasted with the mere acts of  
entertaining a proposition, it is clear that in some sense they consist in taking a proposition 
to be true, and yet they are not doing so in the way in which judgment does. 
Notice  moreover  that  while  judgment  can't  be  formed  at  will,  supposition, 
assumption, and entertaining can. I can assume at will a proposition to see where it leads; I 
can suppose at will that a proposition is true, when I engage in a thought experiment, for  
instance;  I can also just entertain a proposition at will  in order to explore some of  its  
properties. But I can't judge a proposition at will71. 
If  there  is  any such thing as  acceptance,  then it  should be appreciated that  its 
commitment is weaker than (or just different from) the commitment of  judgment. Van 
Fraassen (1980) has argued that often in science scientists accept theories without really 
believing and consciously judging that they are true, and Bratman (1999) has presented a 
case that has been used to show that sometimes one can believe and judge propositions to 
be true without however accepting them. For our purposes, we set on a side commitments  
like acceptance and focus on judgment72. 
Velleman  (2000)  takes  acceptance  as  being that  which  judgment  and the  other 
cognitive attitudes like supposition and assumption have in common, namely the fact that  
they all somehow consists in attitudes that take or regard their contents as true. Velleman 
then contrasts judgment from other attitudes by saying that they differ in the aim with  
which a given proposition is accepted. Judgment is accepting a proposition for the sake of 
accepting it as true if  and only if  it is true, whereas imagining, for instance, is accepting a  
proposition  as true for the sake of  something else, like entertainment. I will discuss and 
reject Velleman's account in Chapter IX. 
To sum up, a judgment that p is then the conscious act that consists in taking p as 
true in a way which is committal, whereas other attitudes like acceptance, supposition, and 
assumption do not commit the person who has them to their truth. 
71 There is widespread agreement in the literature that belief  and judgment can't be formed at will.  For 
defenders  of  the  impossibility  of  believing  at  will,  see  Alston  (1989),  Adler  (2002),  Church  (2002),  
Buckareff  (2014), Swinburne (2005),  Yamada (2012); Williams (1973) O’Shaughnessy (2000) and Scott-
Kakures (1994). There are however some people who claim to have found counterexamples to the claim. 
See  Steup  (2000),  (2008),  (2012),  Ryan  (2003),  Hieronymi  (2008),  Ginet  (2001),  Nickel  (2010),  Peels  
(2015), Johnston (1995). However, even if  these counterexamples were genuine, they would not prove, as  
they  defenders  themselves  admit,  that  it  is  always possible  to  believe/judge  at  will.  They  show that 
believing/judging at will is possible only in very specific circumstances. We are always in a position to  
suppose, assume and entertain something at will. 
72 For discussions on acceptance see also  Harman (1986), Cohen (1989), (1992), Lehrer (1990), Velleman 
(2000), and Frankish (2004).
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There  is  another  cluster  of  issues  that  we  should  briefly  mention  before 
proceeding. Is judgment an all-or-nothing affair, or is it an alethically committed gradated 
attitude like confidence, if  there is any such thing? This question intersects a wider set of  
concerns  which  relate to debate  about  the  relationship between degrees  of  belief  and 
outright  belief.  I  will  explain  how the  discussion  I  am conducting  here  affects  and is  
affected by discussion on credences and outright belief  at the end of  the Chapter, as I will  
present possible objections to the claims I propose in what follows. For the time being, I 
will assume that judgment doesn't come in degrees and will only consider it as an outright 
judgment.
Having circumscribed the phenomenon of  judgment, I now proceed to offer an 
analysis  of  its  normative  profile.  As  explained  in  the  previous  chapter,  the  analysis  is 
conducted  by  engaging  in  the  method  of  eidetic  variation.  The  aim  is  to  discover 
uncotenability claims – claims about whether two mental states can be held at the same 
time – in order to have evidence about what one is committed to accept if  one is judging 
that p is the case.
§3.3 To judge that p is to be committed to p's being true
Easy claims first. One can't judge that p while at the same time judging that p is not true or 
while at the same time being consciously and comprehendingly open minded as to whether  
p is true or not73. 
§3.4 To judge that p is to be committed to there being grounds for judging that p
In order to test that, try to put yourself  in a state such that you judge that p is true while at 
the same time you judge to have no ground for judging that p is true (or while at the same 
time you  are  consciously  and comprehendingly  open minded  as  to  whether  you  have 
grounds  for  judging  that  p is  true).  This  is  impossible,  I  submit.  Remember  that  the 
category of  grounds is quite inclusive, since for something to count as a ground for p  is 
just for it to be taken by the subject as speaking in favour of  the truth of  p. Suppose you 
really take yourself  to have no ground for judging that p. Then to judge that p is true is not 
possible  for  you,  because  judging  that  p would  be  entirely  arbitrary  from  your  own 
73 In  Chapter  IX  I  will  defend  a  minimalist  view  of  the  thought  that  truth  is  the  constitutive  aim of 
judgment. The discussion will further clarify the sense in which judgment is committed to the truth of  the 
judged content.
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perspective (why not judging that not-p instead?). 
We might see the same point by reflecting on doxastic deliberation74.  Could you 
possibly come to judge that p while you take yourself  to haven't discovered any ground yet for 
so judging? No. You could eventually have the dispositional belief  that  p, but when you 
raise the question whether p is true self-consciously, so long as you don't take yourself  to 
have grounds you won't be judging that p, even if  the disposition is present and operative 
at  earlier  and later  moments.  Notice  that  this  result  is  achieved even if  we try  to put 
ourselves in  a  mental  situation in  which we are open minded as to whether  there  are  
grounds for our judgment.  This  is  impossible,  again. One positively needs grounds for  
judging, otherwise the judgment won't survive reflection.  
Here again some possible misunderstanding should be avoided. The claim is  not  
that there is no coming to form a judgment that  p  unless one also judges (maybe before 
coming to formation of  the judgment that p) that there are grounds for so judging. If  that 
were the claim it would both be phenomenologically implausible and have the consequence 
that judging is impossible (we would be like Achille trying to reach the Tortoise). Moreover, 
we might even allow the existence of  judgments formed on the basis of  no ground, if  
there be any75. The point here is simply that a judgment won't survive reflection unless one 
is prepared to judge that there are grounds for so judging, were the question about grounds 
to be raised. This claim is compatible with the possibility of  believers that don't possess the  
concept of  ground for belief. Even though it seems difficult to make sense of  a believer 
who is not capable of  basing one's belief  on grounds that she understands to speak in  
favour of  the truth of  the judged proposition, we might make room for the possibility that 
one lacks a proper concept of  epistemic ground. In this case, there would be no committed  
proposition about grounds that she would be able to understand and, as a consequence,  
required to judge as true in order to keep her initial judgment – however, I guess that the  
believer might be capable of  endorsing the commitment about ground if  the content of 
the commitment is specified with less sophisticated concepts.
Are there possible counterexamples to this claim? There have been attempts to 
argue that doxastic deliberation is possible on the basis of  non-evidential considerations, 
that  is,  on the  basis  of  considerations  that  don't  speak  in  favour  of  the  truth of  the 
proposition the belief  in which they are meant to support. Even if  we grant the possibility 
of  such cases (though see Chapter IX for a rejection of  the claim that these cases are  
74 By doxastic deliberation I mean the activity consisting in trying to make up one's mind about the truth-
value of  some proposition. 
75 Though see again Chapter IX for the suggestion that there is no ungrounded judgment, that is, whenever  
we form a judgment, we form it on the basis of  some alethic ground.
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possible) these are still compatible with my claim. For, even if  it is possible, let's assume, to  
judge that p on the basis of  no alethic ground, but rather on the basis of  some prudential  
ground, say, the point still remains that if  one raises the question whether there are alethic 
grounds for  p  one would not be capable of  judging (or keep judging) that  p  while she 
comprehendingly judges that there are no grounds for p76. 
§3.5 Five models about the relationship between a mental state and its commitments
When we are committed to the presence of  grounds for judging, are we also committed to  
our grounds having a specific epistemic quality or not? Surely, we are committed to our 
grounds being  good enough. But are we also committed to our grounds being  conclusive for 
judging that p? If  that were so, it would mean that judgment is committed to infallibility. 
That might seem incredible at a first sight, yet this is precisely what seems to be the case. In 
order to prepare oneself  to see that judging commits to infallibility, we should first make a  
digression. 
There  broadly  are  five  different  ways  of  understanding  the  relation  between 
judgment (and the other mental states that give rise to commitments) and its commitments. 
76 This is a long footnote in which I argue that to judge that p is to be committed to its being (alethically) correct to  
judge that p. One can't judge that p is true while at the same time she judges it to be (alethically) incorrect 
to believe that p is true (or while at the same time she is consciously and comprehendingly open minded 
about whether it is alethically correct to judge that p is true). 
Of  course, the claim is  not  that judgment that  p  occurs only when one also judges that it is 
correct to judge that  p is true. This is phenomenologically implausible and anyway will make judgment  
impossible for it will demand that our mind be stuck with an infinity of  judgments. The only thing that is  
claimed here is that if  one judges that p, then, if one is asked to take a stance with respect to the claim that 
it is correct to judge that  p, one can keep her initial judgment only if  she judges it to be true that it is  
correct to judge that p. To reject it (i.e., judge that it is false) or to be open minded about it will destroy 
one's judgment that p. 
Of  course, it might be the case that some believer doesn't understand what the meaning of 
alethic correctness is. My view doesn't entail that this person can't have judgments. Simply, she won't be 
capable of  entertaining one of  the propositions she would be committed to were she to understand them.
The main claim is also compatible with the possibility we have of  thinking of  our judgments 
from a  third-personal  evaluative  perspective.  So,  I  can  evaluate  my judgment  as  correct  or  incorrect 
according to a variety of  evaluative dimensions. To illustrate, I can think that in so far as the prudential  
dimension, say, is concerned, my judgment that p is not correct if  it makes me sad where it is one of  my 
goal to be happy. But from a first-personal deliberative point of  view, if  I master the concept of  alethic  
correctness, I must be in a position to recognize my judgment that p as alethically correct, where the issue 
to be raised, even if  I might at the same time judge that to judge that p is undesirable or incorrect given 
other non-alethic aims. 
The only dimension of  correctness which is efficacious from a deliberative  point of  view is the 
one of  alethic correctness. As I will argue in Chapter IX, we can ground our judgment on alethic grounds 
only,  namely  on grounds that  speak  in  favour  of  the  truth  of  the  proposition  to  be  judged.  Thus,  
evaluating  our  judgments  in  terms  of  their  correctness  or  incorrectness  with  respect  to  non-alethic  
dimensions like prudential and moral ones has no impact whatsoever in our deliberation. I can't form a 
judgment on the basis of  non-alethic reasons, and the only grounds for judging are alethic ones. Nor can 
I abandon a judgment that p upon recognizing that it is not prudentially correct say, so long as I take it to 
be  alethically  grounded.  Nor can I  maintain  a  judgment  if  I  take  it  to  be  without  sufficient  alethic 
grounds, even if  I judge at the same time that it is correct as far as my prudential goals are concerned.
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First model. A given mental state sometimes give rise to commitments, sometimes it 
doesn't. There is no core set of  commitments which are constitutive for a given mental  
state, though the mental state sometimes might give rise to them. This model is out of  the 
game, I think, for all the mental states I am going to discuss in this dissertation and that are  
going  to  be  crucial  for  understanding  certainty.  They  are  states  that  are  constitutively 
normative (their giving rise to commitments is necessary for them to be the sort of  states 
that they are) in a sense that will have to be made more precise 77. For now, all the mental 
phenomena whose normative profile I am going to explore (namely judgment, suspension 
of  judgment, doubt) are such as to give rise to a core set of  commitments.
Second model. A given mental state always gives rise to commitments, but there is no 
core set of  commitments that are always triggered by that mental state. This model is, like  
the previous one, out of  the game as far as the mental states under considerations are  
concerned.  Take judgment  as  an example  (but  we will  see  other  examples  in  the  next 
chapters). It is implausible to think that the commitments we have seen so far are only  
contingently triggered by judgment. I haven't argued that it is inconceivable for us to think 
of  a judgment that doesn't give rise to the commitments I have listed so far. However, it 
seems fair to say that for creatures like us it is not possible to be judging that  p without 
being committed to p's being true, and to there being grounds that speak in favour of  the 
truth of  p. So, this second model is not plausible.
Third model. A given mental state always gives rise to commitments, there is a core  
set  of  commitments that  are always triggered by that  mental  state,  yet  there are some 
commitments which might or might not be triggered by that mental state depending on the 
circumstances. This model gets some initial plausibility when we wonder whether judgment 
has a commitment not only about the possession of  grounds but about the possession of 
grounds which have a quite specific epistemic quality. 
This is an illustration of  how this model applies to the case at hand. It seems that in 
different circumstances we content ourselves with different grounds for forming opinions. 
This  might  be  captured  by  saying  that  the  formation  of  opinions  is  tied  to  different  
commitments depending on the context in which they are formed. So, we might think that 
the very same judgment that p is tied to the commitment that there are good enough yet 
possibly fallible grounds for p in some circumstances (say, ordinary life), but the very same 
judgment that  p is tied to the commitment that there are  conclusive grounds for p in other 
circumstances  (say,  circumstances  of  deep  reflection).  All  judgments,  being  states  that 
constitutively  give  raise  to  commitments,  vanish  when  they  find  their  commitments 
77 See Chapter VI.
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negated. But there are circumstances in which they trigger commitments that are quite 
modest, so that they are quite easy to fulfil. For instance, a judgment which, given some 
circumstances, is simply committed to the presence of  good yet possibly fallible grounds is  
not lost once one judges that there are no conclusive grounds for that judgment. For, so  
long  as  there  are  grounds,  even  if  inconclusive,  the  commitments  triggered  by  one's 
judgment will be satisfied. There are other circumstances however in which the very same 
judgment  might  give  rise  to  very  demanding  commitments  that  are  very  hard  if  not  
impossible  to  satisfy,  like  the  commitment  that  one  has  conclusive  grounds  for  her 
judgment. 
Fourth model. There are various species of  the same kind of  mental state, judgment. 
This model offers another way in which we can try to make sense of  the sort of  variability 
that the previous model is also trying to capture. We have judgment of  type F (that stands 
for fallible) and of  type I (that stands for infallible),  say. They both qualify as kinds or 
species of  judgments, for they both give rise to a core set of  commitments. However, they 
differ because F-judgments have commitments that I-judgments don't have, and vice versa.  
So, the idea here is that there is no such a thing as Judgment with a capital J,  but rather 
many different judgment-states, that is, states which are somehow the same – because they 
all  consist  in  taking  a  proposition  to  be  true  and  they  all  give  rise  to  a  core  set  of  
commitments – and yet they differ because they have attached to them different specific 
commitments. To illustrate, when I ordinarily believe things about the price of  fruits at the  
supermarket, say, I have judgments of  kind  F, that is, specific sorts of  beliefs which are 
governed by the fallibilist norm that they are correct only if  I have fallible evidence for  
them.  When  I  do  philosophy,  or  engage  in  deep  existential  speculations,  the  sorts  of 
judgments which I eventually end up having are judgments of  kind I, that is, specific sorts 
of  judgments which are governed by the infallibilist norm according to which they are 
correct only if  I have infallible justification for them. What is crucial for this model is the  
fact that F-judgments and I-judgments are at the same time judgment-states and yet their 
nature is such that they belong to different species of  judgment. Here the relation between  
the category of  judgment and the category of  F-judgments and I-judgments is the relation 
of  genus and species. 
This model is the one adopted by those who think that there exist both degrees of 
beliefs and outright beliefs. This model might also be adopted by someone who thinks that  
being psychologically  certain  is  one thing,  and that judging is  another.  If  we take  into 
consideration the fact that we think of  ourselves as having convictions that might differ in  
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their degrees of  strength (I am sure that I exist,  I am less sure that I will  see a movie 
tonight, though I believe I will), then this model immediately gets some plausibility.
Fifth model. For any kind of  mental state, there is a fixed core of  commitments, and 
the  same  mental  states  don't  have  species.  Here  we  have  the  simplest  model,  where  
judgment is a mental state with its own definite set of  commitments. So, according to this  
model,  it  can't  be  the  case  that  judgment  sometimes  commits  to  the  possession  of 
conclusive grounds and sometimes doesn't, nor can it be the case that there is a kind of 
judgment that does, and another kind of  judgment that doesn't.
If  there is any source of  evidence which could possibly convince us of  the truth or 
falsity of  any model about the nature of  the commitments of  judgments it must be some  
phenomenological source of  evidence. It is by living the act of  judgment and by paying 
attention to how we relate to potential  commitments  that  we can  hope to understand 
which one of  these models is the right one. Let's see. 
§3.6 To judge that p is to be committed to there being conclusive grounds for judging that p
I think that phenomenological reflection rules out the fourth model. If  we look at the  
phenomenology of  judgment, I think it  is  impossible to detect any difference between 
several sorts of  judgment-like mental states (though see the discussion on degrees of  belief  
below). Maybe one might try to vindicate the fourth model by looking at third-personal 
evidence  for  this  conclusion.  One  can,  for  instance,  show  that  the  same 
phenomenologically individuated thing – judgment – occurs along with the activation of 
different brain patterns. But this is not the relevant sort of  claim I am interested in here.  
Even if  that were the case, the nature of  judgment is exhausted by its phenomenological 
nature. Anyway, I will put on a side the fourth model for the moment, and call it back into  
discussion in a later moment.
I think that many will be tempted by the third model. There is something initially 
attractive about it which depends on the consideration that in different contexts we set for 
ourselves different epistemic standards. If  the epistemic standards vary, then maybe the 
commitments about the sort of  evidence one needs in order to be correctly judging will 
vary as well. After all, one might think, if  I am committed to have conclusive grounds for  
my opinions will depend on what I want, on how easy it is for me to be satisfied in my 
investigations, or on what the context demands of  me. 
If  we engage in the method of  intelligibility, however, we will see that there is no 
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possible variation concerning the sort of  evidence one is committed to possess for one's  
judgment: one's judgment triggers a commitment to there being  conclusive  evidence for it. 
Following the method of  eidetic variation we should ask this question: can I judge p to be 
true while at the same time I judge that I don't have conclusive evidence for  p? At first 
sight,  the answer  might seem to be 'yes'.  After  all,  it  is  a  platitudinous  fact  about our  
epistemic predicament that we don't know pretty much anything on conclusive grounds. 
Yet, we surely form plenty of  judgments all the time. And it doesn't look as though when I 
consciously consider the fact that I haven't much conclusive grounds in my life I also stop 
judging all the things that I normally judge. I simply recognize, if  I am lucid enough, that  
they are fallibly grounded. What is wrong with that? Can't I do that?
But let us see what happens if  we dig in the meaning of  the thought that one's 
grounds  for  judging  are  not  conclusive.  When  you  judge  that  your  grounds  are  not 
conclusive,  you are judging that they are fallible.  If  you master the concept of  fallible 
grounds, you are also in a position to judge that p (epistemically) might be false, for this is 
part of  what it means that one's evidence is not conclusive, namely that one's evidence 
leaves it open the possibility that p is false. But here comes the problem. Is it really possible 
to judge at the very same time that p is true and that p might be false?78 I must confess that I 
have contrasting impressions here. But I am strongly inclined to think that it is not really 
possible. I will try to argue for that claim now.
The plausibility of  my claim of  uncotenability depends on the notion of  epistemic 
possibility  that  is  involved in  the  content  of  the  judgment  that  p  might  be  false.  The 
following are possible accounts of  epistemic possibility. An evidence-based account has it  
that  whether  p  is  epistemically  possible  depends  on whether  it  is  compatible  on one's 
evidence,  whereas  according  to  a  knowledge-based  account,  whether  p  is  epistemically 
possible depends on what one knows (where one's evidence is not identical with what one 
knows). For my purposes, I should think of  p as being epistemically possible if  compatible 
with what one takes to be her grounds for judging. Thus the idea is roughly that  p  is 
78 As I  remarked when I introduced the method of  eidetic  variation,  in  order  to  test  whether  a  given 
proposition is a commitment of  an alethically committed attitude we should both look whether the truth 
can be consistently judged to be a falsity  while one is holding the alethically committed attitude,  and 
whether  one  can  be  open  minded  about  the  putative  committed  truth  while  holding  the  alethically 
committed attitude. So, is it possible to judge that p while one remains open-minded as to whether it is 
true that  p  might be false? In order to be open minded one should consciously and comprehendingly 
entertain the relevant proposition – that  p  might be false – and refraining from taking any alethically 
committed attitude with respect to it – that is, one should refrain from judging that it is true/false Is it  
possible? Well, it doesn't seem so. For you can't be open minded about whether it is true that p might be 
false unless you take it that p might in fact be false. Were you to judge that p might not be false, you would 
not be able to be open minded as to whether p might or might not be false. But if  you judge that p might 
in fact be false, we are back to the uncotenability between judging that p and judging that p might be false. 
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epistemically  possible  for  some  subject  if  the  grounds  the  subject  recognizes  as  her 
grounds are not conclusive. This is  the best notion that need to be investigated for an 
epistemological project that focus on a Cartesian quest for certainty79.  
One might however construct  an objection80 to the claim that judging that  p  and 
judging that p might be false are uncotenable by criticising my understanding of  epistemic 
possibility. Suppose that one has independent reasons to think that the right account of 
knowledge  is  fallibilist  (one  can  have  knowledge  even  if  one  doesn't  have  conclusive 
evidence for the known proposition).  Now, if  one further endorses a knoweldge-based 
account of  epistemic possibility, then it would seem entirely possible to judge that p even if 
one recognizes that one's ground are not infallible. 
However, this objection misses the target. Even if  one assumes that there is some 
independent plausibility in both a fallibilist account of  knowledge and a knowledge-based 
account of  epistemic possibility, there still seems to be a recognizable sense in which one 
can judge that p might not be true in case one's grounds are merely fallible. This sense will 
remain intact even if  one grants to the objection that there is a notion of  knowledge that  
makes knowledge fallible and a notion of  epistemic possibility that makes it relative to the 
knowledge possessed by the subject. So, all I am claiming is that if  one is judging that p and 
that one's grounds for p are fallible, then one can't also judge that  p might be false, even 
though she is committed to judge that  p  might be false  in the sense  that the falsity of  p  is 
compatible with the evidence the subject takes herself  to possess.
To be clear: I do not want to object to a knowledge-based account of  epistemic 
possibility, nor to a fallibilist account of  knowledge. All I am claiming is that these accounts  
do not capture all  recognizable senses of  epistemic possibility and knowledge. We should 
distinguish between several recognizable accounts of  knowledge and epistemic possibility,  
and see which one of  these senses give rise to co-impossibility between judgments. Since 
the co-impossibilities arise, under the hypothesis investigated here, because of  the nature of 
the act of  judgment and because of  its content, we should explore the claim that judging that 
p  is  uncotenable  with  judging that  p  might  be  false  by  using  different  conceptions  of 
epistemic  possibility  –  hence  different  contents.  The  relevant  notion  of  epistemic 
possibility that I am using here is that which is captured by the evidence-based account of 
epistemic possibility. But it is interesting to see whether similar uncontenabilities arise even 
if  we endorse other models of  epistemic possibility, and it is also interesting to see whether 
79 For discussion of  epistemic possibility see, for example, DeRose (1991), Stanley (2005), Huemer (2007),  
Yalcin (2007), and Dougherty and Rysiew (2009), as well as the essays in Egan and Weatherson (2011). 
80  Thank to Giorgio Volpe for pressing this objection. 
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kindred  uncotenabilities  arise  when  we  consider  judgments  whose  contents  include 
different concepts of  knowledge.  
In order to further support the claim about uncotenability I am making here it is 
important to make the following clarifications. First, the idea is not that one can judge that 
p is true only if  one also judges that it is false that p might be false. Rather, the claim is that 
if one is presented with the thought that p might be false, then one can't judge it to be true 
and also keep one's judgment that p is true. Nor should one judge that one's grounds are 
conclusive in order to be in a position to judge that p. Simply, if  one is presented with the 
thought that one's grounds are not conclusive, one can't both keep judging that  p is the 
case and also judge that her grounds are not conclusive. Second, one might of  course judge 
that  p might  be  false  (or  that  one's  grounds  are  not  conclusive)  while  having  the 
dispositional belief  that p is true or the disposition to judge that p is true. Third, one might 
fail to fully understand what it means for one's grounds to be fallible, and so, thanks to this  
failure of  understanding, one might both keep the judgment that p and the judgment that p 
might be false. 
I have the impression that phenomenological reflection reveals that judging that p 
and  judging  that  p  might  be  false  are  not  cotenable.  However,  there  are  plenty  of 
resistances to accept this claim. In what follows I will try to dissipate some of  them. 
§3.7 On the idea that commitments are implicit I
There is a principled objection to the employment of  my method. 
It is clear that when one engages in the method of  eidetic variation one will be incapable to hold a  
judgement while she judges not to have conclusive evidence in favour of  it. The reason why this  
happens is that the method is so construed that it forces the mind to raise its standards at a very  
high  level.  Moreover  the general  context  of  inquiry (philosophy)  is  such that  it  reinforces  the 
raising of  standards. So it is not surprising that having conclusive evidence becomes a relevant  
standard  for  judgment  when  we  consider  a  judgment  held  in  such  epistemically  demanding 
contexts. Thus, the method is simply unsuitable to find evidence about judgments held in ordinary 
contexts, and no conclusion about judgment in general could be drawn on the basis of  the verdict of 
the method of  eidetic variation. 
This is a powerful objection81, and it is very useful to understand what the challenges it 
81 And also a general objection to the phenomenological tradition.
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poses  are.  The  idea,  at  bottom,  is  this:  so  long  as  we  are  unreflective,  possession  of 
conclusive ground might not be a commitment of  judgment; it  is  only as we move to  
reflect about our judgment that the commitment of  having conclusive grounds is triggered. 
This  objection  relies  on  something  like  the  third  model  of  the  connection  between 
judgment and commitments, the model according to which there is a variation in standards  
that depends on variation of  contexts. But the same objection might be framed exploiting 
the  fourth  model.  One  might  say  that  when  we  are  not  reflective  we  are  having  F-
judgments, and that it is only when we reflect that we have I-judgments. Either way, there is 
a methodological problem for the phenomenologist. By relying on the method of  eidetic 
variation I can discover the commitments that are triggered only by demanding contexts of 
inquiry  (or,  to  frame  the  point  in  terms  of  the  fourth  model,  I  can  discover  only 
commitments about the kind of  I-judgments that we have in these contexts). But then I am 
not entitled to infer from what is true about demanding contexts to what is true about less  
demanding ones. It might simply be that in less demanding contexts we have mental states  
(whether judgments tout court or F-judgments) that trigger less demanding commitments, 
and it is principle impossible for me to know that through phenomenological investigation 
alone.
The  objection,  as  I  have  framed  it,  only  targets  my  contention  that  having 
conclusive grounds is a commitment of  judgment. The focus is explained by the fact that 
this commitment is the most controversial one. But the objection is general. It might be  
extended to any claim I make about commitments. Any claim is made in the reflective 
context. I simply can't be sure of  what is the truth about judgment in unreflective contexts. 
There is something right and something wrong in this objection. What is true, is  
that one might fail to make explicit  all the things to which one is committed to by the 
simple fact of  having a certain judgment. So, ordinarily, I judge without having explicitly in 
my mind the commitment that my judgments be conclusively grounded. In  this  sense of 
the expression 'being committed to', it is not the case that we are always committed to the  
possession of  conclusive  evidence,  for  we  are  not  always  consciously  entertaining and 
eventually endorsing this committed proposition. This point is true also when we move at a  
level in which one becomes more conscious and reflective about her own judgments. It is 
not  the case that  as  I  consciously and deliberatively  wonder  about  a  certain issue  and 
eventually opt for an answer I am also consciously entertaining the further propositions to 
which my answer commits me. This is a quite general phenomenon about commitments.  
Think of  all the logical consequences of  a judgment that I can make. It is obviously not the 
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case that I entertain all of  them or even any of  them while I make my judgment. Yet I am  
committed in the relevant sense to either accepting those propositions which I am capable 
of  grasping,  or  revising  my  judgment.  For,  where  I  to  be  presented  to  a  logical  
consequence of  p, and where I to be capable of  understanding p in such a way that I realise 
that it is a logical consequence of  p, then I will have to judge the consequence if  I want to 
keep my initial commitment to the truth of  p. 
However, the fact that I don't entertain explicitly all the commitments of  a given 
judgment doesn't entail that I am not committed to take (or refrain from taking) further  
propositions as true for the simple fact that I am judging in a certain way. The sort of  
commitments I am talking about are of  course implicit in nature. Thus, by judging that p, I 
am committing myself  to judge that p or q, and this is true even if  of  course I am not even 
entertaining q (which might have nothing to do with p) in the moment in which I form the 
judgment that  p.  The same applies  to the other commitments I have unearthed in the 
previous paragraphs. To say that a commitment is triggered is to say nothing more in this  
context than that they will have to be endorsed, where their truth-value to be made salient 
to reflection, if  the subject has to keep her judgment. 
Notice, moreover, that one can even go so far as to endorse the falsity of  one of 
her commitments – a philosopher persuaded that certainty couldn't be required for correct 
judgment  might  at  times  explicitly  endorse  the  thought  that  it  is  false  that  judgment 
requires conclusive evidence. 
So, the objection is wrong in supposing that commitments might not be implicit. If  
commitments are implicit in the way suggested, then it is possible that even judgments that  
are formed unreflectively display the sort of  commitments that become salient to reflection 
when one is invited to take them into consideration in the context of  a phenomenological 
investigation about the commitments of  one's judgments. 
Yet,  even  if  the  possibility  that  commitments  are  implicit  would  explain  the 
uniformity  between  judgments  held  in  reflective  contexts  and  judgments  held  in 
unreflective  ones,  the  objector  might  still  insist  that  I  can't  be  sure through 
phenomenological investigation alone that this is indeed the case. The objector might insist 
in saying that I am not entitled to conclude anything about commitments for judgment as  
such given the kind of  artificial context generated by philosophical reflection in which I am 
supposed to discover these commitments. 
A first fairly concessive reply to this objection is to grant its point. It might be true  
that our mental life is such that there are aspects of  it that, even though they are conscious,  
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elude systematic phenomenological elucidation for the very reason that phenomenological 
elucidation modifies them by removing them from their unreflective modus vivendi82. In the 
concessive spirit of  this reply, I will also grant that most of  our mental life could be such 
that our conscious judgments do not commit themselves in any relevant sense to the sort 
of  demanding commitments that I have been describing. To grant that much, however, is 
compatible with the recognition that the locus where the most important part of  cognition  
and inquiry takes place is the conscious and reflective one that I am trying to elucidate. We 
might  have  plenty  of  judgments  whose  formation  doesn't  trigger  the  relevant 
commitments I am describing, but the point remains that as soon as we consciously and 
actively raise a question and try to evaluate our grounds for judging, then the points I make  
about commitments would apply. It is there, when we are reflective, that we can protect  
ourselves from errors, and conclusively convince ourselves that we are judging the truth.  
Since the work on commitments I am doing here is intended to highlight the nature of  the  
problem of  certainty and the fact that it impossible for us not to care about certainty, I  
might rephrase all the points I am making as points about reflective cognition or reflective inquiry. 
The point would be that the necessity of  having certainty is a necessity of  our cognition  
when  our  cognition  is  reflective  enough.  This  point  would  maybe  strike  one  as 
uncontroversial and not so interesting. After all, everyone might accept that we can raise 
the standards for judging at the point of  requiring certainty for our judgment. But here the 
point I would be making, if  I were to take this concessive line of  reply, would be stronger  
than that. The point is not simply that we can raise our standards to those of  certainty in  
the sense that we will be judging that we are entitled to judge something only if  it is certain.  
The point here is rather that regardless of  what one thinks about the standards for judging, 
when one is reflective enough, one won't be able to keep judging that p if  one judges that 
the grounds for so judging are not conclusive (or if  one is open-minded as to whether they 
are conclusive).  
Can one say more by way of  reply to this methodological objection? 
§3.8 On the idea that commitments are implicit II
One puzzling thing in the picture I am defending is the idea that some commitments be 
82 This  is  a  general  objection  to  phenomenlogical  method that  have  surfaced  the  literauture  on  many 
occasions.  A  fairly  clearl  illustration  of  the  force  of  the  objection  occurs  if  we  think  of  a 
phenomenologist who is trying to investigate the nature of  an emotion. It is noticed that by paying the  
required inquisitive eye to the phenomenon, one looses the phenomenon itself  by modifying it. I don't 
think that this apparently natural line of  thought is correct, though I won't argue for it here.
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part  of  what it  takes  for a  judgment  to be correct  even though the existence of  this  
commitment is something that is not present in one's mind when one judges, or anyway is 
something that the subject need not be aware of  while judging. We might try to dissolve  
the  feeling  of  puzzlement  by  relying  on  an  example  that  doesn't  concern  judgment.  
Consider perception. When I perceive my environment, I see things. I am now seeing a  
person in front of  me. There is a sense in which the content of  perception is richer than  
what I am capable of  articulating in the instant in which I have the experience. So, by 
experiencing the  person,  I  am also  experiencing  him as  being  a  united  entity.  I  don't  
perceive a head, a body, arms and legs, I do perceive a person, where the body, the arms  
and the legs are the parts of  the whole. Now, was this fact present or not in my perception  
of  the person in front of  me? Yes and no. For the simple fact that my perception is the one 
that it is – namely the perception we are all very well acquainted with, the experience of  
seeing a person in front of  one – there is a sense in which I was experiencing the head, the  
body and the arms as being part of  a unity. But I was not experiencing that they were part 
of  a unity. To bring to light this feature of  my experience is precisely an activity which 
consists in pointing out features of  one's experience, but that there are these features is not  
part of  the experience whose features I am pointing out. There is a difference between an  
experience of  a person, and an experience of  the fact that the arm, the body, and the head  
belong  to  a  single  whole,  which  is  a  person.  By  doing  phenomenology,  the 
phenomenologist shifts from the simple experience of  a person to the experience that the 
person  is  given  as  a  whole  having  parts,  and  not  as  distinct  elements  casually 
interconnected, in order to elucidate what does it take for one to have an experience of  a 
person. 
Now,  a  similar  phenomenon  occurs  with  our  doxastic  life,  except  that  the 
phenomenology associated with our cognitive life is much more elusive. When we form 
judgments there are facts about what it takes to have judgments which are in a sense present  
for the simple fact that one is having a judgment; yet, in another sense, they are not present 
or they are not explicitly present, for if  they were then they would modify the experience of 
unreflective judgment. To illustrate: when I am judging that p I am committed to my having 
grounds for judging, but this commitment is not explicit. While I judge that p I am not also 
judging that there are good grounds for judging – if  I were doing so, I would simply have a  
different experience from the one which I typically have when I judge that p. And yet, there 
is  a sense in which this commitment is  already present while I  believe that  p,  and the 
presence of  the  commitment  can be brought  to light  by using  the  method of  eidetic  
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variation.
The presence of  commitments  as  well  of  our  presuppositions  in  experience is 
made  manifest  when  something  occurs  that  shows  that  these  commitments  and 
presuppositions are not respected. Thus, in experience, suppose I see a person, but then 
while I talk with her at some point she removes her head from the body while continuing  
to speak nonchalantly with me. Here a very well  entrenched presupposition that was a 
precondition for my experience of  that thing as a person has been frustrated. By seeing 
that thing as a person I was seeing its whole body as an organic unity, but when I realize 
that it is not such a unity I loose the experience of  that  thing as the experience of  a person 
and eventually start to conceptualise the thing as a robot.
The  same occurs  with  judgment.  Judgment  that  p has  at  least  two  families  of 
commitments that are partly constitutive of  it: one family which concerns the nature of  the  
act of  judgment itself, the other which concerns the specific content of  that act. Consider 
content first.  When I judge that  there is  a tiger here, I  am also committing myself  to 
judging that there is not a cleverly disguised mule there, even though I am not consciously 
judging it.  As  you can  see,  the  sort  of  commitments  that  are  implicit  because  of  the 
specific nature of  the content believed is potentially infinite here83. It is obvious then that 
they are not explicitly before one's eyes while one judges that there is a tiger. However, if  
some of  them were to be judged to be false, then one's judgment will be lost. If  the subject  
comes to judge that in fact what she has before her eyes just is a cleverly disguised mule,  
she will no longer judge that it is a tiger – provided of  course that her conceptual resources 
allow her to appreciate the connection between her initial judgment and the discovery. 
Now consider the act of  judgment itself. Regardless of  the specific content one is 
endorsing, if  one finds out that one's putative grounds for judging are defective, or if  one 
finds out that there are reasons to judge that the content believed is false, or if  any other of  
the many commitments that judgement triggers is  false, one would thereby loose one's  
judgment. The disposition to judge the proposition true might survive the realization that  
83 I might have a dispositional belief  that p because I have in the past considered whether p, made up my 
mind about the issue, and stored in my memory this belief. The potentially infinite list of  commitments  
triggered by the content of  one's conscious belief  are not all dispositionally believed in this sense. Most  
of  the commitments are such that I am disposed to form judgments that they are true, not that I already  
dispositionally  believe  that  they  are  truth.  I  might  be  disposed  to  form  a  judgment  that  a  given  
commitment is true because, given the other beliefs I dispositionally have, if  I were to be presented with  
p,  I  would find myself  inclined  to judge  that  p.  This  is  the sense which  goes toward capturing  the 
phenomenon of  commitments triggered by content. It is part of  what I believe about the world, that if 
there is a tiger, there isn't something that merely looks like a tiger without being one. In a sense I am then 
disposed to judge  that  the  tiger  is  not  a  cleverly  disguised one,  even  though I  have  never  explicitly  
considered and made up my mind about that proposition. See Audi (1994) for the distinction between 
dispositional belief  and disposition to believe.
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the judgment is not correct, but this is compatible with the points I am making here. I 
hope that these few remarks have gone toward the direction of  making less puzzling and 
problematic the idea that belief  triggers implicit commitments. 
I  hope  also  that  these  comments  have  helped  in  responding  to  the  objection 
according to  which  unreflective  ordinary  beliefs  do  not  display  the  commitments  that 
reflectively  scrutinized  beliefs  have.  One  reason  why  we  have  the  impression  that 
conclusiveness of  grounds is not a commitment of  judgment is this. We form judgment  
without actively looking for conclusive grounds. Then  we retrospectively realise – if  we 
start to philosophise, for instance – that the evidence we have for these judgments is not 
conclusive  (or  we  realise  that  we  don't  know  whether  the  evidence  that  we  have  is 
conclusive or not, which amounts to realise that we can't take the evidence that we have as  
conclusive), and yet since we see that we have formed judgments nonetheless, we think that 
judgment is possible even if  one doesn't possess conclusive evidence. That it is possible to  
judge even if  one doesn't possess conclusive evidence is obvious, since we do that all the 
time. But to suppose on that ground that when we judge we are not implicitly taking the 
evidence to be conclusive is fallacious. 
The picture I am suggesting is this: in everyday contexts, it is not that we form 
judgments unreflectively while assuming that the evidence is non-conclusive,  something 
which  one  might  think  retrospectively  once  one  has  realised  that  there  isn't  much 
conclusive evidence for the things we ordinarily judge to be true84. Quite the contrary: we 
84 Giorgio Volpe has pressed the following objection to me. My account apparently runs afoul of  the fact  
that agents who are convinced that the evidence they have for most of  the propositions they believe is  
actually non-conclusive continue to believe them.
There are two cases to be distinguished here. 
First, there is a case in which a subject, like a philosopher or some person who have thought about the 
issue, becomes convinced that in general we don't have infallible grounds for our ordinary judgments. Yet, 
the objection goes, this person will keep having judgments all the same. But this is easily explained by the 
fact that the subject doesn't bring her general convinction to bear on her doxastic deliberation whenever  
she inquieres  about a given issue.  Even Hume, after having convinced himself  that scepticism about 
external world and about induction is true, would continue forming judgments, because he doesn't also 
explicitly entertain the truth of  scepticism while he forms them. Moreover, and this is another important 
point,  if  he  was  on  occasion  to  think  of  the  truth  of  scepticism  while  judging  some  empirical  
proposition, if  he is really endorsing the truth of  scepticism and appreciating the content of  the view he 
would not be capable of  judging the empirical proposition to be true. More below for a discussion of  
cases in which one fails to integrate her opinions. 
Second, there is a case in which, regardless of  what the subject thinks of  the general possibility of  having 
conclusive grounds, the subject might have on occasion the particular suspicion that with respect to a given 
judgment or class thereof  no conclusive ground could be possessed. Thus, I might on occasion think that  
I am unsure whether there really is water in my bottle. The objection says that even in these cases I might 
be unsure about whether there is water, while judging that there really is water, and so while doing all the  
things that are typically associated with that particular judgment when it occurs (e.g., drinking the content  
of  the bottle, or pouring it in the glass of  a friend). But if  these are the cases that one has in mind, then it  
is not clear to me that these are cases in which one keeps judging that p upon explicit recognition of  the 
uncertainty about the truth of  p. These might be cases of  acceptance (in Bratman sense), or cases where 
one judges a content which is not p but something that qualifies as probable or likely the truth of  p.
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do  form  judgments  unreflectively  while  at  the  same  time  taking  for  granted  that  the 
evidence we have is indeed conclusive. Think, for instance, of  perceptual experience. When 
I see now the laptop which I am using to give written shape to my thoughts, I do implicitly  
take the experience as conclusive evidence for the presence of  the laptop. It never crosses  
my mind the thought that I might be wrong in taking the laptop before my eyes as existing.  
I do not even cognize the perceptual experience of  my laptop as my ground for judging 
that there is a laptop there. For sure, it never crosses my mind the thought that experience 
of  a spatially extended world is compatible with my being in a Matrix scenario. It is only a  
very complicated and controversial piece of  philosophical reflection which eventually gives 
to me the realisation that there might not be a laptop in my hands now. 
The case of  the formation of  perceptual  judgment is  extremely interesting and 
naturally lends support to the contention that judgment that p isn't compatible with judging 
that  p might be false. As noticed, we see and judge. There is seldom the experience of 
perceptual  experience  as  a  ground for  judging.  When experience becomes cognized  as 
ground there is some special factor that pushes us out of  the normal stream of  perception  
and judgment. When the flow is interrupted there often is the thought that what we see 
might be deceptive in some way or another. Thus, I see a person in front of  a shop and go 
there to ask her for information. There is a moment in which I come to think that that 
thing I thought was a person might not be one (but is, instead, a mannequin). The doubt  
might  occur  because  of  the  frustration  of  some  expectation  (like  when  we  ask  the  
supposed person an information but she doesn't  respond and stay frozen in the  same 
position for too long). And when the doubt occurs we are no longer judging that that thing 
is a person.
As already noticed, one factor that makes us recalcitrant to accept the claim that 
when we judge we take our grounds to be conclusive is the fact that we philosophers or 
intellectual who have thought about the issue know, retrospectively, that the grounds we 
have for our judgments are not conclusive. Another source of  resistance is the thought that 
in  order  to  take  one's  grounds  as  conclusive  one  would  have  somehow  to  judge  or 
appreciate  that  they  really  are.  This  is  of  course  phenomenologically  implausible.  We 
almost never apply the concept of  conclusive or infallible ground to our grounds. We never  
even apply the concept of  ground. But there is a sense in which they might be said to be 
taken  as  conclusive  nonetheless.  Even  without  being  conceptualised  as  conclusive  or 
infallible, considerations are taken as grounds for believing while granting that they show 
the truth of  what they ground. This is clear with perceptual cases, where experience is  
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understood as direct confrontation with reality. When I drink my cup of  coffee I never put  
into question the fact that I have a cup of  coffee in my hands. I just implicitly take it for  
granted that no strange sceptical situation is occurring. The same occurs in the case of  
testimony and memory, though in these cases sometimes we might have little doubts which 
can however be discarded by removing mundane possibilities.  
§3.9 Objection from the impossibility of  irrationality
One might object to my view on the ground that it doesn't make it possible to be irrational. 
But this is not true. All that my view entails is that some combinations of  mental states  
can't obtain if  one is conscious and understands the states she is in. Conscious irrational mental 
states are impossible in that sense. Yet one might very well have irrational dispositions and 
therefore  clashes  between  one's  dispositions  and  between  one's  disposition  and  one's  
conscious judgments. I might be disposed to judge that airplanes aren't safe even though I 
am also disposed to judge that they are safe, or that all the evidence points to their being  
safe; the fact of  being disposed in both ways makes me irrational, and where I to judge, say,  
that the plane is not safe, then I would be irrational in the sense that my judgment conflicts  
with a disposition that I have to regard flying as safe. All I am denying is the possibility of  
judging at the same time that flying is safe and unsafe, for instance, or that flying isn't safe,  
though I am almost sure that it is, and so on. 
§3.10 Doubt as incompatible with judgment
Reflecting  on  doubt  provides  another  angle  from  which  one  can  appreciate  the 
impossibility of  holding in the same mental breath the judgment that p and the judgment 
that  p might be false. Here I will briefly introduce ideas that will be further explored in  
Chapter V so I'll ask the reader to wait for further details and argument.
The  thought  is  simple.  Doubt  concerning  the  truth  of  p is  incompatible  with 
judging that p. A doubt as to whether p is true is often (though not always) prompted and 
sustained by the thought that  p might be false. Moreover, it is not possible to genuinely 
doubt whether p is true and to doubt that p is true if  one at the same time judges that p 
might not be false, but rather must be true. This, as I will argue, is evidence that doubting 
about p is committed to it being the case that p might be false. Given the fact that judging 
that  p,  one  the  one  hand, and  doubting  whether  p  is  true,  on  the  other  hand,  are 
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uncotenable mental states, this provides further evidence for confirming the uncotenability 
of  judging that p and judging that p might be false. 
§3.11 Failures to integrate one's own thoughts into a unified perspective
Right now you are taking yourself  to be in a world which exists and within which you exist.  
That this is how you take things to be need not be consciously recognized, at least not 
before I explicitly  invite  you to notice  it.  We obviously  don't  spend all  our life paying 
attention to this fact. But as soon as I bring your attention to consider the issue you will  
realise that this is indeed your case.  You are now thinking that you are in an extended 
world. Can we say that all of  us judge that there is an external world even in the moments in 
which we don't take the fact into explicit consideration? Yes and no. The sense in which 
'yes' is the right answer will not concern us here. There surely is a sense in which right now 
I am having a committed perspective on what is going on. This perspective includes plenty 
of  things: that I exist in a spatially extended world, that I am not alone, that there is a 
laptop, that I have hands, and many many more things. Husserl’s remarks on what he called 
the natural attitude – that is the attitude we all have when we live and do not consider the 
phenomena in a way that deprive them of  our natural everyday commitments85 – goes 
toward the direction of  describing what it means to be committed about the way things are 
even when we are not consciously entertaining thoughts about the way things are. Here we 
are interested in conscious thought.  There is  a clear  sense in which by inviting you to 
consider  the  thought  that  a  spatially  extended world  exists  I  am inviting  you to make 
explicit a commitment that you already implicitly have. By proposing to you a particular  
proposition on which to focus I might bring your attention to a little facet of  your whole  
network of  commitments concerning your place in an existing external world. And when 
you do consciously entertain the thought that there is an external world and that you are 
part of  it, for instance, you are entering in a committal state that differs from the sort of  
implicit underlying commitment that structures your everyday experience. 
Let's  focus on this judgment that you now have.  You do think that there is an 
external world. Can you really also think that the external world might not in fact exist? It is  
important to stress here that the 'might' is epistemic, not metaphysical. You are not invited 
to think that things might have been otherwise from what they actually are. You are rather  
invited to enter a state where the existence of  the world and the inexistence of  the world  
are both possible actual states given all your evidence says about the way things are. You 
85 See Husserl (2010).
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might even take yourself  to have more evidence that speaks in favour of  the existence of  
the world, rather than in favour of  its inexistence. Yet, if  you really think that the world 
might not exist, you are not in a mental state whose occurrence is compatible with the 
occurrence of  the conviction that the external world really exists. It is like picturing reality 
in two different ways: in one way it is already settled (when you take the world to exist), in  
another way there are holes in the whole picture (this tile of  the picture might either be  
filled in by an external world, or not). You can't picture reality in both ways. 
One reason why this is especially difficult to realise is that, I suggest, it is a cause of  
suffering. If  you actually try to seriously entertain the thought – if  you indeed judge it to be  
true, for if  you don't you will have to find another example – that the external world might 
not exist (and so that  right now  things might not really be as they seem to be) but that it 
might be, say, a simple hallucination, then there is a moment in which the mind has a kind  
of  short circuit. For a moment everything is dark, not because the colours of  what you are 
experiencing changes.  Rather,  everything takes the dark atmosphere that  we experience 
when  we  confront  something  which  is  perplexingly  unfamiliar.  The  same  painful 
experience can be brought about if  we try to think of  cases that might be taken as less 
hallucinatory than the apparently catastrophic possibility that our loved world be only an 
illusion. Think of  a relationship you have with a person you love and that you take to know 
very well. Try to consciously entertain the thought that she might be a robot – if  you really  
think that this is a possibility. This might give the same effect. This suffering deserves to be  
explained (it is a suffering associated to a loss of  meaning: for a second the world is lost).  
Unfortunately, this is not the place where I can discuss this topic. However, the existence  
of  these painful experiences explains very well a phenomenon about our mental life which 
is also partly responsible for the impression that surely most of  us share that it is entirely 
possible to hold both the thoughts that  p and that  p might be false in the same mental 
breath. 
Why is it that we still have the impression that judging that  p  and judging that  p 
might be false  are  co-possible?  I  think that  this  possibility  is  in  part  explained by our 
incapacity to clearly and thoroughly think the consequences of  what we are thinking when 
we  think  these  thoughts.  It  is  a  subtle  form of  dissociation  where  one  has untenable 
perspectives that are not integrated in such a way as to make evident their uncotenability.  
One way in which it can occur is this. Many people appear to think that consciousness is 
identical  with  some portion of  physical  reality.  Many people also appear to think that  
science never gives us certainty, but only fallibly grounded results. In fact, the people who 
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think that everything there is is physical are also likely to think that all the knowledge we 
might have is fallible, since the two pictures go hand by hand in the present intellectual  
climate. One might reflect  about the fallibility of  knowledge and realise that given the 
evidence she possesses consciousness might not be identical with some portion of  reality 
but rather be something else. But this piece of  reflection can or cannot be brought to bear  
on the question whether to judge that consciousness is physical. I can, for instance, having 
reasoned my way to the conclusion that consciousness might not be physical, wonder as 
follows: 'is consciousness physical? What should I believe?' When I so reflect, my reflection 
is conducted within a deliberative context which includes the thought that consciousness  
might  not  be  physical.  And  precisely  because  it  is  conducted  within  that  deliberative 
context,  when one genuinely raises for oneself  these questions one is not judging that 
consciousness is physical. If  one were so judging one would not be capable of  genuinely 
asking: 'is consciousness physical?'. Either one will already have the answer, or one will 
immediately answers that it is, but in the scenario we are considering, where one is keeping 
in one's mind the realization that maybe consciousness is not physical, one is not able to 
immediately  answer  the  question  affirmatively.  That  is  what  it  means  to  be  asking  a 
question  –  to  remain  in  an  open  state  where  more  options  are  still  live  options  for  
endorsement. But very often one fails to integrate one's thoughts in a single deliberative 
context. So, the physicalist and fallibilist person we are considering, might fail to connect 
her thought that all her knowledge is fallible with the thought that consciousness is a piece 
of  matter. Simply, she might fail to realise that not having certainty just means that she 
might be wrong about everything, which in turn means that she might be wrong about  
consciousness.
§3.12 To judge that  p is to be committed to one's having an access to there being conclusive  
grounds for judging that p 
We have seen that to be judging that p is to be committed to judge that one has infallible 
grounds for p. But then, by parity of  reasoning, to judge that I have infallible grounds for p 
is to be committed to the fact that one has infallible grounds for judging that one has 
infallible  grounds  for  p.  This  further  commitment  shows that  judging that  p is  indeed 
committed  to  certainty.  Suppose  that  you  want  to  judge  that  your  grounds  for  p  are 
conclusive,  and  yet  you do not  want  to  also  be  committed  to  the  fact  that  you  have 
conclusive grounds for taking your grounds for  p  to be conclusive. If  this is the sort of 
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mental state you want to be in, then you are committed to judge that it might be false that  
your grounds for p are conclusive. But then, the uncertainty about grounds transmits to p 
itself. If  your grounds might be fallible, then it might be the case that p is false. But it is 
impossible  to  judge  that  p  and that  p  might  be  false.  Hence,  judging  that  p  not  only 
commits one to judge that there are infallible grounds for p; it also commits one to judge 
that there are conclusive grounds for judging that there are conclusive grounds for  p. In 
other words, judging that p commits one to judge that p is absolutely certain. 
As we saw in Chapter I where we offered an analysis of  the conditions for being 
absolutely certain, two principles are fundamental: 
Infallibility  Principle:  I  can be  absolutely  certain that  p  on the basis  of  ground  g  (either 
doxastic or non-doxastic) only if  g is a conclusive ground for p
Reflexivity  Principle:  I  can  be  absolutely  certain  that  p on  the  basis  of  ground  g  (either 
doxastic or non-doxastic) only if I have absolute certainty that g is a conclusive ground for 
p
But these conditions are not only the conditions for being epistemically certain, they are also 
the conditions the satisfaction of  which one is committed to when one is judging. This is  
an  highly  significant  result.  We  will  have  many  occasions  to  come back  to  the  many 
significant consequences of  this fact. 
Let me just briefly mention here a  methodological  consequence. If  judging commits 
one to certainty, then it is in the nature of  judgment itself  to be the sort of  state that can 
be meaningfully evaluated in terms of  absolute certainty. The justification for evaluating  
judgments in terms of  their being absolutely certain or not is grounded in the nature of  
judgment itself. This result is striking if  we think about the way in which contemporary 
epistemology tries to discover the conditions for justification and knowledge. The appeal  
to intuitions make our epistemic appraisals dependent on our concepts and conceptions. It 
is not clear how we can ground, if  we rely on intuitions, the application of  our normative  
evaluations  to  the  nature  of  judgments  themselves,  namely  to  the  nature  of  what  we 
typically evaluate using concepts of  justification, rationality, and knowledge. Nor is it clear 
how one  can ground choice  of  particular  conceptions  of  justification by appealing  to 
empirical claims,  like some naturalists do86.  If  I am right,  however,  it  is  constitutive of 
judgment  itself  to  be  the  sort  of  thing which  is  committed to  certainty,  and  so  it  is  
86 See Kornblith (2002)
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constitutive of  judgment itself  that it be evaluated by using the standards of  certainty. It  
might also be evaluated with other concepts – like reliability. But these concepts will not be 
capturing the most fundamental notion of  epistemic appraisals. This is an important result  
for those who have pluralistic proclivities in epistemology, for it  provides a ground for  
ranking different kinds of  epistemic justification and knowledge according to whether they 
capture or not the commitments of  that which they are purported to evaluate.
Let us take stock. In this chapter we have seen some uncotenability claims that are 
connected to claims about what judging commits one to. There is a story to be told which 
explains why commitments and uncotenability claims should be linked, and also why some 
commitments and facts about uncotenability are central to the nature of  a given mental  
state  and for  determining  what  is  its  normative  profile.  I  will  address  these  issues  in 
Chapter VI.  Let me now anticipate the link I will  establish between commitments and 
normativity.  It  is  natural  to  take  the  network  of  commitments  we  have  discovered  as 
defining what it takes for a judgment to be a correct judgment. There is a very natural sense 
in which a judgment is correct only if  its commitments are fulfilled – that is, not if  the 
subject actually judge the committed propositions to be true when he entertains them, but 
if  the committed propositions are actually true. The correctness in question is essentially 
tied to the nature of  judgment. The core commitments that we have individuated capture 
the sort of  stance that a subject is taking with respect to the truth by having a particular  
judgment. In a sense, the satisfaction of  one's commitments constitutes the satisfaction of 
the claim or pretension that a judgment is advancing. 
Here  is  a  table  of  the most relevant  uncotenability  claims87,  the  corresponding 
claims about commitments, and principles about correctness for judgment.
Normative profile of  judgment
Judgment Correctness principles  Uncotenability claims Commitment claims
Truth Judging  that  p is 
(alethically) correct only 
if  p is true
Judging that  p can't occur 
while  one  is 
comprehendingly  judging 
Judging  that  p commits 
one  to  judge  that  p is 
true (and to refrain from 
87 Here, please keep in mind the following. There are plenty of  principles that are conceptually equivalent to  
those I have just listed. So, one principle could have been the following: a belief  that p is correct only if  it 
is not epistemically possible that not-p. Why choosing one principle rather than another, even though they 
are equivalent? Nothing particularly profound hinges on the choice. The choice is governed by what right  
now are the sort of  expressions that are more likely to point our attention to the relevant fact which we  
are  thereby  coming  to  know  when  we  know  that  these  principles  of  correctness  are  true.  The 
phenomenon we are interested in is this dense and yet elusive life of  our mind. We use the words we have 
in order to bring our attention in the relevant places. Moreover, the selection of  the principles is also in  
part dictated by the overall aim of  discussing epistemological issues connected to certainty.
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that  p is  false  (or  while 
one is being open minded 
as to whether  p is true or 
false)
judging  that  p is  false 
and  from  being  open 
minded as to whether  p 
is true or false)
Infallibility Judging  that  p is 
(epistemically)  correct 
only  if  one  has 
infallible grounds for p
Judging that  p  can't occur 
while  one  is 
comprehendingly  judging 
that one has not infallible 
grounds  for  p (or  while 
one is being open-minded 
as  to  whether  one  has 
infallible grounds for p)
→  Judging that  p can't 
occur  while  one  is 
judging that p might be 
false.
Judging  that p  commits 
one  to  judge  that  one 
has  infallible  grounds 
for  p (and  to  refrain 
from  judging  that  one 
has  not  infallible 
grounds for  p and from 
being open-minded as to 
whether  one  has 
infallible grounds for p)
Reflexivity Judging  that  p is 
(epistemically)  correct 
only  if  one  has 
infallible  grounds  for 
judging  that  one  has 
infallible grounds for p. 
Judging that  p can't occur 
while  one  is 
comprehendingly  judging 
that one has not infallible 
grounds  for  judging  that 
one has infallible grounds 
for  p (or  while  one  is 
being open-minded as to 
whether one has infallible 
grounds  for  judging  that 
Judging  that  p  commits 
one  to  judge  that  one 
has  infallible  grounds 
for judging that one has 
infallible  grounds  for  p 
(and  to  refrain  from 
judging that one has not 
infallible  grounds  for 
judging  that  one  has 
infallible  grounds for  p, 
87
one has infallible grounds 
for p)
and  from  being  open-
minded  as  to  whether 
one  has  infallible 
grounds for judging that 
one  has  infallible 
grounds for p)
§3.13 Judgment, degrees of  belief  and outright belief 
What is the relationship between judgment on the one hand, and degrees of  belief  and 
outright belief  on the other hand? 
Let me first sum up my view. Firstly, I hold the view that judgment is an all-or-
nothing affair – there are no degrees of  judgment. Secondly, I hold the view that judgment 
is a distinct mental state from belief  understood as a dispositional mental state. There are 
discussions that are going on in formal epistemology and philosophy of  mind which might  
seem to interact with my view about judgment. I will briefly present the debates that seem 
to interact with my view, and explain why they don't. 
There seems to be a distinction in ordinary speech between belief-like mental states 
that are an an all-or-nothing affair and belief-like mental states that are gradable. Here is  
Wedgwood on the issue: 
“Both ways of  thinking of  belief  seem to be in evidence in everyday folk- psychological discourse.  
It is perfectly natural  to say,  for example, you are considerably  more confident  that Dublin is the 
capital of  Ireland than that Dushanbe is the capital of  Tajikistan. But it is also natural to say that  
you simply  believe  that Dublin is the capital of  Ireland, without giving any further qualifications 
about how confidently or strongly you believe it”. Wedgwood (2012), p. 309. 
This piece of  linguistic evidence offers some initial plausibility to the thought that there are 
both outright belief  and degrees of  belief88. If  outright belief  is a distinct category from 
88 See  Wedgwood  (2012),  p.  310  for  a  discussion  of  various  positions  that  have  been  taken  on  the  
relationship between belief  and credences. Jeffrey (1970) and Maher (1993), p. 152–155 are eliminativist  
about outright beliefs. Moon (2017) holds that there are no degrees of  belief. Reductionist  views come in 
many forms. Clarke (2013), Sturgeon (2008) and Foley (2009) hold that outright beliefs are reducible to 
levels of  confidence. Kaplan (1996) and Weatherson (2005) claim that outright beliefs are reducible to 
facts about the relevant agent’s preferences or  utilities together with facts about the agent’s  levels  of  
confidence. Harman (1986) and Holton (forthcoming) claims that levels of  confidence are reducible to 
facts about outright beliefs.  Finally, Greco (2015), Buchak (2013), Leitgeb (2014), Ross and Schroeder 
(2014), Frankish (2004), (2009) maintain that neither of  these two kinds of  belief  is reducible to the  
other. 
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levels of  confidence (assuming that credences are psychologically real phenomena), then 
my claims might be taken to apply to outright belief  only (and, possibly, to belief  with a 
degree of  confidence 1), and in this case there are no considerations stemming from this 
debate which contradicts my view. If,  however,  outright belief  is  reducible to gradable  
beliefs  then we might  have a challenge to my view89.  According to such reductionism, 
outright belief  will then simply be a belief  which has a certain degree of  confidence in the 
truth of  the proposition. This view can then roughly take two forms. Either outright belief  
is reducible to belief  with credence 190.  Or one holds some version of  the much more 
influential threshold view, according to which to have an outright belief  in p is to have a level 
of  confidence in p that exceeds a certain threshold r, where the threshold is not 191. If  what 
is right about belief  applies to the nature of  judgment – and we then have to accept the  
view that judgment is a gradable mental state – then these reductionist views are in tension  
with mine. Let's see why.
Outright belief  = degree  of  credence 1.  If  judgement comes in degrees, and outright 
judgment is equivalent to judgment with degree 1 of  confidence, then what I have said so 
far about the commitments for judgment will apply to judgment with degree 1 only. One 
might think that all  the evidence we might have for believing the many incompatibility 
claims I made before come from cases in which one is judging with a degree of  confidence  
1, and yet insist that there are other cases where one can give lesser confidence to the truth 
of  a proposition and that these are cases where the uncotenability  claims are not true.  
Thus, to illustrate, one might claim that it is entirely possible to both have degree 0.8 of  
confidence for p while also having some relevant degree of  confidence to the proposition 
that p might be false. After all, the lower level of  confidence is witnessing precisely the fact 
that one takes it that p might be false. 
Threshold view. If  we consider the threshold view, the incompatibility with my view is 
even clearer. If  the threshold is lesser than 1 (at least in most cases), then it is hard to  
explain why judging that p will have to be uncotenable with the judgment that p might be 
false.  
Either  way,  both  views  are  in  tension  with  mine.  The  crucial  factor  that  puts 
pressure on my view is the existence of  credences. If  there are credences, then presumably  
most of  the judgments we make in our life have different degrees of  confidence. But then  
89 Of  course, eliminativism about outright belief  is also incompatible with my view, but eliminativism has 
very little to recommend in its favour. 
90 This seems to be the view defended by Clarke (2013).
91 There are many forms of  this view. See, for a version of  this view, Foley (2009), pp. 38-9, and (1993), 
pp.143-144, Sturgeon (2008).
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most of  the judgments we make in our life do not engender the commitments I have  
argued being constitutive of  judgment. 
One obvious rescue move will be to claim that my view about the commitments for 
judgments apply to judgments with level of  confidence 1 only (and to outright belief, if 
reductionism is false and there also are outright beliefs). Yet, I think that phenomenological  
reflection supports a much stronger contention, namely that all  judgments are such as to 
give rise to the commitments listed above. So we need to look to ways in which we can  
deny the existence of  levels of  confidence, or ways in which we can deny the fact that their  
existence concerns judgments. 
What are the arguments for believing in the existence of  credences? Here is a very 
clear statement of  what I regard as the main argument.
“Consider first the suggestion that flat-out belief  is maximum confidence — a view reflected in the 
frequent use of  the term “full belief ” for flat-out belief. The problem here is that one can believe 
something, in the everyday sense, without being certain of  it. I believe that my grandmother was 
born on the 3rd of  August, but I am not absolutely certain of  it. I may have misremembered or 
been misinformed. Nor is this lack of  certainty necessarily a bad thing; a fallibilist attitude to one’s 
own beliefs has much to recommend it”. (Frankish 2009, 79)92 
Following Clarke (2013), we might call this worry the Certainty worry. The worry is not that 
most of  our beliefs would be unjustified since they are not certain. The worry is rather that  
even though we think we have plenty of  beliefs, in fact we don't. For most of  our beliefs  
are not psychological certainties, or so the argument goes. 
First of  all, we should be clear on the distinction between having a judgment that 
commits one to it being the case that the judged content is certain, and having a subjective 
feeling of  certainty or having a second-order thought to the effect that one's judgment is 
certain.  My  claim  is  not  that  whenever  we  judge  we  also  have  some  second-order 
perspective upon ourselves such that we take our judgment to be certain. If  that were the 
claim, it  would obviously be false.  Most of  us rightly think that our beliefs are fallibly 
92 The quotation goes on introducing another problem: “Another difficulty for the full-belief  view arises in 
connection with practical reasoning. On Bayesian principles, to assign a probability of  1 to a proposition  
is to cease to contemplate the possibility that it is false and, consequently, to ignore the undesirability of  
any outcome contingent upon its falsity. One consequence of  this is that if  one is certain of  something, 
then one should be prepared, on pain of  irrationality, to bet everything one has on its truth for no return  
at all. For one will simply discount the possibility of  losing the bet. . . . Yet we can believe something, in  
the everyday sense, without being prepared to stake everything, or even very much, on its truth. (I would  
bet something, but not a great deal, on the truth of  my belief  about my grandmother’s birth date). So flat-
out belief  is not the same thing as maximum probability” (p. 79). See Clarke (2013) for a response to this  
second worry. 
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justified, though of  course we rarely consciously entertain and judge this thought and, even 
more rarely,  we bring this thought to bear on what we judge to be the case. Nor am I  
claiming that when we judge we also always have a feeling of  certainty associated with it.  
Far  from  that.  The  subjective  feeling  of  certainty  might  be  present  in  particular 
circumstances – for instance, when one is in presence of  what one cognizes as the fact that  
one is judging to be the case, or when one understands that one actually has a conclusive 
ground for one's claim. But it is not always present, and in fact, if  we think of  how many 
judgments we form all  the time everyday, it  is  seldom present. My claim simply is that  
judging that p is uncotenable with judging that p might be false (as well as with judging the 
many other propositions that entail that p might be false).
Having clarified what I am claiming,  I  think that  part  of  the force that stands 
behind the objection evaporates. What is the evidence the argument is relying on? One 
source of  evidence seems to be the fact that one is rarely subjectively certain of  what one 
is believing. If  by this it is meant the fact that one rarely consciously takes what one is 
believing as being certain, or that one rarely has a feeling of  certainty while believing, then 
I can't agree more. But as I have explained, these observations are perfectly consistent with 
the recognition that judgment is committed to certainty. 
Another possible source of  evidence for believing that there must be credences is  
maybe the following. Judgment is often the output of  a conscious process of  deliberation. 
During the process, one assess one's evidence. It seems that sometimes we end up judging 
what  we  do even if  during  the  deliberation we have realised that  our  evidence is  not 
conclusive.  It  seems  then  that  there  is  a  phenomenological  ground  for  believing  that 
judgment is often made on the basis of  less than conclusive evidence. If  this is so, then 
judgment can't be committed to certainty. 
This argument can be resisted on two fronts. First of  all, I think there is something 
right in the contention that we come to form judgments even when we realise that we have  
less then conclusive evidence for the propositions we are deliberating about. But very often 
we  do not  forms judgments  that  p is  the  case  or  not  the  case.  We do typically  form 
judgments of  the sort 'p is likely to be true', 'it is almost certain that p', 'p seems true', or the 
like. This point is overlooked because in conversation we do not mention all the cautionary  
clauses that are however present in thought, yet they can be made evident if  we challenge 
what people claims by asking: 'Are you certain of  it?'. Often the answer will be 'No, though 
it is very likely that p'. Second, and again, my view is not that we form judgments only on 
the  basis  of  certainty-conferring  grounds.  We  often  don't.  Third,  I  think  that  we  are 
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inclined to have a wrong opinion about the phenomenology of  judgment because we take  
a  retrospective  perspective  upon  our  doxastic  states.  We  form  judgments.  Then  we 
eventually form opinions about the epistemic quality of  our judgments. We realise that they 
fall short of  certainty. We then have the impression that when we judge we come to judge  
upon the conscious realisation that we have fallible grounds. But this is not how things 
really occur. When we reason, we typically take for granted many alternative possibilities 
that would make explicit the fallibility of  our grounds were they to be made explicit. But 
they are almost never made explicit. This is surely the case with very remote possibilities –  
like sceptical ones. 
A third source of  evidence for the claim that  judgment can't  be  committed to 
certainty comes from linguistic considerations. I will  discuss these considerations in the 
next paragraph. 
There is another complain against the view that judgment is committed to certainty.  
The complaint is voiced by Fantl and McGrath (2009), p. 134, when they say that “if  the  
view is true then fallibilism about justified belief  is false”. Fallibilism is almost a dogma of 
contemporary epistemology, which explains why Fant and McGath can nonchalantly take 
the consequence that fallibilism about justification is false as an unwelcome consequence.  
The dogma is false, however, as I will argue in Chapter VIII. Indeed, if  certainty is the 
norm of  judgment, then our judgments are correct only if  certain, and since they don't 
merely aim at truth but also at certainty, it is natural to think of  their epistemic justification 
as being infallibilist  in  kind.  The issues here  are  complicated by the  question  whether  
monism or  pluralism about  epistemic  justification  is  true.  This  is  why I  will  postpone 
discussion of  these issues in Chapter VIII.
Do I then believe that judgment is credence 1? I don't think that credences have 
anything to do with judgments. Judgment is an all-or-nothing affair. So, it doesn't make 
much sense to ask which level of  confidence is inherent to judgment. 
§3.14 Phenomenology and linguistic data 
So far I have constructed my arguments by trying to make reference to phenomenological 
evidence only. Particularly, I haven't brought to bear any consideration stemming from an 
analysis of  the way in which we speak about our mental states. In what follows I discuss 
some purported pieces of  linguistic evidence that are meant to be somewhat informative 
about the nature our mental states. 
92
The  view  that  certainty  is  the  norm  of  judgment  provides  a  very  natural  
explanation of  a  bunch of  various  purported  facts  about the  way in which  we speak. 
Consider the following. 
(A) It is raining, but I am not certain that it is raining (p, but I am not psychologically 
certain of  p)
(B) It  is  raining, but it  is  not certain that it  is  raining (p,  but it  is  not epistemically 
certain that p)
(C) It is raining, but it might not be raining (p, but p might be false)
(D) It is raining, but my reasons for so believing don't make it certain that it is raining  
(p, but my reasons for believing p are such that p is not certain)
These four sentences when asserted are infelicitous. One natural explanation is that judging 
that  p commits  one  to  certainty  that  p in  such  a  fashion  that  it  is  impossible  to 
comprehendingly judge the conjunctions listed above. Since it is impossible to be in such 
states, and since we might suppose that ordinary speakers are somewhat sensitive to this  
fact, hearing these sentences strikes one as odd. The expressed propositions are not false. 
They simply can't be held by a subject who is comprehendingly thinking these propositions 
and fully understands the implication of  what he is committing himself  to by judging the  
conjuncts of  these conjunctions.
Now consider these sentences about belief.
(A') I believe it is raining, but I am not certain that it is raining
(B') I believe it is raining, but it is not certain that it is raining
(C') I believe it is raining, but it might not be raining
(D') I believe it is raining, but my reasons don't make it certain that it is raining 
Do you find these odd? C' is odd93. B' seems odd as well, at least if  one keeps track of  the  
fact that C' is odd while one entertains B'. A' and D' apparently are not found odd. One 
might argue that since C' is odd, one should find A' odd as well, for if  one is not certain 
that it is raining then one takes it that it might not be raining. For the same reason, one  
might argue that since C' is odd, D' should be found odd as well, for if  one's reasons don't  
make it certain that it is raining then it might not be raining. Of  course, both argumentative 
strategies will have to explain why people don't find A' ad D' odd even if  they should.
There are plenty of  ways in which one can resist the way in which I have suggested 
we might connect my view about the certainty norm of  judgment with the debate on 
norms of  assertion. Some theorists have argued that certainty is the norm of  assertion94. A 
93 As noticed by Yalcin (2007).
94 See Stanley (2008). Williamson (2000), p. 254, seems to be committed to a certainty norm for assertion as  
93
basic piece of  evidence in favour of  this view is the fact that A and B are found infelicitous 
when asserted. In A a subject asserts that p, while denying that he is psychologically certain 
that p, whereas in B a subject asserts p while denying the possession of  grounds for being 
psychologically certain of  p. If  certainty is the norm of  assertion, the oddity is explained. 
Moreover, one's assertion might be challenged by asking whether one is certain of  it95, and 
this is further evidence for taking certainty as a the norm of  assertion. If  one accepts this 
view about the norm of  assertion, and sincere assertion is taken as the expression of  one's 
judgment, then it is natural to think that certainty is the norm of  judgment as well 96. 
This view has of  course been challenged97. There is a growing literature that offers 
data in order to support a great variety of  theories about the norms of  assertion. Some 
theorists hold that knowledge (understood along fallibilist lines), and not certainty, is the 
norm of  assertion98.  Other  theorists  have  defended  weaker  accounts  of  the  norm of 
assertion99. Moreover, it is not clear that the norm of  assertion and the norm of  belief  and 
judgment are the same100. It seems the debate is far from being settled. Anyway, in order to 
defend the view that certainty is the norm of  judgment we need not to argue that certainty 
is also the norm of  assertion, though that might be a desirable result that further supports  
the contention that certainty is the norm of  judgment.
In a recent paper, Hawthorn et al. (2016) have argued that belief  is weak, meaning 
that the norm of  belief  is weaker than the norm of  certainty. One of  their aim is to argue  
against  the  claim  that  the  norm of  assertion  and  the  norm  of  belief  are  the  same,  
proceeding under the assumption that there are good reasons to hold a certainty norm of 
assertion. Here we need not be bothered about this specific point. What matters for us is  
whether the evidence they offer for the contention that belief  is weak is good evidence, 
and whether it has any bearing on the question whether certainty is the norm of  judgment. 
They first offer some linguistic evidence. Whereas 
(A) 'It is raining but I am not sure it is raining' 
sounds odd – and its oddity might be naturally explained by a certainty norm of  assertion,  
well. 
95 A  fact  noticed  by  Unger,  (1975),  pp.  263–264,  who  acknowledges  the  insight  to  Michael  Slote  ; 
Williamson (2000). 
96 Stanley (2008) argues for a certainty norm of  assertion while denying that certainty is the norm of  belief.  
See also Hawthorne e al (2016) for the contention that the norm of  assertion differs from the norm of  
belief  and that the norm of  belief  is weaker than certainty.
97 Turri (2010) and (2016), for instance.
98 See Turri's work in defence of  the knowledge norm of  assertion. 
99 Douven (2006); Hill & Schechter (2007); Kvanvig (2009); Lackey (2007); Wright (2014). 
100Hawthorne e al (2016) argue that the norm of  belief  is weaker than the norm of  assertion. In the attempt 
to defend a fallibilist approach in epistemology, Stanley (2008) defends a certainty norm of  assertion in  
order to explain away the impression that certainty is the norm of  belief. 
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(A') 'I believe it is raining but I am not sure it is raining' 
doesn't sound odd. Also, they notice that 
(E) 'It is raining but I know it might not be' 
is infelicitous, whereas
(E') 'I believe it is raining but I know that it might not be' 
is not. Since both A' and E' don't sound as admissions of  irrationality it is natural to think 
that  certainty  is  not  the  norm  of  belief,  and  that  one  might  be  correctly  believing 
something even if  she is not psychologically and epistemically certain of  it. To this point 
one might further want to add that these pieces of  evidence speak against my claims about 
incompatibility.  Since neither A'  nor E' sound as admissions of  being in an impossible 
mental situation, it is natural to think that it is indeed possible to be in the mental situations 
described by A' and E'. 
What are we to do of  these arguments? One move that I am willing to make is to  
reject the impression,  if  anyone has such an impression,  that A'  and E' are reports of  
belief. I would follow Stanley (2008) in claiming that sentences like A' and E' are not belief 
reports but rather cases in which one is expressing that she has some reasons, though not  
conclusive ones, for thinking that p101. 
Here is another argument they advance in favour of  their claim. 
“One comes from lottery cases. Many argue that one cannot felicitously assert that one’s lottery 
ticket with a one in a hundred chance of  winning won’t in fact win (e.g. Dudman 1992; Williamson 
2000). However, at least intuitively, it seems reasonable to believe that one’s lottery ticket will lose in 
these situations. If  this were not the case no one would be even initially bothered by the lottery  
paradox. This data is problematic for anyone who endorses entitlement equality and thinks that  
lottery  sentences  are  unassertable.  Of  course,  these  judgements  about  lottery  cases  might  be 
denied.  But  the  data  suggests  that  having  a  norm of  belief  on  par  with  that  for  assertion  is  
revisionary of  our ordinary practice in a way that, e.g., the knowledge norm of  assertion does not  
appear to be”. Hawthorne e al (2016), p. 5.
From the fact that it is highly intuitive to hold that it is rational or justified to believe that  
one's ticket will loose, it doesn't follow that people actually believe that their tickets will  
loose. When we say that it is highly intuitive to say that one is justified in believing that 
one's ticket will loose we surely want to capture the following uncontroversial facts: the fact 
101There is something strange in reporting what one believes by saying 'I believe that p' rather than simply 
asserting that p. This offers further prima facie support to the contention that we are not here (typically) 
in the presence of  belief-reports. See Nes (2016) for a discussion of  this issue and of  many more kindred 
cases. 
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that it is almost certain, with respect to any given ticket, that that ticket will loose; that it is  
irrational to buy a ticket, for one is almost certain to loose; moreover, we want also to 
capture the fact that one's course of  action will be legitimate if  it proceeded under the 
assumption that the chosen ticket will lose – for it is highly probable that it will. But in  
order to grant all these intuitive facts we do not also need to grant the fact that people 
actually believe of  each singular ticket that it will be a loser. One might, of  course, so believe.  
But what really happens, I think, is that people are highly confident that the ticket will  
loose. People believe things like: it is almost certain that it will loose. If  you ask them: will it  
loose?  They  will  say:  'yes'.  Are  you  sure?  They  will  say:  'no'.  Thus,  I  think  that  
considerations coming from the putative paradox in the lottery case don't establish the fact 
that people have beliefs in propositions they knowingly take to be uncertain.
The third argument that the authors offer in favour of  their claim suggests that the  
sort of  phenomenon I am interested in – the one of  conscious comprehending belief,  
what is typically called judgment – is not the same phenomenon that people are talking to  
when they use 'belief'  and kindred expressions.  According to them,  'belief'  behaves like 
other weak mental states do. They think there is linguistic evidence to the effect that 'belief'  
behaves in such a way as to suggest that it is as weak as 'to think', 'to suspect that', 'to have  
some confidence that',  'to half-expect that',  'to be tempted to think that',  'to be of  the 
opinion that'.  I think the evidence here is controversial,  and they themselves don't fully 
commit to the interpretation and the linguistic intuitions they favour. Anyway, if  this was to  
show something it  would show that their view indeed applies  to a  very  weak sense of 
belief. The sense is so weak that it simply doesn't interfere with the thesis I am defending  
here. In fact, it is quite natural to think that the phenomenon of  belief  they are referring to 
is the one of  dispositional belief. It might indeed be that our folk conception of  dispositional 
belief  is of  the sort of  taking it not to be subsumed by the certainty norm. Anyway, I have 
no intention to argue that belief  in this sense is governed by the certainty norm. In fact,  
the authors themselves recognize (p. 10) that their  point about our ordinary talk about 
belief  doesn't show that there is no further belief-like mental state which is governed by 
different norms.
There  is  a  general  reply  that  we  can  give  to  these  sorts  of  linguistically  based 
considerations against my view and, more generally, in favour or against any view about the 
nature of  the mind. These data offer evidence for understanding what is our folk theory of 
belief  (and of  other mental  states).  The folk theory implicitly includes both normative 
considerations ('I believe that  p,  but  p is not certain' is taken to provide evidence about 
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what norms govern belief  attributions) and considerations about the metaphysics of  the 
mind ('I believe that  p, but  p is not certain' can be taken to provide evidence about our 
opinions about the connection between belief  and certainty). But Linguistic data alone do 
not offer us ground to conclude anything that goes beyond our folk theory of  the mind. 
Yet there is a temptation in the literature to take facts about our folk theory as  
evidence for conclusions about the normativity and the metaphysics of  the mind. With 
respect to the move from our folk theory to normative conclusions, it must be enough to 
observe,  in  the  present  context,  that  there  is  no  obvious  reason  why  we  should  be 
conservative about normativity and take our folk theory as providing the correct picture of 
the normativity of  the mind. Even if  we concede that we commonsensically think of  belief 
as correct and justified even if  uncertain, why should common sense be taken as right? 
With respect  to the move from our folk theory of  the mind to conclusions about the  
metaphysics of  the mind, it should be even more obvious that this transition if  far from 
being uncontroversial. What reason do we have to think that our ways of  speaking about  
our mind has evolved in such a fashion as to track the way in which our mind actually 
works? We don't believe that our folk conception of  time should be evidence about the 
nature of  time, but then why should we believe that our folk conception of  belief  should  
be  evidence  about  belief  itself ?102 Anyway,  even  if  we  menage  to  provide  abstract 
arguments for thinking that our ways of  speaking about the mind are on the right track, it  
would  still  be  possible  to  question  whether  we  should  be  confident  of  our  ways  of  
speaking (let alone of  our ways of  collecting data about our ways of  speaking and about  
our interpretations of  these data). And the best way to check whether what we implicitly 
and commonsensically think about our conscious mind is correct is to look at the way in 
which our mind actually works. This is precisely what we do when we do phenomenology.  
Hence, the phenomenological evidence I have tried to provide in this chapter enjoys an 
obvious theoretical priority on the putative evidence provided by analysis of  our linguistic 
practice. The last word belongs to phenomenology103.  
102One reason is that there is an anti-realist tendency in the literature to take facts about the mind to be  
determined by facts about our conceptual scheme. We will see some instances of  this point, which I think 
can be shown to be pervasive in the contemporary analytic literature, when we discuss theories of  the aim 
of  belief  in Chapter IX. 
103One might think that another way of  looking directly at the way in which our mind works consists in  
doing cognitive science and in approaching the mind from a third-personal perspective. However, a third-
personal approach still has to be checked by relying on phenomenological observations. The only way one 
can be sure that her scientific discoveries are about  belief,  say, is to find some correlation between the 
discoveries and the phenomenon that we first-personally individuate as the phenomenon of  belief. 
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Chapter IV
Suspension of  Judgment
 
Six people are asked the following question: 'why is there something rather than nothing?'.  
The theist answers that God created being from nothingness. The atheist denies that and 
maybe adheres to some other answer. A guy never thought about the question and just 
confesses  that.  He  is  however  curious  to  know and starts  a  passionated  open-minded 
inquiry on the matter. Then there are two agnostics. One claims that it is simply impossible  
to know what the right answer is and thus also claims that it is impossible to know whether  
God created being from nothingness. The other claims that so far, given all the evidence he 
has been capable of  considering, he isn't capable of  settling the issue one way or another,  
but he is still open-minded as to whether there might be some evidence that one day will  
settle the issue. Finally, the last person says that here the problem is not that we don't know 
the answer, but rather that there isn't any answer to this question and that we are facing a  
mystery. 
In this chapter I will speak about these characters (and a few more) and clarify the 
differences among them. Their differences are important, and should be captured by our 
theorizing about our cognitive life. With the exception of  the person who never thought 
about  the  question,  the  standpoints  endorsed  by  all  our  characters  represent  available 
moves in the quest for discovering the truth. Recent literature on suspension of  judgment 
hasn't been fine-grained enough so as to capture these differences. Or so I will argue. 
§4.1 Preliminary distinctions
It is important to distinguish here (as we did before in the case of  judgment) between 
conscious  and  unconscious  suspension  of  judgment,  as  well  as  between  dispositional 
suspension of  judgment and occurrent suspension of  judgment. 
We can imagine that five of  our characters (all  of  them except the person who 
never thought about the issue) are first shocked by this perplexing Leibnizian question 
when they are young, and that after twenty years they are asked to report how they made 
up their  minds  on  the  issue.  We can  imagine  that  they  really  endorse  their  respective 
positions, and that they are not simply playing the game of  pretending to endorse some 
position just for the sake of  responding to the inquirer. Since they have thought for a long 
time and quite deeply about the issue we can imagine that they have ended up forming  
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some cognitive disposition in relation to it. The theist comes to believe that God exists, and 
this belief  becomes one of  his stable dispositions. The same goes for the atheist, the two 
agnostics, and the person who thinks that we are facing a mystery. They all are in turn  
disposed to consciously judge that God created being from nothingness, that It doesn't 
even exist, that we can't know, that we can't know yet, and that there is no answer to the 
question. So, each of  the committed characters has some disposition towards the question.  
In  this  chapter,  as  elsewhere  in  the  Dissertation,  I  will  primarily  be  concerned  with 
conscious cognitive phenomena. I will therefore be speaking of  conscious suspension of 
judgment, and will take no stance on the relationship between conscious and dispositional 
suspension of  judgment104.
What about the new inquirer? Even if  he has just started to consider the issue he 
might  already  have  the  disposition  to  be  open-minded about  it.  In  order  to  have  the 
disposition  to  be  open-minded  about  the  issue  he  should  not  have  other  beliefs  that 
dispose him to answer one way rather than the other to the Leibnizian question 105. It is 
instructive  to contrast  this  new open-minded inquirer  with  a  character  who has  never 
thought about the question, and yet who possesses other beliefs that dispose him to take a 
stance with respect to that question.  Thus,  we might suppose that he is someone who 
already thinks that we can't  know the answers to big philosophical  questions,  and that 
somehow feels the presence of  a big question when she ears the Leibnizian one, and thus 
is strongly inclined to dismiss it on the ground that we can't know the right answer. This  
naïf  sceptic and the new inquirer are relevantly different even if  both of  them don't have  
any dispositional belief  about the issue. They are disposed to react to it in different ways.  
So, our new passionate inquirer might have some relevant disposition towards the question 
even if  is  she has no answer to it.  The important point  to be noticed is  that  we can  
distinguish here the disposition to be open-minded and the conscious act of  being entertaining a 
proposition  while  refraining  from  taking  any  stance  about  the  truth  value  of  that  
proposition. In Chapter V and VI I will say a bit more on open-mindedness, when I am 
going to discuss the nature of  doubt and the pyrrhonian stance. For the time being, I just 
want to stress that we are here interested in conscious open-mindedness. 
A  last  introductory  remark.  In  what  follows  I  will  assume  that  suspension  of 
judgment is closed under negation, namely that one suspends judgment about p if  and only 
if  she suspends judgment about not-p106. In what follows I will only speak of  suspension of  
104See Chapter III.
105Moreover,  we should also suppose that he  does possess  to some degree the intellectual virtues that 
prevent him to form hasty judgments.
106See van Fraassen (1998) and Hajek (1998) for some discussion of  this assumption, and see also Friedman 
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judgment about p while leaving implicit that suspension includes propositions incompatible 
with p as well.  
§4.2 Suspension of  judgment and mere absence of  judgment
The first point about suspension of  judgment is that it has to be distinguished from mere 
absence of  judgment. If  we reduce suspension of  judgment about p to the absence of  the 
belief  that  p  is  true,  then  it  will  turn  out  that  I  have  suspended  judgement  and  am 
suspending judgment about an infinity of  propositions. We will be suspending judgment 
about all the propositions that we can't grasp, about all the propositions that we have never  
entertained  (with  the  possible  exceptions  of  the  obvious  consequences  of  those 
propositions which we have considered), and that even agents who aren't even capable of  
cognition do suspend judgment107. 
§4.3 Absence of  judgment and open-mindedness
I have just distinguished mere absence of  belief  from suspension of  judgment. Notice that 
there is also an important difference between a person who simply has no opinion about  
the matter and a person who has no opinion but is actively trying to make up one's mind 
about the issue while being open-minded about it. Thus consider the character in our story 
who is confronted with the question for the first time. Immediately before being asked the  
question he has no opinion whatsoever about the issue – maybe he never even entertained 
the question. Now that he has been asked the question and that he took interest into it he 
is  different.  There  is  a  sense  in  which  he  is  more  than  simply  lacking  any  opinion 
whatsoever about the issue, for now he knows that he has no opinion whatsoever and that  
he has no idea about what to respond. I would say that it is natural to mark this distinction  
by saying that now he is really open-minded about the issue108, for now he has the issue in 
mind and so he really has something to be open-minded about. So, absence of  judgment 
might occur even in the absence of  the proposition to be judged. Being open-mindedness  
(2011), p. 166, footnote 4. 
107See  Friedman (2013),  2015)  against  the  claim that  absence  of  belief  is  sufficient  for  suspension  of  
judgment. She also argues that non-belief  is not  necessary for suspension of  judgment, whereas I will 
argue that it is necessary. See also Wedgwood (2002), who notes that, as far as absence of  belief  is the sole 
property concerned, “even rocks and numbers have that property” (p. 272). For similar remarks see Hajek 
(1998), Bergmann (2005), Sturgeon (2008).
108Being open-minded about p – in at least one interesting sense of  the expression 'being open-minded' – 
requires at least entertaining p, in the case of  conscious open-mindedness, and at least having entertained p, 
in the case of  dispositional open-mindedness. 
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however requires that one entertains a proposition without taking a stance about its truth 
value109. To have the disposition to be open-minded is to have the disposition to refrain  
from taking a stance with respect to the truth of  a given proposition when one consciously 
entertains that proposition. Wondering is different from simple open-mindedness, for to 
wonder about the truth of  a proposition is to be open-minded about it while actively trying 
to determine its truth value.  
§4.4 Suspension of  judgment and open-mindedness
We should distinguish between two senses of  suspension of  judgment. One can be said to 
suspend  judgment  on an  issue  in  order  to  freely  and non-prejudicially  inquire  into  that 
matter. That is suspension at the beginning of  the inquiry; or one can be said to suspend 
judgment as a result of  one's inquiry. In order to clearly distinguish between the two things I 
suggest that a more natural way of  describing these phenomena is to speak of  being open-
minded when one starts inquiry and of  being suspending judgment when one concludes it  
or makes progress in the inquiry. Suspension of  judgment is a step at the end of  inquiry or 
within the process of  inquiry. Whereas to be open-minded about an issue is the first step  
of  inquiry – at least, this is the first step of  someone who never thought about the issue 
and never formed dispositions to take a particular committed stance about the issue. The 
two phenomena are easily conflated. There are many good reasons why they are easy to 
conflate, one of  which is the fact that we have ways of  speaking about suspension of  
judgment that conflate the two. Another important reason is that we fail to keep clear in 
our mind the following distinctions: 
– the distinction between the  punctual  conscious  occurrence  of  the  phenomena  of  being-
open-minded and being-suspending-judgment. The two phenomena are different, and it is  
easy to show it.
– The second distinction is the one between the  persons  who, respectively, have an 
open-minded attitude towards an issue, and have a suspensive attitude towards the same 
issue. These two persons are harder to distinguish.
– The third  distinction  is  the  one  between  definitive suspension of  judgment  and 
temporary suspension of  judgement. To definitively suspend judgment is to take it that there 
109Wedgwood (2002) calls 'suspension of  judgment' the act of  consciously considering a proposition without 
believing or disbelieving it. This is roughly what I labelled open-mindedness, with the sole difference that  
open-mindedness  involves  one's  being  inquisitive  about  the  proposition  –  merely  entertaining  a 
proposition without a taking a stance about it is  different from entertaining a propositiong,  wondering  
whether it is true, and refraining from taking any stance because one hasn't made up one's mind yet about 
the issue. Anyway, what matters here are not the labels, but the distinctions among the phenomena. 
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is no possible way of  answering the question. To temporarily suspend judgment is to take it 
that so far we haven't found any way of  answering the question, but we might find a way if  
we insist inquiring.
Distinction  between  open-mindedness  and  definitive  suspension  of  judgment.  To  be  open-
minded about an issue (in the occurrent conscious sense, not in the dispositional sense) is  
to be entertaining a proposition while not taking any stance about its truth-value. Typically,  
moreover, in the context of  an active inquiry, one doesn't simply entertain a proposition 
without taking a stance about its truth-value. Rather one wants to know its truth value. 
This is to wonder about an issue (e.g., about why there is something rather than nothing). 
To be wondering about an issue – where  p  is  a candidate answer to the question that 
provides  the  issue  –  requires  to  be  open-minded  about  it,  hence  it  is  obviously  not  
compatible with judging that p is true (or false). If  one judges that p is true (or false), one is 
not open-minded about the issue, but is rather, in our example, a theist (or an atheist).  
Wondering about whether p is the case is not compatible with judging that the question can 
never be answered either. This sort of  definitive suspension of  judgment which involves 
the judgment that it is not possible, given the sort of  evidence we could possibly have an 
access to,  to answer our question,  is  a  significantly  different stance from the stance of 
someone who is simply wondering about the issue. In fact, as I will argue later, it is not  
possible to have a definitive suspension of  judgment about  p  and also to be wondering 
whether p is true or not. For, if  one has a definitive suspension of  judgment one takes it  
that there is no possible evidence that might help one in answering the question. But to  
wonder about an issue is to be committed to the fact that there might be a correct answer 
to be found, and it is also to be committed to the possibility of  having an access to the 
evidence that will allow one to select the right answer. If  one were to think that there is no 
such evidence one would not even begin the inquiry. Thus, when one is not simply open-
minded but  also  actively  wonder  about  a  given  issue  –  like  in  our  case,  since  we  are  
considering an inquirer – there is a clear difference between the stance occupied by the new 
inquirer and the stance occupied by someone who definitively suspend judgment about the 
issue. 
Yet there is something that suspending judgment and being open-minded clearly 
have in common. In both cases, when one entertains p – the proposition that defines (or 
one of  the propositions that define) the issue under investigation – one doesn't judge that  
it is true/false. Yet, in the case of  open-mindedness one doesn't have any opinion yet to 
the effect that the issue can't be settled, whereas in the case of  definitive suspension of 
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judgment one is precisely so committed. 
Difference  between  open-mindedness  and  temporary  suspension  of  judgment. As previously 
remarked, it is very easy to conflate open-mindedness with suspension of  judgment. One 
reason is that one might fail to bear in mind the distinction between a definitive suspension 
of  judgement and a temporary one. One agnostic in our story takes it that there is no 
possible available evidence that will settle the issue. The other agnostic takes it that so far  
she has found no evidence, but she is still open to the possibility that there be evidence that  
settles  the issue.  Admittedly,  it  is  harder to distinguish between being an open-minded 
inquirer and being temporarily agnostic. After all, they are both still wondering about the 
question. They are both still inquiring. What is the difference then? The difference is that is  
that to be temporarily agnostic is to judge that so far the evidence one has explored in  
order to answer the question doesn't settle it, whereas to be open-minded about the issue 
one doesn't need to have any explicit judgments about one's evidence, because one doesn't 
need to have already started the inquiry, and thus one doesn't need to have any opinion 
whatsoever about her own evidence.  The difference is obscured by the fact that to be  
open-mindedly wondering about an issue is to be committed to the fact that one doesn't 
have the grounds for settling the issue – and this is something to which one is committed if 
one judges that so far the evidence doesn't settle the issue. Moreover, both attitudes are  
committed to the claim that there might be grounds for settling the issue. So, even if  some 
commitments of  open-mindedness about  p  and temporary suspended judgment about  p 
are the same  – namely that one hasn't grounds for settling the issue and there might be 
such grounds – they are two different phenomena – for the latter but not the former also  
claims that some of  the evidence that has been scrutinized isn't enough to settle the issue,  
whereas the former has no such kind of  opinion about previously scrutinized evidence, for 
there isn't any evidence that has already been previously scrutinized. 
§4.5 Suspension of  judgment as a move within inquiry
I have distinguished suspension of  judgment from mere absence of  judgment; between 
absence of  judgment and being open-minded; and between suspension of  judgment and 
open-mindedness. We can further appreciate these distinctions by noticing that to suspend 
judgment is to make a committed move in inquiry, whereas absence of  judgment and mere 
open-mindedness are not committed moves in in inquiry.
Contrast  the  person  who  is  open-minded  about  the  question  'Why  is  there 
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something rather than nothing?' because she has never previously considered it and the two 
agnostics who have considered the issue and made up their mind about it. Suspension of  
judgment is a  response to the effort one makes in order to determine the truth value of  a 
proposition. This is  why suspension of  judgment is a phenomenon the intelligibility  of  
which presupposes that one looks at it through normative lenses. When we think of  it first-
personally  this  point  becomes  obvious:  when  someone  asks  me  whether  I  suspend 
judgment about  p or not I do pretty much the same thing I would do if  I were asked 
whether I judge p to be true or not, that is, I consider the issue itself, whether there is any 
good reason to think that p is true, and if  I end up judging that there can't be such good 
reasons (or that so far there are not such good reasons) I am in a position to respond to 
the question whether I suspend judgment about p or not. This is why the attitude brings 
with it a commitment to the correctness of  the attitude110. And the fact that the suspension 
typically111 comes  after  some  sort  of  deliberation  (which  might  be  more  or  less 
sophisticated and monitored depending on the effort of  the agent) is also why it is part of 
one's  understanding  of  suspension  of  judgment  that  one  shouldn't  suspend  judgment 
unless it is right to do so. 
Another  way  of  approaching  the  same  point  is  this.  Correct  suspension  of 
judgment is as much an achievement in the path guided by the aim of  discovering truths as it 
is correct judgment. Their standards of  correctness differ. A judgment is correct when it is  
true, whereas a suspension of  judgement is correct with respect to  p when we can't tell 
whether p or not-p is  the case (of  course what the impossibility to tell  means will  be 
addressed in a moment). Suspension of  judgment is thus an achievement because it rules 
out one possible move in the game of  discovery of  the truth. Mere absence of  belief  that  
p  is  not  an achievement,  since  it  doesn't  rule  out  any alethically  relevant  attitude  with 
respect to p. The mere absence of  opinion is simply where one finds himself  if  he hasn't  
yet started to enter the game. 
§4.6 Ignorance and mystery 
It is useful to introduce at this point another important sort of  cognitive stance which can 
be  erroneously  confused  with  suspension  of  judgment.  There  is  a  difference between 
judging that one cannot tell the answer to a question, and judging that there is no answer to 
110As Sturgeon (2008)  puts  it,  suspension of  judgment  is  some sort  of  'committed  neutrality'.  And as  
Friedman (2015) puts it, “It looks as though we should say that one is suspended on some matter when 
one has some sort of  opinion on the matter” p 2. 
111I'll discuss the issue whether suspension of  judgment always require previous deliberation in a moment.
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a question. In the first case we have suspension of  judgement. In the latter case there is  
nothing to suspend our judgment about. Yet, they both are moves that compete for being 
the right moves in the game of  truth.
When I wonder whether there is life after death, I  might come to the conclusion 
that I should suspend judgment about the issue, for I believe that the only evidence which  
is  in  principle  available  to  me now is  not  sufficient  in  order  to  settle  the  issue.  But  in 
considering this issue I am assuming that there is something to  know –  namely whether 
there is life after death or not –, except that I know that I can't know it. So, suspension of  
judgment as to whether p presupposes that there is a fact of  the matter as to whether p is 
true or false112. 
In the case of  mystery, however, we know that there is nothing to know, and yet we 
have a question. We have a question, but we know that there can't be any answer113. In this 
case we face what we typically call a mystery. The most profound metaphysical question of 
all questions is an example of  this case. Why is there something rather than nothing? We 
understand the question and we want an answer to it. But, eventually, we know that there  
could  be  no  answer.  We are  puzzled  when  we  confront  this  question.  When  our 
explanations come to an end we face mystery. We raise questions, as if  there were possible  
answers with respect to which we could then either have the state of  belief  or the state of  
suspension of  judgment.  But this  is  a  mere appearance,  because  there  are no possible  
answers. Thus, why is there consciousness? This looks as a normal question so long as we 
think that there is  something to which consciousness is  reducible,  or something which 
could explain its occurrence. But even if  you believe that the reduction or explanation are 
possible,  once  you  have  reached  the  bottom  of  your  preferred  path  to  reduction  or 
explanation you might just raise that same question about the bottom: why does it exist? 
And another mysterious question: why is it like this, and not otherwise? It sounds as though 
there are answers to these questions, but eventually we know that there are not. And this is  
the  realm of  mystery,  not  the  realm of  suspension of  judgment.  We do not  suspend 
judgment about all the possible candidate answers to this questions. Rather, we do believe 
that all candidate answers are false and that there couldn't be any answer at all114. 
112I won't  pursue here the interesting question of  how suspension of  judgment  relates  to  propositions 
whose truth is indeterminate. 
113To be clear: the answer might simply be 'for no reason'. I agree with the answer. But this is precisely the 
source of  the mystery: even if  we know that there can't be any cause for the existence of  anything at all,  
still there remains the puzzlement that can be expressed in the question 'why does it exist?', or 'how could 
it possibly exist?'. Another move would be to reject these questions as meaningless, but the proposal is 
hard to accept given the fact that we easily understand what the questions are asking. 
114Here  the  relevant  claim  is  the  distinction  between  judging  to  be  facing  a  mystery  and  suspending 
judgment, not the specific cases I used as illustrations of  mysteries.
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Thus, the important difference between suspending judgment about an issue and 
judging that we are facing a mystery, is that in the former case we are recognizing our  
ignorance, whereas in the latter case there is nothing to be ignorant about. These attitudes  
represent completely different 'last words' on the truth. 
§4.7 Suspension of  judgment about p is uncotenable with judging that p
The  discussion  conducted  so  far  has  already  allowed  us  to  make  some  progress  in  
understanding what suspending judgment amounts to. I have often been speaking of  it as a  
judgment about grounds for believing, namely either as a judgment about the impossibility 
of  having adequate grounds for judging, or about the momentary lack of  any adequate 
grounds  for  judging.  I  will  end  up defending a  reductionist  view about  suspension of  
judgment,  arguing that  it  is  reducible  to a  judgment  about  grounds  for  judging.  I  will  
proceed in the analysis by showing how this reductionist view captures all we want to say 
about suspension of  judgment.
When is it that suspension of  judgment as to whether p is true is correct? What are 
we committed to by suspending judgment about a given proposition? In order to answer 
these questions I will follow the method of  eidetic variation. 
First of  all, suspension of  judgment as to whether p is true is uncotenable with the 
judgment that p is true (or false). This is trivial. It is the nature of  suspension of  judgment 
of  neither being the judgment that  p, nor the judgement that  not-p. Vice versa, it is the 
nature of  judgment to be committal precisely in the way in which a suspensive attitude as  
to  whether  p is  true  is  not.  This  result  is  what  has  to  be  expected  if  suspension  of  
judgment is nothing but a judgment about the lack of  adequate grounds for judging. If  I 
comprehendingly judge that my grounds for judging  p are not adequate, then I am not 
judging that p. To judge that p, as we saw in the previous Chapter, is to be committed to 
judging that one has good grounds for so judging. And to judge that there are no adequate  
grounds for judging that p is to reject a commitment to judging that p115.
115Again, as in the Chapter on Judgment, here is a long footnote on the connection between suspension of 
judgment and alethic correctness in which I argue that suspending judgment about p commits one to judge that it is  
(alethically) correct to suspend judgment about  p. To see that this commitment is indeed part of  suspension of 
judgment, suppose you are consciously and comprehendingly suspending judgment about p. Would you 
be keeping suspending your judgment as to whether  p if  you were to judge that  your attitude is  not  
(alethically) correct, namely the one to be had if  one wants to discover the truth? No, precisely because it 
is part of  what one judges when one comprehendingly judges that one's attitude is not correct that one 
should not have that attitude. Of  course, one can judge that one should not suspend judgment about p 
but rather, say, judge that p is true, and yet one might fail to have the disposition to believe that p is true. 
However, while one is consciously and comprehendingly judging that she should not suspend judgment as 
to whether p one is thereby no longer suspending judgment about p. For, by judging that one should not 
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§4.8 Suspending judgment about p commits one to judge that one has grounds for suspending  
judgment about p
Can I intelligibly understand myself  as being suspending judgment about p if  I don't take 
myself  to have some ground for suspending judgment about  p? As remarked above, the 
state  of  suspension of  judgment  is  not  a  state  we  are  saddled  with  like  a  perceptual  
experience or a state of  pain. It is the result of  an activity. Passive states like experiences  
are not states the possession of  which requires that we have (or take ourselves to have) 
grounds for their correctness. Suspension of  judgment, being the result of  an activity, and  
being subject to normative constraints, as we have just began to observe, is in need of  
grounds for taking it as the correct cognitive attitude to have. To test that, suppose you are 
consciously and comprehendingly suspending judgment as to whether p is true. Could you 
be doing this while at the same time you judge that you have no epistemic reasons at all to 
take that attitude as the correct one to have? I don't think this to be possible. If  I judge I  
have no reasons to suspend judgment, then it is not intelligible to suspend judgment, for I 
don't take it as a correct attitude to have, which is an implicit commitment of  suspension 
of  judgment. This point is to be expected if  suspension of  judgment is a judgment about 
grounds. For, being a judgment, since any judgment that  p is committed to there being 
grounds for judging that p, suspending judgment will be committed to there being grounds 
for suspending judgment.
Friedman (2011) seems to think that there are states of  suspension of  judgment 
which are grounded on non-epistemic reasons. 
“Can’t S think that it’s good luck to be agnostic about whether his team will win and so suspend  
judgment about whether they will  prevail? Can’t he think that it is morally corrupt to have any  
suspend judgment about p one is no longer giving assent to the implicit commitment that is part of  one's 
suspension of  judgment, namely the commitment that it is correct to suspend judgment.
This point is again captured if  suspending judgment just is judging the lack of  adequate grounds  
for judging. For, as we have seen in the Chapter of  judgment, to judge that p is to be committed to the 
correctness of  the judgment that p, hence to judge that one lacks adequate grounds for judging is to be 
committed to the correctness of  this judgment about grounds. 
I have been speaking of  alethic correctness only. Suspension of  judgment, like judgment, can be  
evaluated also by using  non-alethic considerations. I can, for instance, evaluate my present belief  that there is 
no God-grounded meaning in life as being prudentially ineffective for many aims that I might like to  
achieve. However,  first-personal deliberation  about these attitudes is constrained by  alethic considerations only 
(there are non-alethic reasons that the subject can use in order to form judgments and in order to suspend 
judgment). The notion of  alethic correctness I use here is tied with first.personal doxastic deliberation.  
However, one can construct notions of  correctness which are tied with third-personal evaluation, and 
which can be prudential, moral, or aesthetic correctness. I am not concerned about them here. 
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beliefs  about  Middle  East  politics  and  so  adopt  an  agnostic  stance  instead?  Or might  he  not  
suspend because he thinks that God or his mother or his president or his doctor or Brad Pitt wants 
him to? It is not clear how to make sense of  these possibilities on a view according to which 
suspended judgment is just a state of  epistemically principled non-belief ” (Friedman (2011),  p. 
175). 
These are very interesting examples and they represent objections to my view. They do not  
show that  it  is  possible  to  suspend  judgment  on  the  basis  of  non-epistemic  reasons,  
however. What they show is how looking at the behaviour of  our way of  speaking could  
mislead our understanding of  the nature of  our cognitive life. 
Let's consider her first example. Since, as we have seen, and as Friedman agrees, 
suspension of  judgment  about  p  is  connected to the  issue whether  p is  true or not – 
suspension  of  judgment  is  a  move  in  the  game  of  truth  –  one  cannot  consciously  
understands oneself  as being suspending judgment about whether her team will win on the 
basis of  the consideration that so doing will avoid bad luck. The fact that avoiding belief  
that I will win brings with it bad luck doesn't say anything at all about the truth of  the  
proposition that I will win.
So,  maybe  it  is  possible  that  some  unconscious  causal  mechanisms  have  the 
consequence that  I  don't  believe  that  I  win,  where  the  causal  mechanism is  somehow 
initiated or sustained by my firm conviction that believing in my victory will bring to me 
bad luck. If  we want we can speak of  suspension of  judgment about this sort of  scenarios.  
But it is important to appreciate the difference between this sort of  unconscious and first-
personally unintelligible sort of  suspension of  judgment from the sort of  conscious and 
first-personally intelligible suspension of  judgment I am interested in here. If  the subject 
were to explicitly consider the issue whether the proposition that he will win is true, even if 
he is unconsciously led to suspend judgment about the issue, if  he doesn't take himself  to 
have any reason to believe that he couldn't conclude for his victory or loss, then he will not  
be in a position to find it right to suspend judgment about p. There will then be a mismatch 
between his own unconscious inclinations and his own first-personal self-understanding. 
And the latter is what matters here. 
It is interesting though to wonder why Friedman finds these examples persuasive. 
One explanation is that we simply have different methodologies, and different targets in 
mind. I care about what is first-personally recognizable as a suspension of  judgment, and 
take  the  intelligibility  as  a  methodological  guide  for  discovering  what  this  sort  of 
suspension  of  judgment  amounts  to.  She  appears  to  be  interested  in  suspension  of 
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judgment  as  a  phenomenon which could occur even when one doesn't  first-personally 
understand oneself  as being suspending judgment, and she uses the appeal to intuitions 
through the method of  cases in order to discover what suspending judgment amounts to. 
Maybe it is the latter methodology which brings her to think that suspension of  judgment 
can occur even in cases in  which one is  not  prepared to understand oneself  as  being 
suspending judgment (in a later paragraph I will criticize her use of  a case).
Another  additional  explanation  is  the  following:  she  is  giving  credit,  however 
implicitly  and  unconsciously,  to  our  public  practice  of  speaking  about  suspension  of 
judgment, but the way in which we publicly speak about the truth and our cognitive life  
doesn't perfectly reflect the way in which our cognitive life works. Thus, consider again the 
case of  the match. It is true that we recommend each other to avoid  saying  that we are 
going to win, because this is bad luck. I might say to a mate of  my football team who is  
confidently saying that we are going to win: “Shut up! Don't say that, it brings bad luck!  
Actually,  don't  even  think  that!”.  This  is  a  common  phenomenon.  But  no  one  ever 
supposes that the possible bad luck is a reason to suspend judgment! It is a reason to  
publicly suspend judgment, as it were, or to avoid in one's own foro interno to think about the 
issue. But this evidence about the way we speak doesn't support in any way the idea that  
there could be non-epistemic reasons for suspending judgment. The same considerations 
apply mutatis mutandis to the other examples she makes. 
§4.9 Suspending judgment about p commits one to judge that there are no adequate grounds  
for judging that p
What sort of  grounds are relevant for suspension of  judgment? Since suspending judgment 
about p is neither to take p as true nor to take it as false, these can't be grounds in favour of  
p or not-p. Of  course, being the attitude of  the agnostic, they should be grounds about the 
quality  of  one's  grounds  for  p.  It  is  natural  to  take  suspension  of  judgment  to  be 
committed to there being no adequate grounds for judging that p, for if  there were such 
grounds, one would just judge that p, instead of  suspending one's judgment about it.  
Since suspension of  judgment is an achievement, and since it is an achievement 
with respect to the question whether p should be believed or not, and since, as we have just 
seen, only alethic considerations matter when deliberating whether to suspend judgment or 
not, it is to be expected that  one would be able to suspend judgment about p only if  one 
has judgments about whether there is evidence for believing  p or  not-p116.  This point is 
116This point is noticed by Crawford (2004) as well: ‘‘Suspension of  judgement necessarily involves thoughts  
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trivially explained if  suspension of  judgment is reducible to judgment about grounds. For 
to suspend judgment about p just is to judge that one doesn't have adequate grounds for p. 
So,  if  this  reductionist  view  is  true,  it  is  not  entirely  correct  to  say  that  suspending 
judgment commits one to judging that there are no adequate grounds for p, for to suspend 
judgment and to judge that there are no grounds for p are just the same thing. 
§4.10 Suspending judgment about p commits one to judge that there are no conclusive grounds  
in favour of  p
If  I judge to have conclusive evidence in favour of  p, then, if the issue of  whether p is true 
or  not  becomes  relevant  (as  it  obviously  is  since  I  am  consciously  judging  to  have 
conclusive evidence for  p) I also judge that I should judge that  p,  for there is no other 
cognitive attitude with respect to p which is supported or compatible with my evidence.  
Hence, if  I am to keep my judgment that I have conclusive grounds for p, I will have to 
judge that  p.  This point has been argued for in the Chapter  On Judgment,  where I have 
argued that to judge that p is to be committed to judge that I possess conclusive grounds 
for  p.  Here, we have just seen the same point considering the judgment that I possess 
conclusive  grounds  for  p.  If  I  so  judge,  I  am committed  to  judge  that  p.  And since 
suspension of  judgment is not compatible with judging that  p, it is not compatible with 
judging that one has conclusive grounds for p either. 
This  point  should  be  clear  already  since  it  has  been  argued  that  to  suspend 
judgment commits one to judge that one doesn't possess adequate grounds for judging that 
p. To possess conclusive grounds is of  course to possess adequate grounds for  p. Hence 
the two are not compatible. This point is again nicely captured if  suspending judgment 
reduces to judgment about grounds. 
§4.11 Suspending judgment about p commits one to judge that one has conclusive grounds for 
judging that one doesn't have conclusive grounds in favour of  p
This sounds controversial, but it should not. What should be the epistemic quality of  our 
ground  for  suspending  judgment  in  order  to  have  a  reflexively  stable  suspension  of 
judgment? Should the ground be conclusive or not? Suppose I suspend judgment about p. I 
can either  take  myself  to  have  a  conclusive  ground for  so doing  or  a  non-conclusive 
about one’s own epistemic perspective on whether or not p, namely, that one’s epistemic perspective falls 
short of  establishing whether p and thus that one does not know whether p’’ (p. 226)
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ground for so doing. If  I believe that the ground is not conclusive, but merely fallible, then 
I am also in a position to judge that it might be false that there are no conclusive grounds  
in favour of  p or not-p. But if  this is so, then I am in a position to judge that it might be 
that suspension of  judgment is really not the correct attitude to take. Suppose then that I 
make all these consequences explicit. I will have to find myself  in a mental state such that I  
both suspend judgment about p and also judge that suspending judgment about p might in 
fact be the wrong thing to do, for after all there might be conclusive reasons for settling in 
favour of  p or not-p. But I can't find myself  in that mental situation. If  I am consciously 
judging that suspension of  judgment might be wrong, then I am not suspending judgment 
about  p.  Thus,  to have this judgment  is  to judge that  it  is  not yet  correct  to suspend 
judgment, for one has still to be open-minded on the issue, at least so long as one hasn't  
settled  (that  is,  reached  conclusive  grounds  about)  whether  there  could  be  conclusive 
evidence or not for believing p or not-p. This means that one of  the implicit commitments 
of  suspension of  judgment is that one has conclusive evidence for believing that it is the 
attitude to have, namely for believing that in principle the issue whether p or not-p could not  
be known. This adds another important commitment to suspension of  judgment117. 
This is  again well explained if  suspending judgment reduces to judgment about 
grounds  for  believing.  For  any  judgment  that  p commits  one  to  the  possession  of 
conclusive grounds for judging that  p, hence suspending judgment will be committed to 
there being conclusive grounds for suspending judgment.
§4.12 Temporary and definitive suspensions of  judgment 
Now we are in a position to clarify the distinction between the two agnostics of  our initial  
story.  I  might  suspend judgment  because I  take it  that  right  now I  have not  conclusive 
evidence for p or not-p. This is a relative suspension of  judgment. It differs from the state of 
being simply open minded, because when one is open-minded one is looking for evidence 
to settle the issue or anyway one is still exploring one's own available evidence in order to  
determine whether belief  is warranted or not. In this case, however, one has already gone 
through one's evidence and settled that suspension of  judgment is warranted. This relative 
suspension of  judgment differs from a really definitive suspension of  judgment, though. The 
117This point is nicely explained by the fact that suspension of  judgment, as I will argue in a moment, is  
reducible to a particular judgment. For, as I argue elsewhere in the dissertation, a judgment that p is true is 
correct only if  there are  conclusive  grounds in favour of  p. The argument relies again on the method of 
intelligibility. It is impossible to be  at the same time  judging that  p is true and judging that there are no 
conclusive reasons for it. 
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latter consists in judging that there is no possible evidence whatsoever which will eventually 
settle the issue. 
Another way of  displaying the same distinctions is by relativising the reasonableness 
and  correctness  of  suspensions  of  judgments  to  bodies  of  evidence.  This  way,  we  can 
distinguish open-mindedness from suspension of  judgment in the following fashion: being 
open-minded about an issue amounts to not having yet completely explored one's body of 
evidence,  and hence one is  still  wondering what the right attitude is;  being suspending  
judgment is however to have already analysed and appreciated one's evidence, and having 
concluded that  relative  to that body of  evidence,  suspension of  judgment is the correct 
attitude to have. We can then see the distinction between a relative suspension of  judgment  
from a definitive suspension of  judgment in the following way. The former is relative to a  
body  of  evidence,  but  it  is  still  open  to  the  possibility  that  in  principle there  could  be 
evidence which will eventually settle the issue. A real definitive suspension of  judgment is 
then an attitude which is relevant to  all possible bodies of  evidence. One has taken a definite 
suspension of  judgment once one judges that there couldn't be,  in principle, any evidence 
whatsoever which could possibly settle the issue one way or another.  
Let me illustrate these distinctions with the case of  religious belief  in God. One 
might be completely open-minded about the issue, like our new inquirer. But then one can 
be a relative agnostic if  she believes that the sort of  evidence that she possesses so far is not 
enough to settle the issue one way or the other. This is the case of  someone who thinks,  
for instance, that all the empirical evidence she could possibly possess doesn't allow him to 
go one way or another.  She might think that  it  is  in  principle  impossible to have any 
evidence about God's existence by relying on empirical evidence. That same person might 
however also believes that she has no reason yet to exclude the possibility of  there being 
any further source of  evidence which could settle the issue of  the existence of  God. Thus, 
having heard of  particular divine experiences, of  revelatory experiences, epiphanies, one 
might believe that he has no reason yet to exclude their existence. So, so far, he has reasons 
for endorsing a temporary or relative suspension of  judgment; but he has no reasons to take a 
definitive suspension of  judgment. 
This temporary agnosticism has to be distinguished from the definitive agnosticism 
of  someone who believes that there couldn't be any source of  evidence whatsoever that 
could possibly settle the issue whether God exists or not. This is an agnosticism which is  
committed to believe that there couldn't be any evidence whatsoever for concluding with 
certainty that God exists.
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§4.13 Suspension of  judgment as reducible to judgment about grounds
As I have described the difference between the two agnostics, their difference boils down 
to a difference in judgments about grounds for p. Is there anything more that distinguishes 
their  core  suspensive attitudes? Of  course,  they do have different dispositions  towards 
inquiry. One might want to keep looking for evidence for  p,  whereas the other doesn't. 
These different dispositions are again very well explained by the difference between their  
judgments about grounds. Also, focusing on judgments about grounds allows one to detect 
the otherwise imperceptible difference between the new open-minded inquirer and the old 
searcher of  God. The latter, but not the former, has already thought a lot about the issue 
and  has  formed  a  stance  about  the  grounds  for  settling  it  –  only  an  extraordinary 
experience, possibly received as a gift from divine grace, might prove that a Creator exists.  
The new open-minded inquirer  has no such stance about evidence.  Yet,  they both are 
relevantly alike in their dispositions to keep being open to the possibility that a positive (or  
negative) answers to the question might be found.
There is another important virtue in taking suspension of  judgment to be reducible  
to judgment about evidence.  It  allows us to make very fine-grained differences among 
many  different  inquirers.  By  inquiring  on  an  issue,  different  people  might  form  very 
different opinions about the sort of  evidence one has – or possibly have – for settling the  
issue.  One might  think that  in  this  life  the  question can't  be  settled,  though in future  
reincarnations it will, since karma pushes all of  us to discover the truth. Another might  
think that she is unable to appreciate the evidence and settle the issue, though others who 
are more skilled are surely  in  a  position  to settle  it.  Another  yet  might think that  the 
question might be nonsensical, and suspend judgment in this sense. Here the variety of  
suspensive attitudes is enormous. This variety can be captured only if  one understands 
suspension of  judgment as a judgment about grounds (and, in fact, more generally, as a 
judgment or set of  judgments about our capacity to answer the question that defines our 
inquiry118).  
Reducing suspension of  judgment to particular judgment also captures this very 
important point: the more conceptually sophisticated you are the more sophisticated your  
118In this Chapter I have been focusing on our six characters only. But there are plenty more ways in which 
one can relate to a question. Many such ways might consist in the rejection of  the question. There might  
appear to be a question there, but there is none (e.g., it is a nonsensical string of  words). Other such ways 
consist, as I indicated in the main text, in varieties of  positions about the way in which we  can achieve 
knowledge of  the correct answer to the question. So our characters might have been many many more.  
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mental life could be. When a layman says that he is agnostic about whether God exists, she 
might not have made the distinction between: God's existence can't be known never; God's  
existence can't  be known given the available evidence;  God's existence can't  be known 
given the  evidence  I  possess;  God's  existence can't  be  known in  principle  by me,  but  
perhaps it can be known by other people; … Once you make the distinction available to  
her, she is in a position to refine his own state. This doesn't mean that she didn't have a  
judgment about grounds for believing in God's existence before. The point is simply that  
the contents of  one's judgments depend on the conceptual repertoire of  the believer, and 
the  more  sophisticated  you  are,  the  more  sophisticated  and  nuanced  might  be  your 
judgments about grounds, and hence you suspensions of  judgments. 
If  we  couple  these  observations  with  the  fact  that  all  we  want  to  say  about  
suspension  of  judgment  and  its  normative  profile  is  captured  if  we  think  of  it  as  a 
judgment about ground, we have a very strong case for the reductionist view. So, my view 
end up being significantly different from the one recently defended by Friedman (2011) 
and (2015), according to which suspended judgment both is a particular sui generis mental  
phenomenon,  and  it  has  single  monist  nature.  In  fact,  being  reducible  to  a  particular  
judgment  about  grounds,  there  might  be  a  plethora  of  interestingly  different  ways  of 
suspending judgment about an issue. 
Is there some residual impression that somehow suspension of  judgment should 
not be a judgment? The impression that suspension of  judgment is a further mental state 
than belief  might  come from the realization  that  suspension of  judgment  should  also 
involve something like the absence of  positive judgment as to whether p is true or not. This 
is true, but the absence of  a positive judgment doesn't have any mental reality, precisely  
because it is an absence. The lack of  conscious positive judgment is necessary for one to be 
intelligibly suspending judgment about p, but this doesn't mean that this absence is part of 
the  mental  reality  of  the  suspension  of  judgment  itself.  By  judging  that  one  can't  in  
principle establish that p is true, one also understands, however implicitly, that it is wrong 
to judge that  p (or to judge that not-p, for that matter). But this understanding isn't such 
that when combined with the judgment that one can't establish that p is the case constitute 
a new mental state. We might say that by suspension of  judgment we refer to a complex set  
of  mental  states  involving something like  a  judgment to the  effect  that  there  can't  be 
conclusive evidence for p or not-p, plus the understanding that one should not judge that p, 
or something along these lines. But this complex of  mental states doesn't look like the right  
candidate for being a sui generis kind of  mental state. It is better to describe it as a set of 
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interconnected states, rather than a new independent state.
Another reason why people might think that suspension of  judgment is a different 
state from the belief  that one can't know whether p is true or false is that people have in 
mind suspension of  judgment as a dispositional unconscious state. Maybe the necessary and 
sufficient conditions that one should satisfy in order to be in that dispositional long-term 
state of  mind differ from those that one should satisfy in order to have the judgment that  
one can't know whether p is true or false. But this phenomenon is not the one I am talking 
about here. 
If  suspension of  judgment is really reducible to belief  that one can't conclusively 
establish whether p is true or false, then we can rewrite all the correctness principles about 
suspension of  judgment as principles about that particular kind of  judgment. Interestingly, 
as I noticed in the section on the intelligibility method, what we would have discovered are  
then principles of  correctness whose source is both the nature of  the state (belief) and its 
particular content (that one can't know whether p is true or false). 
§4.14 Suspension of  judgment and disagreement
Having identified (some of) the normative commitments of  suspension of  judgment we 
are now in a position to better clarify a remark I have made several time in the text, namely  
that the characters of  our story are all  making incompatible moves in the same game,  
namely the quest for truth. I will put on a side the person who believes that we are facing a  
mystery, for this standpoint raises complexities which aren't our direct concern here. Also, 
we should put on a side the person who is open-minded about the issue, for he is not 
disagreeing with the theist, the atheist and the agnostics. He is still inquiring about which  
one of  these positions (plus the position which endorses mystery) is the right one to have.  
The others are holding incompatible standpoints. Why? 
The incompatibility, as stressed, is not between the propositions they hold, for the 
agnostics  don't  hold propositions that  contradict  those  endorsed by the  theist  and the 
atheist. Mere proposition-incompatibility will lead to the result that the atheist and theist  
disagree among themselves but not with the agnostics, and similarly that the temporary and 
the definitive  agnostics  disagree  with  one another  but  not the  with  the  theist  and the 
atheist. 
To recapture the incompatibility we should think in terms of  incompatibility of 
standpoints, rather than of  incompatibility between the propositions they hold119. These four 
119For more on the notion of  standpoint see Chapter VII.
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standpoints are incompatible moves because one can't occupy one and also occupy any of 
the others. This point is highlighted if  we look at their respective commitments. Thus, to 
judge that p is true is to be committed to the possession of  conclusive grounds for p. But 
suspension  of  judgment  about  p is  precisely  the  judgment  that  such  grounds  aren't 
available.  Similarly,  to  judge  that  p is  false  is  to  be  committed  to  the  possession  of 
conclusive grounds for not-p, and suspension of  judgment about  p is the judgment that 
such grounds aren't  available.  The incompatibility between the theist  and the atheist  is  
obvious. So, the disagreement occurs because the different characters  disagree not about 
propositions about God, but about propositions about our grounds for believing that God 
created everything from nothingness.
§4.15 Reply to an objection
Let me now consider an objection to the view I am defending here. Responding to the 
objection will help me in making my view more precise. According to Friedman (2011), p. 
175, it is possible to envisage a case which has the following structural features. There is a  
subject  who  has  what  she  calls  an  'epistemically  principled  non-belief'  about  a  given  
proposition  p.  An epistemically principled non-belief  concerning  p is  very much what I 
take definitive suspension of  judgment to be: it is the absence of  belief  about  p, but an 
absence which is epistemically constrained in the sense that the subject who is suspending 
judgment about p takes herself  to have reasons to do so, crucially reasons for believing that 
there are no conclusive reasons for believing  p or not-p. Friedman doesn't disagree only 
with the details of  my position, but rather with its general spirit, namely with the idea that a  
subject needs to have reasons for judging that the issue whether  p is  the case can't  be 
settled. In order to sustain her rejection of  this view, she offers the following putative 
counterexample in which a subject who looses her epistemic reasons for avoiding judging  
that p, actually keeps suspending judgment about p even if  she has reasons for judging that 
p is true: 
“Here is an example. Say that S is agnostic about whether Martians exist (p: Martians exist), and 
that his reasons for non-belief  with respect to p have to do with there being no way to know 
whether Martians exist.These are epistemic reasons. Now say that S comes upon what he takes to 
be (and is) a reason that defeats his reasons for being in a state of  non-belief  about Martian life.  
Perhaps NASA announces that they have developed a new test for discovering whether or not 
Martians exist (although they haven’t yet received the results). Given that, S takes his reasons for  
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non-belief  to be defeated (and they are). Does S, at the very moment he loses his reasons for non-
belief, thereby stop being agnostic about whether Martians exist? No. That he has lost his reasons 
does  not  guarantee  that  he  has  changed  his  mind  about  whether  Martians  exist.  S  does  not 
automatically  give  up  his  position  about  Martian  life—his  agnosticism—merely  in  virtue  of 
discovering (and registering the impact of  the discovery)  that NASA has the ability to test for 
Martian life. He’s still very much in the dark about whether there is life on Mars, and his reasons 
having been defeated do not amount to (and need not even prompt) a change in view about p itself. 
One may suspect that S simply replaces one reason for non-belief  with another in the story 
from the last paragraph. But we get the same results even if  we make sure that this doesn’t happen. 
Let’s instead say that S’s defeating evidence is evidence that he takes to establish the existence of  
Martians (say NASA announces their test results) and that he no longer takes himself  to have any 
epistemic reason for non- belief.  In that  case, even if  S recognizes that  he now has reason to  
believe p or reason to stop suspending, this does not mean that he will thereby have given up his  
agnosticism. It may be that he has been suspending for so long that stopping is difficult even if  he 
thinks he ought to. Even if  he takes the evidence to be extremely compelling, he may be slow to  
respond rationally to it given how much is bound up with his agnosticism. He may, in response to 
losing the relevant reasons, eventually stop suspending, but he does not automatically stop in virtue 
of  losing his reasons. His reasons for non-belief  may well be reasons to suspend, but they are not  
partly constitutive of  his agnostic state. It appears that S can be agnostic about p despite not having  
the relevant kind of  reasons, so being in a state of  epistemically principled non-belief  with respect  
to p is not necessary for being in a state of  suspended judgment about p …” 
Here is my response to this challenge. First of  all, let us consider the version of  the case  
were  S  takes  herself  to  have  conclusive120 evidence  that  establishes  the  existence  of 
Martians, and she no longer takes herself  to have reason for non-belief. The reason that 
Friedman provides in order to convince us that in this occasion S might still be suspending 
judgment  about  the  existence  of  Martians  are  the  following:  it  might  be  that  she has 
suspended judgment for so long that stopping is too difficult even if  she thinks she ought 
to; he may be slow to respond rationally to her new evidence given how much is bound up  
with  her  agnosticism.  The  sort  of  evidence  she  provides  makes  clear  that  all  that  
Friedman's  case  establishes  is  that  the  disposition  to  suspend  judgment  can  survive  one's 
discovery that she has no reason to suspend judgment but rather reasons to believe in the 
existence of  Martians. If  a subject  really  judges that there are conclusive evidence for the 
existence of  Martians then at that moment a subject is not suspending judgment about the 
existence of  Martians. It is simply impossible for a subject to both judge to have conclusive 
120Friedman speaks of  S's taking her evidence to establish the existence of  Martians. I take this to mean that 
she takes her evidence to be conclusive. 
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evidence  of  the  existence of  Martians  and being suspending judgment  about  whether  
Martians exist. That being said, the point Friedman makes seems to me to be perfectly fine 
as far as it is taken to capture a point about our  dispositional mental state of  suspending 
judgment about a given issue121. 
At one point Friedman says that “it appears that S can be agnostic about p despite 
not having the relevant kind of  reasons”. This is true in one reading, but false in another.  
In order to see the point here it is useful to distinguish between the claim that suspending  
judgment that  p is  committed to there being reasons for so doing,  and the claim that  
suspending judgment that  p occurs only when the subject explicitly takes herself  to have 
reasons for so doing. The former claim doesn't entail the latter. So, it is perfectly possible –  
and maybe a quite widespread phenomenon – that someone suspends judgment about  p 
without having in mind any explicit reason for so doing. However, by actually suspending 
judgment one is presupposing that there are such reasons, and in this sense she is committed 
to there being such reasons, even if  at the moment in which she suspend judgment she  
isn't capable of  articulating them or even if, as a matter of  fact, if  she were to bring her 
attention to the issue she would realize that she has no reason at all to suspend judgment. 
In light of  the discussion, Friedman's case doesn't establish that having reasons for 
one's suspension are not constitutive of  suspension of  judgment.  All  that it  eventually 
establishes is that our dispositions to suspend judgment as to whether p might survive what 
we consciously and comprehendingly believe about our evidence. This is as it should be,  
given  how  cognitively  imperfect  we  are.  But  this  doesn't  show  that  consciously  and 
comprehendingly suspending judgment as to whether p is not constitutively committed to 
there being reasons for suspending judgment. This point remains intact, and it is positively 
supported  by  what  we  find  out  through  active  engagement  with  the  method  of 
intelligibility.
§4.16 Concluding remarks 
You might have noticed that I haven't been speaking of  a particularly famous suspensive 
stance that one can take with respect to an issue: namely the Pyrrhonian stance. Reducing 
121In her papers on the subject, Friedman seems to be trying to capture the phenomenon of  suspension of  
judgment conceived as both a disposition and a conscious mental state. However, I think that the two  
phenomena should be sharply distinguished, as the case of  Friedman shows when it is compared with the  
verdicts of  the method of  intelligibility. In general, the confusion of  the two phenomena seems to me to  
occur if  one lets ordinary language and our intuitions as revealed through the method of  cases to guide 
our philosophical reflection. Ordinary attributions of  suspension of  judgment are such that they typically 
cover both dispositional and conscious types of  suspension of  judgements.
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suspension of  judgment to judgment about grounds means that suspending judgment is 
being a dogmatic sceptic – namely someone who positively believes that scepticism (about 
a  given  issue)  is  correct.  Pyrrhonian  scepticism  purportedly  differs  from  dogmatic 
scepticism since it amounts to a general suspension of  judgment about any proposition,  
included  the  sceptical  proposition  about  grounds  that,  according  to  my  view,  is  what 
suspending judgment really amounts to. Moreover, Pyrrhonian scepticism is also different 
from the mere open-mindedness of  the new inquirer, for Pyrrhonian scepticism is in some 
sense an achievement in inquiry, not the first step in it. Isn't then my account failing to 
capture an important stance? No, for, as I will argue in Chapter VII there is no such a 
stance as a Pyrrhonian stance. That stance is a philosophical construction which can't exist  
in reality. In order to make this claim I will have also to analyse wonder and doubt, which  
will be done in the next chapter.  
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Chapter V 
Doubt
The phenomenology of  questioning is  a  fascinating and profound subject.  It  puts  the 
inquirer at the heart of  herself  and her struggle for understanding and finding the truth122. 
In this chapter I will suggest that we think of  questioning as the genus and of  doubt as one  
of  its species123. I will offer an analysis of  the normative profile of  questioning in the same 
way in which I did with respect to judgment. The analysis will reveal important connections  
between  judgment,  questioning  and  certainty.  Most  importantly,  I  will  explain  the 
relationship between doubt and certainty, and will explain that the problem of  certainty 
fundamentally arises because of  the nature of  doubt. 
§5.1 Open and closed questions
A first step into the nature of  questioning can be made by comparing and distinguishing 
different kinds of  questioning states of  mind. I now ask myself: 'what did my neighbour 
have for breakfast this morning?'. I have no idea whatsoever where to start for answering 
this question. I simply don't know my neighbour well enough to be able to know what he 
might have eaten for breakfast today. Compare with this other question: 'has my neighbour 
had breakfast this morning or has he skipped it?'. Again, I have no idea whatsoever. 
These two questions have two important elements in common. They both concern 
122The importance and terrific beauty of  wonder and doubt is testified throughout the history of  human 
reflection. For a narration of  doubt during the Victorian age see Lane (2010). For an history of  doubt in  
human thought from the beginning of  Greek philosophy to nowadays see Hecht (2003). 
As the Zen maxim says: “Great doubt: great awakening. Little doubt: little awakening. No doubt: no 
awakening”. (Quoted in Batchelor (1990), p. 42). Buddhist practice particularly highlights the importance 
of  doubt in order to achieve progress in the path towards understanding of  the truth. To cultivate and  
meditate a question is a core practice in the Zen tradition. Consider this beautifully intense comment on 
the famous Zen koan 'Mu' where it is described how one should engage in the questioning practice: “[...]  
concentrate your whole body, with its three hundred and sixty bones and joints, and eighty four thousand  
hair-holes, into this Question; day and night, without ceasing, hold it before you. […] It must be like a  
red-hot iron ball which you have gulped down and which you try to vomit, but cannot”. Blyth (1966), p.  
32. For the importance of  doubt and questioning in the Buddhist practice and tradition, see Yadlapati 
(2013), Batchelor (1990), especially the chapter on Questioning. I owe to Franco Bertossa the central  
insights about doubt that I develop in this and subsequent chapters. 
123There  are  many  ways  in  which  we  can  speak  of  doubt  and  wonder,  some of  which  vindicate  my 
contention, whereas others don't. (For an analysis of  ways of  speaking about doubts see Moon (2017b)). 
In  what  follows  I  will  focus  on  a  very  particular,  though  I  think  widespread  and  central,  way  of 
understanding wonder and doubt, and I will at times introduce phenomena that are sometimes referred to 
by the same words though they slightly differ from those I am interested in here. Here as elsewhere when 
we deal with phenomenology, we should be careful in not letting considerations stemming from linguistic 
use to interfere with an apprehension of  the real phenomenology. 
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a subject matter I don't care anything about. And they both concern a subject matter I have  
no previous opinions about. They are however significantly different from one another 
because  the  first  is  an  open question (it  is  open to a  wide  range of  candidate  answers), 
whereas the second is a question that poses an alternative between two possibilities, either 
breakfast  or  no  breakfast.  More  precisely,  it  is  a  question  where  there  are  only  two 
possibilities involved, namely  p  and not-p.  We might call  these sorts  of  questions  closed  
questions124. 
If  we take the moment of  questioning as our reference phenomenon125 we see that 
whenever we raise a question, we are in a state of  mind that has a very specific quality.  
What quality? Exactly! What is it like to be questioning? Precisely!126 When we ask about 
the quality of  questioning we ipso facto put ourselves in the state to which we should pay 
attention in order to answer our question. By raising a question and paying attention to the  
phenomenon of  questioning itself  we are undergoing in order to investigate questioning 
itself, we are in a position to appreciate the particular phenomenological quality that comes 
124The terminology of  'open' and 'closed' question is sometimes used differently, but here I will follow the  
use stipulated in the main text. The categorization of  questions might be more nuanced and rich, of 
course. But for our purposes, the distinction between open question and closed question will be enoug. In 
the  literature  on questions that  investigate  the  semantics  of  questions  it  is  customary  to distinguish  
between  whether-questions, which-questions,  and  why-questions.  Whether-questions  are  what  I  call  closed 
questions, since they have a definite number of  candidate answers. Which-questions and why-questions 
are  typically  open  questions,  since  they  allow  for  an  indefinite  number  of  answers.  I  prefer  the 
terminology of  open and closed questions because the crucial distinction I am interested in is the one  
between questions with a definite number of  candidate answers, and questions with an indefinite one. 
Speaking of  wether, which and why-questions suggests a relativisation of  the distinction to linguistic 
expression, which is inessential for my purposes. 
I put on a side corrective answers – that is, answers that reject presuppositions of  the question (e.g., Q: How 
many people will come today at the seminar? Corrective Answer: there will be no seminar). For more on  
the semantics of  questions in which the aforementioned distinctions are made, see Cross & Roelofsen  
(2016), and the literature referred to therein.
A last introductory point. Take a closed question like: “Is there life after death?”. In normal contexts, the  
question presupposes that either there is life after death or not, so 'There is life after death' and 'There is  
no life after death' are the two sole candidate direct answers. What about: 'I can't know whether there is  
life after death?', 'There is and there is not life after death'? Are these direct answers that are recognized as  
candidate answer by the presupposition of  the question in a context, or are they corrective answers that 
reject some presupposition of  the question in a context? The choice here will not be essential. I prefer to 
take the two last mentioned answers as corrective ones, for in typical contexts when one raises a question  
whether p (rather than not-p) is true, one has p and not-p in mind as candidate answers, and so to deny the 
knowability of  the answer or to reject the law of  non-contradiction is to make moves that go against the 
typical presuppositions of  the questioning state. 
125In this chapter I will confine my attention to the moment in which doubt and questioning arise. I am  
therefore trying to capture the bare bones of  inquiry, the little dense moments of  consciousness which 
animate our inquiring mind. For a description of  different ways in which one can relate to one's doubts,  
see Batchelor (1990), Heidegger (1966) and Marcel (1976). 
126Here there would be much more to say about the distinction between an inquiry that is directed towards  
the very acts of  inquiry and an inquiry that is directed outside itself, as it were. Here I am drawing on  
Franco Bertossa's teaching who has devised a plethora of  effective ways of  inducing the inquirer to 
redirect her attention to the very act of  inquiring rather  than searching for an answer to his inquiry 
elsewhere. See Bitbol (2014), who is also inspired by Bertossa. Bertossa in turn draws from the Zen 
tradition: Zen koans also feature dialogues where the monk uses dialogic strategies that help the inquirer  
to redirect her inquiry upon herself  as she is living the very act of  being inquiring. 
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with (or, more aptly, is constitutive of) the phenomenon of  questioning. This particular 
quality we will  refer  to as the moment of  questioning.  It  is  a state where the mind is  
perplexed. 
In the case of  open questions there is a sense of  openness on a scale of  possible 
answers to be explored.  In  open questions  one rarely  can clearly  see  all  the  candidate 
correct answers. When I wonder about the nature of  consciousness, I might already have 
some idea about what the candidate answers might be (if  I have thought about the issue), 
but unless I judge that the only remaining candidate correct answers are a few three or four 
(in which case, the open question comes closer to a closed question), when I raise the 
question it is as though I am overlooking an unexplored and unclear landscape. 
When I engage in closed questioning I have clear in my mind what the two available 
answers are, namely p or not-p. Will I die when my body dies...or not? Here two options are 
posited, either I die or not. When we engage in closed questioning, particularly when the 
closed questioning concerns issues that we care a lot about (like death), we might also feel  
the sense of  openness into an unknown landscape that we might experience when we 
engage  in  open questioning.  For,  as  the  mind slowly  abandons  the  proposition  she  is 
doubting about, the apprehension of  the fact that there might be many alternatives to  p 
lends the mind to new open questioning. 'If  I don't die when my body dies, then what 
happens?' 'What does it mean that I don't die? …'. 
From now on I will speak of  a doubt or a wonder as to whether p is true in order 
to refer to cases of  closed questioning, and will speak about a wonder about an issue in  
order to refer to cases of  open questioning. So, a doubt is a case of  closed questioning127.
§5.2 The normative profile of  questioning
The normative profile of  questioning is interesting, because it represents a mental state  
that is not committal – in that, when one is in it, one is not making a claim as to how things  
127Doubt as the inquisitive mental state  of  raising a question as to whether  p  is  true or not should be 
distinguished from other phenomena we sometimes describe as 'doubts'. Sometimes we speak of  a doubt 
we might have when we are invited to believe something, or when someone expresses her opinion to us  
and we disagree with her. Thus, someone argues that the cinema will cost half-price on Wednesdays and I 
reply that I doubt it, by this meaning that I believe that it does not cost half-price and eventually that I 
have reasons to so believing. When I want to convey this sort of  information, I should not say that I am  
doubting  that the cinema will cost half-price, for this suggests that I haven't already made up my mind  
about the issue.  A related way of  speaking consists in referring to a doubt or to doubts as a reason or  
reasons to disbelieve some proposition. So, instead of  saying that I doubt that the cinema will cost half-
price on Wednesdays, I might say that I have my doubts about that, thereby conveying the information 
that I have reasons to think that the cinema will not cost half-price on Wednesdays. Again, this is not the  
sort of  phenomenon we are interested in here. 
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are, that is, questioning has no thetic or representational component – yet it arguably gives 
rise  to  commitments.  This  is  a  sui  generis  normative  profile,  when  compared  to  the  
normative  profile  of  judgment  (and  of  its  particular  varieties,  one  of  which  being 
suspension of  judgment). 
In the case of  judgment, its having standards of  correctness which are tied to the 
sort of  alethic commitments that it generates is explained by two facts: first, the fact that  
judging is in some sense something that we actively do (instead of  passively receiving);  
second, and crucially, the fact that judgments make a claim about the way things are by 
representing  reality  as  being  in  a  certain  way.  The  difference  between  judgments  and 
experiences, as we have noticed in the previous chapters, is that even though they both 
have a representational component, the former belongs to spontaneity and makes a claim 
about the way things are, whereas the latter belongs to receptivity and suggests or invites a  
claim about the way things are. 
Questioning is interestingly different from both judgments and experiences because 
it doesn't represent reality as being a certain way; yet, it is like judgments, and different 
from experiences, because it belongs to spontaneity rather than receptivity. To question and 
doubt is to actively engage in some mental activity. Its having alethic commitments – that  
is, to recall, commitments to take further propositions as true – is not due to its being a 
state which makes a claim about the way things are; it is rather due to its being something  
that in some sense the subject does, rather than being passively receiving. 
I will now engage again in the method of  eidetic variation in order to vindicate the 
claim that questioning gives rise to commitments even if  it  doesn't  represent reality as  
being some way.
§5.3 Questioning about an issue is uncotenable with judging any of  the recognized candidate 
answers
Suppose I wonder about why there is something rather than nothing. Can I wonder about  
this while at the same time I judge that God created being from nothingness? No, for by so 
judging the issue is closed, I have already made up my mind about the issue128. 
128On pretending to be questioning. We can ask questions in our foro interno without really asking them. This is a 
puzzling phenomenon. It is as real as assertion in one's mind which is not accompanied by real judgment.  
Suppose  you  want  to  find  an  experience  that  constitutes  a  counterexample  to  my  claim  about  the 
incompatibility between doubt and judgment. In order to do so, you will be directed to think about an  
issue where you have a stable belief  that  p (e.g., your occurrent belief  that the feet that you see at the 
bottom of  your visual field are yours) and try to ask in your mind the question whether p is really the case. 
Try. Now, if  what I observe in myself  applies to you, what happens is a very interesting phenomenon. It  
is easy to form in one's own mind the question – as if  one was almost hearing it – yet, it is hard to give  
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It is instructive to apply the method both to cases of  questions about old issues and 
to cases of  questions about new issues – that is, respectively, issues with respect to which we 
have  already  formed  some  opinions,  and  issues  about  which  we  are  completely  open 
minded. As applied to new issues it is easier to appreciate that wonder about a question 
where p is recognized by the subject as representing a candidate answer to the question is 
incompatible with judgment that  p. If  the issue is new and I am wondering for the first 
time about it, I don't have already an answer to it and so when I wonder I do not judge any  
of  the candidate answers. But when we consider an old issue, the phenomenon is at first 
sight harder to detect. Suppose I come to consider an issue about which I already have  
opinions. We might think of  two scenarios here. In the first scenario I bring to my mind a  
proposition p which I already dispositionally believe and which I then come to judge to be 
true when I entertain it. While I so judge I can't at the same time raise a question about an  
issue that makes it an open question whether p is true or not. Of  course, I might do it if  I 
fail to recognize that p is a candidate answer of  my question. But if  I am cognizant of  the 
fact that p is a candidate answer of  my question, then I won't be able to raise my wonder so  
long as I judge that  p  is  true. In the second scenario I start wondering about an issue 
without already judging any proposition that I recognize as constituting an answer to my 
question.  Then,  since  I  already  have  opinions  about  the  issue,  at  some  point  my 
dispositional belief  or dispositions to believe are activated, as it were, and I come to judge a  
proposition that I recognize as constituting an answer to my wonder. When I so judge I  
have thereby stopped to wonder. 
We can see the same point as applied to doubt in particular, that is a case of  closed 
questioning129. Here, again, we might think of  two cases, one which concerns an old issue 
and one which concerns a new one130. When we doubt about a new issue, since the issue is 
new we have no opinion about it yet. In the case of  old issues, when I raise a doubt as to  
whether p, my belief  about p is shaken and for a moment I reopen the question whether p 
is really the case. The doubt might last a very short span of  time, and I might come back to  
credit to the perplexity that the question is supposed to express (or actually to be identical with). When I  
see my feet on the floor and give inner voice to the question 'are these feet really mine?', I am typically 
merely pretending to be raising this question. In fact I am not. It is like pretending to assert something. I  
can now inwardly 'say' that today is really a nice day, but I might be doing this in a way which is a mere  
pretension – I am not thereby judging that it is a really nice day. 
129    See Schellenberg (2005),  p. 96 for the claim that belief  and doubt are not compatible. 
130It is important to notice that it is more natural for us to speak of  a doubt when we are concerned with a  
closed question that concerns an old issue, rather than a new one, for doubt is often taken to target one's  
previously held opinions.  Also, doubt is most naturally associated with closed questioning which concerns 
issues of  great importance for the subject. In the main text, I will keep speaking of  doubt in order to 
refer to closed questioning in general. If  you find it linguistically odd, then take my proposal as stipulative.  
Needless  to  say,  what  matters  is  the  nature  of  closed  questioning,  not  whether  this  is  the  mental  
phenomenon which we call 'doubt' in our speech.
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my belief. This of  course happens in most cases since it is often painful to abandon one's  
convictions  (indeed very  painful  when the convictions  matter  a  lot  for  the  subject).  A 
punctual doubt rarely deactivates one's belief. If  the doubt is cultivated and the subject has 
the strength to push forward the inquiry, then one's previous belief  might be removed, if  
the doubt is sustained by good evidence to think that one's previously held belief  might be 
false. But this is not likely to be what typically occurs131.
Even if  it doesn't matter for phenomenology, we might look for confirmation or 
falsification of  the previous points by noticing the following putative linguistic data (I don't  
give much weight to these considerations, but I mention them for the reader inclined to  
take them as decisive). 
It seems odd to assert the following:
(A) It is raining, but I wonder whether it is raining
(B) It is raining, but I wonder what is the weather like
In case (B), the oddity occurs only if  the subject is cognizant of  the fact that the presence 
of  rain is an answer to a question about the weather. The oddity here is naturally explained 
by noticing that people are sensitive to the fact that it is unintelligible to raise a question 
while one thinks to possess the answer to that question. 
Yet, there is a way of  speaking about belief  that might seem to oppose my view. 
Consider
(A') I believe that it is raining, but I wonder whether it is (really) raining
(B') I believe it is raining, but I wonder what the weather is (really) like
Are these odd? I think they obviously are if  what one is doing here is just saying that she is  
judging that p while wondering about it. There are however a couple of  cases in which one 
can  speak  felicitously  using  A'  and B'.  It  is  fair  to  say  that  in  most  cases  one  would  
131There are interesting mixed cases. Typically, when we doubt about the significance or relevance of  our  
grounds for judging that p, we can't at the same time also keep judging that p,  at least so long as one is 
keeping in mind the fact that one's judging that p is based on such grounds. Thus, to illustrate, suppose I 
judge that the Jardin des plantes is in the fifth arrondissement on the ground that a friend of  mine who 
lives in Paris told me so. Suppose further that while I walk towards the fifth arrondissement I am saddled 
with a doubt about the reliability of  my friend. Maybe she is wrong, for, after all, she lives in Paris but she  
has a very bad memory, and anyway she likes to give her opinion on any matter, so maybe she wasn't  
really sure about the localization of  the garden... Since this doubt takes place in a context in which I am 
clearly keeping in mind the fact that all I have as a ground for judging that the garden is in the fifth 
arrondissement is my friend's testimony, I can't at the same time keeping judging what she told to me to  
be true. 
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intelligibly and felicitously speak in these ways about her own opinion if  she wants to say 
that she is inclined to think that p though she is not yet sure that p. It is a way of  expressing 
the fact that one possesses some good grounds for thinking that p is the case, while also 
communicating that one still isn't sure about it and so wonder about it. 
Another way of  using belief  that  makes the above cases  felicitous  involves the 
report of  one's dispositional beliefs132. So, consider a person who goes to the psychoanalyst 
and finds out that she believes that her husband is unfaithful. She finds out this belief  of  
her  by observing her behaviour,  the things  she said to the  psychoanalysts,  and similar 
evidence. Yet, she is not fully endorsing her recalcitrant belief,  and this is  why she can 
happily say that though she believes that her husband is unfaithful, she is still wondering  
whether he really is.
So, questioning (both closed and open) seems to be incompatible with judgment, 
though it might be compatible with dispositional beliefs. If  we look at the way in which we 
speak about doubt, and if  by doubt we refer only to a closed old questioning, we will see  
that it is possible to argue that language is sensitive to fact that doubting is not compatible 
with judging. So consider
(C) 'God exists, but I am having a doubt as to whether He really exists'
(C') 'I believe that God exists, but I am having a doubt as to whether He really exists'
With respect to (C) the sense of  oddity is clear. With respect to (C'), depending on the  
readings, the assertion might strike us as odd or not. Here is a context which makes it 
natural to find (C') odds. Suppose people are having an animated conversation about God's 
existence.  People  are trying to express their  views about the subject  matter,  they  offer  
arguments for thinking one way or another. There is a person who is forcefully offering 
reasons to doubt God's existence. So people say to him something like: 'So you do  not  
believe that God exists?', and he replies: No! I do  believe  that God exists, but I am just 
having a doubt as to whether He really exists'. This is a very odd reply. It invites people to 
wonder whether this person really understands what it means to be believing something or 
to be doubting something.
There is however another much more common context in which asserting (C') is 
entirely fine. It is precisely the context of  a believer who is entering in the painful process 
of  hesitation about his own belief. This is an assertion that a believer might say to a priest  
during a confession. Yet, the fact that this is a fine assertion in this context doesn't falsify  
132Coliva discusses many such cases in her work on self-knowledge. See Coliva (2016), (ms). 
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the point that  while one is doubting one is not judging the proposition that the doubt 
targets. For, what we typically want to say when we say things along the lines of  (C') in  
contexts analogous to the one in which a believer is confessing his painful hesitations to a  
priest, is that we are undergoing a phase of  uncertainty. What we previously firmly believed 
is shaken by questions to which one is unable to find satisfactory answers. Even though 
during the process one might keep having the dispositional belief  that, say, God exists, this 
doesn't mean that in the very moment in which the doubt occurs one is also judging that 
God exists. 
Moon (2017b) argues that belief  is compatible with doubt on the basis of  such 
linguistic evidence.
“Consider that 
(11) “Fred believes that it will rain tomorrow, although he has a little bit of  doubt that it  
will.” 
(12) “Fred believes that it will rain tomorrow, although he has some doubt that it will.” 
are consistent.  Not only  are they possibly true;  it  also seems that  Fred could  rationally  
believe and rationally have some (or a little) doubt”. Moon (2017). 
This is a further instance in which linguistic analysis, when performed in a context where 
one is not paying attention to phenomenology itself  leads our theorizing astray. There is a  
very natural understanding of  (11) and (12) that make them compatible with mine. What 
one is saying in asserting them is that one has some evidence for thinking that it might not 
be raining tomorrow. Or maybe one is communicating that he has some evidence not to 
take as fully convincing the considerations one is relying on in order to assess whether it  
will rain tomorrow or not. Either way, this doesn't show that it is possible, while  one is 
having a doubt as to whether it will rain tomorrow, to also judge that it will. Moreover, this  
use of  doubt – 'having some doubt' – naturally suggests a reading which doesn't refer to the 
very act of  doubting – understood, as I do here, as being an act of  questioning – but rather 
to  judgments  or  beliefs  about  grounds.  This  is  another  phenomenon  which  is  easily 
conflated  with  doubt,  for,  as  we  are  going  to  see  in  the  next  paragraph,  questioning 
commits  one  to  truths  about  grounds,  though  questioning  is  not  reducible  to  these 
commitments. 
§5.4 Questioning about an issue is uncotenable with judging that there are conclusive grounds 
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in favour of  any of  the recognized candidate answers
Here we touch a very important point that lets us see the intimate connection between  
questioning and our quest for certainty. We have seen that a question about p – or about an 
issue involving p as a candidate recognized answer – is incompatible with judging that p is 
true. Given the normative profile of  judgment, this has further important consequences. 
Let  us  first  look  at  questioning  from  some  distance.  Why  is  it  that  we  raise 
questions? Because we want to discover the truth, we want answers about issues we are 
interested in. But if  we want this it is of  course because we take it that we don't already  
have an answer to these questions. Why is it that we doubt? Because we don't want to be 
mislead into judging what is false. And we don't want to judge falsely because we want to  
judge truly. Thus, when doubting whether p is really true one is displaying the fact that she 
is not yet certain about whether p is the case – though she is inclined to judge that it is the 
case, and might have a strong dispositional belief  that p. When one doubts about p the fate 
of  p is open again. In so doing we are presupposing that  p  might be false in two senses. 
Metaphysically, we take it that the world might be such that p is not the case. Epistemically, 
we take it that we are not yet in a position to exclude that p is false. 
These platitudinous observations are confirmed if  we try to look at what happens 
when we engage in both open and close questioning. When I am doubting as to whether p 
is  really  true,  I  can't  at  very  same time comprehendingly  judge  that  I  have conclusive 
grounds for believing p. For, if  I so judge, then I take it that it is not possible for p to be 
false. Relatedly, while I doubt whether  p is really true, I can't judge that it is not the case 
that p might be false. The same applies to wonder. When I wonder about an issue, I can't at 
the same time judge that I have conclusive grounds for a proposition that I recognize as  
being an answer to my question. For, by so judging, I have already settled the issue I am 
supposed to be wondering about. 
What about might-judgments? When I wonder about an issue, I can at the same 
time judge that some of  the initially candidate propositions are in fact false – and that it is  
not the case that they might be true. However, there are some judgments that it is not 
intelligible, hence possible for me to make. So, I can't at the same time wonder about an 
issue and judge that a given candidate answer to my question can't be wrong. I can't judge 
that it  is  not the case that it  might be false. For, by comprehendingly so judging I am 
thereby also judging that that proposition is true. Similarly, unless I am facing a question  
which has no answer133, I can't judge with respect to all candidate answers to the question 
133See Chapter IV, §4.7 for the discussion of  the distinction between ignorance and knowledge that one is 
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(except one) that it is not the case that they might be true and that these are all and the only 
candidate answers to the question. There are many other combinations of  uncotenability 
claims that can be described, but this much I hope that gives the fundamental cases that  
help in figuring out all the others. 
Both a question about an issue and doubt about  p can be held in the following 
circumstances. I can wonder about an issue even if  I judge that there are  some  grounds 
(though not conclusive ones) for (or against) a recognized candidate answer. I can also  
doubt about p while I judge that there are some grounds for/against  p, and this is normal 
since doubt typically targets a proposition we already believe or are strongly inclined to  
believe.
These  uncotenability  claims  ground  claims  about  commitments.  When  I  doubt 
about p I am committed to judge that p might be false (and also that it might be true, and 
the same applies to not-p). Relatedly, when I doubt about p I am committed to refrain from 
judging that I have conclusive grounds for p (the same applies to not-p). Similarly, when I 
wonder about an issue, I am committed to take it that the candidate answers might be false  
(and true, otherwise they wouldn't even be considered as candidate answers). Relatedly, for 
any recognized candidate answer,  I  am committed to take it  that I  have no conclusive 
ground for judging it to be true. 
However, notice that a question about an issue where  p is a recognized candidate 
answer and a doubt  about  p  are  not committed to there  being in principle conclusive 
grounds for p (we might be facing an issue where suspension of  judgment ends up being 
the  right  attitude).  Moreover,  they  are  not  even committed  to there  being in  principle 
grounds at all for p.
These  points  about  incompatibility  and  commitments  highlight  the  connection 
between questioning and certainty. When I wonder about an issue  I can't also take myself 
to be certain that one candidate answer is true.  When I doubt about  p  I can't also take 
myself  to be certain that p. Conversely, if  I take myself  to be certain that p, then I can't be 
wondering about an issue where p is a recognized candidate answer to the question. And if 
I  take  myself  to  be  certain  that  p,  then  I  can't  be  doubting  whether  p  is  the  case. 
Questioning and judgment mutually excludes each other. 
Again, linguistic practice seems to reflect these facts. Consider the following: 
(D) 'It is certain that it is raining, but I am wondering whether it is raining'134
facing a mystery. 
134See Stanley (2011), p. 42, for a discussion of  similar assertions having to do with knowledge and wonder 
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(E) 'It is certain that it is raining, but I am having a doubt as to whether it is raining'
(F) 'I am certain that it is raining, but I am wondering whether it is raining'
(G) 'I am certain that it is raining, but I am having a doubt as to whether it is raining'
They  all  are  very  odd.  A  natural  explanation  is  that  speakers  are  sensitive  to  the 
incompatibility between the two states and the corresponding commitments135. 
§5.5 Does wonder about an issue and doubt about p commit one to judge that the question 
and the doubt are correct?
We have seen that the display of  commitments in the case of  judgment (and suspension of  
judgement) is intimately related to the fact that judgment is the sort of  thing that can be  
evaluated as correct or incorrect according to the relevant alethic dimension of  evaluation. 
Open questions and doubts might naturally be evaluated as correct and incorrect as well,  
though this evaluative practice  is  of  course less  natural than the practice of  evaluating 
judgments in terms of  correctness. Maybe the word 'correctness' in connection with open 
questions and doubts is not a word we find ourselves comfortable with. This is maybe due 
to  the  fact  that  correctness  is  predicated  of  judgments  when  they  are  true  and  to 
experiences  when  they  correctly  represent  the  environment.  This  makes  correctness  a 
property that supervenes on features of  the representational or thetic content of  a mental  
state. But, as we have seen, even though it is natural to think of  open questions and doubts 
as propositional attitudes, they are not representational or thetic – they do not represent 
the world as being one way or another. 
There are however related normative notions that are naturally predicated of  open 
questions and doubts – like justified, legitimate, appropriate, rational, reasonable … This 
fact can't be due to their being representational mental states. It is probably due, I suggest,  
to  their  belonging to  spontaneity  rather  than receptivity.  It  is  intelligible  to  ask:  am I  
justified  to  keep wondering  about  why  there  is  something  rather  than nothing?  Am I 
justified in doubting whether I exist? Since these questions are intelligible, there is a clear  
sense in which by being in that inquisitive state one is committing herself  to the fact that 
being in that inquisitive state is correct, or justified, or legitimate (here we should let the  
ascriptions.
135My point does not conflict  with the thought  that  one might  at the same time know or have stored  
conclusive evidence for p while wondering about p. This is possible if  while wondering one is not recalling 
the possessed knowledge or the possessed evidence. Of  course the kind of  knowledge that gives rise to 
these cases is externalist in nature. See Friedman (2015) for a case in which one both knows a proposition 
and wonder whether it is true.
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vocabulary be settled by what we find natural enough, nothing profound hinges on the 
choice of  the word).  So,  by doubting whether God really exists,  I  am also committing 
myself  to the fact that it is reasonable to so doubting. Why is it reasonable? Because I am 
also committed to the fact that I do not yet possess conclusive grounds for thinking one 
way or another. Were I to knowingly possess such grounds, I would not be in a position to  
doubt God's existence. Conversely, if  I take it that my existence is certain, then there is a  
fairly recognizable sense in which it is not reasonable for me to doubt whether I really 
exist. The doubt is excluded by it being taken as certain that I exist. 
These  notions  of  correctness  or  reasonableness  do  not  concern  the  question 
whether I have non-alethic reasons to doubt or not to doubt. They rather concern the 
alethic normative dimension only. This brings us to the next paragraph, which concerns the  
relationship  between  non-alethic  reasons  for  questioning  and  alethic  constraints  on 
questioning.
§5.6 Is questioning responsive to alethic considerations only?
A prima facie evidence to think that it is not so responsive is that it seems to be possible to 
raise a question at will. Just ask the question. It is not possible to judge at will, and one 
consideration that is often mentioned in order to explain why this is so is precisely the fact  
that judging is responsive to alethic considerations only. Since I can raise a question at will,  
if  the responsiveness to alethic considerations only is what explains the impossibility of 
judging at will, then we have evidence to think that questioning is not responsive to alethic  
considerations only. 
Moreover, there is a more straightforward ground to give a negative answer to the 
question of  this paragraph. Questioning simply doesn't seem to be the sort of  mental state  
that can be grounded on evidential grounds. The sort of  relation we are thinking of  is the  
act of  taking something as a ground for judging something to be true. Questioning, not  
being a judgment, is  simply not the sort  of  thing that can stand in  this relation. Open 
questioning and doubt are not mental states that make a claim about the world. For this 
reason, they are not the sort of  things that can be based in this way on evidential grounds. 
When I begin wondering about an issue, in order to enter into a questioning state, I do not 
base anything on any ground. There is nothing to be based on ground, whether evidential 
or not. 
Yet, the situation is much more complicated. Even though open questioning and 
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doubt  differ  from judgments in  that  they  are  not  alethically  committed,  they  are  alike  
judgment in that they give rise to alethic commitments. This significantly constraints the  
extent and way in which a question can be formed at will and the way in which our reasons 
for  questioning  can  operate.  In  order  to  appreciate  the  interplay  between  reasons  for 
doubting  and  the  way  in  which  alethic  considerations  constraint  doubt  we  should  
distinguish  the  following  four  possible  scenarios  (in  what  follows  recall  the  following 
linguistic stipulation: I speak of  reasons in order to refer to reasons for  action  only (thus 
reasons are never alethic, but always moral or prudential, if  there are varieties of  them) and 
speak of  grounds  in order to refer to grounds for  judging  only (thus grounds are always 
alethic)– the stipulation will be vindicated in Chapter IX).
(1) there are reasons to doubt whether p, and there are no conclusive grounds for p.
This is the most common scenario. It might occur for instance when I want (this is the 
prudential reason) to make up my mind about p – for I still have no grounds for judging 
one way or another –, and in order to make up my mind I inquire about p.
(2) there are reasons to doubt whether p, and there are conclusive grounds for p. 
I don't know how many cases of  this sort there are out there, but in my case I often do  
take myself  to have reasons to doubt whether p even if  I know that were I to raise a doubt 
as to whether p I would have conclusive grounds for it. I take myself  to have reasons to 
doubt whether p precisely because by so doubting I can further appreciate and understand 
the way in which  truth is  manifested in particular  cognitive performances that  put the 
subject in front of  the very fact whose reality is under investigation. Thus, since I care  
about cognitive phenomenology and want to know what it feels like to have a question, I  
have prudential reasons to start raising questions of  the form: 'is this a question?'. Crucially,  
by raising it I bring to being the fact that answers it. Or, consider the question whether I  
exist or whether I think. I have been raising this question plenty of  times in order to better  
understand Descartes, Husserl and, more generally, the way in which certainty works. But I 
have always taken myself  to possess conclusive grounds for so judging, and, crucially, the 
very  moment  in  which I  raised the  questions I  presented myself  to the evidence that  
conclusively answers it.
(3) there are no reasons to doubt whether p, and there are no conclusive grounds for p. 
This might the case of  a religious person who is undergoing a moment of  great doubt 
about God's existence and wonder whether it is not sinful to doubt God's benevolence. 
She might reason in this way: “am I not doubting Him just because I am feeling bad and  
unlucky?  Who  am  I  to  feel  entitled  to  doubt  Him  just  because  of  my suffering?!” 
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Eventually, this person might end up judging that she should not doubt Him because  it is 
morally wrong, even though he keeps judging that God might not exist (thus, he keeps  
failing to possess conclusive grounds for God's existence).
(4) there are no reasons to doubt whether p, and there are conclusive grounds for p. 
An illustration of  such scenario might be the following. A person is wondering whether it  
is prudentially fine to doubt of  her own existence, and eventually end up judging that it is  
not – for it would be the cause of  great suffering, maybe madness, and no benefit would 
come from it. Yet, the person has conclusive grounds for judging that she exists. 
These combinations teach us something important. The first point concerns the extent and 
nature of  our will  in  the  case of  questioning.  Questioning at will  is  possible,  but it  is 
constrained  by  alethic  grounds  in  an  important  way.  Compare  with  supposition  and 
assumption. I can keep supposing and assuming that  p even if  I am completely aware of 
the fact (and so judge that) p is false. This is just normal counterfactual reasoning. This is 
possible because, to put it colourfully, supposing and assuming are not moves within the 
game of  truth and so do not conflict with moves within that game. But the same liberty  
doesn't occur with doubt. I can raise a doubt at will, but  once  it is raised it is hostage to 
alethic considerations in a way in which supposition and assumptions are not. Thus, once a 
doubt as to whether I exist is genuinely raised, then if  I am confronted with what I take to 
be evidence for answering affirmatively, then the answer makes the doubt disappears. This 
fact can be nicely experienced if  you now ask yourself  a question as to whether you are 
now asking a question. I just gave you a prudential reason for asking a question – you want 
to understand my point  better.  And note  that  you have  just  been able  to  raise  it,  for 
questions can be formed at will. But as soon as you ask the question, the questioning state 
is immediately shut down, as it were, by the recognition that what you are doing just is the 
answer to the question. And, crucially, you are not free to keep questioning whether your  
are asking a question if  you understand that you are in fact asking a question. 
The second important point to be noticed is that truth trumps other non-alethic 
considerations. It is not possible to shut down in a stable way a question on the basis of  non-
alethic reasons, for so long as one doesn't have conclusive grounds for an answer, it would 
always be possible for one to raise the relevant question. So long as one cares about a given  
issue even if  one tries to persuade oneself  that she ought to avoid doubting it, if  she cares  
and she doesn't possess conclusive evidence yet, then it is always possible for her to raise a  
doubt about the issue, whenever the subject considers it. 
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§5.7 Questioning commits one to judge that there are grounds for questioning
Judging that p commits to judging that one has conclusive grounds for judging p to be true.  
Does questioning also commits one to judge that there are grounds for questioning? As we 
have seen in the  previous sections,  there are  no such things as  evidential  grounds  for 
questioning, because there is no p which is represented as being true in wonder and doubt. 
Yet, as we have also seen, when one is questioning one is committing herself  to judge 
several  propositions to be true (and to refrain from judging several  propositions to be 
true). Doubt as to whether p commits one to judge that there are not conclusive grounds 
for  p.  But  to judge that  there  are  not  conclusive  grounds  for  p commits  one to have 
grounds for judging that there are not conclusive grounds for p. These might be seen as the 
grounds that one is committing himself  to when one is having a doubt. After all, we doubt  
because  we think that  we don't know the truth yet,  but  if  we took ourselves to have  
conclusive grounds for an answer, we would also take ourselves to know the truth already.  
The point here is that to doubt that p is to be committed to take p as dubitable. 
So, questioning is committed to the possession of  having grounds for questioning 
in a derivative sense, namely by being committed to the possession of  grounds for judging 
some propositions that questioning is committed to, namely the propositions that there are  
no conclusive grounds yet for any candidate answer to our questions.
This point about commitment vindicates the point often credited to Wittgenstein 
that doubt presupposes certainty136. But my point should be distinguished from other ways 
in which one can make the Wittgensteinian point that doubt presupposes certainty. One 
way is to argue that the possession of  concepts requires one to make alethic commitments 
(we must take some propositions to be true in order to possess a given concept), and to 
add that by raising a doubt I am employing concepts and therefore committing myself  to  
those  propositions  to which  I  must  be  committed to in  order  to  possess the  relevant 
concepts. Thus, by doubting whether there is an external world, I can't also be doubting 
the fact that an external world is spatially extended, for if  I don't accept that proposition it  
136Wittgenstein expresses something like the idea that one can't be doubting something unless one is certain 
of  something in various ways. It is not clear whether there is a single idea there or rather a cluster of 
different ideas. The important point to notice is the difference between my way of  making the point by 
appealing to the phenomenology of  cognition and his way of  making the point. 
“If  you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of  doubting  
itself  presupposes certainty” (OC 115,  see also OC 125, 163, 337).  
For a defence and interpretation of  Wittgenstein's claim that doubt presupposes certainty, see Hamilton 
(2014), Chapter 11, and the works referred to therein. 
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is no longer clear whether my doubt has a  content  at all137.  Another way of  arguing that 
doubt presupposes certainty is by arguing that the circumstances in which doubt might 
occur  are  such  as  to  engender  alethic  commitments.  Thus,  one  might  argue  that  the 
practice of  asking and giving grounds for believing presupposes that some propositions are 
accepted as true and beyond doubt138.  A yet further way of  making the point is this: it 
seems that to doubt whether p is true presupposes that one's thoughts about p make room 
for the possibility of  p's being false, and the most obvious way of  explaining how this is so 
is by saying that one proceeds by presupposing that some propositions are true, namely 
those propositions whose truth will make it possible for p to be false. Thus, if  I can doubt 
whether this experience is an experience of  an external world it is because I judge that it is  
conceivable that  there  be  such an experience completely  disconnected  from what  it  is  
meant to be representing. Or, less dramatically, if  I doubt whether it is true that the street I  
am looking for is on the right after having heard the testimony of  a person, it might be  
because I judge that this person might have desired to give me help just for the pleasure of  
it, and not because she really knows where the street is to be found. These are instances of  
scenarios in which one's doubts presuppose certainty in that sense that one's doubt is made 
intelligible by the presupposition of  some truths which are the grounds for judging that the 
doubted p might be false139. Finally, some doubts occur in contexts which are made possible 
by the unquestioned acceptance of  some very general propositions. Thus, when I wonder 
about the exact location of  my keys in my house, I can so doubt in the way I am doubting  
(that is, by thinking of  the house as a really spatially extended huge thing in which I am 
placed) because I take it that there is an external world, for instance. This sense is different 
from the previous one, for the fact that there is an external world is not itself  a positive 
grounds for judging that the relevant p might be false, but rather constitute the framework 
within which the very practice of  appealing to some grounds for thinking that p might be 
false is possible at all140.
Whatever  the  merits  (or  lack  thereof)  of  these  strategies,  they  should  be 
distinguished from the point I am making here about commitments, namely that by having 
137“If  you are not certain of  any fact, you cannot be certain of  the meaning of  your words either” (OC 114)
138If  we generalise the point that “a doubt about existence only works in a language-game” (OC 23–24), we 
get that a doubt about some issue only works in a language game, and a language game presumably can be 
played only if  some things are taken as true beyond doubt.
139“One cannot make experiments if  there are not some things that one does not doubt” (OC 337).
140“[O]ur doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like  
hinges on which those turn” (OC 341). This is the way of  making the claim that appeal to Wittgenstein's 
conception of  hinge propositions. Maybe he would deny that there is a sharp distinction between the last  
two ways of  making the point that doubt presupposes certainty, since he notoriously denies the fixity of 
hinges. 
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a doubt I am committing myself  to take some propositions as true, like the proposition 
that the doubted proposition might be false. The main difference, which is going to take 
central stage in Chapter XII is that the commitments I am talking about are constitutive of  
cognition,  and  their  constitutivity  is  grounded  on  phenomenology.  The  sort  of 
commitments Wittgenstein is talking about are less formal than mine, as it were, and do 
not express the normative profile of  the basic moves of  cognition. In Chapter XII I will  
highlight  the  point  by  distinguishing  between  empirical  hinges  –  those  on  which 
Wittgenstein was focusing – and transcendental hinges – those on which I am focusing.
§5.8 Questioning is not reducible to judgment about grounds 
We have seen that questioning about whether p is the case commits one to the proposition 
that  p  is  questionable,  namely  to  the  proposition  that  p  might  be  false  (or  that  one's 
grounds for p are not conclusive). This might give one the temptation to take a reductionist  
line on questioning and understands it  as  reducible to judgments about grounds or to 
judgments about what epistemically might be the case – or about conceptually equivalent  
contents.  But this temptation should be resisted. Phenomenological evidence is, I think, 
crystal clear in this respect. There is a significant difference between raising a question and 
answering a question. Ask yourself: is there a difference between question and answer? If 
you answer,  you have already left the questioning state.  Whereas,  if  you are asking the  
question, you are still questioning and you are not yet answering it. When you answer you 
make  a  judgment.  When  you  are  questioning,  you  haven't  settled  yet  how things  are. 
Questioning  is  not  like  a  suspension  of  judgment  –  where  you  judge  that  some 
propositions  can't  be  known  (and  where  the  sort  of  suspension  of  judgment  varies 
depending on how you understand the modal and the epistemic quality). Suspension of 
judgment is itself  a potential answer to a questioning state. Is there life after death? Yes, no, 
we don't know. Each possible reactions – as well as all the other possible reactions that we 
have seen in the chapter on suspension of  judgment – are different mental state from the 
state of  questioning itself.
Even if  one resists the reductionist temptation,  there is a connected temptation 
that consists in thinking that in order to be doubting whether  p  is the case one should 
actually have the judgment that p might be false (and maybe even the judgment that p might 
be true)141. My account doesn't require the actual presence of  a judgment about grounds or 
141According to Moon (2017b)'s account of  doubt it is a necessary condition for having a doubt about the 
truth value of  p that one has the belief  that p might be false. 
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epistemic  possibility.  This  judgment  is  not  typically  there  when  we  raise  doubts  and 
question.
§5.9 Universal doubt as untenable
Is doubt with respect to all propositions at the same time possible142? In a sense, the answer 
is  obviously  not,  for  by  doubting  I  should  be  entertaining  a  proposition,  and  I  can't 
entertain all propositions at once. Yet, there is a way of  capturing what one might want to  
capture in saying that it is possible to doubt all propositions at the same time. It might be 
possible to doubt whether all the propositions I might entertain are true. One is not here 
doubting all propositions by doubting each one of  them, but she is rather trying to be 
having  a  doubt  about  all  propositions  by  doubting  a  single  proposition  –  namely  the 
proposition that all the propositions that one might happen to judge as true are really true. 
We might think of  this particular standpoint as the one that Descartes was trying to depict  
when he considered the supposition that there might be an all powerful evil demon who is  
deceiving us into believing the false.  By so supposing,  we are thinking of  ourselves as 
possibly being in a scenario such that all the things that we might happen to find true are in 
fact false.
However, such a standpoint is not reflexively stable because it leads to incoherent 
commitments143. Surely, it is a possible one, so long as one is not making explicit to oneself 
the commitments  of  this  doubt.  Yet,  the commitments  are not  co-tenable.  If  I  doubt  
whether p is the case, then I am committed to judge that I haven't conclusive grounds for p. 
Hence, if  I am doubting whether all the propositions that I might happen to find true are 
really true, then I am committing myself  to the fact that I have not conclusive grounds for 
any p that I might find as true. But then, there is at least one p which I must judge to be 
true, namely the proposition that there is no p such that I have conclusive grounds for it. 
But by being committed to judge this proposition to be true, I am also committing myself  
to judge that I have conclusive grounds for judging that this proposition is true, namely I  
am committed to judging  that  I  have  conclusive  grounds  for  judging that  there  is  no 
142I will put the point here about doubt – that is closed questioning – but the same point can be made with 
respect to open questioning as well. In the next Chapter I will speak of  the pyrrhonist attitude, an attitude  
which closely resembles that of  a universal questioner, both open and closed.
143Notice the difference between these two standpoints. One consists in  judging that all our judgments are 
false. This standpoint is arguably  absolutely self-refuting, for it entails that the very proposition that all 
propositions are false is false. The other standpoint consists in  doubting whether all our judgments are 
really true. This doubt is committed to take it that there are no conclusive grounds for any proposition 
whatsoever, hence it is committed to take a proposition as true. It is self-refuting, but not absolutely so. 
See Mackie (1964) for the notion of  absolute self-refutation and for other kinds of  self-refutation. See  
Castagnoli (2010) for a beautiful discussion of  self-refutation in ancient philosophy. 
137
proposition that has conclusive grounds. These are the contradictory propositions to which 
I am committed by doubting whether all the propositions I will find true are really true. We 
might put the point here by saying that a fully reflexive agent will not be in a position to  
hold this universal doubt. 
What I have just done is one way to unpack the incoherence of  a standpoint of  a  
universal doubter. Here are two others ways of  showing the untenability of  this standpoint. 
First, if  I am to judge that it is possible that an evil demon is deceiving me into believing  
the false whenever I believe something, then what should I think of  this very judgment?  
Since I am having it, I think that it is true, but then I am also committed to think that it is  
false that an evil demon is always deceiving me into judging to be true what is actually false, 
for  this  very  judgment  about  the  power  of  the  evil  demon is  taken  as  true.  Second, 
Descartes himself  provided another way of  showing the untenability of  this standpoint, 
and that is Descartes'  cogito and  sum.  If  I am doubting whether every proposition that I 
might find plausible is really true, then there is at least one thing of  which I can't doubt:  
namely that there is a doubting going on144. 
We might  think of  another  way of  making sense  the  idea  of  universal  doubt. 
Namely as a dubitative attitude such that,  whenever one is  presented with a candidate 
believable proposition, one doubts whether it is really true. 
Here we are considering a very complicated stance. The best way I have to describe 
to myself  in a realistic manner what would be like to be in such a stance is this: whenever  
one is presented with a candidate proposition to be believed, the subject enters in a state of  
doubt; the subject has a certain disposition to enter into that state of  doubt; the subject is  
144That  there  is  doubting  going  on is  less  committal  than the  contention  that  I  am doubting.  This  is 
Litchenberg's  point.  See  Zanetti  (ms5)  for  more  discussion  of  Descartes's  cogito  and  Litchenberg's 
objection. Descartes's move is different from the one that consists in pointing out the propositions to 
which I am committed by having a doubt. His move rather consists in showing that by having a doubt 
one is in a position to discover with certainty the truth of  some propositions. In his case, then, the doubt  
is  shown as  incoherent  because  one can be  certain  of  some truth.  Whereas  in  the  response  to the  
universal doubter that I have suggested the universal doubt is shown to be incoherent because it commits 
one to contradictory judgments. But this commitment doesn't suffice to make the commitments true. 
Here we see the difference between two ways in which a view might be shown to be in some way self-
defeating. The cogito and the sum are self-verifying in that by doubting them one is making them true. Yet 
they are not  absolutely self-refuting – it is  not the case that the falsity of  the cogito logically entails  a 
contradiction. My points was not to show that the commitment that there is a certainty is self-verifying; 
rather the point was to show that by doubting whether there is any certainty we are committing ourselves 
to there being some. Here it would be important to work on a taxonomy of  kinds of  self-refutations and 
see  their  relationship  with  the  points  about  tenability  I  make  here  and  in  the  following  chapters. 
Unfortunately,  this  will  have  to  be  done  in  another  occasion  (see  Zanetti  ms).  Here  is  some useful 
references on the varieties of  self-refutation: Fitch (1946), Jorgenson (1953), Popper (1954), Johnstone 
(1959), (1989), Passmore (1961), Hintikka (1962), Mackie (1964), Bonney (1966), Jordan (1969), Shaper  
(1972), Ripley (1972), Boyle (1972), Snydey (1972), Feldman (1973), Boyle et al. (1976),  Walton (1977),  
Meiland (1979), Stack (1983),  the papers contained in Bartlett  & Suber (1987),  Boyle (1987), Bartlett  
(1988), Sorensen (1988), White (1989), Lonergan (1989), Page (1992), Haslanger (1992), Skidmore (2002), 
Broughton (2002), Bardon (2005), Castagnoli (2010).
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not explicitly committed to all propositions being dubitable, because if  that were so, he 
would fall  into the previous untenable attitude. So, the subject is not committed to the 
correctness of  his own disposition. He simply has it. 
Is  this  stance tenable? On the face  of  it,  it  doesn't  seem so,  and for the same 
reasons  as  before.  Whenever  one  doubts  whether  p  is  true,  one  exhibits  some 
commitments, of  which the subject is  potentially aware, and whose potential awareness 
make the doubt intelligible as such. Thus, the view is not reflexively stable: if  one makes 
explicit one's commitments whenever one has a doubt, then one has to judge the alethic 
commitments in order to keep having the doubt, but then if  she judges them to be true she 
no longer doubts every proposition. 
But here is a reply. A universal doubter of  this sort could doubt every propositions,  
though  she  cannot  doubt  all  of  them at  the  same  time.  Whenever  she  encounters  a 
proposition,  she has a  doubt  about  its  truth value.  If  she  doubts  whether  p,  and this 
commit her to judge that q, when she is presented with q she will also doubt whether q. So, 
it is true that when so doubting she will no longer be doubting whether p, but she is not 
judging anything either! She never judges anything to be the case, even if  she commits 
herself  to judge many things, like we do, whenever she entertains a doubt. 
Can we really make sense of  this stance as a stance that we can occupy? This mind 
will be a relentless free-floating mind than never takes any stance. For my part, I can't make  
sense of  me  as being in that game. I will discuss further this stance in Chapter VII, in 
connection to a discussion of  Pyrrhonian scepticism.
There  is  a  kind of  methodological doubt  which  is  however  possible.  This  sort  of 
doubt is in fact widely practiced, knowingly or not. It consists in proceeding as if  one was 
not believing a certain class of  propositions. A universal methodological doubt will consist  
in proceeding as if  one was not believing anything at all. 
Speculating about this sort of  doubt can be very useful: it might offer a way to 
appreciate whether there is an unmoved mover of  epistemological reflection, something 
like experiences or intuitions. So, by so pretending to doubt, one might eventually realise 
that there are cases in which experiences are enough in order to justify belief  in a suitable  
class  of  propositions.  This  claim  might  of  course  be  challenged  in  various  way.  I 
mentioned it  as an example of  the sort of  work that a universal methodological doubt 
might be taken to perform. 
A methodological doubt which is not universal proceeds by putting into brackets 
truths that belong to a suitably isolated class of  claims. Thus, one might stop relying on 
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propositions  belonging  to  the  empirical  realm,  in  order  to  see  what  can  be  known 
independently  of  any empirical  information.  This  methodological  doubt  is  the  sort  of  
doubt that, I think, Descartes was really performing in his  Meditations – also because it is 
impossible to  be  universal doubters – but this exegetical point goes beyond our present 
purposes145. 
§5.10 Doubt, the problem of  certainty, and the condition of  possibility for its solution
 
Let us start by noticing that it seems prima facie plausible that it is psychologically possible to 
doubt any proposition in any circumstance. After all, we might think, there are no limits to the 
perversity  of  the  human mind146.  Moreover,  the  fact  that  whenever  we  doubt  a  given 
proposition  p we are also committed to there being some true propositions – like the  
proposition that the doubted proposition is dubitable – does not, by itself, show that it is 
impossible to doubt any proposition. In fact, the commitments can be doubted as well,  
though in another moment. 
It is not obvious then, at least prima facie, that a doubt could not be raised with 
respect to any proposition.  In order to show that  there are limits  to the psychological  
possibility of  doubt we would have to show that there are special circumstances in which,  
by psychological necessity, we can't form a doubt. The best candidate such situation is one 
in which one takes oneself  to possess conclusive grounds for a given proposition. More 
specifically, if  we suppose that one is in presence of  these grounds and their conclusiveness 
(like when I am aware of  the fact that there is experience going on while I ask whether  
there is experience going on), then it seems that it is impossible to have a doubt for the  
corresponding proposition. 
But let us put this argumentative strategy on a side for the time being and let us 
proceed under the assumption that it is possible to doubt any proposition whatsoever in 
145See for Frankfurt (1970) ch. 2 for an exegetical account that is sympathetic with mine.
146Since I make constitutive claims about doubt – it is constitutive of  a doubt that it is possible to raise it if  
p is not absolutely certain – I am committed  to say that if  there are people who have doubt-like states 
that  don't  respect  my  constitutive  claims,  then  they  are  not  really  having  doubts,  but  some entirely  
different mental state altogether. A way of  weakening my point will be to relativise it to a human mind  
that satisfies some suitably specified conditions C for being a normal questioner. In order to know whether 
this relativisation is needed, one would have to do empirical work and check whether there actually are 
people with respect to which we can't deny that they have doubts, yet their dubitative states are different  
from ours because of  some factors (like illness). I haven't done this empirical research (see Billon (2014) 
for a philosophically minded survey of  psychological literature on doubt and of  those capacities that 
seem implicit in the capacity to run through Descartes's cogito). The question whether we must introduce 
some conditions C in my constitutive claims hinges on the larger question whether we should understand 
cognition and its structures transcendentally or naturalistically. As soon as some conditions C are put in 
the constitutive claim, there appears the spectre of  naturalistic relativisation of  the features that make  
knowledge possible (for us!). This is why I am reluctant to so relativise my claims. 
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any circumstance whatsoever. If  this is true, how is it that one can resolve one's doubt?
There are ways of  stopping a doubt about a proposition that do not amount to 
resolutions  of  a  doubt.  A doubt  could  be stopped due  to  factors which  are  completely 
irrelevant to the question whether the doubted proposition is true or not. Thus, I might 
stop doubting that the external world exists simply because I stop philosophizing and go 
have a beer with colleagues. Or I might stop doubting a given proposition because keeping 
my mind in a state of  doubt makes me suffer too much147. 
So the question is not how to just stop doubting, but rather how to stop it in a 
rational way. One way of  rationally removing it is by finding evidence for a proposition and 
taking it  as a ground for judging accordingly.  But suppose that the evidence is  merely 
fallible.  If  it  is  fallible,  then  it  is possible  to  reopen the  question  of  the  truth  of  that 
proposition. It is always possible for us to doubt a proposition so long as we don't have 
conclusive grounds for it. Hence, this sort of  rational resolution of  a doubt will at best be  
temporary. If  one comes back to the issue, for whatever reason, then the doubt will still be 
there. 
So, what we are looking for is a definitive rational resolution of  a doubt. Suppose that it 
is impossible to remove a doubt in this definitive rational way. If  it is so, then we also have 
to concede that certainty is impossible. The impossibility of  a rational definitive resolution 
of  doubting is  compatible  with the  fact  that  we might be psychologically  incapable to 
doubt some proposition. But this impossibility will be  merely  psychological – it would be 
grounded on some feature of  our psychology, and it would not be in the light of  the truth. 
Can we rationally and definitively resolve at least some of  our doubts? The point I 
wish to stress now is that  if we proceed by assuming that it is psychologically possible to 
doubt any proposition whatsoever in any circumstance, then it seems that we can't. This is  
why. 
Suppose  I  consider  the  proposition  p.  Ex hypothesis,  we  have  the  possibility  of 
doubting it, and in so doubting we are asking for a conclusive ground for judging that it is  
true148. (Recall: if  one offers a fallible ground for judging, then doubt is still possible, hence  
147What makes one suffer can vary upon many many factors. Take for instance the belief  in the existence of 
God. There was a time during which doubting whether God really exists or not was an extremely painful 
and courageous performance (see books on doubt in the Victorian England). Nowadays it is arguably less 
painful for many of  us to come to doubt whether God really exists or not. I myself  am in a state of 
doubt when I think about the issue – I neither believe that he exists, nor that he doesn't, I take myself  to 
have conclusive evidence for neither option – but the doubt is not a cause of  suffering. The reason is that 
I do not regard that particular issue as crucial for me, I do not think that any salvation or progress will 
come from the resolution of  this doubt. 
148Of  course, we might judge that p is true, and simply refrain from raising the question whether p is really 
true. If  we refrain from raising the question, then there is no epistemological problem from the subject's  
own personal perspective. The question we are addressing now, however, is how to solve the problem 
141
we need a conclusive ground to rationally and definitively remove the doubt).
In order to resolve my doubt, I might consider another proposition q as a candidate 
ground.  The problem is that I  can doubt whether  q  is true itself. And if  I do, then his 
pushes the search for grounds further.
Suppose that, after a while,  p itself  is proposed as a ground for some proposition 
(which belongs to the chain of  propositions purporting to show that p is true). I can doubt 
again whether it is true, hence I can't resolve my doubt by relying on p itself. 
The point here is not just that relying on p itself  will not remove my doubt since I 
am precisely doubting about whether p is true. The point here is that the simple possibility of 
raising a doubt as to whether  p  or any other proposition q is true will  ipso facto block the 
possibility for me of  relying on p or q as grounds for resolving my initial doubt whether p is 
true. In order to use some proposition as a ground for judging I must take the proposition 
as true. But to doubt it is precisely to suspend its truth and to wonder whether it is indeed  
true.
Suppose that I then try another route for resolving my doubt. I consider  cr: that 
circular reasoning is fine (maybe with the proviso: in such and such circumstances). 
Now,  either  cr  is  used  as  ground  for  judging  that  p  or  not.  If  not,  then  it  is 
completely irrelevant for our purposes, for we are trying to remove a doubt as to whether p 
is true, and this is  my doubt and so it is me who has to resolve it, regardless of  whether 
there is some external point of  view whose perspective is such as to make sense of  my 
doubt as solved.
If  cr is used as a ground for judging that p then it means that circular reasoning by  
itself is not enough to resolve my doubt, for it is not the circular reasoning simpliciter that is  
resolving my doubt, but the judgment that circular reasoning is fine. In fact, the fact that 
the reasoning is circular doesn't play any role whatsoever – all that matters is the chain of  
grounds on which I rely in order to judge that p, and as it happens the chain includes p and 
cr. 
Anyway, the crucial problem here is the following: I can ask whether cr itself  is true. 
But if  I can do so, then I haven't resolved my initial doubt yet.
Suppose, instead, that I consider proposition r: that infinite regress is fine (maybe 
with the proviso: in such and such circumstances). 
Again, r need to be among the grounds for my judgment, otherwise I won't be in a 
were the problem to be raised by the subject. The point is that  if  the subject raises the question, and 
keeps inquiring, then, assuming that doubt with respect to any proposition is always possible, the subject 
will  be incapable of  definitively resolving one's own doubts – that is,  the subject will  be incapable of 
achieving a reflexively stable judgment, and hence absolute certainty.
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position to solve my doubt. Yet, ex hypothesis, I can doubt r itself. Hence we need more.
Suppose  that  I  consider  a:  that  to  arbitrarily  stop  at  some  point  the  chain  of 
grounds is epistemically sound. But again, since I can doubt this very proposition, I haven't  
resolved my initial doubt.  
Suppose that various externalist proposals to the effect that I am justified to judge 
that p are proposed. Maybe I consider a proposition of  the following sort: that it is fine to  
judge that p if  my environment is propitious. 
Now, one problem is of  course that even assuming the externalist proposition to be  
true, I would like to know whether I am in such propitious conditions. But the pressing  
problem we  are  interested  in  here  is  another  one.  Namely  that  I  can  doubt  this  very 
externalist proposition, and so I won't have satisfied my initial doubt. 
We might thus think that the problem with all these routes to the resolution of  a 
doubt is the fact that they all try to remove it by relying on a doxastic  ground, that is, on 
another proposition with respect to which is then possible to raise a doubt. 
But if  we move to non-doxastic grounds, then we have the same problem. Suppose 
that experience e is proposed as a ground for judging that p and so for resolving the initial 
doubt about p. We are in a position to doubt whether e is a good ground for p. And when 
we doubt in this way we stop taking e as a ground for judging that p. I can't take what I read 
on  the  newspaper  as  a  ground  for  judging  accordingly  while  I  doubt  whether  this  
newspaper is trustworthy. Hence, we haven't solved our initial doubt about p. 
But then, there is no other way in which we can come to judge some p as being 
true.  The only way is to appeal to some ground,  either doxastic  or non-doxastic.  (See, 
Chapter XII for an argument for this claim). 
The moral  is  this:  if  we start  assuming that  it  is  always in  every  circumstances 
possible to raise a doubt about any given proposition, then a rational definitive resolution 
of  a doubt is impossible. For, with respect to any candidate ground for resolving my doubt 
(that is, for judging a proposition p which is the target of  my doubt) I will always be in a 
position to doubt either its truth (in the case of  doxastic grounds) or its goodness  qua 
ground (in the case of  both doxastic and non-doxastic grounds). Since to rationally resolve 
a  doubt  in  a  definitive  fashion  is  to  have  certainty,  the  possibility  of  doubting  any 
proposition in any circumstance entails that certainty is impossible. 
In order to further appreciate the source of  our problem, consider the following 
reply that is likely to be already in your mind. Surely, even if  we grant that doubt is possible 
with respect to every proposition in every circumstance, still there is a distinction to be 
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drawn between rational  and irrational doubts. It  is  plausible to think that some of  the 
doubts that are psychologically possible are not rational.  So doubt is resolved when we 
encounter cases where  rational  doubt is impossible, though still psychologically possible. 
This reply, however, fails to appreciate the problem. To see why, consider this question:  
how  do  I  know  whether  a  given  doubt  is  rational  or  not?  When  confronted  with  a  
proposition, our initial p, I am psychologically capable, given the hypothesis assumed here, 
to doubt it. Then, according to the present proposal, we should be capable of  doing the  
following: to ask ourselves whether the doubt is rational or not. The idea is that if  this 
doubt is irrational (or some further doubt that comes later in the chain of  the attempted 
resolution) then we have solved our initial doubt about p. But since, ex hypothesis,  doubt is 
always psychologically possible, then we can also doubt whether any given doubt is rational  
or not. Hence, we can't rely on the judgment that a given doubt is rational or not in order  
to solve our initial doubt about p. We are then back to our problem. 
The idea is that if  doubt is always possible, then there never is any secure ground on 
which we can rely in order to remove some doubt. As we say, Wittgenstein is right (though 
not (only) for the reasons he offered) in saying that  doubt is possible only if  something 
remains still. And we must now add that resolution of  a doubt is possible only if  something 
remains still – that is, only if  some candidate ground for judgment is not itself  susceptible 
of  being doubted.
This  gives  us  a  very  important  clue  for  solving  the  problem of  certainty:  the 
resolution should deny that a doubt is possible with respect to any proposition and in all 
circumstances.  To  deny  this  is  either  to  assert  that  there  are  propositions  that  it  is  
impossible to doubt, whatever the circumstances of  doubt might be, or it is to grant that 
any proposition can be doubted in some circumstance, yet insist that there are circumstances 
in which a doubt is simply impossible. The first option is implausible. To doubt a proposition 
is just to raise a question about whether it is true. This seems to be possible with respect to  
every proposition, at least in most circumstances149. In this respect judgment and question 
seems to be essentially tied: it is possible to judge that p only if  I can raise a question as to 
whether p is true, and I can ask a question as to whether p is true only if  I can judge it to be 
true. The second option seems much more plausible. Think of  the cogito – the proposition 
that there is thinking now. Once you have understood what it takes for it to be true, and once 
you have comprehendingly raised the question whether there is thinking going on, then you  
simply can't  keep doubting whether there is thinking. There are moments in which the 
149See Chapter XII for a defence of  the possibility of  there being, for any proposition  p, at least  some 
circumstances in which it is possible to doubt it.
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evidence that you are thinking – the fact that you are now raising a question as to whether  
you are thinking – shuts down the doubt.  The doubt  might  reappear (as we saw,  it  is  
possible to doubt at will), but it can't survive the appreciation that you are thinking. 
If  cases like the one just described are genuine, then rational definitive resolution of  
a doubt is possible. The case of  the  cogito is one in which given certain circumstances – 
namely, those in which one is considering the question whether there is thinking going on, 
one is attentive to the fact that one is questioning, one appreciates that for there to be 
thinking going on is just for there being precisely what is going on now, and maybe other  
conditions – it is impossible to raise a doubt, or anyway a doubt that has been raised is shut  
down.  Also,  this  impossibility  is  not  merely  psychological,  because  it  is  connected  and 
explained by an appreciation of  the  evidence  for the judgment that shuts down the doubt. 
But in what sense is the resolution  definitive, beside being rational? Since it is possible to 
doubt at will it will be always possible to reopen a doubt. Yet, there is a sense in which the 
resolution is definitive because one is not only in a position to doubt it again, but one is 
also in a position to rehearse again the evidence that conclusively establishes the doubted  
proposition. 
I have just described the form of  a possible view which denies that doubt is possible 
in  every  circumstances.  This  is  just  the  beginning  of  a  resolution  of  the  problem of 
certainty we encountered in Chapter I. In this Dissertation I won't focus on a complete 
resolution of  the problem, but only reflect on its conditions of  possibility – one such a  
condition is that there be cases in which a doubt is impossible where the impossibility is 
not just  understood as a mere psychological  impossibility but rather as a  psychological 
impossibility that responds to rational evidence. Indeed, what I have offered above can be 
seen as a transcendental argument for the claim that there are psychological impossibilities  
which are  rational responses to evidence. The argument starts from the fact that  absolute  
certainty is possible – it is possible to have an access to the truth in such a way that we can 
be absolutely certain of  having accessed it. It then argues that a condition of  possibility of  
this  fact  is  that  doubt  is  sometimes  psychological  impossible.  However,  it  argues  that 
psychological impossibility as such is not sufficient – it  might be a contingency of  our  
human psychology that we find some thing to be true in a way that we can't doubt whether  
it  is  true.  Thus,  the  condition  of  possibility  is  not  just  psychological  impossibility  but 
rationally  based  psychological  impossibility.  The argument  is  that  some doubt  should  be 
impossible  because  the subject is  apprehending  evidence that makes the doubt irrational.  It 
should be evidence that shows to one that she is confronting conclusive evidence for a  
145
proposition. The transcendental argument establishes the conclusion that there must be 
such evidence. This is an highly significant argument. It describes the form that the source 
of  certainty should take: it should be a rational source that psychologically compels the 
mind to judge the truth in a way which is responsive to the truth, hence in a rational way,  
and not merely in a way which is a-rational or even irrational.
This conclusion has a further important consequence: to the extent that cognition 
is committed to there being certainties, it is not possible for us to endorse in a reflexively  
stable fashion a theory which makes the conditions for knowledge contingent upon factors  
which might have been different and such that if  they were different they would deliver 
different truths – in other words, in order to make sense of  the possibility of  certainty, we  
should endorse a view which doesn't make the psychological impossibilities that ground 
certainties mere psychological impossibilities, where the relativization 'psychological' can be 
further relativised in such a fashion that what we find certain is nothing but what we find 
certain, though if  we were slightly different we would find certain other things. 
This  point  about  the  untenability  of  a  standpoint  that  doesn't  make  room for 
certainty can be fruitfully used in order to respond to a powerful standard criticism against  
any project whose aim is to secure apodictic or certain knowledge. As remarked, whatever 
we end up judging is based on some ground. Also, as noted, it is necessary that the ground 
doesn't  provide  only  subjective  (or  psychological)  certainty,  but  should  also  provide 
objective or epistemic certainty. Yet, the standard objection goes, how are we to distinguish 
mere subjective certainty from objective one150. This is indeed an apparently desperate task, 
but at least we can say that one condition for solving the task is to say that the objective  
certainty should be grounded on grounds whose comprehension makes it impossible to 
raise a doubt about the corresponding proposition. Yet, having noticed the previous point  
about  tenability,  we  have  two  further  resources  at  our  disposal  for  responding  to  the 
challenge: the first is to say that even a critics who pushes the argument with the intent to  
show that it is impossible to achieve absolute certainty is bound to rely on some ground for  
making its claim, and if  the claim is established with certainty then it  is  self-defeating,  
whereas if  it delivers mere fallible grounds for the conclusion is open to doubt; the second 
is that anyway since the very employment of  cognition is committed to the existence of  
certainties we can't hold in a reflexively stable fashion a view which makes it impossible to 
discover some truth with certainty. This reply doesn't show how to individuate grounds for 
objective certainties by distinguishing them from grounds that deliver mere psychological 
impossibilities to doubt. Yet, it offers a first response that silences the objection. 
150See, for instance, Kolakowski (1975).
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Chapter VI 
Phenomenology and Constitutive Norms
In the previous chapters I have argued that questioning and judging constitutively give rise  
to alethic commitments. Alethic commitments are normative phenomena. Thus, the claim 
defended  in  the  previous  chapters  is  that  there  are  normative  phenomena  that  are 
constitutive of  cognition, that is  the phenomenologically individuated activity of  asking 
questions and answering them in the form of  judgment based on alethic grounds. 
In  this  Chapter  I  will  argue  that  if  one  wants  to  claim  that  some  normative 
phenomenon is constitutive of  cognition, then one needs to show how the normativity is 
grounded and exhibited in the very phenomenology of  cognition. In order to argue for this  
claim I will use the case of  logical normativity as my example. Then I will come back to the 
talk  of  commitments  I  have  made  in  the  previous  chapters  and explain  what  are  the 
candidate phenomenological phenomena that exhibit the legitimacy of  this commitment 
talk. 
This Chapter is in many ways highly speculative, but it  has a central role in the 
whole Dissertation. First, it defends the contention which vindicates the overall spirit of 
this work, namely that phenomenology is needed if  one wants to defend a transcendental  
constitutivist strategy. Second, it  reflects on foundational issues about what it  means to 
ground  normativity  in  the  phenomenology  of  cognition.  There  is  little  work  in 
contemporary literature that recognises the need of  phenomenology for constitutivists and 
that actually attempt to explain how phenomenology can help in grounding normativity, yet  
if  the contentions of  this Chapter are right, we need to seriously work on these issues.
§6.1 Constitutive norms of  cognition
To recall, a transcendental constitutivist is someone who wants to ground the validity of  
some  norm  or  the  truth  or  specialness  of  some  belief  on  what  is  constitutive  of 
cognition151. When a transcendental constitutivist arguer focuses on norms, rather than on 
alethic commitments,  we might  see the structure of  her overall strategy as proceeding 
151See Tubert (2010), Katsafanas (forthcoming) for an overview of  this strategy, particularly in connection 
with practical reason. In Chapter XII we will see how people like Strawson (1985), Stroud (1999), and 
Coliva (2015) apply this strategy to belief, particularly the belief  in the existence of  the external world and  
other minds.
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along the following steps – though the following structure shouldn't be taken too rigidly 
but only as a useful tool: 
Constitutivity step. It is argued that some norms152 are constitutive of  some practice or 
activity. 
Inescapability step. It is argued that the activity is suitably inescapable. 
Transcendental step. Depending on the ambitiousness or modesty of  the theory, 
different conclusions are then drawn from the fact that some norm 
is constitutive of  cognition. To illustrate, can we conclude from the 
fact that we are unavoidably committed to the validity of  modus  
ponens that modus ponens is indeed valid? Or should we conclude 
that modus ponens possesses some special kind of  justification?  
Can we conclude from the fact that we unavoidably aim at truth that 
truth is indeed valuable? 
Explanatory step. Some deeper explanation is provided of  why the constitutive claim 
holds  true.  Thus,  to  illustrate,  is  modus  ponens  constitutive  of  
reasoning because our social linguistic practice makes it so, or is it  
constitutive  because  it  is  an  a  priori  scheme  of  transcendental  
consciousness? Does judgment aim at truth because of  evolution,  
because of  a culturally shaped genealogy, or what else? 
The work conducted in the previous chapters provides the resources for the constitutivity  
and inescapability steps of  the constitutivist strategy.  Particularly, as I will argue in Chapter 
XI, the work on commitments (constitutivity step) provides the resources for arguing that 
some epistemic norms are indeed valid (ambitious argument at the transcendental step) 
because they are (weakly) constitutive of  cognition – like the norm that a judgment that p is 
epistemically  correct  only  if  it  is  grounded,  or  the  norm  that  a  judgment  that  p  is 
epistemically correct only if  it is certain. Also, the whole work on the most fundamental 
ingredients of  cognition – namely judging and questioning – provides the resources to 
explain in which sense cognition is fundamentally inescapable – because to criticise it or 
more generally to inquire about it is to engage in it, namely to raise questions and doubts  
about it  and to form judgments about it.  Finally,  the  work  conducted in  the  previous  
152Here 'norm' should be taken as a place holder for some normatively relevant ingredient. So, instead of  a 
norm, a  constitutivist  might claim that  some aim or value or commitment is  constitutive of  a given 
activity. 
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chapters  also  offers  the  ground  to  clarify  the  idea  of  transcendental  hinges,  namely 
constitutive  alethic  commitments  of  cognition,  which  I  will  discuss  in  the  concluding 
chapter of  this work.
In order to defend the constitutivity claims and inescapability claims made in the 
previous chapters I have heavily relied on phenomenological considerations. In this chapter 
I want to explain in more detail why phenomenology is crucial in order to construct a  
persuasive constitutivist account of  some normative realm. In order to explain why it is 
crucial,  I  will  focus  on  a  form  of  constitutivism  which  is  not  central  in  the  whole 
Dissertation, namely constitutivism about logical normativity, the idea that it is constitutive 
for cognition either to respect or to be evaluated according to some logical norms. I will 
focus on logic for four reasons: first, this constitutivism has to be present in an ideally  
complete constitutivist account of  the normative nature of  cognition, for logic arguably 
concerns the primary dimension of  evaluation of  the transitions among judgments, hence I  
want to touch at least briefly upon it in order to explain why phenomenology is important  
in that foundational context as well;  second, focusing on logic will  allow us to see the  
overall  structure  of  constitutivism  about  normativity  with  particular  clarity,  omitting 
complexities  that  will  have  to  emerge  gradually  when  we  reach  the  stage  in  which  I 
introduce constitutivism about alethic and epistemic normativity; third, it is important to 
address the issue of  the constitutivity of  logic for thought in order to give voice to the 
debate between naturalist and transcendentalist understandings of  the mind  which I will 
briefly touch upon in the last concluding chapter; finally, and perhaps most importantly for 
our purposes, in the previous chapters I have often made claims to the effect that it is 
impossible  to  hold  incompatible  judgments  (that  is,  judgments  whose  contents  are 
incompatible) while recognising their incompatibility, and this is a claim paradigmatically 
defended by (strong) constitutivist about logical normativity. 
§6.2 Strong constitutivism about the laws of  logic
Norms can be constitutive for some activity in two main ways: by being strongly constitutive 
or by being weakly constitutive. A norm is strongly constitutive for some activity if  for it to 
be that sort of  activity is for it to respect the norm. A norm is weakly constitutive for some 
activity if  for it to be that sort of  activity is for it to  be evaluated as correct/incorrect (or 
good/bad, right/wrong, …) according to that norm. Thus, to illustrate the distinction with 
the truth norm – the norm that a judgment is alethically correct only if  it is true – this  
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norm is surely not strongly constitutive of  cognition, for there can be false judgments; yet,  
it is arguably weakly constitutive of  cognition in so far as it seems essential for judgment to 
be the sort of  thing that is evaluated as correct/incorrect according to whether it is true or 
not.
Are there norms that are either weakly or strongly constitutive for cognition? It is 
quite easy to think of  constitutive norms in the case of  activities that we have created, and 
whose act of  creation imposed the relevant normativity on some activity. Yet, in the case of 
cognition,  it  doesn't  seem  easy  to  even  understand  what  it  means  for  there  to  be 
constitutive norms. The very idea of  a strongly constitutive norm seems mysterious, for, if 
something always behaves in a certain way, how could the phenomenon amounts to the 
'respecting of  a norm', given that one can't even fail to behave otherwise? Why shouldn't 
we then take laws of  nature as strongly constitutive norms of  nature? After all,  nature 
behaves according to them. What does  add the  normative property  to a  mere  natural  
necessity? Weakly constitutive norms don't seem less mysterious: what is it that make some 
mental transitions constitutively evaluable according to some norm? Is it the way in which 
cognition itself  behaves? If  it so, then why don't we have weakly constitutive norms within 
Nature as well? But if  it is not the way in which cognition itself  is structured that explains 
why some norms are weakly constitutive of  it, then what else could it be? It seems that if  
we think of  the relevant norms as imposed on cognition by some external source (maybe  
social conventions, or our conceptual scheme?) then we loose grip on the idea that these  
norms are really constitutive of  cognition, rather than of  our conception of  cognition. 
I want now to address these questions and problems by focusing on the case of 
logical laws. And I will start by offering a qualified defence of  strong constitutivism about  
logical  normativity.  As  noticed  before,  one  important  reason  to  focus  on  logic  is  the 
following. In the previous chapters (and in the next ones) I relied (and will sometimes rely)  
on the claim that it is impossible, and not only irrational, to have incompatible judgments. I 
haven't argued for that claim, and it is now time to do so. If  it were possible to judge  
incompatible contents, it would then be incredible that there are any other combinations of 
mental  acts  that  are  actually  impossible.  If  anything  seems  impossible,  it  is  to  judge  
contents  that  are  recognized  as  being  incompatible,  but  if  it  turns  out  that  it  is  not 
impossible, then why thinking that more complicated and less obvious combinations of 
mental acts are impossible? If  we are free to hold recognized incompatible contents as  
true, then our mental arena must be a quite anarchic place. 
To defend the impossibility of  judging recognized incompatible contents is then 
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arguably  necessary  if  there  can  be  any  credibility  in  the  overall  project  of  grounding 
normativity on phenomenology according to the strategy that I have pursue in previous 
chapters relying on the  method of  eidetic variation. If  it is possible to judge recognized 
incompatible contents, then why wouldn't it be also possible to have other combinations of 
mental states like judging that p and that there are no grounds for p, say? But if  all these 
combinations of  mental states are cotenable, then it  is hard to see how there could be  
enough (or even some!) constitutive laws of  cognition on the basis of  which one might  
then hope to ground alethic and epistemic normativity. The normativity, if  genuine, will  
then have to come from elsewhere.
My tentative view is that it is impossible to judge contradictory contents as true just in 
case the contents are recognized as incompatible by the subject. Here is what that means.
First,  I  don't deny that it  is  possible to  entertain – and, in this sense,  to  think – 
incompatible contents. I might entertain the thought that there is a square circle in this 
room, and upon little  reflection judge that  it  is  false that  there is  such a square circle 
because I understand that there can't be any such thing. 
Second, and relatedly, I don't deny that one can have judgments whose contents are 
incompatible. I can judge that  p and that q, where q is incompatible with p, when I don't 
understand that they are incompatible. I might judge that Clark Kent is in front of  me, and  
that Superman is not, so long as I don't know that they are the very same person.  
Third, we should distinguish two impossibilities: the first is to have two judgments, 
one in  p  and the other in  q, where  p  and q  are recognized as incompatible contents; the 
second  is  to  have  two  judgments,  one  in p  the  other  in  q,  where  p  and  q  are  not 
incompatible, and yet the believer takes them to be incompatible. I am claiming that it is 
impossible to judge that p and to judge that q at the same time when the contents p and q 
are recognized as incompatible. My claim is primarily meant to apply to cases where the 
contents actually are incompatible, and not merely taken as incompatible by the subject. I  
think that the cases in which the contents are incompatible are the central ones, for in  
those  cases  the  impossibility  to  have  both  judgments involves  a  responsiveness to  the 
incompatibility of  the contents to be judged, whereas in the case in which the contents are  
not incompatible, the incapacity, if  any, of  the subject to judge both of  them cannot be  
explained  by  reference  to  the  subject's  responsiveness  to  the  incompatibility  between 
contents.  For  the  sake  of  simplicity,  I  will  hereafter  assume  that  when  I  deal  with 
uncotenable  judgments  their  uncotenability  involves  a  responsiveness  to  the  actual 
incompatibility  of  the contents entertained. I will  leave it  as an open question whether  
151
taking some contents to be incompatible is sufficient to generate uncotenability between 
mental states.
Fourth, though I can't judge as true contents that I recognize as being incompatible, 
I can judge that they can't be true at the same time. I can judge that it is false that there is a 
square circle here. Here the content of  my judgment is that it is false that there is a square circle, 
but there is no incompatibility involved in the ascription made with this judgment.
Fifth,  I  am here  assuming  that  there  are  no states  of  rejection.  All  there  is  is  
judgment, and what we call rejection can be understood in terms of  judgment to the effect 
that things are not in a certain way, or that it is false that things are in a certain way. This is  
a claim about philosophy of  mind, more precisely about the phenomenology of  cognition. 
I will  assume this view here, though nothing will substantially change if  you think that  
rejection is a further sui generis mental act.  
Sixth, when I claim that it is impossible to judge contents that are recognized as 
being incompatible I do not mean to imply that it is necessary for a subject to possess the  
concept of  incompatibility or contradiction or anyway to bring to bear such concepts in 
the mental event that consists in entertaining a contradictory proposition and eventually 
conclude that it can't be true. When I consider whether there is a square circle in the world,  
I don't need to possess or rely on the concept of  incompatibility in order to realise that it  
can't be true that there is such a thing. All I need to do is to understand that for a thing to 
be  square  requires  that  it  is  not  round,  and  the  other  way  around.  The  concept  of  
incompatibility might then be used in order to articulate this bit of  understanding, but one 
needs not use it in order to recognize that something can't be round and square at the same 
time. Relatedly, and a fortiori, in order to recognize that some contents are incompatible in 
the relevant sense, one needs not judge that they are incompatible. It is enough to understand  
it, and we need not understand understanding as being some form of  judgment. 
The  main  argument  for  this  view,  though  by  no  means  the  only  one,  is 
phenomenological: I submit that once the relevant restrictions are carefully made, none of 
us is capable of  judging recognized incompatible contents to be true at the same time 153. 
153Upton (1982) argues on the basis of  introspection that judging contradictions is impossible. Priest (2005)  
comments Upton's view as follows: “The unsatisfactoriness of  trying to establish psychological laws in  
this way hardly needs to be laboured”. Footnote 9. However, if  we are talking about laws about the way 
things appear, then the appeal introspective evidence is unavoidable – you can't appeal to third personal 
evidence alone, for you can decide whether the third-personal evidence bears on the issue only if  you 
establish that it corresponds to the relevant phenomena as first-personally, that is, phenomenologically, 
individuated. Also, Priest's remark is unfair, given that his main argument for the possibility of  judging 
contradictions is, as he says, based on his own experience. If  the point is, however, that it is fine to rely on 
experience in order to falsify an empirical psychological generalisation whereas it is wrong to rely on  
experience in order to verify it (for there is Hume's problem of  induction), then we should insist that  
there is no other means than to appeal to experience in order to make claims about the way things appear.  
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This appeal to phenomenological evidence can be further articulated by commenting on 
examples like the following. Consider again the case of  the round square. Upon hearing or  
reading this sentence, one doesn't need to immediately understand what would it take for 
there  to  be  a  round  square.  If  one  however  thinks  about  the  issue,  then  one  might 
eventually understand that if  something is square it isn't round, and that if  something is  
round it  isn't  square.  When one understands that,  and keeps this  bit of  understanding 
before one's mind, one can't comprehendingly judge that there is something square and 
round. 
The other arguments are mainly negative: the arguments purported to show that it  
is  possible  to  believe  contradictions  are  defective.  It  is  now  useful  to  consider  some 
objections to this strong constitutivism and respond to them. I submit that once the main  
objections are discarded the impossibility claim might start to look very plausible. I will  
start by discussing a nice recent paper by Jessica Leech (2015). Leech's focus is on the  
Kantian and Fregean idea that the laws of  logic are in some sense the laws of  thought154. She 
distinguishes155 three  ways  of  understanding  the  idea  that  logical  laws  are  the  laws  of 
thought.  According to strong constitutivism, one can't  reason without respecting them; 
according  to  weak  constitutivism,  one  can  reason  without  respecting  them,  though 
reasoning is what it is in virtue of  the fact that it is evaluated as good or bad depending on 
whether it respects the laws of  logic; according to evaluativism, the laws provide optional 
standards for evaluation of  reasoning. Leech's aim is to defend the idea that the laws of 
thoughts are weakly constitutive. 
Before considering her arguments against the idea that the the laws of  logic can't be 
strongly constitutive for thought, we should be clear on what she means by 'thought', for 
this point is I think responsible for her readiness to reject strong constitutivism. Here is her 
clarification on this point: 
“I have in mind a conception which includes something as minimal as ‘entertaining a proposition’,  
as well as more robust thoughts such as ‘opining that p’, beliefs, propositional knowledge, drawing 
inferences, and so on. The core idea is that some propositional content should be involved. So, for  
example, cases which are not obviously propositional,  e. g., cases of  mental imagery, or trying to 
remember a melody, will count as cases of  thinking in my sense only if  they are accompanied by 
some propositional content. This isn’t  a very demanding condition;  e.  g.,  in trying to imagine a 
scenario, I may often have a description in mind to guide my imagining, which is propositional in 
Moreover, one does not need to rely on induction in order to make the constitutivist claim: one might rely 
on eidetic variation or more generally on methods that would support conceivability claims. 
154See MacFarlane (2002) for a discussion of  Kant and Frege's views. 
155I have chosen different labels from Leech.
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form. If  the reader nevertheless takes this to be too strong a condition, then the present discussion 
should be read as being about laws of  propositional thought. I take it that this is still a sufficiently  
wide-ranging phenomenon to render the laws of  such a phenomenon philosophically interesting”. 
p. 2
The problem, in my opinion, is not, as she says, that her condition for 'thought' might be 
too demanding. Rather, the problem is that it is not restrictive enough in that it groups  
together very different things. It is clear that by 'thought' we might mean many things, and  
we surely might intelligibly refer to a phenomenon as wide as that which consists in playing 
with  propositional  contents,  both  conscious  and  unconscious,  dispositional  and  not, 
experiential and doxastic. So, I have no lexical objection to Leech, that wouldn't be very  
interesting. The point is that if  we carve our mental reality in the way in which she does we 
fail to identify a phenomenon which is unified enough and as a consequence we end up  
missing important differences in the way in which logic can be constitutive or normative 
for our cognition. Here is why. 
First of  all, Leech doesn't clearly distinguish between conscious and unconscious 
thought. My claim about the idea that some basic logical laws are constitutive of  thought is  
confined to conscious thought. I have nothing to say about unconscious thought, if  any. The 
claim here is grounded on phenomenology and confined to phenomenology. By grouping 
together conscious and unconscious thoughts Leech is missing important distinctions, as 
we will see.
Second, and relatedly, my claim is confined to derivative mental acts, as opposed to 
received ones (see Chapter II, for the distinction between derivative and received mental  
phenomena). I am here referring to the activity we engage in when we make commitments 
about how things are. I don't want to claim here (though I think that the claim would be  
correct) that it is impossible to experience, imagine, dream incompatible contents156. All I 
want to claim is that it is impossible to judge contents which are recognised as incompatible 
by the judger.
Third,  and  crucially, Leech  takes  thought  as  including  both  the  mere  act  of 
entertaining a proposition, and also the act of  judging it to be true. But these are two very 
different kinds of  phenomena: the latter is committal, the former is not; the former can be  
formed at will, the latter can't; the latter must stand in the ground relation (one must judge  
that p on the basis of  grounds that speaks in favour of  p), whereas the former can't (I can't 
entertain p on the basis of  grounds that speak in favour of  p, for entertaining that p is not 
156Priest (2006), Chapter 3, argues that it is possible to experience contradictions. 
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to  take  a  commitment  as  to  whether  p  is  true  or  not).  As  we  will  see,  although  her 
objections  to  the  idea  that  logical  laws are  constitutive  for  thought  easily  apply  if  by  
'thought'  we refer to the mere act of  entertaining a proposition,  it  is  far from obvious 
whether they apply if  by thought we mean judgment. I suspect, as we will see, that the  
apparent force of  her objections is based on the ambiguity of  the notion of  'thought' that  
she uses, namely as referring both to acts of  entertaining and acts of  judging. 
Leech objects both to the idea that it is impossible for us to infer invalidly and to 
the idea that it is impossible for us to think contradictions. She particularly focuses on the 
latter  impossibility,  which is  the  one  I  am interested  in  here  (though see  below for  a  
discussion of  the possibility of  inferring invalidly). According to the view that Leech is  
discussing, 
“[a]ny purported instance of  a thought that p&¬p will violate the law [of  non-contradiction], and 
hence should not count as thinking. The implication is that we cannot even entertain propositions 
with such a contradictory content, but we can” (italics is mine).
As a first evidence for this claim she says that we might count on anecdotal or introspective  
evidence.  But notice that the troublesome implication of  the view that she is plausibly 
taking to be false is the fact that we can't  entertain contradictory contents. This is surely 
false, I am not denying it,  and introspective evidence (what else?!)  can prove the point. 
However, it is not clear to me that introspective evidence establishes also the further claim 
(that I am making) that judging contents recognized as contradictory is possible, and indeed 
I take it t establish exactly the contrary. 
She then offers another argument.
“First, we are often able to recognise our logical mistakes, either by ourselves or through the help of 
others, and go on to correct ourselves in a reasonable way. Suppose someone makes a logical error,  
but is corrected. It is plausible to assume that reasonable thinkers are capable of  recognising where 
they went wrong and adjusting their reasoning accordingly. However, if  what one does when one 
makes a logical error isn’t even thought, how is it that one is able to rationally reflect on what one is 
doing,  and relate it  in a suitable way to genuine, logically  correct thoughts,  in order to correct  
mistakes and transform one’s activity into correct inference? I contend that it doesn’t make sense to 
characterize such cases in terms of  two different kinds of  mental activity, thought and something 
else. Rather, this is simply a case of  mistaken thought and inference, followed by corrected thought  
and inference”. 
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We might  read  it  as  some form of  transcendental  argument  which  has  the  following 
structure: first, it starts from a fundamental fact about cognition, namely the fact that we 
can recognize and correct our mistakes157;  then, it argues that in order to be capable of 
correcting our previous mistakes, there should be unity in the nature of  the states that need 
to be corrected and the states that corrects them; finally, it concludes that the states we are 
in when we make logical mistakes should be the same as the states we are in when we 
recognize the mistakes and correct them. Hence strong constitutivism must be false. Let us 
now see with some detail each step of  the argument. 
Let  us  first  see  what  are  the  relevant  facts  about  cognition  from  which  the 
transcendental argument starts.  First,  we are capable of  recognizing that we have made 
mistakes, either by reasoning invalidly, or by judging contradictory contents, or by having 
more incompatible beliefs. Here we should clearly distinguish between two main kinds of 
mistakes (I will first confine myself  to conscious thought, then I will move to dispositional 
belief) that can occur, and a kind of  mistake that, I argue, cannot occur:  
1) having  incompatible  judgments,  where  this  doesn't  require  that  the  single 
judgments have contradictory contents: e.g., I judge that Clarke Kent is in front of  me, and 
I (separately) judge that Superman is not;
2) Inferring invalidly, e.g., when I move from q and if  p then q, to p. 
These are mistakes that can occur at the level of  conscious thought 158. However, at that 
level, it is impossible for one to incur in the two following situations: 
3) having a judgment whose content is contradictory and is recognized as such; 
4) having judgments in contents which are recognized as being incompatible.
One might also think of  other ways in which a mistake can occur. This might occur at the  
sub-personal level, when one (1) has dispositional beliefs in contradictory contents, (2) has 
incompatible beliefs, (3) or makes invalid transitions (apply mutatis mutandis to the case of 
dispositions  to  believe).  But  we might  also think of  “mistakes” that  occur  because  of  
incompatibilities between what we judge and what we believe or have the disposition to 
believe. This occurs, for instance, when I judge that  p,  yet I also have the dispositional 
belief  that  q,  where  q  is  incompatible  with  p;  or  I  judge  that  p,  yet  I  also  have  the 
157See Burge (1996) for another transcendental argument which starts from the very same fundamental fact  
of  cognition, namely our capacity to rationally revise our thoughts, and lead to a conclusion about the  
nature of  self-knowledge and its justification.
158With the possible exception of  some errors of  kind (3), namely invalid inferences. Surely we do make 
invalid inferences, even when our reasoning is conscious and reflexive. But maybe some very basic logical 
mistakes can't be made when we are fully conscious and reflexive. I will tentatively try to defend a view of  
this sort below; Wright (2004b) can also be read a defending a view of  this sort with respect to modus  
ponens. 
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disposition to believe that q, where q is incompatible with p159. 
Now, (1) and (2) are possible mistakes, while (3) and (4) are not, in my view. How is  
it that we recognize  the mistakes we make? One natural way is by having judgments to the 
effect that we have made a mistake. Suppose I judge that there is Clarke Kent in front of  
me and that Superman is not in town. Once I then learn, in a later moment, that they are 
the same person, I might remember what I was judging (it might have been ten second ago, 
as well as one year ago), and judge that I was wrong. By so judging, if  everything goes fine 
sub-consciously, I will then also abandon the contradictory beliefs, if  I had dispositional 
beliefs beside the relevant judgments, and in this way I will have corrected my mistakes.  
This way of  recognizing mistakes applies  mutatis mutandis both to the case in which one 
recognizes  judgment  in  contradictory  contents  and  the  cases  in  which  one  recognises 
incompatible judgments160161. 
Now,  the  question  is  whether  in  order  for  this way  of  recognising  and  correcting  
mistakes to take place we need to deny strong constitutivism. That we need to do so is  
what the second step of  Leech's transcendental argument is supposed to show. In fact,  
Leech doesn't really offer an explicit argument for that step, but implies one by asking the  
following question: 
“if  what one does when one makes a logical error isn’t even  thought, how is it that one is able to 
rationally reflect on what one is doing, and relate it in a suitable way to genuine, logically correct 
thoughts,  in  order  to  correct  mistakes  and  transform one’s  activity  into  correct  inference?” 
159 For these sort of  cases, see Coliva (2016), (ms).
160The case of  the recognition of  fallacious inferences occur pretty much in the same way. I make the 
mistaken inference, I think again about the issue, and I judge that I have made a mistake. By so judging, if 
everything goes smoothly, I revise my conclusion, if  revision is needed; if  it is not needed, I revise my  
grounds for taking it.
161The impression that revision occurs otherwise is due to many metaphors that we unwittingly use when we 
think about our mind. The metaphor of  our cognition as the process of  building and maintaining a house 
(Descartes) or the metaphor of  a ship that has to be maintained (Neurath) naturally suggest a picture of 
revision according to which there is  first  the recognition that there is something wrong in our attitudes, 
and this recognition occurs by actually witnessing the presence of  inconsistent commitment, and second 
that something must be  done  in order to put the house or the ship in good order. But this is not how 
things  actually  go.  The  first  step  is  the  simple  recognition  of  a  new  truth  (plus  eventually  the 
judgment/memory that I judged otherwise), and there is no second step to be made in order to rearrange 
things right. Things got rearranged by the very recognition of  the initial truth – they got rearranged at the  
first step. To accept the truth is to have made the revision, if  we want to talk in that way. There is a sense in 
which there is something else that we can do (according to the repairing ship metaphor). The new truth 
might have deep consequences in our overall picture of  the world. It might lead to profound changes in 
what we believe. In order to generate these changes we should – and this is a natural way of  repairing 
one's own doxastic life – keep thinking about the issue and exploring the consequences. But it will never  
occur in this process that we will  have on the one hand a judgment that  p,  the judgment that this is 
inconsistent with q, and the judgment that q. What we will have is, for instance, the judgment that p and 
the judgment that p is inconsistent with q, plus eventually the memory or the judgment that q was what I 
believed, or what I am inclined to accept, or what I would like to be true, or what I am committed to 
given other things that I accepted, or things of  the sort. 
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(underscores are mine). 
What she seems to have in mind is the fact that for correction to occur some sort of  contact  
or relationship  should take place between the states to be corrected and those that correct 
the mistakes. This is suggested by her talk of  'transformation'. The imagery is powerful and 
suggestive – we imagine new thoughts to actively modify through contact old ones 162. But 
this imagery is out of  place in the case of  conscious cognition – and maybe also in the case 
of  unconscious  ones,  if  the  adjustments  are  meant  to  be  conscious  and  touch  upon 
unconscious dispositional states. In order to correct a previous mistake I don't need to act  
on the mistake; I need to form a  new  judgment  about  the previous mistake. And while I 
form it, the old one is no longer there. Thus, there is no need to think of  some contact  
between correcting thoughts and corrected ones. But then, there is no pressure to think  
that the states to be corrected and those that correct must be of  the same nature. Of 
course, they might, when they respectively occur (so, when I judge that Clark Kent is in  
front of  me but Superman is not, I am having the same mental state that I have at a later  
moment when I judge that Clark Kent and Superman are the very same person); but when 
the judgment about the past mental  acts occurs,  the past  mental  acts need not be still  
existing; and even if  they exist, they might exist as unconscious dispositional states, and 
hence as having a nature that is different from conscious ones. 
This is one part of  the reply. It concedes that logical mistakes of  the sort (1)-(2)  
can be had. This is  compatible with my claim that it  is impossible to judge recognised  
incompatible contents.
Notice,  however,  that  the  claim  that  it  is  impossible  to  judge recognized 
incompatible contents can be understood in two ways. One is that there are states or acts  
that consist in taking some recognized incompatible contents as true, yet these states don't  
qualify as genuine mental states, or something of  the sort; the other is to say that there simply 
aren't  any  acts  or  quasi-acts  or  shmacts  consisting  in  taking  recognized  incompatible 
contents  as  true.  Sometimes  Leech  speaks  as  if  the  former  was  the  view  of  the  
constitutivist. 
“However, the problem with this proposal [my proposal, namely that we correct previous mistakes  
by making judgments about our past contradictions or fallacies] is that it still isn’t clear how the  
thought that the proposition that p&¬p is contradictory could interact appropriately, as part of  a rational 
process, with a  mistaken pseudo-thought that p&¬p, if  the latter is not a  thought, but something 
162See previous footnote.
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else. If  I do something with the content p&¬p, and if  that isn’t a thought, then it isn’t subject to  
the laws of  thought. So what if  I also think that the proposition that p&¬p is contradictory? The  
laws governing my thinking might well require, in the light of  this thought, that I reject any thought  
of  the form p&¬p. But according to the constitutive account, if  I make this kind of  mistake, there 
is no thought to be corrected. I’m left with my mistaken pseudo-thought, and no logical means to 
reject it. It may be that the thought that the proposition that p&¬p is contradictory can interact with my 
mistake in other ways:  for example, there might be a causal  link between this  thought and the 
subsequent loss of  the contradictory pseudo-thought. But anything other than a logical relation 
between thoughts isn’t going to count as a rational, logical process of  correction. It seems plausible  
that we should be able to correct our logical mistakes rationally and logically, not due to other, perhaps 
merely  causal,  processes.  Hence  we  face  the  problem  again,  that  to  account  for  our  rational  
recognition and correction of  logical mistakes, we need to be able to think contradictions” 
As it  is  clear  in  the  quotation,  she  thinks  that  a  strong  constitutivist  will  have  to  be 
committed to the existence of  pseudo-thoughts about incompatible contents. But this is  
not so. I think that she thinks so because she fails to properly distinguish all the ways in 
which we can make mistakes,  and to distinguish the case in  which we make a mistake  
without recognizing it from the case in which we would knowingly make a mistake. So, I 
concur with Leech that cases (1) to (2) are cases of  genuine thought, yet I deny that cases  
like (3) and (4) ever occur in something like pseudo-judgment. All we need in order to  
make sense of  our practice of  recognition and correction of  previous logical mistakes is to 
accept cases (1) and (2) and judgments about previous doxastic deliberation. 
I  have  tried  to  do  my best  to  defend the  claim that  it  is  impossible  to  judge  
recognized incompatible contents. Yet, I admit that the impression that we are capable of  
doing so is very hard to remove. And maybe the impression is right, we can – of  course 
much phenomenological work should be done in that direction163. 
Let us now move to another point which concerns the debate between strong and 
weak forms of  constitutivism about logic, namely the claim that if  logic is not strongly 
constitutivie for cognition, then it is not clear whether a constitutive view of  a weak kind 
can have the resources to respond to a sceptical challenge against logic.
163I have developed the sketchy view about the impossibility of  judging incompatible contents within a 
classical framework. It is interesting to see whether these claims can be reformulated in such a way as to  
make it compatible within other non-classical frameworks. Particularly, it is interesting to see how the 
view formulated here interacts with dialethism. I can grant to the dialethist the possibility of  judging some 
contradictory  contents  when  we  are  dealing  with  special  contents;  all  I  am  saying  is  that  some 
incompatible contents can't be judged at the same time when they are recognized as incompatible. The  
point about uncotenability should be checked on a case by case basis. This is where phenomenological  
work is important. 
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§6.3 Constitutivism about normativity in the face of  a sceptical challenge
As said, constitutivist views about normativity might be either strong or weak. To recall, a  
norm is strongly constitutive for some activity if  for it to be that sort of  activity is for it to 
respect the norm. A norm is weakly constitutive for some activity if  for it to be that sort of 
activity  is  for  it  to  be  evaluated as  correct/incorrect  (or  good/bad,  right/wrong,  …) 
according to that norm. Here are some illustrations of  weak constitutivist views about  
normativity164. 
(1) Weak  constitutivism  about  logical  normativity. Leech  (2005)  offers  a  weak  form  of 
constitutivism about the normativity of  logic, for she argues that our reasonings might fail  
to respect logical laws, yet she insists that it is constitutive of  thought that it is evaluated as 
good or bad depending on whether it respects some basic logical laws. Kant and Frege 
might be read as weak constitutivist about logical laws. 
(2) Weak constitutivism about alethic normativity. Theorists according to which it is correct 
to judge that p (if  and) only if  p is true can be seen as offering a weak constitutive account 
of  the truth-norm, for they do not claim that for something to be a judgment it must be 
true, but rather that for something to be a judgment it must be evaluated as correct if  and 
only if  it is true165.
(3) Weak constitutivism about epistemic normativity. According to this view some epistemic 
norms – like the norm to judge only what we have good grounds to take as true – might be  
weakly constitutive of  cognition in the sense that for something to be a judgment is for it  
to be evaluable as justified/unjustified only if  it is based on good grounds166. 
(4) Weak constitutivism about moral normativity. According to this view, for something to 
qualify as an action at all it must be subject to some moral norm, though it might qualify as 
an action even if  it is a bad or wrong one.
164A weak constitutivism might be confined to a specific kind of  normativity, or might be less specific by 
being about several kinds of  normative dimensions. Also, it might be confined to particular aspects of  the 
mind, or it might have a wider scope and concern more aspects.  Zangwill, N. (2005) endorses a general 
weak constitutivsm about propositional attitudes which provides a nice example of  how one can take 
weak constitutivism about normativity as a fundamental thesis about the nature of  the mind. His view is  
that “it is essential to a [propositional attitude] to occupy a node in a network of  rational relations with 
respect to other [propositional attitudes]. Normative Essentialism can be stated even more concisely in 
only five words. It is the thesis that propositional attitudes have rational essences”. p. 3 These normative 
properties are properties like the following: having that [propositional attitude] is such that you ought to 
have that other propositional attitude (or you ought to refrain from having this other PA), and so forth.  
As the arguments in the main texts are meant to show, if  such form of  Normative Essentialism is not 
grounded on phenomenology, then it is explanatory wanting.
165In Chapter IX I will defend a weak constitutivism about the truth-norm, but I will ground it on a strong  
constitutivism according to which it is strongly constitutive of  cognition that it aims at truth.
166In Chapter XI I will defend a weak constitutivism about some epistemic norms.
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As I see it, there are two main challenges for weak constitutivism. The first is conditional 
upon the fact that one wants to rely on weak constitutivism in order to respond to a sceptic  
who  challenges  the  corresponding  normative  realm.  The  problem  is  that  weak 
constitutivism has not enough resources to reply in a non-question begging manner to the 
sceptic.  Thus,  this  first  problem doesn't  target  the  truth  of  the  view,  but  only  its  anti-
sceptical aspirations. The second problem is more serious (and it is not conditional upon 
an arguably unnecessary desire to respond to a sceptic) and purports to show that weak  
constitutivism has no resources to explain  why the putative weakly constitutive norms are 
indeed constitutive of  cognition. In other words, the problem here is that since we lack an 
explanation why some norms are weakly constitutive of  some activity, we lack the grounds 
to take the weak constitutivist claim as true. In order to provide an explanation it must rely  
on phenomenology, or so I will argue.
Let  us  start  with  the  first  problem.  Since  it  is  not  strongly  constitutive  of  the 
activity  that  it  follows  the  relevant  rules,  sometimes  the  activity  does  respect  them, 
sometimes it doesn't167. If  this is so, then the sceptic attacks as follows: why is reasoning 
that respects norm N the right one, and not the other reasoning which doesn't respect it?
The constitutivist who aims to take seriously the sceptic needs to provide an answer  
which doesn't  beg  the  question  against  the  sceptic.  Obviously,  it  won't  do  to  say  that  
respecting norm N is constitutive of  rational reasoning, because whether respecting N is to 
be rational is precisely what is at stake in the confrontation with the sceptical challenge.
Now, here is how a constitutivist might try to answer this challenge. My aim, the 
weak constitutivist says, is to silence the sceptic. To silence him, all I need to show is that her 
challenge is self-defeating. And this much I can achieve whenever  the sceptical challenge is 
raised in a way that respect norm N. If  the challenge is purporting to show that respecting  
N is not rational, yet it relies on it, then the challenge is self-defeated. 
This reply is fine. But the problem is that the constitutivist strategy so far has just 
provided what we might call  a  temporary  response to a sceptical challenge as to whether 
respecting N is  rational.  For,  the  constitutivist  reply  so far  consists  in  considering the 
various sceptical challenges that are actually produced against N, and see whether they rely 
on N or not. If  they do, then they are not problematic, because they are self-defeating.  
167I assume, for the argument's sake that at least sometimes the relevant norms are respected (after all, if  they 
are never respected the very weakly constitutive claim that being evaluated according to that norm is 
constitutive of  the relevant activity looses much ground). If  this assumption is wrong, however, then the 
sceptical attack is even more powerful.  The skeptical attacks remains alive even if  the activity almost  
always respect the relevant norm. It is enough if  it fails to respect it at least sometimes. 
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Since so far they all do respect N, there is no actual challenge really. The problem with such 
a  temporary  strategy  is  that  it  leaves  open  the  possibility  of  a  challenge  that  has  the 
following features: it concludes that N is not rational, and it does so by following other  
norms. Suppose that it is indeed possible to construct a challenge of  this sort (more on this  
possibility below), that is a challenge that concludes against N without respecting it, that is, 
by following other norms. Then it is unclear whether the weak constitutivist could have any 
resources to answer the sceptic. For, ex hypothesis, we can both reason according to N and 
reason according to other norms that are incompatible with N (they deliver incompatible 
verdicts). But then, if  the reply is made by relying on N-reasoning, it is question-begging.  
If,  however,  the  reply  is  made  by  relying  on non-N-reasoning,  then  the  reply  is  self-
defeating for the constitutivist, for it seems that by so non-N-reasoning she is committing 
herself  to the claim that reasoning according to non-N is rational, but the constitutivist 
view is that only reasoning according to N is rational. 
To illustrate, suppose that we are dealing with a rule of  inference S that licenses the 
following transitions:
p,
if  q, then p, 
therefore, q
where q is the sceptical claim. Here one is using a rule of  inference that the constitutivist 
wants to claim to be invalid. But if  the weak constitutivist says that it is possible to so 
reason, then she has no non-question begging resources to argue against that. 
One possible reply for the constitutivist would be to use the very rule used by the 
sceptic  in  order  to  show  that  scepticism  is  itself  inconsistent.  On  this  ground,  the 
constitutivist would have shown that our resources are such that they show that it is better  
to reason according to N rather than according to S (the sceptical rule). Maybe this can be 
done. Suppose that the strategy works. Still  it relies on the validity of  the law of  non-
contradiction. How is this law vindicated? Again, either temporarily by means of  a self-
refutational move, if  the sceptical challenge under consideration happens to be accepting 
the  law of  non-contradiction.  But  then,  if  there  is  a  sceptic  who  purports  to  raise  a  
challenge that doesn't use it, the constitutivist will have two options: either to be a weak  
constitutivist about the law of  non-contradiction itself, but in that case the same problem 
of  question-beggingness reappears with respect to that very law; or it might appeal to a 
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strong form of  constitutivism about the law of  non-contradiction and on that ground 
claim that the sceptic is not really raising a challenge but only pretending to do so; but in 
that case we would have abandoned a global weak constitutivism, and this much would 
prove my contention that we need strong constitutivism (at least a strong constitutivism 
about some logical norms) in order to silence the sceptic.
Another option is to say that of  course when we reflect on S we realise that it can't  
be valid. But again, how so? By argument, it is circular168. It should be by some sort of 
direct  intuition or understanding169.  This  might  be  correct,  but  then the sceptic is  not 
silenced by relying on weak constitutivism; it  is  silenced by relying on an independent  
epistemological story as to how we know the validity of  some rule.
There  is  another  attempt  for  the  weak  strategy.  It  is  to  appeal  to  a  difference 
between reflexive and irreflexive reasoning.  Reflexive reasoning is  roughly the one that  
occurs when the subject engages in doxastic deliberation, whereas irreflexive reasoning is 
one  that  roughly  occurs  when  the  subject  doesn't  focus  her  attention  to  doxastic 
deliberation  itself.  The  idea  is  that  even  though  N  is  strongly constitutive  of  reflexive 
reasoning, it is merely  weakly constitutive for  irreflexive reasoning. Then it is claimed that 
when the sceptical challenges are raised relying on rules like S, we can't reason through the  
argument if we are reflexive, for reflexive reasoning always respect N170, though we can if 
we are irreflexive. Then one adds that being reflective is the truth-conducive reliable mode 
of  reasoning,  whereas  being  irreflexive  is  not  the  reliable  one.  Thus,  the  sceptic  is 
disarmed. 
For one thing, this move doesn't really preserve weak constitutivism. It might be 
said to be a weak constitutivist theory because it says that reasoning in general (be that  
reflexive or irreflexive) can occur without respecting R, yet the price for so saying is that  
one has made a strong metaphysical distinction between reflexive and irreflexive reasoning.  
And with  respect  to the  former strong constitutivism is  true.  Thus,  despite  superficial 
reasons of  labelling, the resulting view is indeed a form of  strong constitutivism, though it  
makes room for irreflexive non-N-respecting reasoning. 
But there is another major problem for this view: namely how to distinguish in a  
non-question begging way between reflexive and irreflexive reasoning. One can't appeal to 
the  fact  that  reflexive  reasoning  is  rational,  whereas  irreflexive  is  (at  least  sometimes) 
168This point has been stressed and discussed several times in the literature on the epistemology of  basic  
laws of  inference. See, for instance, Boghossian (2003) and Wright (2004b). 
169See  Boghossian  (2003b)  and  Wright  (2007)  against  the  possibility  of  knowing  through intuition  the 
validity of  basic law of  inference.
170Wright (2004b) can be read as defending a strong constitutivism of  this sort when he claims that modus 
ponens is a presupposition of  any cognitive project that involves reasoning.
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irrational. One should appeal to something else.
One proposal, which I think has much to recommend to it and which I will adopt,  
is to distinguish reflexive and irreflexive reasoning on phenomenological grounds. Given that 
the phenomenological considerations are not obviously question-begging (since they are 
not normative considerations but merely descriptive ones), one can then appeal to them in 
order to distinguish between reflexive and irreflexive reasoning. 
The problem, as we will see in the Chapters on alethic and epistemic constitutivism, 
is that the benefit of  having a non-question begging distinction on the basis of  merely  
descriptive  considerations  is  counterbalanced  by  the  fact  that  merely  descriptive 
considerations  don't  seem  to  carry  normative  implications:  even  if  one  concedes  the 
difference between reflexive and irreflexive reasoning, and even if  one concedes that some 
rules  are  strongly  constitutive  of  the  former,  but  not  of  the  latter,  why thinking that 
reflexive reasoning is reliable and irreflexive one is not? Here much work should be done in  
order to make the point in a non-question begging way. But here is how the answer might 
go. It is true that we can reason in ways that fail to respect N. And it is just because we know 
that we can so reason that we then have the capacity to make intelligible to ourselves the 
sceptical challenge. But, and this is the crucial bit, when we make intelligible to ourselves  
the sceptical challenge we are reasoning in a reflexive manner and as such we are respecting 
N.  N  is  thus  strongly  constitutive  whenever  we  raise  the  challenge  because  raising  a 
challenge  is  to  engage  in  reflexive  reasoning.  More  generally,  whenever  we  seriously 
evaluate the pros and cons of  a view, we can't but reason reflexively. Hence, in a sense,  
reflexive reason is the locus where  I  make  my doxastic decisions.  It is  the locus whose 
verdicts have authority for me. In a sense, what I think irreflexively it is not my thinking, 
and its verdicts are not mine, they are not endorsed by me, thought they can influence me, 
and also influence my future endorsements. The legislation of  reflexive reasoning trumps 
that of  irreflexive reasoning – or,  more aptly,  reflexive reasoning is  legislative,  whereas 
irreflexive  reasoning is  not.  Consider  this parallel  with desires.  Irreflexively,  I  might be 
animated by all sorts of  desires that push me in all sorts of  directions. But desires becomes  
mine when  they  are  endorsed  or  authorised.  The  reflexive  rejection  of  a  desire  might 
confront itself  with the recalcitrant presence of  the desire which keeps determining the 
psychic life of  the individual despite its opposition to it. Yet, it is at the level of  conscious  
reflection that the desire can be endorsed or rejected and thus can become the subject's  
desire,  rather  than  a  force  that  she  passively  undergo.  The  same  goes  for  irreflexive 
reasonings that culminate in judgment. I might form all sort of  judgments irreflexively, but 
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when I want to check my beliefs I do so reflexively, and relfection is the locus where I can 
endorse judgments as mine. 
The most important point here is that there is an asymmetry in authority between 
reflexive and irreflexive cognition. The sort of  source of  judgment that I authorise is the 
one that is conducted reflexively. This can be appreciated by noticing that whereas it makes  
sense that we try to authorise previously irrelfexively formed opinions by engaging in more 
conscious  reflexive  doxastic  deliberation,  it  does  not make  sense  to  say  that  irreflexive 
reasoning is used by us to authorise the verdicts we reach through reflexive cognition. 
Reflexive cognition is the locus where  I  can be persuaded of  a given proposal as to how 
things  are.  Hence,  if  a  strong  constitutivism  about  normativity  is  true  for  reflexive 
cognition, then the sceptic is answered. Even if  the sceptic (who can be me) might raise his 
challenge by reasoning irreflexively, she can't raise it in a way that is not self-defeating when 
she is reasoning in a reflexive manner
To  sum  up,  weak  constitutivism  alone  doesn't  seem  to  have  the  resources  to 
respond to sceptical challenges. Only a strong form of  constitutivism seems to possess 
anti-sceptical resources, even though this doesn't mean that it can easily be shown how a 
strong constitutivist can defend a credible anti-sceptical story. But there is a price to be 
paid:  being  strong  constitutivist  about  logic  seems  to  run  afoul  of  the  fact  that  we 
sometimes  reason  illogically  and  irrationally.  A  strong  constitutivist  has  the  burden to 
individuate a suitably confined activity which does issue only correct performances. Thus, 
if  we like, we might see the discussion conducted so far as showing that there is a challenge 
that takes the form of  a dilemma for those who want to ground normativity in what is  
constitutive of  some practice or activity: on the one hand, if  one wants to make room for 
mistaken moves in the activity, one will loose anti-sceptical weapons; on the other hand, if  
one wants to have anti sceptical weapons, one must shrink the border of  the activity in 
such a fashion as to find a core which doesn't issue mistaken moves, yet it is difficult to  
find such a core, and the risk is that it will turn out to be so minimal that its powerful anti-
sceptical  weapons can  only  defeat  very  few forms of  scepticism,  leaving much of  the 
normative  realm to be without  a  vindication  against  the  sceptic.  As  we  will  see  when 
discussing constitutivism about alethic and epistemic normativity, this is indeed the case: 
many sceptical attacks on the idea that truth and certainty are valuable or normative for us 
will  remain wide open.  But this  is  as  it  should be,  I  will  argue,  and anyway the  most  
significant sceptical attack will turn out to be satisfactorily responded to. 
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§6.4 Explanatory problem for weak constitutivism 
The explanatory problem goes as follows. Weak constitutivism claims that it is constitutive 
of  a given activity that it is evaluated with norm N. But why is it so? Why is it that a given 
activity is to be evaluated with norm in N in order to be that activity? If  it is because of  our 
conceptual scheme, then there is an apparently unbridgeable gap between how we think of  
the normativity of  some activity, and whether it is really weakly constitutive of  that activity  
to  be  evaluated  accordingly.  The  only  option  to  bridge  the  gap  is  to  appeal  to  
phenomenology. But then, what does the fact that our phenomenology is as it happens to 
be explain? If  it is because of  our conceptual scheme, then the previous gap is re-opened 
again. If  it is not, then it is unclear how we should think of  phenomenology. To put the 
problem in other terms: if  we think of  reality along with naturalistic lines – that is, lines 
which understands the current phenomenology as  being the effect  of  some genealogy 
captured by available scientific explanations – then we can't explain why some norms are 
weakly  constitutive  of  the  phenomenology;  but  if  we  want  to  think  otherwise  of  
phenomenology, then we don't really know how to think of  it – we feel that the alternative  
to a naturalistic picture would be too mysterious. 
Let us first consider an activity which has been created by us: chess. Arguably, the 
reason why it  is constitutive of  certain moves made in a certain contexts that they are 
evaluated as correct or not according to the norms of  chess is that we have so decided171. 
We have created a practice and rules governing it.  If  one looks at the sum of  physical 
movements that all chess players have ever made while playing what we call chess, there is 
nothing in the physical movements themselves that make them constitutively evaluable in 
terms of  the norms of  chess. Thus, this is a case in which the source of  the normativity is 
external from the nature of  the very activity whose workings are constitutively evaluated in  
terms of  some norms. 
Suppose that this anti-realist model for weak constitutive normativity is applied to 
some  candidate  constitutive  norms  for  cognition.  This  model  has  the  advantage  of  
providing a clear explanation, that is an explanation whose details and workings are easy to  
grasp and understand. Thus, to illustrate, a creationist of  this sort about the normativity of 
logic for cognition might say that a given transition is logically correct only if  it follows rule  
N because we have so decided, and we all understand what it means to so decide. Or, one 
171Let us put on a side the controversial question whether the normativity of  rules of  chess is strongly or 
weakly constitutive of  it, and let us assume for the sake of  argument that it is merely weakly constitutive; 
nothing hinge on that. 
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might apply the idea to the truth-norm by saying that it is weakly constitutive of  judgment 
because we have decided that  it  must be so.  These creationist  views about logical  and 
alethic normativity rightly strike us as utterly implausible. Surely, no one ever decided that 
these norms are the  right  ones;  also,  what  we want  to capture  when we think of  the 
normativity of  these realms in constitutive terms is that the relevant normativity is there  
anyway,  that  is  regardless  of  what we decide  about  these realms.  Thus,  if  we were to 
choose that a judgment that p is correct only if  it makes us happy, we would readily find 
this decision as having no bearing at all on the nature of  judgment itself  – the decision 
won't make it constitutive of  judgment that it has to be evaluated according to its effects 
on our sentiment. Yet, in some normative realms this kind of  creationist model might be  
the right one: this might plausibly be the field of  social reality172, where our decisions have 
the power to create the relevant activities for which it is constitutive to be evaluated by the 
norms we have decided. When such creationist versions of  onstitutivism are true, it seems  
that the relevant activity must be in some sense created along with the creation of  the 
relevant web of  weakly constitutive norms173. 
Being  a  creationist  is  not  the  only  way  of  being  an  anti-realist  about  a  given 
normative realm. The real enemy to a constitutivist view grounded on phenomenology is in  
fact this subtle form of  anti-realism which doesn't go as far as claiming that the relevant 
normativity is there because of  our decision and creations, but claims that it depends on our 
representational  means  anyway.  According  to  this  mild  anti-realism  –  I  will  call  it  
conceptualism – the norms that constitutively govern our cognition are there because of  the 
conceptual resources that we happen to have. Let me illustrate the view by using a couple  
of  examples for the alethic, the epistemic, and the logical domain. 
In the alethic domain we have, as an example, a quite popular conception of  alethic 
normativity (see Shah (2003) and Shah & Velleman (2005)) which we are going to discuss 
172See Searle (1995) and (2010) for an account of  the way in which normativity in these realms is created.  
See Searle (1969), section 2.5, and Rawls (1955), section 3 for an introduction of  the idea of  constitutive 
norm  or  rule  (as  contrasted  with,  respectively,  regulative  rules  and  maximes  or  rules  of  thumbs).  
Interestingly, both Searle and Rawls use the case of  games in order to illustrate the notion of  constitutive 
norms. The reason is that it is easy to think of  constitutive norms of  some activity when they also at least  
partially  create that activity; when the activity is there regardless of  our creation of  the relevant norms  
governing it, it is harder to make even sense of  the idea of  some norm being constitutive of  that activity.  
That is exactly the problem for constitutivist theories of  normativity of  the mind that I am trying to 
highlight right now. 
173What  has to be created is  not the  brute  reality,  as Searle,  following Anscombe,  might put it,  like the 
physical movements that are made when people play at chess. What is created is their being chess moves, and 
it is created along with the creation of  the relevant norms. Again, if  you disagree with the examples, this  
won't matter; what matters is the structural point. So, strictly speaking, we should distinguish between two 
sorts  of  creation:  creation  of  something from some raw material;  and creation  as  counting-as,  that  is 
creation  as  imposition of  some new status,  qualification,  or  role  to  something that  is  already  there.  
Compare also with Haugelang's insightful discussion in his 'Truth and Rule-Following',  in Haugeland 
(1998), particularly his discussion of  constitutive rules.
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in great detail in Chapter IX. According to this view, it is true that we should judge only 
what is true because our concept of  truth is such as to embed the presupposition that truth is 
weakly normative for judgment. 
In the logical domain the view will be that it is constitutive of  our reasoning to be 
evaluated as correct or not if  it complies with, say, modus ponens, because our concept of 
if...then... is such as to embed the presupposition that transitions are correct only if  they 
respect modus ponens.  Boghossian (2003b), for instance,  can be read as defending this 
version of  conceptualism174. 
In the epistemic domain the view will  be strictly analogous with the one in the 
alethic domain, and it will be something to the effect that our concept of  judgment and/or  
of  justification are such as to embed the presupposition that a judgment is correct only if  it  
is  suitably  justified.  Since  most  people  in  the  theory  of  justification  believes  that 
justification is not a natural kind, and actually believe that what we are discovering is the 
right conceptual analysis of  the concept of  justification, most contemporary theories can be 
read  as  belonging  to  this  conceptualist  view,  at  least  to  the  extent  that  they  take  the  
discoveries about the concept of  justification to have a bearing on what is constitutive of 
judgment itself.
Now, this kind of  conceptualist view – which I take to be quite widespread, though 
it  is  hard to find people explicitly  endorsing it  in  these  terms  and in the  context of  the 
discussion of  a source for constitutivity claims about norms of  the mind – has at least  
three problems. The first problem, which is connected with the explanatory step of  the 
constitutivist  strategy,  is  that  by  making  normativity  dependent  upon  our  conceptual  
resources,  it  makes  the  relevant  normative  realms  contingent.  We  might  have  had  other 
concepts,  (that  is,  different  concepts  of  judgment,  different  concepts  for  connectives, 
different concepts of  truth, and different epistemic concepts). The sort of  picture we have 
of  concept-possession is such that they could have easily been otherwise175. According to 
174To be more precise, his claim is that inferring according to modus ponens is justified because the ability to 
so reason is constitutive of  our understanding of  the concept  if...then....  However,  since according to 
Boghossian's theory an unwillingness to reason according to modus ponens is  an indication that  the  
subject doesn't possess the relevant concept, a willingness to reason according to modus ponens is in turn  
to be explained by reference to the possession of  the relevant concepts, and thus one might understand 
the view as implying that modus ponens is in some way normative for thought.
175The point holds regardless of  how stance on the innateness of  our concepts. Suppose that a constitutivist  
wants to claim that some of  the concepts that we possess and that ground the relevant normativity are in  
fact innate. Maybe this is true, but this doesn't make them any less contingent in the sense that we might 
have been equipped with different sets of  innate concepts. 
Nor is the point avoided if  one thinks of  concepts along with more realistic Fregean lines. The point 
about the contingency of  our conceptual resources is of  course easier to appreciate if  one thinks of  them 
as psychological capacities. But even if  one thinks of  concepts as something to which we have an access,  
the point can be recast in terms of  the contingency of  our capacity to access that we happen to possess. 
Given the picture of  the mind that we have when we think in naturalistic terms, it is entirely contingent  
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this mild form of  anti-realism there is no obvious reason why we couldn't ended up having 
other concepts than those we actually have and as a result have different weak constitutive 
norms, or no norms at all. Yet, this point is in tension with the fact that we want to say that  
even if  we had different concepts, the relevant norms would have been true all the same.  
Thus, even if  we had a concept of  judgment (or, if  you prefer, of  shmjudgment) such that  
it is correct to judge that  p only if  so judging makes the judger happy, we would still say 
that this will be a wrong concept(ion) that fails to capture the real normativity of  cognition. 
Similarly, if  we had concepts that made it primitively compelling transitions of  the form S 
(p, q then p, hence q), then we would like to say that these concepts are the wrong ones to 
have. Analogously, in the epistemic case, if  we had a concept of  judgment that makes it  
accountable to prudential considerations, we would have different concepts of  justification 
that are not connected with the aim of  believing truly, and as a result that give rise to 
norms that are not recognisable as correct from our present perspective. The general point  
is that the norms in question are not such that we can make sense to a relativistic view of  
the sort that is made possible by explaining their weak constitutivity by reference to our  
conceptual scheme. 
The second problem is a related one. If  these norms depend on concepts, and if  
our concepts might change or might have been different, then it is no longer clear in which  
sense these norms are weakly constitutive of  cognition. For, unless there is some suitable 
link between the concepts that we have and the kind of  phenomenology that we have,  
then, since the relevant normativity is built in our concepts, it is only according to our own 
conceptual scheme that our cognition has to be governed by certain norms, but cognition  
itself  might be otherwise than our conceptual scheme supposes it to be. That our cognition  
is to be evaluated according to a given norm is simply a piece of  our overall representation 
of  the way things are, not of  the way things really are. It is not that for something to be the 
sort of  thing that it is – the phenomenon of  judgment, or of  reasoning – it has to be 
evaluated by norm N; rather it is for our concept of  that something that in order to be counted as 
that thing instead of  some other thing it has to be evaluated by norm N. To bridge this gap 
the conceptualist will have to make some link between our concepts and phenomenology, 
or rather going creationist about the relevant activity – cognition – but cognition is not the 
the fact that we have an access to some concepts instead of  others.
Of  course, the conceptualist will add that even though it is contingent that we possess the concepts that  
we possess (or that we have access to these concepts instead of  other concepts), the contingency is a 
lucky one: for, as it happens, there is an harmony between our psychological resources and the truth (the 
right concepts that allow us to conceptualise the reality as it really is). This is exactly the article of  faith 
that a transcendentalist who is moved by critical concerns ('critical' in the Kantian sense) is reluctant to 
accept. 
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sort of  thing, like the game of  chess or any other social activity, that can be thought of 
according to these strong anti-realistic creationist lines. Cognition is there independently of 
how we think of  it; and how we think of  it is itself  a move within cognition, hence it is  
impossible to think of  the relevant act of  creation about cognition, for to be created it 
would  to  have  been  there  already.  What  is  conceivable,  however,  is  the  fact  that  as  
cognition evolves and we form opinions about it  (or as a conceptual scheme involving 
cognition itself  evolves), the interplay between cognition and the conceptual scheme leads  
to a change of  the former in the light of  the presuppositions that come to be embedded in 
the  latter.  This  picture  will  make  a  link  between  our  conceptual  scheme  and  the 
phenomenology, but there is a price to be paid, as we will see.
A  third  related  problem  is  that  these  conceptualist  views  don't  have  obvious 
resources to explain  why  the concepts that we now happen to possess are the  right ones. 
These views are indeed committed to take the concepts that we now possess as the right 
ones,  otherwise  we  would  loose  grip  of  the  idea  that  the  relevant  norms  are  weakly  
constitutive of  cognition itself, instead of  cognition as it is represented by our conceptual scheme. 
To explain this rightness, they can either appeal to the phenomenology of  cognition, or 
not. If  they don't, then it is unclear why these must be the right concepts. If  these concepts  
are  meant  to  be  the  source  of  norms  the  subjugation  under  which  is  constitutive  of  
judgment (individuated phenomenologically), then there must be some link between these 
concepts  and  the  relevant  phenomenology.  Otherwise  the  constitutive  claim  that  is 
embedded in our conceptual scheme can be arbitrary – it might be a false constitutive claim.
This moves us to consider the prospects of  an appeal to phenomenology in order 
to explain why the concepts that  we happen to possess are the right  ones.  One fairly  
natural move is to say that the reason why these norms (and the corresponding concepts) 
are the right ones is that the phenomenology itself  is such as to ground the relevant weakly  
constitutive norms. To put it in other terms, the source of  the normativity is not external to 
the activity of  which the norms is meant to be constitutive; rather, the source is internal to  
the activity itself, and since the activity is individuated phenomenologically, the source is 
exhibited in the phenomenology itself. Somehow, it can be evinced from the very structural 
features  of  the  phenomenology  of  cognition  that  the  relevant  norms  are  weakly 
constitutive of  it. But then, if  this is so, there is no longer a need to appeal to our concepts 
in order to explain the application of  the norms. If  the phenomenology by itself  explains  
why it is correct to regard some norms as weakly constitutive of  it, then we don't need to  
appeal to our conceptual scheme (and to the presuppositions build therein) in order to 
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explain why the relevant norms apply. Or at least we don't need to invoke our conceptual  
scheme if  we take a view of  the phenomenology of  cognition such that it is independent 
from our conceptual scheme – the relevant structural features of  cognition are as they are 
regardless  of  what  we  think  of  cognition  and what  our  conceptual  scheme implicitly 
presupposes about it. This is the outline of  a view which grounds the normativity in the 
phenomenology of  cognition – and that is the kind of  view which I defend throughout  
this work.
Another option – which is a variation of  a phenomenologically-based explanation 
of  why some weak norm is constitutive of  cognition – is  of  course to claim that  the  
concepts that we possess actually constitute, at least partly, the very phenomenology that 
we happen to possess, and that the phenomenology is such as to make it correct to explain  
why the  relevant norms apply.  This  view has the problem that,  again,  it  doesn't  really 
explain why the concepts we actually possess are the right ones. Since they might have been 
different, we might have had, ex hypothesis,  a different phenomenology,  which in turn 
would have had different (weakly or strongly) constitutive normative profile, or a complete 
lack of  it. But then the question about the rightness of  the present conceptual scheme is 
not answered, it is still there: why thinking that this is the right phenomenology to have, 
instead of  some different one, given that it depends on a conceptual scheme that might  
have been different? Why preferring a phenomenology (and its corresponding conceptual 
scheme) that makes it normative for us to judge only on the basis of  alethic considerations 
instead  of  prudential  ones,  say?  Why  preferring  a  phenomenology  (and  a  conceptual 
scheme) that makes it correct to say that our reasoning is to be evaluated as correct or not  
depending  on  whether  it  respects  modus  ponens  instead  of,  say,  any  of  the  rule  of  
inference that we now firmly regard as invalid? 
Beside this problem, there is an even more troublesome consequence for such a 
view: it fails to explain how we can give credit to the result of  our inquiry. If  the norms 
that  guide the inquiry are  explained by the phenomenology,  which in turn is  partially 
explained by the concepts we happen to possess, then we also are in a position to judge  
that were we to have different concepts we would have had a different phenomenology and  
a different set of  weakly constitutive norms. If  that were the case, we would be playing a  
very different game. But then, which game is the best one in order to discover how things  
are?  Since  the  relevant  norms  under  considerations  are  all  connected  with  a  true 
representation of  the way things are (logical, alethic, and epistemic norms), the idea that  
they could have been different had our conceptual scheme been different puts pressure on 
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the idea that the norms that we are actually bound to try to respect are the right ones to  
have in order to have a true representation of  how things are. But if  this is so, then by  
being a conceptualist one is occupying a self-defeating standpoint: by judging according to 
the conceptualist lines, one is at the same time taking cognition as delivering the truth (in 
that case, the truth about cognition itself!) but one is also taking cognition as the result of  a  
contingent process, which might have been otherwise, and such that had it been otherwise 
it would have possibly delivered a cognition which would have led us to give credit to other 
propositions.
To sum up, I have argued that only a view which appeals to phenomenology can 
make sense of  the idea that some norms are weakly constitutive of  cognition. Then, we 
have seen that there are two views about phenomenology: one which makes it independent  
from our conceptual scheme (and rather makes the latter dependent on the former – that 
is, it takes the realist horn of  the Euthypro contrast), the other which makes it dependent, 
at least partially176, on our conceptual scheme (that is, it takes the anti-realist horn of  the 
Euthypro contrast)177. I have pointed to a couple of  problems that arguably beset the latter  
view. But much more must to be said about it. (I will come back to this view in the last  
Chapter, where we touch the opposition between a naturalistic understanding of  the mind 
and a transcendentalist one).
Now,  in  order  to  move  further,  we  should  ask  how  we  can  ground  a  weakly 
constitutive claim on phenomenology. We must somehow try to show that it is built in the 
very phenomenology of  cognition the fact that only a given norm N or set thereof  (and 
not other norms) is the one subjugation under which is constitutive for cognition. Now, 
one way of  doing so is to show that it is always true that our cognition respects norm N.  
But this, besides its own problems (we will see them below), would make one wonders why 
preferring weak constitutivism to strong constitutivism. One can be a strong constitutivist 
if  cognition always respects N – this is the strong constitutivist claim – and on this basis 
one can further endorse weak constitutivism. If  this should not be the move, something 
else must be found in the very phenomenology that justifies the weak constitutive claim. 
What can it be? I will answer to this question in §6.6 and §6.7, relying on the previous work 
on the normative profile of  judgment and questioning. Before moving to that, we should 
176That is, it doesn't make phenomenology so much dependent on our conceptual scheme as falling into an  
implausible  view  according  to  which  our  conceptual  scheme  creates not  only  the  relevant  weakly 
constitutive norms but also cognition itself.
177See Wright (1992) for a use of  the Euthypro contrast in the context of  an articulation of  the opposition 
between realism and anti-realism for a given area of  thought. It is particularly interesting to see how the 
contrast applies when the relevant 'reality' to be put in the contrast is that which is typically taken as 
contrasting reality, namely experience itself. 
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tackle another important explanatory problem which concerns strong constitutivism, and 
to connect the problem with the importance of  phenomenology. 
§6.5 Explanatory problem for strong constitutivism
 
If  we are lucky enough, some of  the norms we think are true are such that we already can't 
but follow them. The question now is how to make sense of  the idea that the fact that our  
cognition  behaves  in  a  given  way  might  be  legitimately  conceptualised  as  being  a 
normatively guided behaviour, instead of  a simple regularity of  nature.
To see the problem, take any candidate law of  nature. From the fact that, say, when 
a ball is hit in such-and-such conditions it always follows a certain behaviour (it moves in  
such-and-such a fashion), it doesn't follow that the ball is respecting a norm (move in such-
and-such a fashion!). Now, suppose that our cognition, when it works reflexively enough, 
happens to always follow a given rule of  inference like modus ponens – we know that this  
is hardly true, but let us suppose it is for the argument's sake. What is it that bridges the 
gap between this descriptive  fact  and the further  claim that  there  is  a  norm – 'reason 
according to modus ponens!'  – which our cognition is respecting? Here it  won't  do to  
appeal to any intention of  the agent to so reason, for here the thought that we want to 
capture is that cognition is respecting a norm whatever we think of  it, whether we intend  
to respect it or not. What can we say to bridge the gap? 
Let us take another case, which is going to be our focus in Chapter IX and XI.  
Exclusivity is the phenomenon according to which judgments are formed always and only  
on the basis of  considerations that speak in favour of  the truth of  the judged proposition. 
The corresponding norm is  that  one  should form a  judgment  on the  basis  of  alethic 
grounds only. How is the gap bridged here? 
A first condition that we must respect if  we want to bridge these gaps is to find the 
relevant ingredient that motivates the transition from the regularity  to the norm at the 
phenomenological  level.  This  is  exactly  the  same  requirement  for  a  satisfactory 
phenomenological grounding of  constitutive normativity for cognition that we found in 
the case of  weak constitutive norms: somehow, it must be evinced from phenomenology 
itself  that  there  is  some norm which  cognition  is  respecting.  This  is  not  going to  be 
evinced from the presence of  some intention to respect it; rather, the normativity should 
emerge from the very structure of  the act of  intending, if  we are talking about constitutive 
norms of  intentions. Nor is the normativity going to be captured by our judging that we 
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should respect some norm, for again we want to capture the idea that the normativity is 
there anyway, regardless of  what we think about cognition. So, to make the point with 
respect  to  the  case  of  judgment,  the  normativity  should  somehow  emerge  from  the 
structure of  the act of  judging itself. The proposal should therefore have the following 
form:  somehow,  from  the  very  perspective  of  the  cognitive  agent,  there  must  be  a  
sensibility to the fact that cognition proceeds as it should (strong constitutive normativity) or 
should  proceed  as  it  should  (weak  constitutive  normativity).  This  sensitivity  should  be 
transparent in the very phenomenology, as it were. To anticipate, one tentative way to go is 
to claim that when we cognize we have experiences of  rational necessitation or normative 
pressure which are either accompanied by actual compliance with the relevant norm (when 
the norm is strongly constitutive) or that pushes us towards making some moves in the  
game of  truth even if  we can fail to make them (when the norm is weakly constitutive).
Even if  we are persuaded that something like this account is correct, there are still  
many questions that are left unanswered. One might think that even if  there are these  
experiences  of  normative  pressure,  still  all  that  has  been  given  to  us  is  only  a  richer 
descriptive account of  the committal nature of  cognition. But from the fact that there is this 
experience  of  normative  pressure  nothing  obviously  follows  as  to  whether  there  is  a 
corresponding  norm to  the  effect  that  one  should  reason according  to  the  way  these 
pressures comprehendingly incline us to. It is important to appreciate that this is a further  
challenge, and it is  different from the one to explain how mere regularities can count as 
respecting a norm.  This  would be answered by providing a dimension of  intelligibility 
internal to the phenomenology of  cognition that explains why it makes sense to think of  
the railways along which cognition proceeds as being candidate for having a normative 
status. But it is a further question whether this much is enough to show that there really is a 
genuine norm to the effect that one should reason in a certain way, and not just the internal  
pressure to proceed according to a norm. This further problem will be dealt with in the 
chapters on constitutivism, in which we will discuss the charge that a constitutivist account 
of  normativity is committing a naturalistic fallacy. 
§6.6 Experience of  rational necessitation and commitments
Having made these general remarks about the interplay between the constitutivist theory of 
normativity and phenomenology, I want now to tentatively suggest a path that someone 
willing to ground normativity in the phenomenology can take. As I argued, if  we want to 
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argue that some norm is constitutive of  cognition, we must have an account which makes  
normativity somehow transparent in the phenomenology itself. And this is true both for 
strongly constitutive norms and for weakly constitutive ones. So, what we need is first a  
phenomenological indication that we are entitled in speaking of  our cognition as exhibiting 
commitments, for then on that basis we are eventually178 capable of  grounding the talk of 
constitutive  norms  of  cognition  –  since  the  presence  of  these  commitments  and the 
sensitivity to their presence is what can be then used to explain the sense in which some 
norms are constitutive of  cognition179. 
We can speak of  uncotenability or  co-impossibility  between mental states when some 
mental  states  that  can't  be  held  at  the  same time.  And we  can  speak  of  incompatibility 
between contents when some contents can't be both true at the same time. Thus, there are 
uncotenable mental states that are incompatible (like judging that p and that not-p) and there 
are other uncotenable mental states that are not incompatible, since they can be true at the 
same time (like judging that p and that p might be false). 
How can we make sense  of  the 'commitment'  talk?  Sheer  impossibility  doesn't 
suffice to make sense of  the talk of  commitment – like sheer necessity doesn't ground the 
talk of  strongly constitutive norms (natural necessities are not norms). Surely, by putting a 
foot in a shoe I am not committed to refraining from putting the other foot in the same 
shoe. If  I were to try to do so, I would not succeed – so the two physical states are co-
impossible.  But  this  co-impossibility  here  doesn't  ground  any  legitimate  use  of  the 
commitment  talk.  The  commitment  talk  got  introduced  if  we  move  at  the  level  on 
intentional action. If  I intend to put a foot in a shoe, then, if  I recognize that both feet 
178Notice, again, the important distinction between two tasks: 1) showing that we are entitled to speak about 
the presence of  normative phenomena in experience; and 2) grounding on that basis the claim that some 
norm is  indeed a valid  constitutive  one.  The first  task consists  in  showing that  the phenomenology  
exhibits normative features; the second consists in bridging the gap between the descriptive point that the  
phemenology exhibits normative features and the normative point that there is indeed a valid constitutive 
norm. Here we are still dealing with the first problem; the second, which touches on the problem of  the 
naturalistic fallacy of  deriving ought from is, is a problem that we will discuss in connection with the 
transcendental steps made in transcendental constitutivist views about alethic and epistemic normativity 
in chapters X and XI respectively.
179There is in fact another form of  constitutivism that can ground the claim that some logical norms are  
valid  on  the  phenomenology  without  however  arguing  that  the  norm  is  either  strongly  or  weakly 
constitutive. The idea would be that it is inescapable for us, given the cognition that we have, that when 
we reflect on the truth/validity of  some logical laws, we find this law truth/valid. The idea here would be 
that even if, say, it is possible to reason illogically, still when we deeply contemplate the relevant candidate  
logical  laws  (like  the  law of  non-contradiction,  modus  ponens,  and  so  on)  we  can't  but  find  them 
valid/true. This might be described as a platonist form of  constitutivism because it builds a platonic element in 
the phenomenology of  cognition itself: when we reason about some issue, we can't but find that thing are 
one way rather than another because we kind of  see that these is how things are. Yet, this view needs not 
to be committed to the actual existence of  platonic entities. All it does is to build this platonic element in  
the structure of  cognition – it seems to us as if  we are apprehending the truth, and we can't see things  
otherwise. This view is worth of  further investigation, I think, but I can't work on it any further here. 
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don't fit, I am committed (in a recognizable sense of  commitment) to avoid putting the 
other foot in it, other things being equal, of  course. But in this case, we are not merely  
dealing with brute co-impossibility, there is something more, namely the presence of  an  
intention and the recognition of  the relevant co-impossibility.
What is it that we should add in the case of  cognition to brute co-impossibility in  
order to sustain the commitment talk? Should we add some intention in the mind of  the  
agent, maybe an intention to be rational, or something of  the sort? Appealing to some 
intention  won't  do,  for  cognitive  activities  aren't  systematically  accompanied  by  some 
relevant intention to be rational or consistent. Nor will  it  do to claim that the relevant  
intention  is  a  background  intention,  for  then  if  its  presence  isn't  transparent  in  the 
phenomenology  of  cognition  we  aren't  in  possession  of  an  account  that  sustains  the 
commitment talk (and, relatedly, the norm talk) at the phenomenological level itself. What 
should we appeal to then? 
As we have seen, there are two cases of  uncotenable states: cases involving mental 
states that can't be both true, and cases involving mental states that can be both true, and 
yet  can't  be held at  the same time. In the case of  incompatible  mental  acts  we might 
suppose that what sustains the legitimacy of  a commitment talk is the fact that the subject  
is  sensitive  to the  fact  that  the  two contents  can't  be  true at  the  same time.  Thus,  to  
illustrate, suppose I judge that it is snowing. I am thereby committed to judge that it is not 
sunny because I understand that it can't be snowing and be sunny at the same time. Even if  
while judging that it is snowing I do not think of  the sun, its relationship with snow, and  
similar connected things, I am still committed to judge that it is not sunny, because I am a  
competent speaker and understands what sunny means, what snowing means, and so on, in  
such a way that were I to be invited to consider the proposition that it is sunny I will feel  
compelled  to  judge  that  it  is  not.  Sensitivity  to  facts  about  compatibility  and  the  
corresponding normative pressure to refrain from judging contradictory contents might be 
the candidate phenomenological ingredients that can sustain a talk of  commitments. 
The  recognizability  of  the  'commitment'  talk  fades  the  more  we  think  of 
unobvious  incompatible  contents  or  anyway  contents  that  the  subject  doesn't  already 
recognize as being incompatible. Thus, suppose that someone judges that the animal in the 
cage is a zebra – to take a well known example. Surely, by so judging, she is also committed  
in  some sense  to judge that  it  is  not  a  cleverly  disguised  mule.  But  the  fact  that  this 
consequence is so remote makes the talk of  commitment fading, for when the subject 
judges that there is a zebra in the cage she might not already think of  the fact that if  there  
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is a zebra there is no cleverly disguised mule in the cage. The situation is even clearer if  we 
think of  a consequence which the subject is not even in a position to contemplate. Right  
now, it  might be that our mind is not in a position and never will  be in a position to 
understand  some  propositions  and  the  connection  between  them  and  our  body  of 
knowledge. By judging as we do, we are also in some sense committed to take some of  
these propositions as true, and to refrain from judging some of  these propositions, yet we 
will never be in a position to understand them and their relationship with our body of  
knowledge.  In this case,  the sense of  commitment is  even less  rooted in our ordinary 
understanding of  the term.
So it seems that the more we consider incompatible claims that are remote from the 
subject's own understanding of  and attention to the logical space, the more we loose grip  
on the idea of  commitment. But there is a core that allows us to speak of  commitment in a 
meaningful and understandable way nonetheless. Here is what it is, I think. We can think of 
the performances of  our mind as being picturing reality. By having a certain judgment,  
some combinations are excluded.  By refraining from making a certain judgment,  some 
combinations are possible again. Thus, by making a judgment, we understand that even 
very remote possibilities might be excluded. Yet, we also understand that they might be so 
remote that we can't be aware of  them while judging. So understood, in this abstract sense,  
we can speak of  commitments also about very remote possibilities. Yet, typically, what is 
deliberatively pertinent are only near possibilities, those that are relevant in the relevant  
context.  If  sensitivity  to  the  incompatibility  between  contents  is  what  sustains  at  the 
phenomenological  level  the  talk  of  commitments,  then  when  we  consider  remote 
possibilities or simply when some proposition is not present before one's mind, there is  
nothing at the phenomenological level that anchors the commitment talk.  We can then 
distinguish two ways of  talking about commitments: a  primary  talk which is immediately 
grounded in the presence of  a sensisitivity to incompatibilities or entailments between the 
contnet  judged and the proposition  under  conscious consideration;  and a  derivative  talk 
which is only mediately grounded on the phenomenology, because we can intelligibly speak 
of  commitments to accept (or reject) contents with respect to which, if  the subject were to 
consciously consider them, she would be sensitive to their being entailed by the content 
judged (or to their incompatibility with the content judged).  
So,  we have just  seen the relatively easy case,  those of  co-impossibilities  which 
involve having incompatible judgments. What does sustain, if  anything does, the talk of 
commitment  in  the  case  of  uncotenable  yet  compatible  mental  states?  What is  it  that  
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commits me to judge that there are grounds for judging that p if  I judge that p? Now, one 
easy approach to this question is to appeal to our social practice of  giving and asking for  
reasons as that which explains why the relevant commitment is in place180. But this is too 
superficial. It is not that we ask for reasons because some social structure made it necessary 
or  relevant,  rather  we  ask  for  reasons  because  we  need  evidence  in  order  to  judge  
something to be the  case – it  is  a  fundamental  fact  about  cognition  that  explains  the 
practice, not the other way around. What is so fundamental about cognition that explains 
this fact? I offer as a speculation to be further justified the following hypothesis: it is our  
capacity for questioning. We are capable of  questioning – that is reflexive distancing – and 
a question survives so long as we don't have conclusive grounds for an answer. This is why  
we need grounds – and, in particular, conclusive ones – because without grounds we can't  
answer our questions. Since we can raise a question about p so long as p is uncertain, and 
since by raising a question about the truth-value of  p we are no longer judging it to be true, 
when we take it to be true, we understand that we must have grounds if  we want to have an 
answer. So, in this case, the phenomenological elements that sustain the commitment talk 
are  again  some  sort  of  sensitivity  or  understanding  and  a  corresponding  normative 
pressure. The sensitivity is to the need of  grounds in order to have an answer and stick to it  
in the face of  invitation to think otherwise (that is, in the face of  doubts). 
These rough suggestions about the ground for the talk of  commitments should be 
further supported by exploring the phenomenological ingredients that are meant to ground 
it. To see the initial attraction of  the proposal that appeals to phenomenology in order to  
ground the commitment talk, let us try to imagine what would it be like for a robot or a 
software to 'think'. If  we were to try to imagine it – though of  course we can't make sense  
of  its having any phenomenology at all, let alone a phenomenology analogous with ours, – 
we would imagine a list of  operations that occur one after the other, linked by mechanisms 
which  follow  instructions  built  in  the  software.  Imagine  that  the  phenomenological 
counterpart of  what happens in the robot is shown on a screen. The robot receives the 
input, which is presented on the screen, then the machine follows a rule that 'says' that 
from the given input some output 'must' follow, and hence be presented on the screen (for  
simplicity's sake we can imagine that for any input there is a rule which will fix a single  
output – that  is,  the 'norms'  here  are strongly  constitutive;  if  that  is  not sophisticated  
enough for a robot, think of  it as a bad robot). So, we first see
180This  would  be  the  approach  that  is  followed  by  those  who  focus  on  practice  in  order  to  ground  
normativity. See Brandon (1994), for instance.
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p, p → q
which is the input, and after a second we see under the input the output, namely, 
q
Cognition  for  a  robot  goes  like  this:  give  it  an input,  and  it  will  give  you an output,  
according to the rules that have been encoded in the software181. 
When we don't pay attention to the phenomenology itself, we might be tempted to 
think of  our own cognition as proceeding in the same way: we receive inputs, and we give 
outputs, and a list of  thoughts pop up in our mental arena. But this is not how it goes.  
There are at least two things that our phenomenology exhibits of  which we loose track if  
we think of  our cognition according to the robotic model just presented: 1) understanding of 
the contents of  our thoughts; 2)  sensitivity to relationship between our judgments and the 
thoughts we entertain; 3) a corresponding feeling of  normative pressure to proceed in such a 
way as to avoid inconsistencies and to adjust our judgments according to what we end up 
thinking of  our grounds for them. What we need in order to ground the commitment talk 
and  normativity  on  the  phenomenology  is  to  find  this  understanding,  sensitivity  and 
normative pressure present  in our experience. Here is a couple of  ways in which they get 
manifested. 
One very simple instance occurs when there is a conflict in my thoughts or my 
rational  expectations.  Thus,  I  walk  towards  Sebastiano's  office  in  order  to  ask  him  a 
perplexing  philosophical  question,  I  open  the  door  and in  the  office  there  is  another 
person,  and the  things are arranged in a  way that  don't match  the memory I  have of 
Sebastiano's  office.  Beside  the  experiential  shock,  there  is  also  a  pressure  to  revise  or  
reconsider my judgment that I am entering into Sebastiano's office. In fact it is not his 
office but the one at the left of  his office. This normative pressure is the sensitivity to the 
181This simple picture doesn't make room for weakly constitutive norms: there are only, if  any, strongly 
constitutive norms, since for any input there always is a single possible output. More generally, there is no 
sense we can make of  the operations of  a robot as enjoying some sort of  weakly constitutive normativity.  
Suppose that for some input, there is more than one available output (this condition is required in order  
to make sense of  the possibility of  weakly constitutive norms). Now, by itself, the physical movements of  
the robot can be described as being subjected to any sort of  norm: once we fix the relevant norms, we  
can then describe the operations of  the robot in such a fashion that it makes sense to say that in one case  
it has failed to respect a norm. The norm will be constitutive for the activity of  the robot being the kind 
of  activity that it is only in the sense of  a creationist account of  normativity, namely the sort of  thing we do 
when we create social reality. So, it is not that the relevant norms are weakly constitutive of  the operations 
of  the robot; rather, they are at best weakly constitutive for (or within) our conception of  the sort of  activity 
that this robot is exhibiting. The very same activity could have been conceptualised in a different way. 
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fact  that  the judgment that  this  is  Sebastiano's  office  conflicts  with  the ground for so 
judging.  It  isn't  simply  that  the  input  (the  experience)  moves  me to some output  (the 
abandonment  of  the  judgment  that  this  is  Sebastiano's  office)  in  the  way  in  which 
transitions in robots occur: there is an experience to the effect that I should revise my 
expectation. 
Or  take  another,  maybe  better  example  that  involves  less  distracting  elements. 
Suppose I judge that  p  and that  q  follows from p. Here I do have a rational pressure to 
judge that q. The pressure is not irresistible. But the pressure is present, and it explains why 
my thoughts take the familiar forms that they typically take in these circumstances. I see  
that q follows from p, yet I wonder whether q is really true, whether it is plausible despite p, 
then I eventually wonder again whether p is the case, or I simply accept both p and q and 
wonder how else I should see things if  I have accepted them, and so on. 
When I judge that p, it is not only the case that I can't judge at the same time that p 
is false. I also understand that it is wrong to so judge. This understanding doesn't have the 
form of  a further judgment to the effect that it would be wrong, or bad, or incorrect, to also 
judge that  p  is false while I judge that  p. The understanding rather takes the form of  a 
comprehending rational pressure not to judge that p is false. In order to see the presence of 
this pressure, one can put oneself  in (or try to conceive of) a situation in which she is  
invited to consider the proposition that p is false when one is already judging that it is true. 
The invitation should not be thought of  as an invitation to check again the credentials of  p 
(this  is  another  phenomenon).  The  invitation  should  rather  be  taken  as  being  asking 
whether one can also take p to be false if  one judges that p. If  one tries to endorse that p is 
false and also that  p one feels  the pressure not to do so.  The pressure is  not  a  blind 
meaningless feeling, but it resembles more the understanding that it would be wrong to so 
judge, and that it would be wrong because it  can't be  true  that  p  and that  p  is false at the 
same time. This is a case where the pressure is negative, it is a pressure to refrain from doing 
something. And the pressure seems to be grounded on an understanding of  the conditions 
in which things might be like. It can't be the case that p and that p is false. 
Consider again the case where you judge that p and you are invited to take notice of 
the fact that some proposition q logically follows from p. Here there also is an experienced 
pressure,  but  the  pressure  is  positive,  for  it  is  a  pressure  to  endorse  some  further 
proposition as true. The pressure again is not experienced as an alien pressure. Is not like 
having one's own body pushed on a street that one doesn't want to take. Here the pressure 
is a form of  understanding that q is also true and in this case there is a pressure to judge 
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that it is, given that p is judging as true by me.
Both these cases seem to arise because the subject has some understanding of  how 
things should be like in order for them to be at all. Things can't be such that it is both the 
case that p and that not-p. As a result of  this understanding there is a pressure to conform 
one's judgments to the way things are. Using the case where one judges that p, that p entails 
q,  and feels the pressure to judge that  q, we might sum up the relevant features of  this 
pressure as follows: 
– the pressure is not experienced as an alien force; it is a pressure which is rather 
somehow experienced as something which has to be followed; it is as though one 
finds judging p as immediately compelling, as the thing to be done.
– the pressure is not (or at least not primarily and not necessarily accompained by) 
the thought that I should believe that q, nor is it a more complicated thought having 
to do with what I do have to do in this occasion;
– there are two ways in which we can conceptualise the pressure. Here the pressure is  
not first-personally conceptualised as being a pressure to  judge that  q  is true. The 
pressure rather is first-personally experienced as a pressure to  q  being true. Here 
language leads us astray. It is not that one understands that q should be judged, but 
rather that q should be the case.
This much is not enough in order to defend the claim that phenomenology itself  sustains a  
commitment  talk.  Much  more  should  be  done  in  order  to  properly  describe  this  
phenomenon. I hope that these brief  remarks can at least give an idea of  the sort of  work  
that we should do in order to settle the issue whether there is any ground that justifies the 
claim that some norms are constitutive of  cognition182.
§6.7 Uncotenability within the same mental breath
I have repeatedly made claims about uncotenability, that is claims to the effect that it is 
impossible to have two mental states at the same time, or within the same mental breath, as I have 
sometime put it. I have to say more on this, for there is a powerful objection against the 
whole work on facts  about uncotenability  as grounds for commitment-talk that I  have 
made so far. 
182Compare  the  discussion  with  Korsgaard  (2009b)'s  description  of  the  phenomenon  of  rational 
necessitation. Compare also with Scanlon (2007) and Kolodny (2005) talk of  normative pressure. The 
investigation into the phenomenological grounds for finding constitutive norms of  cognition should also 
take into consideration the Wittgensteinian worries to the effect that mental compulsion (like the famous 
so-called logical compulsion) have any non-mythological role to play in our understanding of  cognition.
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The  objection  hinges  on  a  certain  natural  picture  of  the  phenomenology  of 
cognition. This  picture sees cognition as the succession of  punctual isolated mental acts. 
An useful visual metaphor that can be used to sustain this picture is to think of  experience 
as being something that occurs along the line of  time. Time is thought of  as discrete, and  
different experiences arise in different times along the lines of  temporal succession. So, at  
t1, there is an isolated mental act, at t2, another isolated mental act, at t3 yet another one, at 
t4 the same cognition that was present at t3 is present again, and so on and so forth. Thus,  
to illustrate, at t1 there is a closed question about p (e.g., is there life after organic death?), 
at t2 there is a judgment (e.g.,  I am nothing but 'my'  organism),  at t3 there is  another 
judgment (e.g., I die when my organism dies), at t4 there is a doubt (e.g., is it really the case 
that  I  am nothing but my organism?),  at t5  I distract  myself  from the issue and have 
another  judgment  (e.g.,  I  want  a  beer),  and  so  on  and  so  forth.  If  we  think  of  the 
phenomenology of  our cognition in this way, the claims I have made about uncotenability  
between different mental states become either trivial or very hard to sustain in a principled 
manner. If  the uncotenability claims are about a specific time – so, if  the claims have this 
structure: for any time t, at t mental act A, say, is uncotenable with mental act B (e.g., for any 
time t, at  t a doubt about p  is uncotenable with a judgment that  p) –  then the claims are 
trivially  true.  For,  at  any given instant,  there  is  just  one  cognition  that  can  occupy  my 
experience. The incompatibility claims are therefore trivial and uninformative – particularly, 
they  don't  highlight  facts  about  commitments  –  because  any  given  cognition  will  be  
uncotenable with all other cognitions. So, I can't at the same time judge that it is sunny and 
judge that I like that it is sunny, for there is one judgment at a time that can cross my mind 
– if  I am judging that it is sunny I am obviously not judging that I like that it is sunny, and 
viceversa. But this uncotenability, beside being trivial, doesn't engender any corresponding 
interesting sense of  commitment – by judging that it is sunny I am not thereby committing  
myself  to refrain from judging that I like that it is sunny. 
So, if  we endorse this picture of  experience, we should not think of  uncotenability 
claims as holding at a time. But then how can we think of  them? The natural suggestion is  
to think of  them as holding at intervals. But does it really help? How many instants make up 
the relevant slice of  time at which we can make interesting and commitment-revealing  
uncotenability claims? 
There are several assumptions about time in this picture, and some of  them might 
be taken to be responsible for the generation of  the problem. One such assumption is that  
for  any  instant  there  can  be  only  one  cognitive  act.  If  we  drop this  assumption,  then 
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incompatibility claims start to make sense and to be revealing again. So, we might say that  
at the same time one can both judge that it is sunny and that one likes that it is sunny, yet 
we might argue for the uncotenability claim that one can't both judge that it is sunny and  
doubting whether it is sunny. But there is another general strategy to avoid the problem. 
The problem arguably arises because we are thinking of  cognition and time from a third-
personal perspective. If  we take experience at face value without trying to understand it by  
using resources from a detached understanding of  reality – the notion of  discrete instants, 
for instance – the problem evaporates.  Phenomenologically speaking,  it  is  very  easy to 
detect what I have loosely called mental breaths. Here are some examples. Suppose you are 
drawing an inference from p and p → q, to q. By drawing an inference here I mean to refer 
to the phenomenon which consists in first endorsing the truth of  a proposition and then 
the truth of  another proposition, then appreciating the logical relation between them, and 
finally on that basis coming to make a further judgment in the truth of  the conclusion. This 
is both a simple and a complex mental achievement. It is simple when compared to the 
achievement of  making a long deduction (with, say, 55 premises), yet it is complex when 
compared with the simple act of  raising a question as to whether p is true. When I deduce 
a conclusion from 55 premises I am not capable of  drawing the conclusion on the basis of 
the cognition of  all the premises and the logical relationship between them. It is not that I 
have in mind all the premises and while cognizing all of  them I then judge on the basis of  this 
cognition that a  further proposition that is  recognized as following from them is  true.  
Rather, what I do is to proceed by means of  little steps, that is, I proceed in several more 
or less self-contained mental breaths. The steps couldn't be as little as many isolated acts of 
cognition,  as  we  have  previously  seen.  If  cognition  is  understood  as  the  sequence  of 
isolated  acts,  then  cognition  becomes  impossible.  If  I  don't  somehow  take  into 
consideration in the same mental breath both the fact that a given proposition is true and 
the fact that it entails another given proposition, there would be no drawing inferences. So, 
proceeding  by  means  of  little  steps  means  drawing  short  inferences,  then  taking  for 
granted the conclusions and drawing further inferences,  and so on and so forth.  How 
complex and long could be a little step? I have no principled answer to this question, and 
we need not have such an answer for our present purposes. Surely, inferring a conclusion 
on the basis of  55 premises is impossible. Surely, inferring on the basis of  one premise is  
possible. More fundamentally, a very little step which is possible – and that represents the 
minimal bone of  the skeleton of  cognition – is the act of  taking something as a ground for 
believing something else. If  this act is not possible, then there would be no cognition.
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Thus, the uncotenability claims made above are meant to be relativised not to an 
instant  of  time,  but  to  what  we  might  understand  as  little  deliberative  contexts  or 
performances.
Summing up,  in  this  chapter  I  have first  tried to  defend a  qualified  version of 
strong constitutivism about logical  normativity,  by trying to defend the claim that  it  is  
impossible  to  judge  recognized  contradictory  contents.  This  defence  was  important  in  
order to sustain some of  the uncotenability claims I have made in previous chapters. Then 
I have explained why phenomenology is needed if  we want to make sense of  the idea that  
some norms are constitutive of  cognition, rather than being merely constitutive of  our 
conception  of  cognition.  Finally  I  have  tried  to  show that  there  is  something  in  the 
phenomenology  of  cognition  that  can  be  appealed  to  in  order  to  ground the  talk  of 
commitment that I have made in this and the previous chapters. As said at the beginning of 
the chapter, some of  the discussion conducted here is highly speculative in programmatic 
in many ways. In the next chapters I will try to do some more progress in the attempt to  
explain how normativity is grounded in the phenomenology. Before discussing this part of  
the  transcendental  constitutivist  program that  focuses  on normativity,  in  the  next  two 
chapters I will  come back to the part of  the transcendental  constitutivist program that 
focuses  on  alethic  commitments,  for  I  will  explain  how  the  work  on  the  alethic 
commitments  of  cognition  conducted  in  previous  chapters  help  us  in  reshaping  the 
landscape of  contemporary epistemology. 
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Chapter VII
Global Scepticism and 
Pyrrhonian Scepticism as Untenable
In this Chapter I begin a complex argument to the effect that the only tenable standpoint is 
the one that consists in judging that there are certainties. The argument will be completed  
in the next Chapter. I will consider candidate alternative standpoints and will argue on a  
piecemeal basis that they are untenable. In this Chapter I argue that Global Scepticism and 
Pyrrhonian Scepticism are untenable. In the next Chapter I argue that the standpoints of  
Monistic Fallibilism (the judgment that all our beliefs are at best only fallibly justified) and  
Monistic Externalism (the judgment that all  our beliefs are at best only externalistically  
justified), or any mixed standpoint that combines them, are untenable as well. 
§7.1 Standpoints and propositions
In order to properly understand the sort of  philosophical work which I am doing here we 
should  spend  some  time  asking  ourselves  what  is  it  that  we  evaluate  when  we  do 
philosophy. Typically, when we assess views or evaluate philosophical positions, as we say, we 
are  just  evaluating  propositions  taken  in  abstracto.  Essentially,  we  look  at  the  logical 
consequences of  a given proposition, we look at the evidence for thinking that it is true,  
and  look  at  other  propositions  we  think  are  true  in  order  to  check  incompatibilities 
between them and the proposition under scrutiny. I say that this is what we 'essentially' do 
because of  course we do many many other things. But what is crucial to notice here is the 
fact that when we evaluate a philosophical view we rarely wonder about what it takes to 
hold or endorse that view.  
There is a natural explanation why we tend to be oblivious of  facts about what it 
takes to hold a view: when we are interested in some subject matter, what we are interested  
in is the truth about that subject  matter,  and not about our way of  apprehending and 
holding what we eventually take to be the truth about the issue under scrutiny183. And there 
183Of  course, if  the subject matter is mental, like the nature of  belief, there is a sense in which we are also  
interested in the way in which we apprehend and hold what we take to be true, but this sense is irrelevant  
here. We don't take facts about how we believe things about belief  to be important in our understanding  
of  the truth about belief,  if  not in the sense that these facts are precisely the facts we are trying to  
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is a simple reason why we take facts about what it takes to hold a philosophical view to be  
irrelevant  with  respect  to  the  issue  at  hand.  Pre-philosophically,  we  regard  truth  as 
objective, as mind-independent, as not being reducible or dependent on what we believe. 
So, to illustrate, even if  Hume is right when he says that we are incapable of  stopping to 
believe that the external world exists, this fact about our mental life doesn't have anything 
to do with the question whether the external world really exists or not, not even with the 
question  whether  we  can  know or  not  that  there  is  an  external  world  –  in  fact,  this 
compulsion, if  real, to believe in the existence of  the external world is typically regarded as  
compatible with the non-existence of  the external world, as well as compatible with the  
fact that we do not know whether there is an external world or not184.  This separation 
between what is the case and what we believe about what is the case typically holds for 
many philosophical views which we entertain and evaluate when we philosophize. What 
should  it  follow  about  X  itself  (be  that  free  will,  knowledge  of  external  world,  the 
existence of  objective values, the meaning of  life, and so on) from the fact that we can't 
but believe in such-and-such a manner about X? X is as it is, the thought goes, regardless 
of  how we can think of  it.  To accept  this  much as a  default  thought is  to accept  an 
apparently platitudinous view of  the relationship between the way things are and our finite 
human capacity for apprehending how things are. 
There is however also an important reason why we should pay attention to the 
possibilities of  our cognitive standpoint. When we do philosophy we want to  discover the 
truth. We want, that is, to come to believe what is true. After all, when we say that the aim of 
inquiry is truth this is of  course a shorthand for saying that the aim of  inquiry is having  
true beliefs. If  we don't pay attention to what it takes to believe, we might proceed under the 
assumption that an abstract consideration of  propositions is all we need to do, and that  
then  we  just  have  to  believe  the  propositions  that  we  find  to  have  enough epistemic 
support.  But  there  is  no  a  priori  guarantee  that  this  could  be  the  case.  Discussing 
philosophical propositions in abstracto may obscure the important fact that there are views 
which we can't believe or which we can't but believe. These facts are important, because 
our aim is neither belief  nor truth taken in isolation from one another, but belief  in the truth, 
and these are facts about what we can or can't believe. 
In this chapter and the next I am mostly concerned with these facts about tenability 
discover. 
184Though of  course there are approaches to the problem of  scepticism about the external world according  
to which the fact that it is impossible for us to stop believing in the existence of  the external world has  
some bearing on the question whether we do also know that there is an external world. See, for instance 
Strawson (1987), who in turn relies on a reading of  Hume's and Wittgenstein's reactions to the sceptical  
problem. I will discuss these moves in Chapter XII.
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and untenability. I want to argue that the only tenable standpoint is the one which judges 
that there are certainties. In order to so argue I will consider various standpoints that are 
candidate competitive standpoints, and will either argue that they are untenable, or that they 
are not real competitive standpoints.
In what follows I  will  speak of  a  standpoint in  order to refer to the cognitive  
attitude which is  representative  of  a  given position  or  to a  combinations  of  cognitive 
attitudes, if  to endorse the view is to give a particularly dynamic shape to one's inquiry.  
Thus, to illustrate, if  fallibilism is the view that we can have fallible justification only, then  
the standpoint which endorses fallibilism is the judgment that we have fallible justification 
only. If  someone is a global sceptic, then her defining cognitive attitude will be a judgment 
that  there  is  no  justified  beliefs.  Sometimes  standpoints  might  be  quite  complex  and 
dynamic, like the standpoint of  a universal doubter who moves from one doubt to the 
other,  doubting  every  proposition  she  is  confronted  with  (we  saw  that  standpoint  in 
Chapter V). 
In order to visualise things, it might be useful to introduce the following schematic 
notation with the help of  which I will refer to standpoints: 
CA(P) 
Where 'CA' stands for a given cognitive attitude, and p for the content of  the attitude. The 
main cognitive attitudes we will discuss in what follows are the following:
J(P), namely the judgment that p
D(P), namely a doubt as to whether p
S(P), namely the attitude of  pyrrhonian silence as to whether p185
As we just saw with the examples of  fallibilism and global scepticism, some standpoints  
can be fruitfully considered by taking a single cognitive attitude as its defining core or  
commitment. Other more complicated standpoints might be needed in order to represent  
more complicated positions that one might want to hold. When a standpoint is defined by 
a combination of  more than one cognitive attitude, we might represent the standpoint as a  
set of  cognitive attitudes ordered in time. Thus, to represent the standpoint of  a universal 
doubter, we might think of  something like that: 
D(P1) then D(P2), then D(P3) then … 
185Whereas judgment that p (J(P)) and a doubt as to whether p (D(P)) are basic acts of  cognition, being silent  
about the truth of  some proposition is a more complex standpoint which I will introduce later on in the 
Chapter.  Since  I  will  argue  that  there  is  no  understanding  of  pyrrhonian  silence  to  which  there 
corresponds a real possible cognitive mental attitude, I am not here capable in few words to say what  
basic ingredients are supposed to constitute this complex state.
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The temporal ordering is required by the thought that we only live mental acts one at a  
time186.  We will see some more of  them in what follows.
One cognitive attitude that defines my standpoint is the following: 
J(C), namely the judgment that there are certainties. 
Where 'C' I will refer to the proposition that there are certainties. 
Now, when we think about propositions and standpoints, it is useful to distinguish 
between  two  different  properties:  one  is  the  property  of  being  compatible  (or 
incompatible),  namely the property that holds between propositions when they can (or 
can't) be true at the same time; the other is the property of  being cotenable (or uncotenable), 
namely  the  property  that  holds  between standpoints  when  they  can  (or  can't)  be  put 
together in a joint tenable standpoint. 
To illustrate,  there  is  one  family  of  propositions  which are  incompatible  with  C, 
namely all those which entail the negation of  C. And there are several standpoints which are 
uncotenable  with  J(C). All  those  standpoints  which  consist  in  judgments  of  some 
propositions which entail the negation of  c are uncotenable with J(C) – the uncotenability 
is  inherited by the incompatibility  of  the  contents endorsed by the respective defining 
cognitive  attitudes. Interestingly,  however,  these are not  the  sole  standpoints  which are 
uncotenable with mine. To illustrate, a universal doubter also occupies a standpoint which  
is  uncotenable  with  mine.  This  point  is  important  because  it  shows  that  for  two 
standpoints to be uncotenable it is not necessary that one denies what the other affirms –  
more  generally,  the  uncotenability  needs  not  depend  on some incompatibility  between 
contents that one judges true and the other judges false. Recognition of  this fact moves the 
focus from propositions only to an evaluation of  the normative profile of  our cognitive  
attitudes, thereby justifying the sort of  work I am conducting here.
§7.2 Ways in which a standpoint might be untenable 
Since I am going to be concerned with the question whether a given standpoint is tenable 
186See the previous Chapter, §, for a discussion on the difference between simple co-untenability which is 
due to the impossibility of  living two different mental acts at the very same time and the richer notion of  
co-untenability  which is  tied to the nature of  commitments  and which consists in the idea that two 
different mental acts are co-untenable within the same deliberative context of  mind, or mental breath, as I 
metaphorically said there.
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we need a definition of  the conditions in which a standpoint is tenable. 
Conditions  for  tenability:  A standpoint  is  tenable  only  if  it  can be occupied in a  
coherent and reflexively stable fashion.
Let me clarify these conditions. A first obvious way in which a standpoint can be untenable 
is by being a standpoint that is psychologically impossible, that is, it is simply impossible to 
occupy  it,  to  be  in  that  standpoint.  An  example  of  this  standpoint  is,  perhaps,  the 
standpoint consisting in the judgment that there are and that there are not certainties. If  we 
can't judge contradictions that are recognized as such by the agent (as tentatively argued in 
Chapter VI, §6),  then this is  a standpoint that we can't  occupy.  Another example of  a  
standpoint  that  can't  be  occupied  is,  as  I  will  argue  below,  the  standpoint  of  the 
Pyrrhonian. If  the standpoint is meant to consist in a systematic absence of  judgment in 
response  to  the  appearance  that  there  aren't  sufficient  grounds  to  judge  any  of  the 
propositions we are presented with, then the standpoint can't be realised psychologically, 
for responding to the evidence is having judgments.
The fact that a standpoint can be occupied doesn't entail  that it is tenable. The 
standpoint also needs to be coherent and stable. A standpoint is coherent when the totality 
of  its commitments don't give rise to contradictions. Thus, to judge that there are no truths  
is incoherent in that by so judging one is committed to there being at least one truth,  
namely that  there are no truths,  and this  contradicts the proposition that there are no 
truths. The judgment that there are no truths is absolutely self-refuting in that it entails a  
contradiction. Yet, a standpoint might be incoherent without being absolutely self-refuting. 
Thus, to illustrate, to judge that the present judgment is not justified doesn't entail that the 
present judgment is justified. Yet, by having it, one is committed to its being justified. In  
this way the standpoint is incoherent without entailing a contradiction. This point reflects a 
general feature of  commitments: commitments might be generated either by the nature of 
the cognitive attitude, regardless of  its content (any judgment that p, for any p, is committed 
to there being grounds for taking p to be true), or by the nature of  the cognitive attitude 
given its particular content  (thus, a judgment that there are no truths is committed to there 
being at least one truth because the content judged entails that there is at least one truth187).
When a standpoint is incoherent it might be possible to occupy it, but it is not  
possible to endorse the totality of  its commitments. Since the commitments give rise to a 
187It  is  actually  controversial  whether  'there  are  no  truths'  gives  rise  to  absolute  self-refutation.  See  
Castagnoli (2010).
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contradiction, and assuming that it is impossible to judge contradictions while recognizing 
that they are so, it is impossible to endorse an incoherent standpoint once its commitments are  
made explicit. Thus, coherence is a property of  contents  of  a standpoint, particularly of  its 
defining cognitive attitude and the many commitments it  give rise to. Occupability  is  a  
property of  a standpoint and of  the combination of  the standpoint and of  some of  its  
commitments.
Another way in which a standpoint might fail to be tenable is by being reflexively  
unstable. A standpoint is unstable if  it is lost once one makes its commitments explicit or  
start to reflect about it. Thus, if  I am a fallibilist I believe that  all my beliefs are merely 
fallibly justified, if  justified at all.  I am committed to believe that the belief  that all our 
justified beliefs are fallibly justified is itself  fallibly justified. But then I am in a position to  
doubt it, because I recognize that it might be false. But when I doubt it, I am not judging it.  
This is a belief  then that is unstable in that it doesn't survive reflection and is lost in the 
moment in which its commitments are made explicit. The case of  reflexive instability is 
different from the case in which one is occupying an incoherent standpoint: in the case of 
reflexive  instability,  one  needs  not  necessarily  be  committed  to  judge  contradictory 
contents once all the commitments are made explicit; rather, the instability arises because 
there is an incompatibility in cognitive attitudes themselves, as it were: if  a standpoint (like  
fallibilism) is committed to take as true that the fallibilist doctrine itself  might be false, then 
one is in a position to doubt that doctrine, and in so doing one stops endorsing it. Notice  
that  this  instability  is  not  straightforwardly  reducible  to  the  claim  that  the  fallibilist 
standpoint is  incoherent:  it  might  also  be the case that since judgment is committed to 
certainty, then the fallibilist is committed to both there being no certainties and there being 
at least one certainty (namely fallibilism itself); yet, even if  one denies that judgment is  
committed to certainty, if  doubt about  p  is  possible so long as  p  is uncertain, then the 
fallibilist  standpoint is  untenable by being reflexively unstable, since if  one makes fully 
explicit the consequences of  the fallibilist doctrine then one realises that the doctrine can 
be doubted, and if  one doubts it, one stops endorsing it.
§7.3 Varieties of  scepticisms
Having made these important clarifications, let us now see in more details the views that 
are incompatible with c – the proposition that there are certainties –  and the standpoints 
that are uncotenable with J(C) – the judgment that there are certainties. 
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Let us start  with  the propositions  that  are incompatible with  C. Scepticism about  
certainty is the denial of  C, namely the claim that there are no certainties. Any view which is 
committed to scepticism about certainty is incompatible with  C.  Since there are at least 
three views which are worth considering opponents of  C I will spend some time explaining 
what the relevant kind of  scepticisms that I will discuss later are.
By scepticism here I will refer to any view which denies the possibility of  having 
some positive epistemic status. Scepticism about certainty is a particular kind of  scepticism, 
since it denies the possibility of  having the particular epistemic status of  certainty. Global  
scepticism is  the  negation of  the  possibility  of  having  any positive  epistemic  statuses.  It 
makes room for there being more than one positive epistemic status (thus it makes room 
for a kind of  epistemic pluralism). It simply denies that our judgments can possess any 
positive epistemic status. Other non-global forms of  scepticism denies the possibility of  
having  just  some positive  epistemic  status,  but  might  make  room  for  there  being  the 
possibility for our beliefs of  possessing some positive epistemic status (in the next Chapter 
we will see Fallibilism and Externalism, that here are understood as forms of  scepticisms  
about certainty, which however are not forms of  global scepticism, since they claim that 
some  positive  epistemic  status  might  be  possessed  by  our  judgments,  namely  fallible  
justification, and externalist justification respectively).
The  understanding  of  scepticism  can  vary  depending  on  its  modal  strength. 
Traditionally, the interesting form of  scepticism is the one that claims that it is impossible, for  
beings like us, to have knowledge. So understood, scepticism doesn't exclude by definition 
that  there  could  be  some  standpoint,  like  God's,  from  which  it  is  possible  to  attain  
knowledge. What we are interested in is whether it is possible for us to have knowledge, and 
not whether it  is  possible for some Godly  entity,  if  any,  to have something which  we 
cannot ever have. So, the sort of  possibility we are considering is relativized to a cognitive 
agent relevantly similar to us.
Another  understanding  of  the  view  is  the  one  that  claims  that  it  is  only 
contingently  the  case that  we don't  have knowledge while  leaving it  an open question 
whether we could have it or not. True, if  we were to discover that we now have knowledge, 
namely that this contingent form of  scepticism is false, we would also have discovered that 
we  can  have  it,  and  so  we  would  have  discovered  that  the  modally  strong  form  of 
scepticism  is  false.  But  if  we  were  by  hypothesis  to  discover  (or  to  think  to  have 
discovered) that we do not, right now, have any kind of  knowledge whatsoever, we would 
still be unsatisfied and ready to wonder whether we could have it or not. So, the interesting 
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form of  global scepticism which I am going to criticise in what follows is the one which 
denies, for creatures like us, the possibility of  having any of  the relevant positive epistemic 
status.
Let us now consider the  standpoints which are uncotenable with J(C). All those 
judgments in views which entail scepticism about certainty represent standpoints which are 
incompatible with J(C). A further standpoint which is incompatible with J(C) is the one 
endorsed by  Pyrrhonian Scepticism, that is the standpoint consisting in remaining silent 
about the truth-value of  any proposition she happens to consider. A global sceptic doesn't  
remain  silent  about  every  proposition  for  she  judges  that  scepticism  is  true.  Another 
standpoint yet is that of  the Universal Doubter we saw in the previous Chapter.
There are several standpoints that might seem cotenable with J(C), though they are 
not. We might conceive of  a standpoint according to which it is possible both to judge that  
there are certainties, and also to judge that this latter judgment is not among the certainties. 
This standpoint happens to be untenable, for by being in J(C) one is also ipso facto judge 
that it is certain that there are certainties188. 
This introductory discussion offers us a perception of  the main standpoints that we 
seem to be in a position to occupy. 
J(C): the judgment that there are certainties.
All the standpoints that endorse the proposition that there are no certainties are forms of 
scepticisms about certainty and they are incompatible with J(c). These are the main forms 
of  scepticism about certainty I will discuss:
Global scepticism – J (GS): the judgment that none of  our judgments enjoy any 
positive epistemic status. 
188There are then various ways in which one can endorse the standpoint J(c).  My standpoint consists in 
adding the judgment that it is certain that there are certainties. This contrasts with the following complex 
standpoint: the judgment that there are certainties, plus the judgment that it is not certain that there are 
certainties. This latter standpoint can then be declined in different ways. One can add that  J(c) doesn't 
possess any positive status. Or, with apparent more plausibility, one might add the judgment that even 
though J(c) is not itself  certain, it enjoys some lesser epistemic status (like a fallibilist kind of  justification).  
Depending on the status chosen, we will have variations of  the latter standpoint. Another way in which 
one can hold the judgment that there are certainties without also judging that it is certain that there are  
certainties is to hold that the judgment that there are certainties is somehow a special judgment which 
eludes the space of  reasons since it is some unavoidable commitment of  cognition that must be in place 
for  cognition to work. My view is,  again,  that the nature of  cognition is  such that  the only tenable  
standpoint is that there are certainties, and that this commits one to take it that it is certain that there are  
certainties.
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Fallibilism – J(F) : the judgment that our judgments can be grounded on fallibilist 
grounds only.
Externalism – J(E): the judgment that our judgments can only enjoy an externalist 
kind of  justification. 
There are other  standpoints  that  are  offered as alternative  to J(c) even if  they  do not 
amount to the judgment that there are no certainties
Pyrrhonian scepticism: remaining silent about every proposition one happens to 
entertain
Universal doubter: a doubt about every proposition she happens to entertain
Alethic deniers: a judgment to the effect that there are no truths
This is just a schematic reminder of  the main general options. 
 §7.4 Arguments for global scepticism 
The picture I have offered you of  the variety of  scepticism is quite more complicated than 
the one which has been typically assumed in the literature. My picture relies on epistemic 
pluralism,  namely  the  idea  that  there  is  a  plurality  of  positive  epistemic  status.  As  a  
consequence, a sceptic could be sceptical of  some epistemic status but not all. Since it has 
been  standard  to  assume  monism  in  epistemology,  by  global  scepticism  people  have 
customarily meant the thesis according to which it is impossible to obtain a particular kind 
of  positive epistemic status which was equated with justification (or knowledge). So, many 
of  the arguments I will  present in what follows were meant to conclude that epistemic 
justification and knowledge are impossible. Typically, these arguments rely on particularly 
demanding internalist  kind of  justification,  if  not  on certainty.  Externalist  accounts of 
justification  and  modest  fallibilist  internalist  accounts  of  justification  are  typically 
conceived  of  as  capable  of  avoiding widespread sceptical  consequences,  and  hence  as  
providing  resources  to  resist  global  scepticism.  When  the  dialectic  is  seen  within  the 
pluralist  perspective  that  I  favour,  we  should  see  externalist  and  fallibilist  internalist  
193
responses  to  arguments  for  global  scepticism as  pointing  out  that  these  arguments,  if  
sound, do indeed establish that certainty is impossible, and yet they do not impugn the 
possibility  of  having lower epistemic goods.  So,  within this pluralist  dialectical  context,  
most of  the arguments that are standardly presented as arguments for global scepticism are 
really just arguments for scepticism about certainty. 
What are then the main arguments for scepticism about certainty? The history of 
philosophy is filled with these sorts of  arguments. Here I won't be concerned in offering 
the details of  these arguments, nor will I try to cover all of  them. I will just present in  
rough form the most famous ones. 
The problem of  certainty. We have already encountered in Chapter I the a version of 
most famous and challenging argument for scepticism about certainty. The problem, as we 
saw,  was  that  if  we  look at  the  conditions  that  need  to  be  satisfied  in  order  to  have 
certainty, then certainty will look as impossible. Sometimes these conditions have also been 
taken to be plausible conditions for justification and knowledge in general, and as a result  
what I have called the problem of  certainty was rather presented as an argument for global 
scepticism. 
The problem of  the evil demon. Descartes famously conceived of  an all powerful evil 
demon capable of  misleading us into judging propositions that turn out to be false. How 
can't we exclude its existence without being mislead in the very process of  trying to do so? 
Again,  though  this  argument  is  naturally  seen  as  targeting  the  possibility  of  certain 
knowledge, it might also be presented in a context in which it targets the possibility of 
knowledge in general. If  one presents the argument in a monist frame of  mind and takes it  
that in order to know or be justified in believing that p one should be capable of  excluding 
the possibilities incompatible with p, then the argument can be seen as in favour of  global 
scepticism. 
The problem of  the criterion. This is another classical argument that can be read as an 
argument against the possibility of  certainty as well as a global sceptical argument. Here is  
its rough form. How should we choose what to believe? It seems that in order to answer 
this question we need general rules about what indicates that a proposition is true. But in  
order to find these general rules we should first have some particular instances of  true 
propositions from which we can then extract the general rule. If  there is no other way of 
beginning in a justified manner, then how could we possibly ever believe something with 
justification? 
Postmodernist arguments. There is then a huge variety of  arguments whose overall aim 
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is to deny the very possibility of  making sense of  objective notions of  truth, and, as a  
consequence,  they  aim  at  removing  the  grounds  for  making  sense  of  the  notion  of 
certainty and more generally of  knowledge and justification189.
Schaffer's Debasing Demon. Very recently Schaffer (2010) has offered a new argument 
in  favour of  universal  scepticism. Shaffer's  argument relies  on a  different demon than 
Descartes's. It is a debasing demon, that is, a demon which debases all our beliefs. It leaves  
our beliefs as they are, and it may even leave the world as we take it to be, if  our beliefs are  
actually true; however, contrary to appearances, it makes it the case that all our beliefs are  
formed in deviant and defective ways. What we take to be believing on the basis of  sound 
reasons  is  in  fact  believed  through,  for  instance,  mere  guessing.  Since  Shaffer  further  
assumes that having knowledge that  p requires also knowledge that one's belief  that  p is 
properly based, and since the putative conceivability of  a such debasing demon will make it 
impossible for us to know whether our beliefs are properly debased or not, it turns out that 
we don't have any knowledge whatsoever190. 
In what follows the details of  these arguments will not be relevant. The problem , I 
will suggest, concerns the very idea of  offering an argument in favour of  global scepticism. 
§7.5 Global Scepticism as Untenable
Global Scepticism, namely J(GS),  the judgment that there are no justified judgments,  is 
189On Rorty's global scepticism – which is one form that these so-called postmodernist attacks might take – 
see Rorty (1980) and the reply by Putnam (1985). Here is how Putman nicely summarises the trouble with  
such kind of  view: “Why should we expend our mental energy in convincing ourselves that we aren’t  
thinkers, that our thoughts aren’t really about anything, noumenal or phenomenal, that there is no sense in 
which any thought is right or wrong (including the thought that no thought is right or wrong) beyond being 
the verdict of  the moment [or of  some longer run], and so on? This is a self-refuting enterprise if  there 
ever was one!”. See Thomas-Fogiel (2010) for a detailed critical discussion on these postmodernist attacks  
on the possibility of  philosophical knowledge stemming from both the Anglo-Saxon and continental  
traditions.
190Like in Descartes's case, there might be various ways of  resisting to this argument, and in fact there have  
been  different  strategies  in  the  literature.  Brubeckner  (2011)  simply  denies  that  knowledge  requires 
knowledge that one's belief  is properly grounded. Ballantyne & Evans (2013) reject Schaffer's argument 
by arguing in favour of  an account of  the basing relation which allows us to have knowledge of  basing  
relations despite the conceivability and possibility of  such a demon. Conee (2015) argues that even if  the  
demon is possible, we have no reason to believe that we are in a debasing scenario, whereas we do have  
reasons to believe that we are not in a debasing scenario. Bondy & Carter (forthcoming) denies that a  
debasing demon is possible at all, by pointing out that none of  the existing plausible accounts of  the 
nature of  the basing relation are compatible with the obtainment of  such an unlucky scenario. 
My argument against Schaffer's debasing case is more general, and depends on the simple fact that an 
argument is used in order to come to be convinced by universal scepticism. If  there is a debasing demon,  
then it debases the very belief  in a debasing demon, hence this possibility can't be threatening, for we 
can't believe that it is a possibility. 
In Chapter XI I will present several arguments whose main purpose is to downplay the importance of 
certainty. The function of  these arguments is not to argue that certainty is impossible, but rather to argue, 
in one way or another, that we should not care about it, that we should not put certainty at the core of  
our epistemological theorising. 
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untenable, and the reasons why it is untenable are very simple and, I think, also well-known 
by anyone  who has  given some thought  to  the  issue.  This  is  puzzling  though,  for,  as 
observed by Alasdair MacIntyre (1982, p. 22), genuinely refutable doctrines only need to be 
refuted once, and yet GS is still a view with which epistemologists engage (we will see some 
instances  later  on).  Hence  I  must  give  an  explanation  of  why  the  simplicity  of  these  
reasons hasn't been enough to put the view on the one side. To anticipate, the explanation  
is that epistemology has not been conducted in a resolute first-personal manner.
There are two ways of  addressing GS. One can offer grounds for judging that it is 
false. Or, one can offer grounds for judging that it can't be held. Of  course,  prima facie,  
grounds for judging that GS can't be held are not also grounds for judging that it is false,  
unless one provides further bridge premises. I will first offer grounds for judging that GS 
can't be held, then at the end of  the next Chapter I will comment on the gap between the  
untenability of  GS and its falsity. 
Here  is  the  reason why  GS is  untenable.  Either  GS is  something  which  I  am 
supposed to judge without grounds, or it is something which I am supposed to judge on 
the basis of  what I take to be good grounds for thinking that it is true. 
The  first  stance is  untenable  by  being reflexively  unstable.  I  might  happen  for 
whatever grounds to judge that GS is true, but as soon as I am invited to take a stance with 
respect to the question whether I have grounds for so judging, if  I judge that I have no 
grounds, then I loose the judgment in GS. If  I understand that I have nothing that speaks 
in favour of  GS, I ipso facto stops to judge that GS is true. 
The second stance is untenable by being incoherent It is not possible for me to 
coherently judge that GS is true and also to judge that I have grounds for judging that it is 
true.  By  judging  that  GS is  true,  I  am  committing  myself  to  an  incoherent  set  of 
commitments:  for,  by  judging  that  GS is  true,  I  commit  myself  to  judge  that  I  have 
grounds for so judging, but I also commit myself  to judge that I have no grounds for so 
judging. The standpoint is then incoherent, and it is untenable in the sense that it is not 
possible to judge all of  its commitments. The point is not simply that even though GS is a 
standpoint that we can occupy it turns out that it is incoherent. The point is rather that it is  
a  standpoint  that  can't  be fully  occupied precisely  because  it  is  an incoherent one.  Of 
course it is possible to occupy it in the sense that it is possible to judge that GS is true and 
that there are grounds for so judging. But the problem is that it can't be fully occupied  
because its commitments are contradictory. 
Since the view is obviously untenable, why is it that we should keep arguing for this 
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claim? There are several reasons. One reason that I will describe in a later paragraph is that  
the untenability of  a view doesn't seem to entail its falsity, and so we have the impression 
that we should not discard a view just because it is impossible for us to endorse it. Another 
reason  which  we  are  going  to  appreciate  right  now  is  the  fact  that  epistemological  
reflection  about  global  scepticism  is  not  always  conducted  in  a  resolute  first-personal 
manner. The untenability of  global scepticism can be appreciated only if  one is inquiring  
for oneself  – because she wants to know the truth – and only if  in so doing one is keeping 
an eye on what it takes to be inquiring. A third related reason is this: even when reflection 
tries to be aware of  facts about what it takes to endorse a view, the facts that are typically 
noticed in the analytical  literature are facts about the  public  endorsement  of  a view191.  For 
some reasons192, analytic philosophers tend to give more credit to their opinions about the 
behaviour of  public assertoric practice rather than to their opinions about the nature of  
cognition itself. This focus has obscured the phenomenon that should be investigated in 
order to understand whether global scepticism is really tenable.
Gallois (1993) tries to show that global scepticism is self-refuting by analysing what 
it takes to  assert that view in a  dialectical context where there are two opponents trying to 
convince each other. At the beginning of  his paper he starts considering a strategy which is  
very similar to mine, but then, after having dismissed it, he moves to assertion. Here is the 
relevant passage where he dismisses something which closely resembles my strategy:
“An anti-sceptic who wishes to show that the global sceptic cannot believe in global scepticism 
without believing that she is justified in doing so may have recourse to the following argument. A 
global sceptic believes that none of  her beliefs are justified. So, no truth relevant considerations will  
lead the global  sceptic to adopt some beliefs and reject others. Hence, a global sceptic  will be  
prevented from adopting any beliefs. 
The preceding argument rests on the following premiss. In the absence of  the belief  that some 
beliefs are justified nothing could lead the global sceptic to believe that some, but not all, beliefs are 
true. This seems to be plainly false. Indeed, a global sceptic may consistently form her beliefs in the  
191I don't have the inductive basis for making this sociological claim. However, throughout the Dissertation I 
make reference to philosophers (or whole debates) who (or which) by focusing on language and assertion 
end up failing to perceive points about phenomenology. Beside the philosophical claim suggested, I think 
that the sociological claim is a fruitful conjecture that explains much of  the tendency which characterises 
a significant portion of  debates in contemporary analytical circles. 
192It would take an historical investigation in order to identify the roots of  the current preference for an  
analysis  of  public  linguistic  practice  as  opposed  to  a  phenomenology  of  thought  itself.  I  haven't  
conducted this research, but it easy to point to the facts that such an historical investigation would have to  
take into account. Since the beginning of  analytic philosophy there has been a good deal of  scepticism 
about the inner life (Frege's anti-psychologism, Ryle's behaviourism, Wittgenstein's remarks in Philosophical  
Investigation, Austin's focus on linguistic practice). The insistence on the analysis of  language itself  goes 
hand in hand with this tendency to look at what is without and not at what is within. See the essays 
contained in Rorty (1992), particularly his introductory essay. 
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following fashion. She comes to hold a belief  that she is considering just in case she believes the  
following. If  any beliefs are justified the belief  she is considering is. If  the global sceptic forms her 
beliefs in this way then she will discriminate between true and false beliefs in much the same way as  
the anti-sceptic”. p. 38.
Gallois is suggesting that there is a way in which the global sceptic might come to hold her  
scepticism. He says that it is enough for a sceptic to believe the following: if  any beliefs are  
justified then the belief  in global scepticism is. This is, however, not enough. It is not a  
belief  that offers a sufficient ground in favour of  global scepticism. This means that there 
must be further premises that lead the global sceptic to judge global scepticism to be true,  
and  by  judging  the  premises  one  is  thereby  committing  herself  to  the  possession  of 
justified judgements. But even if  we bracket this problem, the main point remains that by 
judging global scepticism one is committing herself  to an incoherent and thereby untenable  
set of  commitments: one is committing herself  to both judge that  there are no justified 
judgments and that it is justified to judge that there are no justified judgments. 
I have just argued that it is not coherent to argue in favour of  global scepticism. As 
remarked, however, there are plenty of  arguments in the history of  philosophy in favour of 
global scepticism. Cling (1994) understands the Problem of  the Criterion as an argument for 
global scepticism, and doesn't find anything objectionable in the fact of  arguing in favour  
of  universal scepticism. Conee (2004) also thinks that it is possible in general to  argue  in 
favour of  global scepticism, and discusses with some details why there is no incoherence in  
so proceeding despite initial appearances to the contrary. 
According to them, a sceptic might avoid the charge of  occupying an incoherent 
standpoint by proposing an argument for her view as a form of  reductio ad absurdum of  the 
possibility of  having good reasons. 
“The argument would then have the following overall structure: if  there were any good reasons to  
believe anything, then this argument would give conclusive reason to deny that there are any good  
reasons. Hence there are none”. Conee (2004) p. 12. 
But if  you believe that you have no grounds tout court, then you have no grounds to judge 
that there are no grounds. You cannot intelligibly be in a position in which you judge that  
because of  this and that (the premises of  the argument), there are no grounds, for in so 
doing  you are  relying  on grounds.  You can't  even tell  to  yourself  that  because of  that 
argument, which is a reductio, scepticism is true, for again, even if  the argument is a reductio, 
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you are taking it to provide grounds for your conclusion. 
Nor can you tell  to yourself  that  since there are no grounds,  your argument for 
judging that there are no grounds does not provide you with grounds to judge that there 
are no grounds. The problem with you thinking this is twofold: the first is that it doesn't  
make any sense to  use an argument without taking it  to provide you with grounds for 
judging its conclusion; the second is that in thinking that,  since there are no grounds, my 
argument for judging that there are no grounds does not provide me with grounds to judge  
that there are no grounds,  you are reasoning,  drawing conclusions,  relying on grounds.  
There is no escape. 
Conee offers further ingenious ways in which we can try to make sense of  the 
stance of  a global sceptic. His proposals are very interesting because they allow us to see 
how  focus  on  public  endorsement  of  a  view  obscures  facts  about  real  first-personal  
endorsement of  a  view. There is  as noticed a tendency in the literature to explore the 
tenability of  positions by exploring the way in which a conversation, a debate, between the 
defenders of  two incompatible theses will  go. The focus is on assertion, on presenting 
arguments, on defending positions against a very demanding and crazy sceptic, and so on. 
This is not bad in itself  – it is interesting if  one is interested in assertion and dialectical 
issues, or it is useful if  dramatizing helps in understanding the issue – but it unsuited to  
address the central issue. The central issue is what I can possibly judge and hold in a rational 
way. This issue is somehow independent on the following question: what can I assert and 
argue  for  in  the  public  sphere  with  an  opponent?  The  focus  on  the  latter  issue  has  
obscured several important phenomena, like those I am discussing here. 
Conee responds to the objection to global scepticism according to which by relying 
on an argument the sceptic is committing herself  to the claim she is denying – namely 
there are grounds for judging – as follows: 
“The psychological fact that a certain argument is found convincing may prompt a universal reason 
skeptic [a global sceptic] to present the argument. So the sceptic can offer the argument sincerely 
while not assuming or implying that it has any rational force.” p. 12. 
The idea he is proposing is that the sceptic is someone who recognizes that some chain of  
statements, if  presented to an interlocutor as an argument, may have a certain convincing 
force which may convince the interlocutor to believe in scepticism. Because of  this the 
sceptic may propose the argument without however believing that it offers grounds. But 
what if  I am the interlocutor which is presenting the argument and to which the argument  
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is presented? In no way I can tell to  myself that I am presenting to myself  the argument 
because  I  find  it  convincing  and  persuasive  without  however  judging  that  it  provides 
grounds for its conclusion! It is like trying to consciously deceive oneself. And even if  it 
happens that I arrive at judging that global scepticism is true on the basis of  a causal story 
which doesn't include me recognizing that there are grounds for so judging,  once  I have 
made  the  judgments  I  have  thereby  triggered  untenable  commitments  that  I  am in  a 
position to make explicit  if  I  start  reflecting about the issue.  Conee is  here describing 
something that can happen, but he is failing to describe a coherent standpoint, and so he is  
failing to describe a position that might be stably occupied within inquiry. 
Another counterargument to what I am arguing consists in saying that the sort of  
incoherence  I  am describing  is  a  mere  sociological/pragmatic  fact  with  no  epistemic 
import. Here is what Conee says: 
“There  may  be  a  sense  of  commitment  whereby  the  sceptic,  just  in  virtue  of  presenting  an 
argument, is committed to its cogency. That in turn may include a commitment to the rational  
defensibility of  the argument's premises and form. If  so, then these things are just conventional 
facts  about  the  social  role  of  offering  an  argument.  And  again,  the  sceptic may  present  the 
reasoning because she believes its premises and accepts its validity, without regarding any of  it as  
reasonably believed. It is not entailed by someone's presenting an argument that the person asserts 
or implies that any of  its premises, or its form, has some positive epistemic status”. p. 12 
This sort  of  answer  is  a  spectacularly  clear instance of  the sort  of  philosophical  self-
alienation which I am trying to make salient in this Dissertation. There are several wrong 
ideas in this passage. To say that the commitments of  cognition – in the present case, the  
commitment to the cogency of  an inference one is making, and the commitment to the 
rational defensibility of  the argument's premises and form – are just conventional facts 
about the social role of  offering an argument is basically to reduce normativity to a social  
product. Yet, to think of  cognition in this way – as we will see with some more details in  
the last Chapter – is to fail to make sense of  the possibility of  knowledge. Moreover, this 
view  is  implausible  when  evaluated  on  the  ground  of  the  investigation  of  the 
phenomenology  of  normativity  –  they  do  not  look  as  the  kind  of  facts  that  can  be 
conventional, namely such as to vary with a variation of  social convention. It is untenable  
to judge that it is a social convention that determines that judgment is intelligible only if 
the agent takes the judged proposition to be well  grounded. What can explain Conee's  
insistence of  the social role of  offering an argument is that he is not paying attention to 
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cognition but to public linguistic practice, as it is confirmed by what he says at the end of 
the quoted passage.
There  are  other  remarkable  mistakes  in  Conee's  argument.  He  says  that  it  is  
possible to judge that the premises of  an argument are true, to judge that the argument is  
valid, without regarding any of  these judgments as justified. This, as we have seen in the 
previous  phenomenological  investigation,  is  simply  false,  since  judging  triggers  further 
alethic commitments, some of  which having to do with the possession of  grounds for so 
judging.  Conee  is  maybe  saying  that  because  he  is  failing  to  properly  appreciate  the 
interplay between considering propositions in abstracto and considering them while paying 
attention to the fact that they have to be endorsed in standpoints. He says that “it  is not 
entailed by someone's presenting an argument that the person asserts or implies that any of  
its  premises,  or  its  form,  has  some positive epistemic status”.  But in  saying this  he is  
focusing on the wrong phenomenon. If  we are wondering about whether a given view is  
tenable – in the sense that it can be endorsed in a coherent fashion, without engendering 
incoherent commitments – we should not look at what is implied by publicly presenting an 
argument in its favour. We should look at what it takes to judge that view to be true and to  
provide for oneself  reasons for so judging. The quest for knowledge  is a first-personal 
problem. We should think of  scepticism as an option which exists within each of  us. Each of 
us should wonder what to think about global scepticism, just as we have to wonder about 
any other philosophical proposition193. 
Conee has a last attempt to make sense of  the global sceptic's standpoint. 
“Maybe this sceptical view actually can be rationally accepted. For instance, it seems possible for  
such a sceptic to see rational force in some argument for her view, and thereby accept it,  not 
noticing that the view entails that she is not thereby justified in believing it. This might be enough  
for a rational acceptance of  the view.” Conee 2004. p. 14 
This is surely correct, and it is arguably what happens when people come to be persuaded 
that global scepticism might be true. They understand the arguments (think of  the problem 
of  certainty), they come to judge that conclusion, yet they are not fully aware that by so 
believing one is committing herself  to her being justified in so believing. However, as seen, 
193This alienation between the philosophical problem and the personal problem is one of  the most serious 
diseases of  contemporary philosophy, I think. Philosophical problems are not typically treated as real 
existential problems – problems such that the truth about them is going to have an impact on the whole 
life of  the philosopher. This is clear in the case of  scepticism. As James Conant and Andrea Kern (2014), 
p1 note: “[the problem of  scepticism] is treated as just one philosophical puzzle among others, a puzzle 
upon which a professional philosopher might or might not sharpen her analytical teeth”. We are not here 
to sharpen our analytical teeth; we are here to understand something about all this before we die. 
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the standpoint is untenable because it gives rise to an incoherent set of  commitments. It is  
very  hard  then  to  see  what  relevant  notion  of  'rational  acceptance'  Conee  might  be 
appealing to in the passage, since it entails that it is rational to be in a standpoint such that  
one is committed to both judge that there are no justified beliefs and that there are justified  
beliefs. One might characterise a notion – perhaps even an interesting and useful one for 
our evaluative practice – of  'rational acceptance' such that it might be rational in that sense 
to accept an untenable standpoint like global scepticism. But this doesn't change the point 
that the view is incoherent and can't be occupied when its commitments are made explicit.  
It is not then a stable move in the game of  truth that we are playing when we inquire. 
One of  the crucial point of  my defence of  Reason against the global sceptic hinges  
on the fact that we should not think of  the sceptical challenge as a challenge that comes 
from the  outside,  but  rather  as  a  challenge  that  we  raise  to  ourselves  using  the  very  
resources of  Reason that the challenge is supposed to challenge. This sort of  strategy is 
not new, as I noticed in the beginning of  this section. Thomas Nagel (1997), to mention 
just him, use the same strategy in order to show that logic and Reason more generally  
cannot be challenged by the sceptic because she will have to rely on these very resources in 
order to raise the challenge194. Putting the points in a first-personal manner makes the point 
vivid: I can't rely on whatever resources I am employing right now in thinking this thought  
in order to convince myself  that this thought and all other my thoughts might be false...  
Enoch (2006) has however a challenge to this strategy195. It is worth quoting his thought at 
length.
“But this  line of  thought—however influential—nevertheless fails.  Skeptical  challenges […] are 
best seen, I think, as highlighting tensions within our own commitments, as paradoxes arguing for  
an unacceptable conclusion from premises we endorse, employing rules of  inference to which we 
are committed.  In responding to such challenges,  we must  not  yield  to the temptation  of  the 
“adversarial stance” (Wright 1991, 89): The philosophical challenge is not to defeat a real person  
who advocates the skeptical view or occupies the skeptical position (what  view or position?) but, 
rather,  to  solve  the  paradox,  to  show  how  we  can  avoid  the  unacceptable  conclusion  at  an  
acceptable price. If  we must think of  the situation in dialectical terms, we should think of  skeptical 
challenges as ad hominem arguments, with all of  us as the relevant homini. “The skeptic” is entitled 
to use, say, logic because we are committed to the legitimacy of  doing so. […] In other words, the 
skeptic is entitled to use our own weapons against us. If, using these weapons, he can support a  
194The same point is perhaps voiced by Nietzsche when he says (1979), p. 94: “even scepticism contains a  
belief: the belief  in logic”.
195Compare with Feldman (2002), p. 120-1. 
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conclusion we are not willing to swallow—one stating, for instance, that the very weapons he is 
using are not ones we are entitled to use—then it is  we  who are in trouble, not him, because we 
have been shown to have inconsistent commitments. Think of  the situation as an analogue of  a  
reductio ad absurdum: a good reductio argument assumes a certain claim only to prove it false. And 
just like a sound (reductio) argument establishing that a certain claim is false may assume that it is 
true, a sound argument concluding that a certain method of  reasoning is incorrect or unjustified 
may employ that very method.” p. 184-5.
There is something correct and something profoundly misguided in this picture of  the 
sceptical challenge. I agree that the sceptical challenge is best seen as a challenge that we  
raise to ourselves using whatever resources our Reason provides and relying on whatever 
premises that we think to have reason to take as true. I also agree that once a challenge is 
raised, and we effectively find the reasoning valid and the premises compelling, then  we 
have a problem. Hence, some of  our commitments must be wrong. But,  and here I think 
Enoch is getting the phenomenon wrong, from this it doesn't follow that it is possible to  
challenge the very resources of  Reason that we use in order to raise the challenge. What 
can be challenged are some of  the premises, where the premises that can be challenged are 
those whose acceptance is in no way constitutive of  cognition – namely a premise whose  
acceptance is a  precondition for the very possibility  of  cognition. Surely,  if  a  sceptical 
challenge is raised and it is found challenging it is because the argument is found valid and  
we are inclined to regard the premises as true. But, if  we understand that the argument is  
self-defeating in the way that a global sceptical argument is, then we can't judge that the 
conclusion might be true. What we should judge is that some of  the premises are false, or  
that the logical form is invalid. In fact, the existence of  this challenge is important precisely 
because it teaches us that some of  the premises that we initially found plausible is wrong – 
the challenge allows us to make order in our commitments, but this is so precisely because 
we understand that the conclusion can't be true. 
Enoch is probably led to accept the view that a sceptical challenge is a paradox that 
we face and, crucially, that a way of  facing it is by accepting its conclusion as true, because 
he is thinking in too general terms about sceptical challenges. Surely, the sceptical challenge 
to show that the external world really exists might be understood in the way Enoch does,  
namely by considering it as a paradox, where one of  the available legitimate moves is to 
embrace the paradox by accepting its conclusion. However, and this is the crucial point, in 
the case of  scepticism about the existence of  external world the conclusion is not a truth 
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which  is  presupposed  by  the  very  use  of  cognition196,  thus  it  is  possible to  coherently 
embrace its conclusion. But in the case of  scepticism about strongly constitutive rules of 
inference197, if  any, or scepticism about the very possibility of  knowledge and justification, 
the conclusions can't be embraced, for they are presupposed by the very use of  cognition. 
This is why in the case of  these particular sceptical arguments, what they challenge is not  
the truth of  the conclusion but rather the justification we take ourselves to possess in 
giving credit to the premises that engender the paradox.
We should then distinguish different kinds of  paradox. The standard paradoxical 
situation is the one which is here is summarise by Sainsbury (1995), p. 1: 
“This  is  what  I  understand  by  a  paradox:  an  apparently  unacceptable  conclusions  derived  by  
apparently acceptable reasoning from apparently acceptable premises” p. 1.
So understood, the structure of  a paradox is silent with respect to the question whether the 
premises and the conclusion of  the argument are constitutive commitments of  cognition.  
If  they are not,  then the natural  reaction to a  paradox is  the  one that Sainsbury adds 
immediately after to the just quoted passage: 
“Appearances  have  to  deceive,  since  the  acceptable  cannot  lead  by  acceptable  steps  to  the 
unacceptable. So, generally, we have a choice: either the conclusion is not really unacceptable, or 
else the starting point, or the reasoning, has some non-obvious flaw” (p. 1).
But, not all paradoxical arguments are of  these kinds. We might further distinguish two 
kinds  of  paradoxical  situations.  Both  paradoxical  situations  are  such  that  there  is  an 
argument  that  leads  to a  conclusion that  we can't  accept  not  only  (and not  so much) 
because it is 'apparently unacceptable' but rather because we are committed to its falsity by  
being  engaged  in  the  very  activity  which  we  should  use  in  order  to  argue  for  that  
conclusion. Yet, one paradoxical situation (which I think is the one we face with global 
scepticism) is such that the premises of  the argument are merely seemingly plausible but,  
and this is crucial, they are not propositions to which we are unavoidably committed when  
196At least  it is not obvious that it is.  It is unclear whether the fact that we believe that there exists an 
external world (or some claims in the vicinity) would be a precondition of  cognition. One might however 
construct a transcendental argument to the effect that taking the external world to exist is a precondition  
of  inescapable aspects of  our cognition or experience. See Chapter XII for an argument to the effect that 
hinge  epistemologies  that  are  inspired  by  Hume's  and  Wittgenstein's  reactions  to  scepticism fail  to  
respond to scepticism about the external world because the belief  that there is an external world is not 
inescapable in the required sense. 
197See Chapter VI.
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we engage in cognition. If  they were (and this is the other kind of  paradoxical situation),  
we would be in a really troublesome situation: namely a situation in which our cognition is  
committed by its  very  nature  to  incompatible  commitments.  This  paradoxical  situation 
could not be solved in the way in which I propose to solve the paradoxical nature of  the 
argument for global scepticism. In the latter case, we can indeed find something wrong 
about the premises (or the logical form of  the argument), and this possibility is not blocked  
by the fact that these premises, whatever evidence we might have about their truth-value, 
are anyway propositions that we regard as true, however implicitly, when we cognize. In the 
former  case,  when  all  the  premises  and  the  conclusion  are  unavoidable  alethic  
commitments of  cognition,  the situation is  simply irresolvable:  this would be a tragical  
condition, if  it were real, because it would mean that we are irremediably committed to  
incompatible  propositions,  whatever we do to persuade ourselves that at least some of 
them are, in fact, false. 
Now,  having  proved  that  global  scepticism  is  indeed  untenable,  and  having 
distinguished different paradoxical venues for our reflections, we should check whether the 
premises  that  lead  to  global  scepticism  are  themselves  constitutive  commitments  of 
cognition (like the proposition that there are justified judgments)  or not.  Further work 
should  be  done  in  order  to  conclusively  show that  all  plausible  arguments  for  global 
scepticism do rely on premises that are not constitutive commitments of  cognition.
After this quite long discussion it is worth quoting Hume's comment on the global 
sceptic. He says:
“Whoever  has  taken  the  pains  to  refute  the  cavils  of  this  total  scepticism has  really  disputed 
without  an antagonist  and endeavoured  by arguments  to establish  a  faculty  which  Nature  has  
antecedently implanted in the mind and rendered unavoidable”198
There is something right in this point, but something dangerous in the way in which Hume 
makes it by reference to Nature. Surely, there might be a global sceptic, if  by that we simply 
mean  someone  that  on  a  given  occasion  believes  (and  eventually  asserts)  that  global  
scepticism is true. Yet, there can't be any coherent global sceptic, for any involvement in  
cognition will commit one to the existence of  justified beliefs, and thus to the negation of 
global  scepticism.  So,  in  this  sense,  it  is  Nature  that  has  implanted  in  the  mind  a 
commitment to the falsity of  global scepticism. But the way in which this commitment is 
implanted is not the same way in which a desire for survival, if  unavoidable, could be said  
198End of  book 1 of  the Treatise. 
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to have been implanted in our mind. The commitment to the existence of  justified beliefs 
is connected with a wider set of  commitments that form an intelligible whole. There is  
some sort of  internal coherence and unity among our commitments and the structure of 
the fundamental ingredients of  cognition, namely judgment and questioning. The reference 
to Nature as that which has implanted in us the commitment to falsity of  global scepticism  
might naturally suggest a detached vision of  our cognition that looses sight of  the internal 
coherence  and kind  of  intelligibility  that  it  exhibits.  This  is  an  important  point  to  be 
noticed199, for this touches the transcendental problematics that I have briefly described at  
the end of  the Introduction. 
§7.6 Pyrrhonian silence
So far I have discussed global scepticism understood as a thesis to be believed. We have 
seen that  the crucial  problem with global  scepticism is  the fact  that  we can't  but take  
ourselves to be justified in believing it  if  we believe it.  The problem seems thus to be 
connected with the very nature of  the act of  believing and with what it involves. This is a 
problem which is well known, and it is one of  the reason why Pyrrhonian scepticism is 
typically taken to be more promising than dogmatic scepticism. 
The crucial difference between global scepticism and pyrrhonian scepticism is that 
the former involves taking a dogmatic stance in inquiry, whereas the latter is supposed to 
involve  taking a  suspensive  stance in  inquiry.  There  are  several  ways in  which we  can 
understand a pyrrhonian suspensive stance. In what follows I will try to highlight the most 
promising ways of  understanding the position. I will make my best efforts to make it a  
tenable stance, though I will ultimately argue that there is no tenable wholly suspensive 
pyrrhonian sceptical  stance.  The point won't  be that it  is  irrational  to be a  pyrrhonian  
sceptic; the point will simply be that it is impossible. 
199This point would have to be elaborated much further than what I have done in the main text. A richer  
discussion will have to connect it with discussions that focus on the different kinds of  intelligibility that is 
exhibited when we put things in the logical space of  reason and in the space of  nature. As the labels suggest, 
the  discussion  will  have  to  take  into  account  Sellars's  influential  views  on  the  matter,  Davidson's  
discussion of  the distinction between causal relations and normative relations, Wittgenstein (from which 
both are drawing) as well as Pittgsburg philosophers like Brandon and McDowell who have followed 
Sellars's Kantian and Wittgensteinian take on the issue. Unfortunately, this is not the place where I can do  
so. See Wittgenstein (1997), Sellars (1956), McDowell (1994), Brandon (1994). The whole Dissertation 
can be seen as giving a phenomenological twist to the search for a distinction between space of  reason  
and space of  nature that is central in the reflection of  these philosophers. The main divide between the 
present  work and these  works  is  that  most  of  them ground the  realm of  normativity  in  our  social 
practices and in our concepts, whereas I want to explore the idea that at least some (though of  course not 
all!) normativity is to be grounded in phenomenology itself, in structures whose existence is independent 
on the way in which our conceptual scheme and practices have developed.
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Pyrrhonian  sceptics  are  sometimes  said  to  be  suspending  judgment  about 
everything. As I prefer to use the term 'suspension of  judgment', suspending judgment just 
is  to  have a  judgment  about  grounds.  Pyrrhonian  sceptics  are  not  meant  to  have any  
judgments whatsoever, and anyway the core of  their standpoint is not meant to be some 
set  of  judgments  about  grounds  for  judging.  This  will  have  to  be  a  revisionary 
understanding of  the position, or anyway the conclusion of  an argument to the effect that 
a Pyrrhonian sceptic should understand herself  as having judgments about grounds. Before 
coming to this conclusion, however, we should try to give a more neutral and more faithful 
characterization of  the sort of  suspensive attitude that the pyrrhonian is supposed to have.  
In order to avoid terminological  confusion,  I will  speak of  suspension of  judgment in 
order to refer to judgments about grounds, as I did in Chapter IV. I will speak of  silence,  
or of  a silent attitude, in order to refer to the core of  the Pyrrhonian stance. 
What is this silence supposed to be? Mere absence of  judgments is not enough, for 
this makes me silent about pretty much every proposition except the one I am right now 
judging while writing this very sentence. We should look for a suitable absence of  judgment. 
One  option  is  to  consider  silence  as  being  the  act  of  simply  entertaining  a  
proposition  without  taking  any  stance  with  respect  to  it.  I  might  now  entertain  the 
proposition  that  467:13=34,7  without  taking  any  stance  about  it.  I  have  not  even  a  
proclivity to go one way or another, since this division is beyond my automatic arithmetical  
powers. (If  you believe that the example offered does not amount to a proposition that can 
be entertained, consider an empirical proposition, maybe the proposition that the number 
of  stars is even). The problem is that if  silence just is entertaining a proposition, then this 
is clearly not a competitor of  the stance I am defending here, namely judging that there are 
certainties. Regardless of  whether it is possible to spend one's life by simply entertaining 
propositions, this life won't represent a competitive standpoint to the standpoint of  the 
believer in certainties. It is not even clear whether occupying this stance would constitute a 
move within inquiry. Surely, to entertain a proposition is necessary in order to then be  
capable of  judging or wondering whether it is true. But mere entertaining is not to take a  
stance in inquiry but rather to put oneself  in a position to then eventually take some stance 
in inquiry.
Another option is to take silence as being the act of  entertaining a proposition 
while wondering about its truth value, without however judging one way or another. This is  
what I have previously described as the attitude of  open-mindedness. Open-mindedness is  
relative to some proposition – this is why it  requires that it be entertained – and is an 
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inquisitive  attitude,  that is  an attitude of  someone who is  considering whether a  given 
proposition is true. Open-mindedness is the default position one finds oneself  in when 
one is wondering about the truth value of  a proposition which one isn't already believing 
or which is such that one doesn't have any disposition to believe it200. Now we are depicting 
the pyrrhonian sceptic as someone who is looking for the truth, yet whenever she wonders 
about a proposition she remains open minded and refrains from making any judgment. 
This picture comes closer to what we want. For, there is absence of  judgment and there is  
a move within inquiry – namely questioning. 
Is this a tenable standpoint201? Before going to answer this question, we should 
further  distinguish  between  some  variations  of  this  standpoint.  Why  is  it  that  while  
wondering about the truth-value of  a proposition our sceptic doesn't make any judgment? 
One option is that there are no motivations at all. Our subject is simply so disposed or 
simply  so caused.  Another  motivation  might  be  that  she  has  a  non-alethic  reason for  
preferring an inquisitive silence over judgment. In this case, however, as we will see, the  
silence won't constitute a move in inquiry and so this silence won't be a genuine competitor 
to judgment. Another motivation is that the subject has alethic grounds for so preferring.  
This represents a move within inquiry – for silence is endorsed as being the correct attitude 
to take with respect to the aim of  truth. Moreover, this seems to represents a possible move, 
since there is nothing immediately unintelligible in the supposition that one might remain 
silent about  p on the basis  of  alethic grounds.  The question we will  raise is,  however, 
whether one can  at  the same time have alethic grounds and be really silent about any 
proposition whatsoever, for this seems to be the core of  the pyrrhonian attitude: not just a  
local silence, for that would make all  of  us pyrrhonians, but a global silence. Also,  the 
question is whether it is possible to avoid having alethic commitments even if  we grant that  
it  is  possible  to  remain  really  silent,  at  any  moment,  about  the  propositions  one  is 
considering. These are the questions we are now going to address in a moment. 
So,  to  sum  up,  to  a  first  approximation  we  might  understand  silence  as  the 
condition of  entertaining a proposition  p without judging it  to be true (or false),  while 
200For the distinction between dispositional belief, and disposition to believe see Chapter III, §3.2. For a  
discussion of  open-mindedness see Chapter IV, §4.2-4.5.
201Notice that so understood silence is almost identical with the cognitive attitudes of  the Universal Doubter 
described in Chapter V. The universal  doubter  raises a doubt about every proposition she comes to 
entertain, and since raising a doubt is a way of  seeking for the truth-value of  the proposition doubted, the  
two standpoints are almost identical, the only difference being that silence as characterised concerns both 
open and closed questions, and not only closed questions (those that we raise when we doubt). In what  
follows I will try to see different ways in which one can enrich this silent open-mindedness by making it  
an attitude that goes towards resembling the one that the Pyrrhonian sceptic is supposed to occupy. In so 
far as the attitude is a mere silence understood as a form of  open-mindedness, it inherits all the problems 
that I have discussed in connection with the stance of  the Universal Doubter. 
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wondering whether it  is true or not. We will then add several elements to this minimal 
cognitive stance in order to see whether there is  any version of  it  that ends up being  
tenable. 
Here  is  the  overall  structure  of  my  argument  against  Pyrrhonian  scepticism. 
Suppose you ask to yourself: is it possible to be silent about everything? If  you judge that 
the answer is positve, then you are not being silent about everything. If  you judge that the  
answer is negative, you are both failing to be silent about everything – since you are judging 
something –, and you are also denying the possibility of  the very standpoint you were 
supposed to occupy. Is there any other option? You might remain silent and refrain to  
answer the question. But why would you ever remain silent? One option is that you remain  
silent for no reason, but this is  not a move within inquiry.  Another option is that you 
remain silent because you conclude that you alethically should remain silent, given that you 
don't want to be mislead into believing the false. This is failing to remain silent, because  
you conclude something. A last option is that you remain silent because you conclude that  
you prudentially should. This is failing to remain silent and also failing to occupy a move in 
the game of  truth. Is there any other option? No. 
Let  me  now  go  into  the  details  of  the  argument.  If  you  find  the  argument 
persuasive as it stands, you might skip the following paragraphs and go directly to the next  
Chapter.  
§7.7 Tranquillity driven pyrrhonian scepticism as untenable
The first question to ask here is whether pyrrhonian scepticism is meant to be a move 
within inquiry or a move outside it. When I play football my physical movements constitute  
moves outside inquiry, whereas when I draw inferences and refrain from judging on the 
basis of  appreciation of  the evidence I am making moves within inquiry. Depending on 
whether pyrrhonian scepticism is taken to be a move within or without inquiry we have 
two very different pictures of  pyrrhonism.
According  to  what  we  might  also  call  the  non-rationalistic  or  non-alethic 
understanding of  pyrrhonism, silence is an attitude which is adopted for the sole sake of 
achieving tranquillity. Crucially, it is not adopted because it is somehow seen as the correct 
attitude to have with respect to the goal of  believing the truth. It is a stance that is taken on 
the basis of  non-alethic reasons.
There is a simple reason why pyrrhonism so understood can be discarded, namely 
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because it doesn't represent a  competitive  stance against  the standpoint I am defending, 
namely  the judgment  that  there are  certainties.  Since  the  pyrrhonian stance is  adopted 
regardless of  whether it is taken to be the alethically correct one to have, it doesn't count as  
a  move within  inquiry.  To see that,  suppose it  is  possible  to refrain from judging any 
proposition one happens to be presented with, and that one refrains from judging on the 
ground that so doing will put her in a reasonably peaceful state of  mind. Well, for this 
person  it  will  always  be  an  open  question  whether  it  is  alethically  correct  to  refrain 
judgment – this is, after all, precisely what her silence amounts to. One will always be in a 
position to tell to herself: I am not going to judge that p is true because I want to be left in 
peace, but is  p true? The fact that this question remains open shows that the suspensive 
attitude of  the pyrrhonian is not a move within the game of  truth. 
Yet there is a difference between the sense in which playing football is not in the 
business of  the truth and the sense in which refraining from judging on prudential grounds 
is  outside  the  game  of  inquiry.  For,  I  can  at  the  same  time  play  football  and  make 
judgments, whereas I can't at the same time refrain from judging and judging. Thus, there is  
a sense in which, however, a tranquillity driven scepticism of  this sort is really somehow 
incompatible with my stance. Yet, and this is crucial, the incompatibility here doesn't arise 
because there is a tension in the commitments of  the respective standpoints. If  one were 
to refrain from judging that  p on the ground that so doing would be the most beneficial 
attitude to have, one would not ipso facto display commitments about what is true, about 
alethic  grounds  and about  their  quality.  The  sort  of  incompatibility  we  would  have  is  
somehow accidental  when compared to the incompatibility  between judging that  p and 
judging that there are no grounds for p. 
Another  way  of  putting  the  point  is  that  the  clash  between a  silence  about  p 
motivated by prudential reasons and a silence motivated by alethic grounds is a clash that 
doesn't  arise  within  the game of  truth,  but rather outside it.  It  is  a disagreement as to 
whether the aim of  truth should trump the aim of  achieving tranquillity. This is a useful 
metaphorical way of  putting the sense in which the two attitudes are not incompatible in  
the relevant  sense.  Yet,  as  I  will  argue in  more length in  Chapter  IX,  there  is  no real 
disagreement  between  the  aim of  truth  and  other  aims  in  the  case  of  judgment  and 
cognition more generally,  for truth is  the constitutive aim of  cognition in a sense that 
doesn't license any weighting it with other aims. 
There is a general lesson to be extracted from this case and which I will repeat 
several times again in different occasions in what follows. The lesson is this: any stance 
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which is in practice incompatible with the stance of  someone who does believe something 
with certainty does not represent a competitor stance  if it is a stance that has no alethic 
support. To put it in different terms: if  a stance is the result of  some sort of  deliberation 
which is  not  truth-oriented  – like  the  practical  deliberation which consists  in  deciding 
which one is the most suffering-free attitude to have – then that stance has no relevant  
bearing on the quest for truth. Similarly, and a fortiori, any stance which is the result of 
processes which are not truth-oriented and which are not transparent to the subject as such 
is not a stance which is relevant to the question whether certainty is possible or not. To 
illustrate the latter case, on which I will say something more below, consider this: suppose it  
is possible for a human being to stop, at some point of  her life and due to a causal process 
of  which she is unaware, to believing everything. She becomes a subject whose judgment 
with respect to any conceivable proposition whatsoever is forever absent. It is clear that  
that possibility doesn't  represent any threat to the claim that certainty is possible.  This 
works for any aetiology whatsoever, so long as the aetiology isn't cognized by the subject as 
being the (alethically pertinent) causal ground for judging or refraining to judge. Thus, to 
apply the point against a certain picture of  a quietist philosophical move, if  thanks to some 
sort of  philosophical discourse one just stops believing everything without however taking 
the discourse as one's alethic ground for so doing (regardless of  whether the philosophical 
discourse does in fact represent a good (alethic) ground or not), then the possibility of  
such a stance is no threat to the thesis that certainty is possible. Simply, the possibility of 
these suspensive stances, if  ungrounded by alethic considerations, belongs to an entirely 
different business from the one which is characterised by the question: what is true? 
So far I have argued that even if  it were possible to refrain from judging on the 
basis of  non-alethic grounds, the resulting standpoint would not be a competitor to my 
standpoint, as well as to any standpoint that is grounded on alethic considerations. But it is  
worth mentioning the fact that anyway it seems to be strictly speaking impossible to be 
silent on non-alethic grounds. If  you are taking some consideration as a prudential ground 
for  silence,  then  you  are  judging  that  you  possess  such  grounds,  or  anyway  you  are 
committed to take yourself  to possess prudential grounds. Hence you are failing to be 
entirely silent. 
§7.8 Alethically driven pyrrhonism as untenable
In  order  to  have  a  genuine  competitor  to  the  standpoint  that  judges  that  there  are 
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certainties  we need somehow to make sense of  silence as a move within inquiry,  as a 
response to the aim of  inquiry.
My case against the possibility of  an alethically based pyrrhonism is based on two 
facts. First, it is impossible to be an inquisitive mind of  the sort the pyrrhonian is describing 
without  also  having judgments,  particularly  judgments  about  grounds.  This  shows that 
there  is  no  inquiring  mind  that  can  be  completely  silent.  Second,  even  if  it  were  by 
hypothesis possible to be entirely silent, it is not possible not to have alethic commitments.  
This means that the pyrrhonian standpoint, even if  it manages to be silent on any occasion,  
is still committed to take some propositions as true, and so it fails to be a stable standpoint. 
There are various subtle ways in which one can try to save the pyrrhonian picture from 
these objections202.  So we will  gradually explore such moves and along the way we will 
further our understanding of  the alethically committed dynamics of  cognition. 
Our question is now the following: how can one both be silent and take part to 
inquiry? The suspensive sceptic neither believes that it is possible to achieve the truth, nor  
does she believe that it is impossible. If  she believed the latter, she would be a dogmatist  
sceptic. Whereas if  she believed the former, she would anyway failing to be silent about  
every proposition. Yet, one might wonder whether it is intelligible to say that someone is  
actually engaged in the search for truth if  she is not taking the discovery of  truth to be a  
possible output. That would be a first objection to the tenability of  an alethically based 
pyrrhonism. 
According to Perin (2010), however, 
“It is not a necessary condition on engagement in the search for truth that one believe that it is  
possible to discover the truth. All that is required is that one not deny, as the negative dogmatist  
does, that it is possible to do so”. p. 19203. 
This point can be argued for by noticing that when we deliberate about what to believe we 
need  not  explicitly judge  that  it  is  possible  to  discover  the  truth.  If  we  think  of  our 
202In what follows I will mainly focus on Perin's book The demands of  reason whose aim is precisely to show 
that it is entirely possible and consistent to be a pyrrhonian sceptic who takes her silence to be a response 
to the demands of  our truth-oriented inquiry. See Perin (2010), particularly Chapter 1.  See also Brennan 
(1999) pp. 84-7 and 99-106, for a defence of  the claim that the pyrrhonian sceptic is engaged in the search 
for truth. For a contrary opinion, See, Palmer (2000), and Striker (2001). 
203There is  a  further  consequence  of  this.  Because of  the  fact that  the sceptic  is  not a  dogmatist,  his 
suspension of  judgments is not even a commitment to remain silent forever. Of  course, it may happen that 
the sceptic will never have any ground to believe an option instead of  its alternatives; however, this might 
not happen. If  it turns out that there are conclusive grounds to judge a given p as true, then the sceptic 
will thereby stop to be one. Sextus is quite explicit on this point. PH. 1.25, 1.200, 1.201, and 3.70, as it has 
been remarked by Barnes (1990) p. 10, and Perin (2010) p. 21-22. 
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inferential grounds for judging, in order to judge the conclusion of  an argument we need  
not  rely  on  an  argument  whose  premises  include  the  proposition  that  the  truth  is 
discoverable. 
Yet, and this is one first point to be brought home, from the fact that it is not 
needed to explicitly judge that the truth is discoverable in order to come to judge anything 
upon alethic considerations, it doesn't follow that there is no commitment to judging that 
the truth is discoverable. This point can be noticed from a certain distance if  we realise the 
simple fact that when we engage in a project we do so because we presuppose that it is  
possible to execute the project. The same goes for inquiry, the project of  discovering what 
is true. When I inquire it is because I take it, however unconsciously and implicitly, that it is 
possible to discover the truth. If  I were to explicitly judge that it is impossible to discover 
the truth I  won't  start  inquiring  (even if  judging in this  way would amount to a  self-
refutational step in inquiry). If  we move closer to our mental life and try to engage in the  
method  of  intelligibility  we  realise  that  judging  is  committed  to  the  possibility  of 
discovering the truth. In order to appreciate this, we might try to put ourselves in a state  
such that we both judge that p is true and that it is impossible to discover the truth. This is 
not  possible  –  it  is  precisely  the  sort  of  shortcoming  that  makes  global  scepticism 
untenable204. In fact, the same result might be more easily appreciated if  one were to try  
simply to judge the proposition that it is impossible to discover the truth. As soon as one 
understands what one is judging and appreciate its implications, one will be stopping to so 
judge. For by judging that it is impossible to discover the truth I am judging that this very 
judgment might be false. So, even if  a pyrrhonian sceptic need not explicitly judge that truth 
is discoverable, she is committed to it if  she is engaged in the search for truth. But absent any 
further  argument  the  presence  of  this  commitment  seems  to  be  compatible  with  the 
thought that one can be silent whenever she considers a proposition.  I  will  argue in a 
moment that this appearance is illusory. 
The crucial problem for an alethically driven pyrrhonian scepticism emerges if  we 
ask  the  following:  why is  it  that  the  Pyrrhonian  decides  to  remain  silent  when  she  is 
presented with a new proposition? It can't be on the basis of  no reason or ground, for in 
204The only case that might elude this point is  the one of  mystery. In the case of  a question which is  
recognized as being asking something that has no answer, I might in some sense be inquiring while I also 
take it that there is no truth to be discovered. Mysteries however are not insulated acts of  cognition. They  
take place and are intelligible within a larger set of  beliefs and commitments. Thus, when I raise the  
question that touches on a mystery, there are cases where I don't know already that I am dealing with a 
mystery (and in this case the commitment to the discoverability of  the truth is in place) and there are 
cases in which I do know that I am facing a mystery (and in that case, even if  I don't take it that the  
answer is discoverable, I am committed to there being discoverable truths, since I have discovered that I 
am facing a mystery). 
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that case her stance will be a thoughtless mental event, something that the cognitive agent  
can't ascribe to herself  as her standpoint, as the standpoint she endorses. It can't be on the 
basis of  non-alethic reasons – like the reason that being silent leads to tranquillity – for this 
won't amount as the endorsement of  an attitude in the light of  the truth. Thus, it must be 
on the basis of  some reason or ground that are connected with the truth. 
Perin is explicit on this point: 
“It is clear that Sextus does not think that the Sceptic (or anyone else) can suspend judgement 
simply by deciding or intending to do so. For if  the Sceptic could suspend judgement in this way, 
he would not need to seek or devise,  as he does,  arguments  for and against  the truth of  the 
candidate for belief  that is under consideration. These arguments are supposed to put the Sceptic 
in a position in which it appears to him that for the relevant value of  p there is no reason to believe 
either p or its negation. Suspension of  judgement is the Sceptic’s response to finding himself  in this 
position”. p. 22-23.
However, silence – namely entertaining a proposition while wondering whether it is true or 
false – can't be an attitude that is based on grounds, in the technical sense in which I am 
using the expression 'ground' (viz., a ground is a proposition or an experience on the basis 
of  which some further proposition is judged, and when something counts as a ground in 
this sense it is is taken by the subject as speaking in favour of  the truth of  the judged  
proposition). When we remain silent, we do not take things to be in a certain way – silence 
has no representational or thetic component. Thus, it is not the sort of  thing that can stand  
in the ground relation with some ground. (Compare this discussion with Chapter V, §5.8). 
Therefore, silence must be done on the basis of  some  reason. The reason, as we 
have seen, should have something to do with the truth – somehow, one should take silence  
as being the attitude to be had in order to be in a legitimate relationship with the truth, as it  
were. 
One question is whether it is possible to endorse pyrrhonian silence on the basis of  
a reason, rather than a ground. The answer seems affirmative. I might have a reason to  
entertain a proposition and wonder about whether it is true. This is something I can do at  
will. However, there is something that is beyond my control. I can't control what is going 
to happen once I start considering  p  and wonder about its truth-value. For, if  I end up 
confronting evidence for judging it, there is no practical reason that could prevent me from 
judging it. This is not a problem for a pyrrhonian. In fact, as noticed, she leaves it open the  
question whether there will be propositions that are justified enough so as to deserve our 
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judgment. If  they were judging otherwise they would fall in the dogmatist camp. 
What this shows is that the pyrrhonian stance is not a definitive stance. This should 
not be a problem, for the unsettledness of  our epistemic condition is precisely what the 
pyrrhonists should embody with their mental behaviour: so far, no proposition deserved 
our  judgment,  but  we  will  see.  Though  the  pyrrhonist  can't  judge  it,  somehow  her  
systematic open-mindedness should display sensitivity to this discovery. 
Another question about the proposal that there is a reason to be silent is whether 
this proposal has the resources to describe the pyrrhonian in such a way that his silence is  
complete.  I  think  that  the  answer  should  be  negative.  Here  is  a  way  of  presenting  the 
problem. Somehow, the pyrrhonian is endorsing her stance because she thinks that it is the 
right one to have – the right one to have given the aim of  judging the truth. This is part of  
what we need to capture in order to be capable of  thinking of  pyrrhonism as a move 
within inquiry and as a competitive stance against other moves in the game of  truth. But  
the problem is  that  if  the pyrrhonian silence is  a  response to reason,  then it  is  not a  
completely silent attitude. The pyrrhonian remains silent because she judges that this is the 
alethically right attitude to take, and maybe in order to come to judge that this is the right  
one take, she also needs to make much more judgments. But then the price to be paid in  
order to be silent on some issues is to have one's mind stuck with many judgments and 
commitments. 
One way of  highlighting this point is to reflect on the way in which the pyrrhonian 
herself  is  led  to  silence.  The pyrrhonian  is  presented  with  a  suggestion  to take  some 
proposition as true. Then she reflects on the suggestion and offers an argument to the  
effect that it is impossible to conclusively establish whether the suggested proposition is 
really true. The most natural way of  thinking of  this process is by thinking of  a process in 
which one comes to judge on the basis of  some grounds that we can't be sure whether p is 
true.  If  that  is  how the  process  goes,  then  the  alethically  driven  pyrrhonian  is  not  a 
completely silent stance,  for whenever a pyrrhonian is silent  about an issue she is also 
making judgments to the effect that it is right to be silent, and eventually she is also making 
judgments  about  grounds  and  in  this  way  ends  up  suspending  judgment  in  the  way 
described in Chapter IV, namely by having  judgments  about grounds. This is not a silent 
mind in the required sense. If  this is so, then the pyrrhonian stance is not a competitor  
stance, and it is impossible for us to be completely silent. 
There are various ways in which one can try to resist this picture. One way is to say 
that  the  pyrrhonian  is  not  one  who  is  judging  things,  not  even  judging  things  about 
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grounds, but is just someone who is presenting grounds to reject a given suggestion to take 
some proposition as true. This goes nicely with the idea that the pyrrhonian stance is not  
really a cognitive stance but rather some sort of practical stance. This picture is very clearly 
expressed  in  Williams  (2010)'s  description  of  what  he  takes  to  be  the  core  of  the 
Pyrrhonian stance:
“A sceptic  is  a  virtuoso  dialectician.  He  can  take  any  claim  or  argument,  commonsensical  or 
theoretical, and find a countervailing claim or argument of  roughly equal persuasive force. Facing  
with such offsetting claims, he suspends judgment. Sextus defines the sceptic as one who possesses 
this ability. … Possessing the ability to orchestrate sceptical antitheses is the absolute bedrock of 
the Pyrrhonian stance- Sextus insists on this: “the chief  constitutive principle” of  scepticism is 
“every account's lying opposed to an equal account” (PH 1.12, my translation). The sceptics is not 
one who argues, thus believes, that every proposition he might be tempted to accept can be offset by 
a countervailing proposition: he is one who can produce a suitable counterweight. Suspension of  
judgment has  nothing to do with what a sceptic  believes: is wholly a matter of  what he can do. The 
Pyrrhonian stance is practical all the way down”. p. 295. 
This description, attractive in itself  as it might be, and even historically accurate as it might 
be, still fails to describe a stance which can be occupied by some subject. I cannot take 
myself  to have an ability  which consists  in  finding counterweight reasons that  lead to 
equipollance unless I judge it to be so; unless, that is, I at least judge, on the occasion in  
which I find myself  producing counterweight evidence, that I am actually reaching a state 
of  equipollence,  or at  least  a  state  which legitimates  certain transitions in  my doxastic  
practice. So, Pyrrhonian scepticism is maybe meant to be wholly practical, but it can't be 
practical all the way down. 
One might reply along the following lines. Maybe it is true that I cannot take myself 
to have reached equipollence unless I take myself  to have grounds, and also take myself  to 
be legitimately believing certain truths. But it is enough that I produce a set of  assertions 
which, once put together in an argument, do consist in a counterweight to the proposition 
under discussion. I don't need to judge the propositions I assert; nor do I need to judge that 
equipollence is reached; I only need to actually reach to equipollence, whether I judge it or 
not. This sort of  externalist twist wont' do. If  we just assert things without judging the  
asserted contents, then there is no reason for me to enter a silent attitude. Hence, the lack 
of  reason makes my silence, if  actual at all, a state which doesn't consist in a move in the 
game of  truth. 
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Williams is  aware  of  this  objection to Pyrrhonian  scepticism.  He concedes  the 
premise that to make judgments about grounds would amount to fail  to be completely 
silent in the required sense, and he tries to answer the objection as follows: 
“Pyrrhonian  antitheses  must  be  psychologically  effective,  rather  than  epistemologically  balanced. 
Equipollence  is  not  judged  but  experienced,  the  experience  leading  directly  to  suspension  of 
judgment”. p. 296
But what about that experience? Two main problems: 1) it makes sense to wonder whether 
the experience is correct or illusory; 2) even if  we grant the correctness and reality of  this  
supposed experience of  equipollence, the way in which it  leads directly  to suspension of 
judgment can be of  two sorts: a) alethic/epistemic, in which case pyrrhonian scepticism is 
no longer  coherent,  b)  or  a  mere psychological  compulsion,  in  which  case pyrrhonian 
scepticism is just a non-rational itch which as such is no longer a move in the game of  
truth. 
Another way of  resisting the objection is offered by Perin. He suggests that the 
main difference between the dogmatic and the suspensive sceptic is the way in which they 
understand the cognitive attitude the presence of  which justifies or makes it correct to react in 
their  respective  ways  –  namely,  judgment  that  nothing  can  be  justifiably  judged,  and 
suspension of  judgment (silence, in my terminology) respectively. This is the requirement 
for a dogmatist: 
(SJ) Rationality requires one to suspend judgement about whether  p  if  one  believes there is no 
reason to believe either p or its negation (p. 40),
whereas this is the requirement for the pyrrhonian: 
(SJ*) Rationality requires one to suspend judgement about whether p if  it appears to one that there 
is no reason to believe either p or its negation (p. 43).
The crucial  difference is  that  the  former  takes  the  relevant  ground for  suspension  of 
judgment to be the belief  that there are no reasons to judge either p or its negation, whereas 
the pyrrhonian takes the relevant ground for suspension of  judgment to be the appearance  
(which is not to be understood as a doxastic attitude) that there are no reasons for belief. 
However,  crucially,  in  both cases  suspension of  judgment  is  taken to be an alethically  
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rational response to one's evidence. 
Now, this is as it should be. For this is the only way in which we can properly make 
sense of  pyrrhonian scepticism as being a move within inquiry. The problem is of  course 
how to make sense of  the mental state of  appearing without understanding it as being  
some form of  judgment205.  The sort  of  appearances  we are  dealing  with  here  involve 
potential grounds for judging, and it is unclear how one can understand one's discovery 
about the normative sufficiency of  grounds for judging in a way that is non-doxastic. 
To sum up, I have been pressing two objections to the idea that it is possible to 
coherently be an alethically driven pyrrhonian sceptic. The first objection grants for the 
sake of  argument that it is possible to be one, yet it insists that one can't be a coherent and  
stable one: for, whenever one is silent on some proposition, one is committed to there 
being reasons for being one, and so one is committed to take some proposition as true 
even if, in a later moment, when one considers these very propositions, one will then have  
to  remain  silent  about  them.  The  second  objection  denies  the  very  possibility  of  a  
complete silent, for it argues that in order for a pyrrhonian silence to be alethically driven 
one needs to have judgments about grounds,  or anyways judgments which are used as 
grounds or reasons for then remaining silent. 
The picture of  the pyrrhonian stance that emerges from our discussion is that of  a 
local form of  suspensive scepticism whose core attitude is suspension of  judgment, that is 
judgment abut grounds. The pyrrhonian is someone who finds out – and so judges – that 
with respect to some relevant class of  propositions we can't conclusively go one way or the  
other. Hence, we should suspend judgment about these propositions. Yet, in so doing, the 
sceptic so understood will  not be suspending judgment about plenty of  other issues – 
notably, among others, issues about grounds for suspension of  judgment. So understood, 
the Pyrrhonian stance doesn't conflict in any way with the standpoint according to which it  
is certain that there are certainties. 
205See Perin (2010), Chapter IV, when he concedes that the scope of  the pyrrhonian scepticism is limited in  
that the suspensive sceptic doesn't have beliefs about how things are but she has beliefs about how things  
appear to be. 
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Chapter VIII
Fallibilism and Externalism as Untenable
In this Chapter I complete the work that I have started in the previous one. I will first 
argue that monistic forms of  fallibilism and externalism are untenable. The arguments will  
have a significant consequence: that not only the sole tenable standpoint is to judge that 
there  are  certainties,  but  it  also requires  that  one has  certainty  about  the  fundamental  
epistemological  theory  itself  that  one is  endorsing.  Thus,  no  epistemological  theory  is 
tenable unless it has the consequence that there are certainties and that the epistemological 
theory itself  is, at least with respect to its defining thesis, known with certainty.
§8.1 The reflexivity of  the epistemological inquiry
Since we want to discover the truth, we want to come to judge the true answer to these  
questions: 
(1) What is true? Which propositions are true?
(2) How do we discover what is true? What are the conditions in which we are justified 
in judging that some proposition is true?
Our inquiry as a whole is an attempt to answer (1). Our epistemological enquiry is (at least in 
part) an attempt to answer (2). Since it is an enquiry, it aims at discovering truths, and then  
it is also a partial answer to (1). And since the desired output of  the enquiry is true judgment, 
the enquiry has the following property: 
Reflexivity of  epistemological enquiry:
An  epistemological  theory  provides  standards  for  justified  judgment,  and  the  
judgment in the theory is among the objects that should be evaluated according to 
the standards dictated by the theory206. 
In  this  chapter  I  will  explore  this  feature  of  the  epistemological  enquiry  and  I  will  
investigate the ways in which a judgment in an epistemological theory should be endorsed 
in  order  to  be  a  satisfactory  judgment.  I  shall  call  our  judgments  about  epistemology 
206For an historically informed discussion of  the centrality of  this feature in post-Kantian German idealism, 
see Thomas-Fogiel (2010). 
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'epistemological judgments', though I will omit the qualification 'epistemological' when the 
context allows me to do so without ambiguity.  By an epistemological theory I roughly 
mean what is often described as a 'theory of  epistemic justification'.
I will proceed the discussion by considering  monist  proposals about the nature of 
justification, in particular a monist form of  fallibilism and a monist form of  externalism. 
Monism about epistemic justification is the view that there is a single kind of  justification.  
Here I will consider monistic fallibilism, or fallibilism for short,  namely the view that a  
judgment  is  justified  just  in  case  it  is  fallibly  grounded,  and  monistic  externalism,  or 
externalism  for  short,  namely  the  view  that  a  judgment  is  justified  just  in  case  it  is  
externalistically justified. Since these are monistic views, they are views to the effect that at  
best our justified judgments are fallibly justified or externalistically justified respectively. 
What does it take for a theory of  justification to be endorsed in an appropriate 
way? The first obvious minimal condition is the following: 
Theoretical Reflexivity: 
a judgment in an epistemological  theory is satisfactory only if  it  possesses the  
status that the theory itself  describes as the status of  justification. 
If  an epistemological judgment doesn't satisfy that condition, then the theory itself  is self-
defeating because it entails that a judgment in the theory is not justified and hence that the  
theory is not to be judged true207.
It is important to appreciate the following distinction: it is one thing to have a belief  
which complies with the standards for being a justified belief, and it is another thing to 
have a further justified belief  about whether the belief  in the theory (be that belief  justified 
or not) complies the standards for being a justified belief. This condition of  Theoretical  
207What about the proposal that the theory should not be justified according to the notion of  justification it  
defines, but rather according to some other notion of  justification which is endorsed as a genuine kind of 
justification by some meta-theory? The resulting view will be a form of  pluralism (for there are at least  
two kinds of  justification, the one of  the first-order theory and the other of  the second-order theory). 
One worry is that it is unclear what the rationale for this meta-theory would be. Since all judgments are 
alike in being judgments, it is unclear why a judgment with a particular content – the content of  the first-
order epistemological theory – would have to be epistemically fine in conditions that differ from those  
that must be satisfied by all other judgments. One further question is whether the second-order theory 
should  be  justified  with the  first-order  kind  of  justification  or  with  the  second-order  one.  Another  
question is whether the overall theory that amounts to the conjunction of  the two theories – that is the  
pluralist theory according to which there are both kinds of  justification – should possess both kinds of  
justification or only one. If  both, then theoretical reflexivity arguably holds for the first-order theory as 
well (because of  the principle according to which a conjunction is justified only if  each of  its conjunct is  
justified according to the same kind of  justification possessed by the conjunction), if  only one, then it is  
unclear which one of  them should be the one to be possessed. Each choice would seem ad hoc. Thus, no 
appeal  to  a  meta-theory can  easily  falsify  theoretical  reflexivity.  More on epistemic  pluralism and its  
relation to the reflexive endorsement of  the theory itself  at the end of  the chapter. 
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Reflexivity doesn't require any meta-belief. So, it is neutral on whether some conditions like 
JJ (the condition that justification requires being justified in believing that one is justified) is  
part of  the conditions for justification. 
There is a further less obvious condition for satisfactory epistemological believing:  
Reflexive Stability: 
a belief  in an epistemological theory is satisfactory only if  the theorist is justified in 
believing that the belief  in the theory is justified. 
Reflexive  Stability  can  be  seen  as  making  a  point  about  the  conditions  for  having  an 
epistemological theory that is stable when one reflects upon the belief  in the theory itself.  
In order to make the theory stable at the reflexive level, one must have the resources to  
find that very theory as justified when one reflects about it. To see this point, suppose a 
theorist  endorsing  the  epistemological  theory  A  were  asked:  'do  you  believe  A?'.  The 
answer would be: 'Yes I do'. 'Do you also believe that you are justified in believing A?'.  
Suppose that the answer to this impertinent question were: 'No, I believe A, but I am not  
justified in believing A'. This would be awkward. The reason is of  course that when we 
believe  a  given  proposition,  we  are  also  committed  to  take  ourself  to  be  justified  in 
believing it. If  we were to realize that we are not after all justified in believing it, we would 
take ourselves to be required to abandon that belief. So, the endorsement of  a theory of 
epistemic  justification  is  going  to  be  stable  and survive  reflection  only  if  one  is  in  a  
position to find her own judgment in the theory to be justified. 
In  Chapter  III I  made  a  stronger  claim,  namely  that  it  is  not  possible  to 
comprehendingly hold at the same time p as being true and also that our so judging is not 
justified (either because there are no grounds at all for so judging or because the grounds are 
not good enough). If  this is so, then the problem is not simply that when one moves at the 
reflexive level one would have to regard herself  as required to abandon her belief  in the 
theory if  she were to take it as lacking justification. The problem is rather that as soon as  
the  person  moves  at  the  reflexive  level  and  takes  her  epistemological  belief  to  lack 
justification, the person would not be in a position to hold her judgment in the theory, and 
if  the subject is lucid enough she will also probably loose the corresponding dispositional  
belief  in the theory. 
Despite appearances to contrary, this requirement does not beg the question against 
externalist  theories  of  justification.  The  requirement  is  not  that  justification  requires 
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second-order  justification (i.e.  justification for  believing that  one has justification).  The 
requirement has to do with the satisfactory endorsement, at the reflexive level, of  a belief  
in an epistemological  theory.  In fact,  as we will  see in greater  detail  in a moment,  the  
requirement  can  also  be  satisfied  by  an  externalist  theory,  provided  that  we  have  an 
externalist  justification  for  believing  that  we  have  an  externalist  justification  for 
externalism. This is not impossible in principle. It is just enough to apply the externalist 
account consistently to epistemological beliefs themselves. 
§8.2 Fallibilism as untenable
Fallibilism is  here  understood as  the  claim that  the  only  sort  of  justification  that  can 
possibly  be  possessed  by  our  judgments  is  a  fallibilist  kind  of  justification,  that  is  a 
justification that is compatible with the falsity of  p208. The question we are investigating 
here is what it takes to be a fallibilist. In order to answer this question we should try to put 
ourselves in the fallibilist's own perspective and see what should we think of  it when we 
reflect about fallibilism itself  and about the picture of  our epistemic predicament that it  
delivers. 
Easy things first. A fallibilist has no problem in satisfying Theoretical Reflexivity 
and  Reflexive  Stability.  The  belief  in  the  fallibilist  theory  itself  might  well  be  fallibly 
justified, if  the believer possesses fallible grounds for so believing that favours fallibilism 
over competing accounts of  justification. Moreover, as a fallibilist  I can also reflect on  
whether I am justified in believing that fallibilism is true,  and if  I take myself  to have 
fallible grounds for so believing then I might take myself  to be justified in believing in  
fallibilism209.
208As Cohen (1988) puts it, “the acceptance of  fallibilism in epistemology is virtually universal”. Reed (2002) 
concurs:  ““Fallibilism is  endorsed by virtually  all  contemporary  epistemologists”  p.  143 It  is  unclear 
whether all theorists who endorse a fallibilist theory of  justification or knowledge according to which 
justification/knowledge are fallible, also endorse the more specific view I discuss in this Chapter, namely  
that at best the sort of  justification/knowledge that we can possess is fallible in kind. I think it is fair to  
assume that most fallibilist views of  justification/knowledge, to the extent that they are monist views, 
they are also fallibilist in the most strict sense I discuss here. Maybe, they are willing to make room for 
some absolutely certain judgments, except that they will count these judgments as possessing a different 
positive epistemic status from the one of  justification/knowledge. Anyway, fallibilists of  the kind I have 
in mind in this Chapter are, I think, legions. Pragmatist philosophers are fallibilist in this sense. Quinians 
and epistemologists who work within a self-conscious naturalised epistemology are typically fallibilist in 
this sense. People who deny the existence of  a priori  justified beliefs are also typically fallibilist in this 
sense (denying the a priori, it is not clear what room remains available for certainty-conferring sources of 
justification). More generally, it arguably is a common thought in the current scientist culture the idea that 
the most we can hope for is fallible revisable justification for our beliefs.
209In order  to  take  myself  to  be justified in  believing in fallibilism I  need not  necessarily  already  have  
justification for believing that fallibilism is the right account. Whether this is needed or not depends on  
the details of  the fallibilist accounts under scrutiny.
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What is the problem then? One problem is that fallibilism is untenable in that it 
gives rise to commitments that can't be endorsed at the same time. In order to bring it into 
clear light, consider a particular proposition p judged by a fallibilist. As the fallibilist is very 
well aware of  her commitments, she believes that p might be false. Since she believes that, 
she is knowingly committed to judge that p and that p might be false. But if  the claims I 
have made in Chapter III are correct, then the fallibilist can't in fact so judge. It is simply 
impossible to comprehendingly judge that p and that p might be false in the same mental 
breath. 
If  the claim about uncotenability made in Chapter III is false and it is possible to 
comprehendingly judge that  p  and that  p  might be false, still it seems correct to say that 
there is a normative pressure to abandon p given the realisation that p might be false. The 
presence  of  the  normative  pressure  might  be  further  explained  and  sustained  by  the 
recognition that, even if  it is by hypothesis possible to judge that  p  and that  p  might be 
false, it is in the nature of  doubt that one can keep doubting whether p is really true so long 
as she doesn't possess conclusive grounds for  p.  When confronted with  p,  the fallibilist 
recognises that her grounds for so believing are fallible, hence she is in a position to raise a 
doubt as to whether p is really true. But when she raises the doubt, she is not judging that p 
is  true.  This  means  that  the  fallibilist  standpoint  is  untenable  by  being  unstable.  The 
standpoint is such that it licenses judgment that  p  when one's fallible grounds for  p  are 
good enough. But then it is possible to raise a doubt about p's truth, and when one does so 
one will be no longer judging that p is true. This is a case in which a standpoint is untenable 
by being unstable given the nature of  our inquiring mind. 
So far we have seen a way in which fallibilism is untenable when we consider a  
particular proposition p that by the fallibilist own lights is fallibly justified. But the problem 
with fallibilism can be better appreciated if  we reflect on what it takes to judge the fallibilist  
doctrine itself. A fallibilist is committed to judge that we only have fallible justification for  
fallibilism. This commits her to judge that fallibilism is true and that it might be false. If  I  
am right in claiming that it is impossible to comprehendingly judge that p and that p might 
be false, then the fallibilist standpoint is untenable for it gives rise to commitments that  
can't be jointly endorsed at the same time. But even if  I am wrong about this impossibility  
claim, the fallibilist standpoint is still untenable in that it can't be held in a stable manner.  
The  fallibilist  standpoint  is  tragical.  By  occupying  it,  we  would  have  to  see  our  own 
epistemic predicament as such that all our judgments, even those we are most confident in,  
might well be false. Yet, the fallibilist in so judging can't at the same time stably hold the  
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very judgment that all that we judge to be true – fallibilism included – might in fact be 
false. For by the fallibilist own lights fallibilism might be false, and when one realises that, it  
is then possible to raise a doubt as to whether fallibilism is really true, and in so doing one  
is ipso facto abandoning, at least so long as the doubt survives, the perspective that sees 
every judged propositions as possibly false. But if  a doubt about p can be stably resolved 
only  if  one  has  certainty  about  p,  and  since  fallibilism  denies  the  existence  of  such 
certainty, the fallibilist will never be in a position of  stably hold her own position. In that 
respect, the possibility of  a doubt about fallibilism itself  is what saves the fallibilist from the 
tragical condition in which she takes herself  to be: the fallibilist is seeing all her perspective  
on reality as potentially illusory (as if  the Cartesian evil genius were a live possibility), but  
when one doubts that very perspective one opens up the possibility that all our cognitive 
perspective  upon  the  world  can't  possibly  be  total  illusion.  The  doubt  reopens  the 
possibility that at least  some of  our judgments capture with certainty the way things really 
are.
Suppose that a fallibilist wants to argue that a doubt as to whether p is not rational 
or  justified  in  a  case  in  which  p  is  fallibly  justified.  (Consider  that  p  might  be  the 
proposition  of  fallibilism).  This  reply  fails  to  appreciate  the  problem for  the  fallibilist  
standpoint. For, we can  also doubt whether this very fallibilist claim about the conditions 
for rational or justified doubt is true, and when we so doubt we can't use the fallibilist claim  
in order to remove the initial doubt about p. More generally, we can doubt about fallibilism 
itself, and we can do so precisely because by the fallibilist own lights fallibilism is merely 
fallibly justified, and so it might be false. 
Notice that this capacity to doubt the fallibilist proposition itself, and in fact any 
proposition that the fallibilist wants to take as true upon the recognition that it is suitably  
fallibly  justified,  has  the  result  that  the  fallibilist  perspective  undergoes  some  sort  of 
cognitive collapse. A fallibilist starts considering some proposition  p, then she doubts it, 
and in order to remove the doubt she will appeal to some further proposition, but since by  
her own lights that very proposition might be false, the fallibilist can't even rely on it. In fact, 
she can't even rely on the judgment that it might be false, for this might be false as well and  
so doubted, but even this latter thought might be doubted, and even the latter one, and 
even... As soon as the fallibilist becomes fully aware of  what she is committed to, she is 
condemned to doubt. But this doubt is recognized by the very fallibilist as correct, and so 
she would have to doubt whether it is correct to doubt, and whether it is correct to doubt  
whether it is correct to doubt, and even... This is some sort of  cognitive collapse, but it is  
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that to which a fully reflexive fallibilist will have to be committed. In fact, I suggest that  
this collapse can be easily experienced if  one actually tries to entertain fallibilism and to 
reason according to the fallibilist understanding of  our epistemic predicament. When one 
does  so,  as  soon  as  one  understands  that  every  proposition  might  be  false  and hence 
doubted, one will simply destroy one's own capacity for reflexive endorsement of  the truth 
of  a proposition. When we try to think according to fallibilism, we first understand that  
according to fallibilism everything might be false,  and then we are immediately lead to  
think 'but then...' and as soon as we try to draw some consequence from our understanding 
of  the  fallibilist  standpoint,  precisely  because  we  understand  that  standpoint,  we  are 
prevented from drawing a  consequence – for  the  conditional  might  be false,  and so  is 
doubted. By running into this thought experiment, one also sees, I submit, in what sense 
our  mind  is  committed  to  certainty:  for,  unless  a  proposition  is  removed  from  the 
possibility of  doubt, no reasoning could even get started210. 
Here  we  reach  the  bedrock,  and  that  is  precisely  what  we  want  from 
phenomenology: a description of  the field – what we might call the transcendental field, or  
transcendental core – within which what is possible for us is fixed. The normative nature 
of  cognition – in that case, it being such that a doubt is possible so long as one doesn't  
have conclusive grounds – can't be superseded by some theoretical consideration (like the  
fallibilist one to the effect that fallible grounds for  p  makes doubt about  p  irrational or 
unjustified), for that very theoretical consideration will be produced using the resources of 
the cognition which is trying to supersede. But it is in the very structure of  our inquiring 
mind that  it  is  legitimate  to doubt  whether  p  is  true  so long as  p  is  not  conclusively 
grounded – and this is the transcendental core, the court which defines the structure of  
inquiry, so even the structure of  inquiry whose outputs end up being incompatible with the 
verdicts of  this very structure. There can be no conclusion that the mind itself  produces  
that can show that, despite the fact that our mind has a certain normative structure, that  
structure is misleading. For it is within the railways of  that very structure that we reach our 
judgments. 
 Why is it that the untenability of  fallibilism hasn't been so explicitly recognized 
210Quine's  epistemological  holism (Duhem-Quine  thesis)  is  the  thesis  according  to  which  any  belief  is 
revisable.  Since  revisability  requires  fallibilism,  as  defined here  – because  to say  that  every belief  is  
revisable commits to the claim that there is no absolutely certain belief  – the argument presented here is 
an objection to the tenability of  a Quinian epistemology, as defended in Quine (1951). See Wright (1986)  
for an objection to the effect that Quinian epistemological holism is lead to an infinite regress. The core 
of  Wright's objection can be captured, in its minimal terms, by the objection I presented in this chapter. 
Wright's  objection  can  be  read  as  a  particular  application  of  my  argument  against  the  tenability  of 
fallibilism in the case of  the particular fallibilism endorsed by Quine's epistemological holism.
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yet211? When we do epistemology and evaluate our beliefs, we have the impression that we 
can  take  some  sort  of  God-like  viewpoint  from  which  we  can  appreciate  what  our 
epistemic condition would be like if  a given epistemology were correct. When we imagine 
God thinking  about  the  world  according  to  the  fallibilist  lines,  there  seems  to  be  no 
cognitive incoherence in endorsing the fallibilist perspective. This is what God could think  
of  our fallible epistemic predicament:  'If  certain conditions obtain – conditions which 
involve the presence of  evidence to which the subject has some sort of  access – then the 
believers  would  be  justified.  These  justifications  are  fallible,  meaning  that  they  are 
compatible with the falsity of  the proposition whose endorsement they justify. However, if  
the believed propositions are also true, then everything is fine, for their fallible justification 
happens to track the truth'. When we think of  our situation in this manner we tend to 
forget that we cannot step outside of  our epistemic perspective. By thinking along these 
lines, we are surreptitiously putting ourselves in the God-like perspective. And so what is 
thought in that perspective applies to that thought itself. And hence, what we must think is 
that if  we are lucky enough then our justification tracks the truth. But since we recognize  
that we might be unlucky, then all we believe is seen as possibly false. And, crucially, all the 
last thoughts I have made falls within the scope of  this doubt. Maybe, that is, the very  
fallibilist picture is false! If  we entertain this thought without illusorily taking ourselves to  
be in the external God-like perspective, we see that the standpoint cannot be maintained in  
a stable fashion.
§8.3 Externalism as untenable
Having appreciated the shortcoming of  the fallibilist epistemology, one might think that  
the  problem  depends  on  the  fact  that  the  fallibilist  view  we  have  been  taken  into 
consideration was an internalist one. In fact, it is natural to think of  the fallibilism I have  
211There is some discussion in the literature that purports to put pressure on the coherence of  the fallibilist  
position by noticing that it is some sort of  Moore-paradoxical epistemology. Thus, it seems prima facie  
odd to assert the following: 'p, but p might be false', 'I know that p, but p might be false', 'I am justified in 
believing that p, but p might be false'. However, the focus has been, as often occurs within discussions in 
the  analytic  tradition,  on  the  practice  of  asserting,  rather  than  judging,  the  fallibilist  views  and  its 
consequences. Lewis (1996) p. 549 famously commented on the doctrine of  fallibilism as follows. “If  you 
claim that S knows that P, and yet you grant that S cannot eliminate a certain possibility in which not-P, it 
certainly  seems  as  if  you  have  granted  that  S  does  not  after  all  know that  P.  To  speak  of  fallible 
knowledge,  of  knowledge  despite  uneliminated  possibility  of  error,  just  sounds  contradictory.”  Lewis 
concludes  that  fallibilism  is  uncomfortable,  though  preferable  to  scepticism.  The  problem  is  that 
fallibilism is preferable if  evaluated in abstracto, for as soon as one tries to be a fallibilist one realises that 
she can't consistently be one. As we repeatedly had the occasion to notice throughout the Dissertation, 
the focus on our linguistic practice as opposed to the phenomenology of  cognition has led to a failure to  
appreciate what are the views that we can coherently endorse. 
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discussed  above  as  endorsing  some  form  of  modest  internalism  according  to  which 
justification depends on what is  first-personally available  as grounds for judging to the 
subject,  where the  relevant  grounds are thought  of  as  being at  best  fallible,  but never 
conclusive. One might then think that in order to make the standpoint a stable one we 
should add some externalist element to it (or abandon the internalist component and hold 
a pure externalist account). The externalist element is something the presence of  which 
connects in the appropriate way (through an appropriate method of  belief-formation) our 
belief  to the relevant fact that it purports to truly represent. So, the hope goes, if  we can 
have a perspective on ourselves according to which there are these externalist links then 
maybe we might hold an epistemology that can be reflexively endorsed in a satisfactory 
fashion, that is, without being untenable one way or another. 
Externalism  is  here  understood  as  the  thesis  according  to  which  the  best 
justification that  we can hope to  possess  for  our  judgments  is  externalist  in  kind.  An 
externalist justification is one according to which, for any justified belief  that p, it is at least 
necessary, if  not sufficient, that some external conditions obtains. Crucially,  the sort of 
externalism that I have in mind, is one that even though can put some internalist element in 
the  conditions  for  justification,  it  cannot however  put  the  requirements  for  absolute 
certainty among them. Moreover, the view must be such that it doesn't make room for 
absolute  certainty,  particularly  room  for  absolute  certainty  about  epistemology  itself,  
otherwise it won't represent a competitor to my standpoint. Thus, to illustrate, in the case  
of  perceptual  justification,  it  might require,  though it  need not to,  that  there  be some 
experience that p as a necessary condition for justifiably judging that p (this condition might 
be construed in such a fashion as to be of  an internalist kind). 
In order to see why externalism so understood can't be reflexively endorsed in a  
tenable manner we should first have an understanding of  the way in which the externalist  
sees herself  and the world. We should make a step into the externalist perspective and 
reveals what can be described as a blind spot – a blind spot that is analogous to the one  
that we inherit if  we think according to fallibilist lines. In order to do this, let me offer a  
description of  what I take to be a fairly recognizable prototypical externalist picture 212.
First step. If  our perceptual-system is reliable213, externalism will allow us to acquire 
212This description is modelled on various externalist works, but the one who recently offered this sort of  
account in fullest details and with the explicit intent to address the sort of  reflexive questions which 
interest me here is Sosa (2011). Since the objection I have against externalism depends on the structure of  
the externalist account, and not on its details, I think that the omissions of  details will not affect my  
point. 
213I have chosen the property of  reliability as an example of  externalist property. You can substitute it with 
your favourite  externalist  property,  or  add to reliability  whatever you think is  necessary (even fallible 
internalist properties) in order to have a plausible externalist (or hybrid) account. This won't affect my  
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in a justified way most of  the beliefs we commonsensically form about the environment 
and  ourselves  on  the  basis  of  perceptual  appearances.  Perceptual  justification  doesn't  
require  that  one  have  a  prior justification  for  believing that  one's  perceptual  system is 
reliable  or,  more  generally,  for  excluding  far  fetched  sceptical  scenarios.  The  only 
requirement is that one doesn't take it that there are defeaters in the environment. One 
might also require that there is some internalist ground for judging. But, and this is crucial,  
the ground need not be conclusive. The ground might simply be, in the case of  perception, 
the experience that p is the case (e.g., the experience that there is a tree in front of  me), or, 
in the case of  testimony, the experience of  reading some text, or something along these 
lines. 
Second step. By so proceeding,  if  not only our  perceptual system but also, and more 
generally,  our  belief-forming  processes  (those,  for  example,  which  allow  us  to  draw 
inferences) are reliable, then externalism will allow us to form214 a justified picture of  the 
world which includes, among other things, a belief  in the reliability of  our belief-forming 
processes. The belief  is justified inductively, by relying on the individual pieces of  justified  
beliefs about our perceived environment. What is crucial to notice here for our purposes is  
that the externalist picture at this stage has already made room for the possibility of  having  
justified beliefs in the obtaining of  the conditions which are necessary and sufficient for 
justification. 
Third step.  When we come to epistemological reflection,  if  the perceptual-system 
and the belief-forming processes are reliable, then on the basis of  their justified outputs the 
externalist  will  be  in  a  position  to  believe  with  externalist  justification  the  externalist 
account itself. At this step, if  all the previous conditions are in fact satisfied, then it might 
well be that the belief  in externalism is externalistically justified. If  this is so, then we have  
satisfied Objective Reflexivity.
Fourth step. The externalist is then in a position to describe the sort of  situation I 
have just described at the previous steps and, indeed, at this very step (and any subsequent  
step, if  any): she is in a position to tell to herself  that her beliefs about the environment are  
by-and-large justified and that they are so justified because they are arrived at through a  
reliable process of  belief-formation; then, relying on the sort of  evidence that is provided 
in epistemological theorizing, she is also is in a position to tell to herself  that externalism is  
point.
214Of  course, this is the description of  a  rational reconstruction  of  the building of  our belief-repertoire. In 
reality, there is no such a succession of  events. For example, the belief  in the reliability of  our senses and  
the belief  in the existence of  the external world are, to use a Wittgensteinian terminology, the sort of 
hinges which are always in place, however implicitly and unconsciously, whenever we rely, as we typically  
and unreflectively do, on our senses for acquiring beliefs about the environment. 
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the true account of  justification. If  the externalist is challenged to show that the evidence 
she has for externalism is good enough for believing in externalism – that is,  if  she is  
challenged to show whether she is also justified in believing that her belief  in externalism is  
justified – then, again, the externalist can tell to herself  the same story: if my belief-forming 
processes  are  reliable,  and  if no  unpropitious  condition  obtain,  then  I  am justified  in 
acquiring beliefs about the environment through my perceptual system, am I also justified 
by inductive reasoning to believe in the reliability of  my belief-forming processes, and I am 
justified in  believing in externalism,  and  if I  follow reliable  belief-forming processes in 
forming the further meta-beliefs,  I  am also justified in taking myself  to be justified in  
believing in externalism. 
So, according to the externalist picture, if  everything goes well,  then our endorsement 
of  externalism satisfies  the principle of  Objective Reflexivity  and also the principle of 
Reflexive Stability. However, as some internalsits215 have pointed out, we feel that this is not 
good enough – we want more. 
To approach the problem, it is useful to start by pointing out that we desire to have 
more than what externalism is capable of  giving us. According to externalism, if  everything  
goes  well  (that  is,  if  our  belief-forming  processes  are  reliable,  and  if  whatever  other 
externalist property is instantiated when we believe) then our beliefs are justified. But  if  
something goes wrong,  then we are not justified. Now, how could we came to be justified in 
believing that everything goes well? We will come to justifiably believe that everything goes 
well by relying on particular outputs of  our more basic belief-forming processes, and  if  
these processes are reliable, that is, if  everything goes well, then we will get a justification 
for believing that everything goes well. But the sort of  externalist justification that will be  
obtained in that manner does not remove our epistemic anxiety, if we have any: for it is a 
justification which relies on what must be proven216. And the same applies for this very 
epistemic story I just told you about justification when understood along externalist lines: if  
externalism is true, then, if  everything goes well, we will eventually form a justified belief 
215The objection I am going to press is very similar in spirit to the one Barry Stroud has repeatedly pressed 
in  his  critical  discussion  of  externalism.  See  the  papers  contained  in  Stroud  (2000).  However,  my 
objection is explicitly linked to the issue of  the reflexivity of  the epistemological inquiry and to the issue  
of  certainty.  What  Stroud describes as a  problem of  lack of  'understanding'  is  what  I  think is  best  
described as a  problem of  lack of  certainty.  I  think that what  explains the possibility  of  raising the 
objection I am raising and the one Stroud was raising is simply the possibility – a possibility secured by  
the structure of  our cognition – of  looking for certainty, rather than any lesser epistemic property. And so 
I think Stroud should have made his points in terms of  certainty rather than understanding, though doing 
so was and still is less easier to accept in the epistemological community.
216It doesn't rely on what must be proven in the sense of  using as a premise the claim that everything goes 
well in order to come to believe that everything goes well. Rather, the premises can be used as such in  
inference because one takes it that they are justified, in the sense that they have been formed in a reliable  
manner. 
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in externalism. And here is the crucial blind spot when you move at the reflexive level: the  
very belief  in externalism is hostage to the obtainment of  conditions which are beyond our 
access. Of  course, if  the notion of  access is understood along externalist lines, then the 
obtainment of  these conditions can be accessed, for it is part of  the very externalist story  
that if  the belief-forming processes are reliable and we follow the relevant procedure then 
we  may  come  to  have  an  externalistically  justified  belief  about  whether  the  relevant 
justification-conferring conditions are present. But the sort of  access that we obviously 
lack  –  whose  absence  we  are  signalling  when  we  keep  asking  whether  the  propitious 
justification-conferring conditions really obtained or not – is an access of  the internalist  
sort. It  is  part of  the externalist story that we might not be internalistically justified in 
believing  that  all  propitious  conditions  obtained.  That  our  reflexive  perspective  is 
unsatisfactory  is  something  we  understand  if  we  realize  that  we  are  capable  of 
understanding the claims that I have just made and that it is desirable to have a more sure-
fire – that is, as I will argue, certainty-conferring – access to the conditions for justification.  
If  we are capable of  asking whether the external conditions really obtained, it is because we 
understand what it means to have more than externalist justification. So long as we don't 
merely  understand  that  we  can ask  for  more,  but  we  also  want  more,  the  externalist 
perspective might be found unsatisfactory.
Suppose that an externalist understands the previous remarks, understands that it is  
possible to have more, and also wants to have more. Still, she might reason somehow to 
the conclusion that she ought not to desire more than that. For one thing, she might think,  
we can't have more. And anyway, this desire might be unjustified in other ways. Here I just 
want  you  to  notice  the  following  point:  again,  if  the  externalist  is  really  feeling  the 
dissatisfaction,  then no reasoning which is  thought  of  as  being merely  externalistically  
justified  can  remove  the  feeling  of  dissatisfaction.  For,  the  dissatisfaction  is  about  
externalist justification itself, and it is not clear how one can succeed to convince oneself  
that externalism is fine by providing an argument which one takes to be conferring mere 
externalist justification for its conclusion.
But let us move beyond this problem and the issue of  desire. There is another more 
serious set of  problems with externalism. The crucial commitment of  externalism, given 
our purposes is the following: that for any externalistically justified belief  that p, the subject 
needs not have an access (understood in internalist terms) to the external conditions whose 
obtainment is necessary for having justification. A fully aware externalist is then knowingly  
committed to judge that any belief  which she takes to be justified might in fact not be a  
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justified one. That happens if  we are unlucky and the relevant external conditions don't  
obtain. The externalist presupposes, without needing internalist conclusive grounds for so 
doing, that the relevant conditions for externalist justification obtain. By presupposing it, it  
eventually  gets  externalist  justification  for  believing  that  they  obtained.  This  circular 
reasoning is fine according to externalist lights, yet there is a clear sense in which even if  
one grants that the reasoning is fine, as far as we can tell, it might be the case that the 
presupposed  conditions  don't  and didn't  obtain.  This  is  something that  the  externalist 
should be willing to accept, for it is part of  the spirit of  externalism. This means that for  
any proposition  p  that the externalist judges to be true, the externalist is committed to 
judge that p might not be justified. But the problem is that, by judging that p, the externalist 
is also committed to p's being justified. Hence the externalist is committed to judge that p is 
justified and that p might not be justified. But if  the arguments provided in the Chapter on 
Judgment are correct, it is not possible to both judge that p and that p might be false – or, 
anyway,  even if  this claim about impossibility is  false, still  it  is  true that externalism is  
unstable because by judging that  p  might not be justified she is in a position to doubt 
whether it is justified, and by doubting whether it is justified one will be committed to  
refrain from judging that p. 
There is another more explicit  way in which externalism might be shown to be 
untenable. That consists in showing that externalism is committed to fallibilism. Here is  
why. The externalist is committed to take it that the relevant externalist conditions might  
not obtain. But then, from the externalist's own perspective, it might be that p is false. After 
all, the evidence upon which the externalist formed his conception of  the world is such as 
to be compatible,  given the evidence to which the externalist  takes herself  to have an 
access  to,  with  the  falsity  of  the  relevant  propositions.  The  externalist  condition  was 
precisely supposed to bridge the gap between our fallible evidence and the truth, but if  the  
externalist is committed to take it that the bridge might not be there, then she is back to  
the fallibilist predicament. 
Consider perceptual justification, which is arguably the justification enjoyed by the 
basic beliefs which are at the foundation of  the rational reconstruction of  the way in which 
we come to have a justified picture of  the world according to externalism. If  one could 
have absolute certainty that our perceptual beliefs (or of  any other beliefs on the basis of  
which the externalist comes to form her own externalist perspective) are true, then one 
would not need to appeal to externalist justification in order to make them justified or in  
order to build a picture of  the world on their basis.  Of  course,  if  there were absolute 
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certainty  for  some  propositions,  one  could  also  claim  that  externalism  is  a  necessary 
condition for having justification, for one might want our certain beliefs to be formed in  
some appropriate way in order to be justified. But this is not the sort of  externalism we are 
considering here. Here we are dealing with externalism understood as the claim that the 
best justification that we can get is an externalist one. The externalist we are considering  
might  claim  that  all  is  needed  for  being  justified  is  the  obtainment  of  some external 
conditions. But it need not be so extreme, it can also ask that some introspectively available  
grounds be present, though these grounds have of  course to be fallible. Since we have seen 
that  the externalism is  committed to judge that  the  external  link might be  absent,  the 
externalist is committed to judge that a given p that she takes to be externalistically justified 
might in fact be false. For, if  there might not be any external link, then all that speak in  
favour of  p might just be the first-personally available grounds, but these grounds are taken 
as being fallible,  hence one is  committed to take  it  that  p  might be  true.  But then,  if 
externalism is committed to fallibilism, externalism inherits all the problems of  fallibilism, 
and it turns out that it is untenable as well. 
In order to see how the problems with fallibilism arises in the case of  externalism, 
it might be useful to dramatise a little bit.  Let's consider what a believer in externalism 
would believe about his own adherence to externalism. 'I believe in externalism because I  
have good grounds to believe in it, of  course. And my reasons are good because they have 
been formed through reliable processes and have themselves relied on further beliefs and 
experiences  which  were  reliably  formed  or  properly  connected  with  the  facts  they 
purported  to  represent'.  Then,  if  pressed,  the  externalist  might  need  to  realize  the 
following: 'If  I am right, however, I have no guarantee that externalism is right. For I have  
no guarantee that the processes I relied on in order to form all the beliefs I have – namely 
those beliefs  on which I  have relied in  order  to come to believe  in  externalism – are  
themselves reliable.  I  mean,  I  started by assuming that the relevant external  conditions 
obtained. After all, I didn't check whether they were obtaining, for I didn't need to do so – 
that is required by demanding forms of  internalism, not by externalism, that is precisely its 
advantage.  But  I  realise  that  since  all  the  other  things  I  believe  depend  on the  initial  
assumption that the external conditions were really obtaining, I must concede that they  
might have not, and so that as a consequence the resulting externalist picture might itself  
be unjustified. So, if  I am right, then I cannot be sure that externalism is true'. This is one 
blind spot. 
But,  like  in  the  case  of  fallibilism,  the  situation  is  even  more  dramatic  and it  
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consists in some sort of  collapse of  the whole epistemic perspective, for I might then also 
realize the following: 'Well, if  externalism is really true, then I cannot even say that I might 
not be certain that it is true?! For, having realized that the externalist picture is believed on 
a basis that makes the picture uncertain, if  I keep relying on that picture, I cannot even 
claim with certainty what I am claiming now, for as soon as I realize that it is uncertain I  
am no longer in a position to stably keep my judgment (doubt incurs). Maybe I can claim it  
nonetheless without certainty. But no! Because this very last claim is uncertain. And even this 
one.  And...'  This  is  some  sort  of  cognitive  collapse,  the  same  we  encountered  with 
fallibilism. 
This, I hope, is clear when the perspective is explored in a way which is resolutely 
first-personal. But we do have an irresistible tendency to behave as if  we could go beyond  
that perspective and see ourselves from the outside. For, I might now tell to myself  the  
following. 'Maybe I cannot be sure that externalism is right. But who cares, for if it is right, 
and if I am not in unpropitious conditions, then most of  my beliefs are justified, and likely  
true, and so I also have reasons to believe in externalism. So, even if  I cannot assure myself 
of  the goodness of  my epistemic position, I could still be in a fine epistemic position'. This  
thought is almost irresistible. But, once you consider that very thought, how would you 
evaluate it? Well, one may continue to reason according to this alienated standpoint and 
say: 'Obviously, if  everything goes fine, than my previous thought is fine as well...'. But this  
is,  again,  a  thought  which  I  am having  about  myself  and  which  I  cannot  have  with 
certainty, because it is in the very nature of  the perspective that I am embracing that I can't  
be certain of  it. So, I cannot even be certain of  being uncertain of  it. The problem is that  
one can endorse such a perspective so long as one keeps oneself  sufficiently alienated from 
the commitments of  that perspective. This gives one the reassuring appearance of  being 
holding a consistent and indeed promising standpoint ('imagine, if  everything goes fine, 
then our commonsensical  picture  of  the  world  is  vindicated...').  But  the appearance is  
illusory. 
§8.4 Absolute certainty about epistemological truths
To sum up, the arguments I have advanced so far against the tenability of  fallibilism and 
externalism can be seen as motivating the two following conditions: 
Infallibility: 
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a  belief  in  an  epistemological  theory  is  satisfactory  only  if  the  believer  has  
conclusive grounds for that theory
Reflexivity: 
a  belief  in  an epistemological  theory  is  satisfactory  only  if  the  believer  has  a  
certainty-conferring access217 to there being conclusive grounds for that theory
As the names suggest,  these are the conditions for absolute certainty we considered in  
Chapter I, and these also capture the commitments of  judgment, as argued in Chapter III. 
Thus the condition is the following: 
Absolute certainty:
a  belief  in  an  epistemological  theory  is  satisfactory  only  if  the  believer  has  
absolute certainty for it                            
The reason why this requirement is correct is easy to detect, now that we have made all this  
journey into the normative profile of  our inquiring mind. For any judgment that p, either 
the subject's overall standpoint allows her to judge that p is certain or not. If  not, it might 
be either because one takes the grounds for p to be merely fallible (lack of  infallibility), or 
because one takes it that she is not in a position to be certain that the grounds for p are 
conclusive  (lack  of  reflexivity).  In  the  first  case  (lack  of  infallibility),  one  would  be 
committed to judge that  p  and that  p  might be false. But this is either impossible or, if 
possible,  it  makes  room for  a  doubt  as  to  whether  p  is  really  true,  and the  doubt  is 
incompatible with the judgment that  p,  thereby making the judgment reflexively unstable. 
In the second case (lack of  reflexivity), one would be committed to judge that p and that 
the grounds for  p  might be fallible. If  one is committed to judge that the grounds for  p 
might be fallible,  then one is  committed to judge that  p  might be false.  Hence one is 
committed to judge that p and that p might be false, and this commitment has the problems 
aforementioned. Thus, one needs to have conclusive grounds and also being certain to 
possess such conclusive grounds. This is tantamount to needing absolute certainty. 
This  has  a  further  important  consequence.  The  sole  tenable  standpoint  is  not 
simply the standpoint that it is certain that there are absolute certainties, but rather the 
standpoint that is also certain of  its own epistemological theory. This is a crucial point.  
217See Chapters I and III for an explanation and discussion of  the condition of  Reflexivity. 
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Defending a theory of  certainty doesn't entail by itself  that the theory itself  can be justified  
with certainty. One should also make an effort to provide a characterization of  the source 
of  internalist infallible justification that is such that the theorist can appeal to that source in 
order to come to judge the very epistemological theory218. 
What is then the true epistemological theory the belief  in which I am arguing is in  
need of  being itself  absolutely certain? The theory is the one that says that a belief  is 
justified only if  it is absolutely certain. How can I be certain of  it? I haven't provided a 
story explicitly directed at answering this question yet. But this is the structure that the  
answer should take. It should be shown that we can know the truths about the normative  
profile of  cognition with certainty. That is, it should be shown that a phenomenological  
investigation into the normative commitments of  our most fundamental mental acts (that  
is, judgment and questioning) can lead to absolute certainty. Once this is done it is shown  
that it is the very structure of  our inquiring mind that imposes the requirement to possess  
absolute certainty as the standard for judgment, for this is the only tenable standpoint that  
our mind can take. This is an extraordinarily difficult task for it requires an epistemology 
that shows how we an acquire certain  modal  knowledge about epistemology and how we 
can derive from that modal knowledge truths that have a normative bearing on how to 
judge. The step from modal phenomenological knowledge to normativity is discussed and 
defended in Chapter  XI.  The missing piece of  this complex epistemological  story is  a 
defence of  the possibility of  acquiring certain modal knowledge about phenomenology219. 
This is the question whether Husserl's eidetic phenomenology is possible and can deliver 
certain results.
                            
§8.5 From untenability to falsity?
I have been arguing that the only tenable standpoint is  the one that countenances the 
existence of  certainties. More specifically, I have also argued that some of  these certainties 
must be certainties about the epistemological theory itself,  namely certainties about the 
conditions  in  which  one  is  certain  (or  epistemically  justified).  But  this  seems  to  leave 
218It is unclear whether current epistemological theories that characterise an internalist and infallibilist kind  
of  justification have the resources to explain how one can have the internalist infallibilism itself  justified in 
an internalist and infallibilist manner. The problem is that the desideratum that one possesses certainty  
about the epistemological theory itself  hasn't been explicitly recognized. As a result, little or no explicit  
effort has been made in order to show that it is possible to be certain about one's own epistemological  
convictions. 
219The initial plan for the Dissertation was to include a Chapter on the epistemology of  phenomenology, in  
which  I  would  have  explained  how  to  know  with  certainty  modal  truths  about  phenomenology. 
Unfortunately, I haven't had enough time to complete the chapter. See Zanetti (ms3) for more on this. 
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entirely open the question whether there really are certainties. From the fact that we are 
inescapably committed to the existence of  certainties (some of  which being certainties 
about epistemology itself),  it doesn't seem to follow that there actually are certainties. Can 
we move from the fact that we can't but judge that there are certainties to the fact that  
there actually are certainties? Or should we rather find an independent source for judging  
that there are certainties? 
We surely can find such independent source. The certainties we have (think of  the 
sum and  the  cogito)  are  grounded  on  a  direct  confrontation  with  the  very  fact  they 
represent, and not on some complicated philosophical argument that bridges the apparent 
gap from the impossibility to think otherwise to the truth of  what we can't think otherwise.  
Also, I think it is possible to discover with certainty through eidetic variation that a doubt is  
possible as  to whether  p  is  true  so long as  p  is  not certain.  Yet,  exploring this  gap is 
extremely important. It touches the very hearth of  the transcendental problem – that is, the  
problem of  understanding how knowledge of  the truth is possible at all. 
I will say more on this gap in Chapter XII, but here I will briefly make the most 
important point that concerns the issue of  the unavoidable commitment to there being 
certainties that we have discussed in this and the previous Chapter 220. There is a difference 
between judging that from the untenability of  global scepticism it doesn't follow that it is  
false, and judging that even if  we can't but be committed to the existence of  certainties,  
our commitment might be wrong. The two things should be distinguished, because we must  
judge that global scepticism can't be true even if  it doesn't follow from its being untenable.  
The recognition  that  the  falsity  of  global  scepticism is  not  entailed by its  untenability 
should not lead us to think that even if  it is untenable it might be true, for if  we were to so 
judge, we will ipso facto be committed to judge that there might not be any certainty. But this  
standpoint is untenable in many ways, as already argued above.
We should  first  appreciate  why  is  it  that  we think that  from the untenability  of 
global scepticism it does not follow that global scepticism is false. The reason hinges on a 
very profound idea that structures the way in which we think about the mind, that which 
confronts the mind, truth and knowledge. That we can't but be committed to the truth of 
some  propositions  seems  to  be  perfectly  compatible  with  the  possibility  that  this 
proposition is false. Since truth is objective, our judgments, however unavoidable, might be 
wrong. Our unavoidable commitments to the truth of  some proposition might simply be 
220The point  made here applies  mutatis  mutandis  to the unavoidable commitment that  there are justified 
judgments (in at least some sense of  justification), a commitment which we have discussed in connection 
with global scepticism – that is, scepticism understood as the denial that there is any justified belief  in any 
sense of  justification. 
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some sort of  psychological compulsion. If  the compulsion is originated by factors that 
have nothing to do with the truth, then it is entirely possible that the alethic commitment is  
false,  even  if  unavoidable.  Since  so  far  all  I  have  done  was  to  argue  that  there  are 
constitutive  commitments  of  cognition  and  I  have  done  so  by  exploring  the 
phenomenology of  cognition,  no evidence has been presented about the  truth  of  these 
commitments. Thus, we need an independent source of  justification, if  any. But, and this is 
the crucial point, even if  it were ex hypothesis impossible to find this independent source,  
we could not endorse a standpoint according to which the constitutive commitments of 
our cognition might be false or are false. This is untenable. So, even if  from the claim that 
we can't but be committed to judge that p it doesn't follow that p is true, still this doesn't 
mean that we can tenably judge that p might be false – for in so doing we are committing 
ourselves to the truth of  p. 
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Chapter IX
Truth is the constitutive aim of  cognition
In this chapter I  will  argue that  truth  is  the constitutive  aim of  cognition.  Through a 
discussion of  existing accounts of  the aim of  judgment, I will defend a minimalist account  
according to which for judgment to aim at truth is for it to represent its content as true.
I will then argue that questioning is also aimed at truth in the minimal sense that by 
raising a question one is raising a question as to whether some proposition is true and  in  
this way posits a true answer as its form of  satisfaction. 
I will  then rely on these constitutivist claims about judgment and questioning in 
order  to  discuss  and  partially  vindicate  some  other  phenomena  that  are  taken  to  be 
distinctive of  cognition, namely the property of  exclusivity – only alethic considerations 
count as ground for judging –,  the property of  transparency – the question whether I 
should judge that p is transparent to the question whether p is true.
The thesis defended in this chapter represents the premise of  an argument which I  
will pursue in the next chapter. There I will argue that truth is valuable for us in a very  
specific  sense  which  is  captured  by  so  called  constitutivist  accounts  of  normativity. 
Constitutivists try to ground the authority of  norms on facts about what is constitutive of 
a  given  suitably  inescapable  practice.  In the next  chapter I  will  argue that  cognition  is 
inescapable in a sense that grounds the claim that truth is unavoidably valuable for us. 
I begin the discussion by introducing three senses in which we can value something. 
These distinctions will be very important in order to develop and evaluate the constitutivist  
strategy I pursue in the next two chapters on constitutivism. 
§9.1 Personal valuing, sub-personal valuing, and transcendental valuing
In order to properly appreciate the sense in which truth and certainty are valuable we 
should distinguish between at least three broad ways in which we can value things. These 
distinctions  will  also  be  useful  in  order  to  make  some  order  in  the  debate  on  the 
constitutive  aim of  judgment,  a  debate  that  we  are  going  to  engage  with  in  the  next 
sections. 
Personal valuing. One way I have for valuing something is by consciously aim at it or by 
consciously take  it  to be  valuable.  This  conscious aiming at something can take  different 
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forms. First, and obviously, I might value something by judging that it is valuable. A second 
way in which I can value something is by consciously desiring it. Thus, I might desire to be 
rich, and by so desiring I am valuing – precisely in the sense that I am desiring it – richness. 
A third way of  valuing something is by intending to bring it about that I possess it. Thus, I 
might intend to become rich, and by so intending I am valuing richness. 
This doesn't mean that by judging something to be valuable, by desiring something 
or by intending to possess something I am valuing something for its own sake. I might  
judge that richness is merely instrumentally valuable; I might desire richness for the sake of 
possessing something else – say, happiness; and I might intend to be rich for the sake of  
helping people that need a financial help.  Yet, in these cases, even if  I am not valuing 
something for its  own sake,  valuing it  for the sake of  something else still  is  a way of 
valuing it. 
These are not three ways of  valuing something in the same sense of  valuing; they 
are rather three different ways in which something can be valued221. Of  course, these ways 
interact. Judging something to be valuable is likely to be a commitment of  intending to 
bring it about that I possess something. Anyway, for our purposes, what matters here is  
that we recognize that these forms of  valuing are  conscious ones. It is a possibility that we 
have to value things in these conscious ways.
Given this possibility, and given our capacity for reflective distancing222, we have a 
normative problem that  can be individuated by the following questions:  what should I 
personally value? In the case of  judgment, the question is: what should I judge as valuable?  
What is really valuable? In the case of  desire: what should I desire? What is really desirable? 
In the case of  intention: what should I intend to do? What should I do? 
Sub-personal valuing. Another possibility we have of  valuing things is by valuing them 
sub-personally.  Here  we can divide sub-personal  valuing in two kinds,  a  form of  sub-
personal valuing that is wholly unconscious, and another form which is partially conscious, 
though it it not explicitly cognized by the subject.
Unconscious sub-personal valuing occurs when we are completely unaware of  the 
fact that our behaviour have some aim. Thus, most of  my behaviour can be conceptualized 
in such a fashion that it  makes sense to say that I value survival, even if  I have never 
221Maybe there are other ways. For instance, caring about something might be a way of  valuing something 
that isn't reducible to the other three ways or to a combination of  them. Nothing substantial will hinge on 
that.
222See Chapter II for a characterization of  reflective distancing. To recall, reflective distancing occurs when I 
put into question the goodness of  a candidate ground/reason for  judging/acting.  Thus,  to illustrate,  
reflective distancing occurs when I step back from my desires and ask whether I am entitled to act on  
them.
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consciously judged that survival is valuable, say. Also, if  we want we might say that our 
organism having functions might be conceptualised as having values, just like we can say 
that our organism values pumping blood in the right way in the sense that it is the function  
of  my hearth to pump blood in the right way. So long as we keep the distinction between  
this sense of  valuing and the previous one, we might unproblematically think of  a sub-
personal valuing activity. 
But there is also a kind of  conscious yet sub-personal way of  thinking of  a valuing 
activity.  Thus, I might be the sort of  person who is curious about architecture, so that 
when I walk around in the city my attention is spontaneously directed towards features that 
have some interest in this regard. In this sense, I value knowledge about architecture, or I 
value aesthetic acquaintance with architecture. Yet, this still counts as a sub-personal form 
of  valuing, because there is no conscious endorsement of  the relevant value in the form of 
judgment, conscious desire, or intention. 
The possibility of  personal valuing and reflective distancing gives rise to normative 
questions about what one should personally value. Can there be similar questions in the  
case of  sub-personal  valuing? Yes,  though they are not quite the same.  In the case of 
personal  valuing  the  questions  have  a  practical  or  deliberative  import:  they  are  questions 
whose answers are pertinent in order to decide what to  do.  In the case of  sub-personal 
valuing it is prima facie more appropriate to think of  normative questions about what one 
should  sub-personally  value  as  being  questions  having  a  mere  evaluative  import.  The 
question 'what should I sub-personally value?' has no immediate deliberative import if  it is 
understood as the question 'what would be a good way for my system to function?'. The  
question might take a deliberative import if  an answer about what counts as  good, well-
functioning for my system somehow provides me with reasons for taking some course of 
action that can shape my system in the desired direction. Thus if  I judge that my system  
would be better off  if  it  were less emphatic,  say,  and if  by doing such-and-such I can 
change my system in the desired direction, then the evaluative question about what it would 
be good to sub-personally value gains a deliberative import. But this doesn't falsify the fact  
that there are two very different kinds of  questions here. One question is: what should I 
personally value? And the other question is:  what would be better  or good for my sub-
personal system to do? The first has a practical import, the latter has primarily an evaluative  
import.
Transcendental  valuing.  Finally,  there  is  another  way  of  valuing  something,  which 
deserves to be called transcendental for reasons that will become clear as we move forward 
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in the study of  this phenomenon. To a first approximation, a value is transcendental if  and  
only  if  it  is  constitutive  of  a  given  dialectically  inescapable  activity,  where  an  activity  is 
dialectically inescapable if  in order to evaluate this activity one should engage in that very  
activity. In the next Chapter I will argue that truth is transcendentally valuable because it is  
constitutive  of  cognition  and  cognition  is  dialectically  inescapable.  I  will  now  briefly 
contrast transcendental valuing with the previous forms of  valuing, but I will have much 
more to say about it in what follows. Here I will be dogmatic, the arguments will come 
later. 
An example of  transcendental valuing is the fact that cognitive agency  aims at 
truth. We might personally value truth or not – thus, I might judge that truth is valuable,  
but I might even judge otherwise, I might suspend judgment on the issue, or be open-
minded about it; I might desire to know the truth about a given issue, or I might intend to 
find it out about a certain issue, but I might also desire and intend otherwise. Regardless of  
what I personally value, I will transcendentally value truth, because so long as I am thinking 
I am asking questions that want true answers and I am judging what I take to be the case in 
such a way that my thinking is responsive to alethic considerations only. 
The same considerations apply to sub-personal valuing. My whole organism might 
be such that it doesn't promote discovery of  the truth and responsiveness to evidence (for, 
say, in some circumstances, if  I know the truth, I might suffer too much; or because, more  
generally,  other  things  are  more  valuable  in  general  than  truth  and  get  systematically  
promoted at the expense of  the truth whenever conflicts arise). Yet, even if  this was true, I 
would still be transcendentally valuing the truth, because if  I judge I judge what I take to 
be true, and if  I ask questions I ask them because I want to know the true answer. 
As noticed, though transcendental valuing of  the truth might occur even if  truth is  
neither personally nor sub-personally valued, it can also be personally and sub-personally 
valued. One question we will  be raising is whether we should personally value what we  
transcendentally value, and whether it would be good that we sub-personally value what we 
transcendentally value.
Is  there  any normative  question  that  can be  applied  to transcendental  valuing? 
What about:  what should I transcendentally value? Or maybe:  what would be good to  
transcendentally  value? Or what about this:  is  it  really valuable  what I  transcendentally  
value?  It  would  be  the  aim  of  the  next  Chapter  to  explore  what  sort  of  normative 
considerations can be deduced, if  any, from the fact that truth is transcendentally valuable.  
To anticipate, we will see that there are no intelligible practical or deliberative questions about 
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how we should cognize, whereas there other non-practical questions (that is, evaluative and 
existential questions) that are intelligible and to a significant extent independent on what  
we transcendentally value. But first, let me argue for the claim that truth is the constitutive  
aim of  cognition. 
§9.2 Judgment aims at truth
There is a growing literature in contemporary debate on the idea that judgment has some 
constitutive  aim,  the  main candidate  for  that  aim being truth223.  The debate  addresses 
several questions.
First,  an uncontested  thesis  is  that  to  say  that  truth  is  the  constitutive  aim of  
judgment is not to say that some mental act counts as the act of  judgment only if  it is true.  
It is to say that a mental act counts as the act of  judgment only if  it aims at truth. 
Second, what does it take for something (e.g. truth) to be the aim of  judgment? We 
will see different ways of  understanding the 'aiming-at' relation. Some understand it as a 
form of  personal valuing, others as a form of  sub-personal valuing,  others as a mixed 
phenomenon  that  includes  both  personal  and  sub-personal  valuing.  Others  take  the 
'aiming' talk as metaphorical and understand the claim that truth is the aim of  judgment as 
the  claim that  it  is  constitutive  of  judgment  (or  of  our  concept  of  judgment)  that  a 
judgment is correct if  and only if  the content judged is true. I will argue that none of  these  
accounts is capturing the most basic and fundamental sense in which truth is the aim of 
judgment.
Third, what is the aim of  judgment? How many aims are there? Is there a hierarchy 
among them, or are they all  equally  fundamental? Many think that truth is  the aim of  
judgment, some think that other values like knowledge or justification are the fundamental  
aims of  judgment. Other endorse a pluralist stance arguing that there are several equally  
fundamental aims or norms224. In what follows I will argue that once the aiming-at relation 
is properly understood, it becomes clear that truth is the fundamental aim of  judgment.
223Most works speak about the aim of  belief, rather than about the aim of  judgment, but here I will henceforth 
speak of  judgment for the sake of  conformity with my previous discussions in this Dissertation. I will 
assume that we are talking about the same phenomenon, and will notice where the difference between 
belief  and judgment might be responsible for difference in opinions.
224People who claim that truth is the fundamental aim of  belief  include: Williams (1973), Railton (1994,  
1997), Velleman (2000), Wedgwood (2002), Boghossian (2003), Shah (2003), Burge (2003), Millar (2004),  
Gibbard (2005), Shah and Velleman (2005), Steglich-Petersen (2006, 2009), Vahid (2006), Whiting (2010, 
2012), and Littlejohn (2012). People who claim that knowledge is the fundamental aim of  belief  include  
Peacocke (1999),  Williamson (2000),  Adler (2002),  Engel (2004),  Bird (2007),  Sutton (2007),  Huemer  
(2007), McHugh (2011), and Littlejohn (2013). Weimer (2014) endorses pluralism about norms for belief  
and deny that neither truth nor knowledge is more fundamental than the other. 
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Despite the just noticed issues of  controversy, some points are agreed upon by 
virtually all participants in the debate. It is agreed that truth (or the other candidate primary  
aim) is the constitutive  aim of  judgment. The constitutivity is then understood either about 
our concept of  judgment or about judgment itself225. Either way, the constitutivist claims 
that  a  judgment  (or  our  concept  of  a  judgment)  is  such  that  its  aiming  at  true  (or  
knowledge) is that in virtue of  which it is the thing that it is. I will also offer a constitutivist  
interpretation of  the claim that truth is the aim of  judgment, and I will argue that truth is 
the constitutive aim of  judgment itself, regardless of  whether our concept of  judgment is  
such that for something to fall under it it should aim at truth. 
There are several reasons why reflection on the aim of  judgment is taken to be 
important.  To  take  truth  as  the  constitutive  aim  of  judgment  promises  to  offer  the  
resources to explain various important phenomena that are central to our cognitive life. 
1) Exclusivity:  only  alethic  considerations  can  count  as  grounds  in  doxastic  
deliberation.
2) Transparency:  the  question  as  to  whether  to  judge  that  p  is  transparent  to  the  
question as to whether p is true. 
3) Impossibility of  believing at will.
4) The authority of  epistemic norms: there are epistemic norms about correct/incorrect, 
justified/unjustified judging.
I don't think that all these phenomena are genuine – particularly, I deny transparency, and 
reject the claim that the authority of  all epistemic norms are explained on the ground that  
truth is the constitutive aim of  judgment (though I remain open minded as to whether some  
epistemic norms derive their authority on the aim of  judgment. The minimalist view I will 
offer deny the need for an explanation of  these phenomena, but rather make them structural 
features of  cognition. I will extend minimalism to them and will argue that they  all are  
basic facts about the phenomenology of  cognition that can't be explained by appealing to 
any further more basic fact  about cognition.  In this respect minimalism is  significantly 
different from other existing accounts which all  purport  to offer explanations of  these  
features.
There  is  another  important  question  which  is  not  explicitly  considered  in  the 
present debate. Namely, the epistemological question concerning the way in which we know 
the right answers to the previous questions. There is no explicit discussion of  the following 
225Conceptualists:  Velleman  (2000),  Boghossian  (2003),  Shah  (2003),  Shah  and  Velleman  (2005),  Engel 
(2013). Essentialists: Wedgwood (2002), Baldwin (2007). It is not entirely clear to me whether Railton 
(1994), (1997) is a conceptualist or an essentialist, for he makes remarks that suggest both interpretations.
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questions: how do we know that truth is the aim of  judgment?; how do we know that truth 
is normative for judgment?; how do we know claims about the constitutivity of  the aim and 
of  the norm? Though I won't have the occasion to explicitly answer these questions here, it  
is  the  overall  aim  of  the  Dissertation  to  argue  that  the  answer  comes  from  a 
phenomenological investigation of  the relevant phenomena, and so the answer must be 
provided by an epistemology of  phenomenological knowledge – particularly, an epistemology 
of  modal knowledge about phenomenology (see Chapter II, §2.12).
§9.3 The minimalist view 
What does aiming at truth means then? The fundamental sense in which truth is the aim of 
judgment is that judging is judging how things are, it is judging that such-and-such is the 
case, or is the truth. This view is a kind of  minimalism about truth as the aim of  judgment in 
the  following sense:  there  is  no  further  thing  that  is  needed  in  order  to  explain  why 
judgment aims at truth in that sense.  It  is  rather the structure of  the phenomenon of  
judging itself  that posits truth as its aim, as it were. The positing is not to be understood as  
some further personal or sub-personal mental state that makes it the case that judgment 
aims at truth. Rather, judgment itself  posits truth as its aim or value in the sense that to 
judge that p is to take p, in the particular way in which judgment does that, as true. 
Here I will offer several clarifications and further elucidations, mostly by answering 
to the most prominent objections to the view and by presenting the flaws of  competing 
accounts.  Like  most  minimalist  or  deflationary  philosophical  views,  this  view is  better 
appreciated by contrasting it with other views which are not minimalist. 
The view is about judgment itself  and not about our concept of  judgment. The 
view tries to capture what the nature of  judgment is, where the nature here is exhausted by  
the  way  judging  appears  – namely  by  its  phenomenology.  It  might  be  that  it  is  also  a 
conceptual truth about judgment that judging just is judging that p is true. But this is a further 
claim I am not primarily interested in here.
One way of  expressing the truth that minimalism is meant to capture is to say that  
to judge that p is to judge that p is true, in the sense that judging is to present its content as 
being true. But of  course, the point here is not that it is the same thing to have a judgment 
whose content is  p and a judgment whose content is  p is true226. It is phenomenologically 
226We should therefore clearly distinguish the claim of  minimalism and the phenomenon that is sometime 
referred  to  in  the  literature  as  transparency (See  Wright  (1992),  for  instance).  Transparency  might  be 
understood as a linguistic and conceptual point to the effect that it is true to say and think that to judge  
that p is to judge that p is true. I don't want to object to this claim about language and thought. The only 
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different to have these two judgments. The minimalist view is meant to apply to both of  
them, since they both are judgments. In the intended sense, to judge that p is true just is to 
judge that p is true is true, namely to present the content that p is true as true. 
When I say that to judge that p is to judge that p is true I am not saying that two 
things that are given as different are in fact the same. It is not like saying that the morning 
star and the evening start are one and the same thing. Rather, to say that to judge that p is 
to judge that p is true is a way of  articulating the very phenomenon of  judgment, the way 
judging is experienced when we judge. It is a way of  articulating what is going on when one  
judges that p is the case. 
The sort of  internal articulation of  the structure of  judgment that I am providing 
here is a quite peculiar one. This is because intentionality is a mysterious phenomenon. The 
articulation  doesn't  provide  the  sort  of  understanding  that  can  be  achieved  by  using 
scientific or natural categories. The point is not about some temporal or spatial property of 
judgment; it is not about its causal power; nor is not about its place in a wider network of  
relations that hold between different relata. 
Relatedly, there is no third-personal understanding of  the aim of  judgment that can 
have the conceptual resources for articulating the fact that judging that p is judging that p is 
true. If  we were to identify something as being the physical substratum of  judgment, the 
sorts  of  concepts  we  would  use  to  describe  that  substratum  would  not  give  us  the 
resources to think of  judgment as being aimed at truth, in the sense in which I am claiming 
that judgement aims at truth by presenting its content as true.
More generally, to say that judging that  p is judging that  p  is true (in the sense of 
being the sort of  act that presents or takes its content as true) is not to place a relationship 
between two things, judgment on the one hand, and truth (or aiming-at-truth) on the other. 
Judging is  taking things to be in a certain way. There is no distinction between the act of 
judging and the component  presenting-things-as-being-true.  Thus, the minimalist claim is not 
ascribing a property to judgment – and thus, saying that truth is the aim of  judgment is not 
saying  that  judgment  has  some  property,  namely  that  of  being  aimed  at  truth.  The 
minimalist claim is meant to be useful in so far as it makes perspicuous the phenomenon of 
judgment by allowing us to see it more clearly. 
Since the claim is meant to be an articulation of  what judgment is, I will argue that 
it is misguided to ask the following question that, as we will see, seems to be in the mind of  
point I wish to make is that minimalism is a view about the phenomenon of  judgment, and as such it aims to 
articulate the very phenomenology of  judgment and the sense in which the phenomenology itself  is such 
that judgment represents things as being in a certain way. 
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many theorists about the aim of  judgment: what is it that makes judgment the sort of  thing  
that  aims  at  truth?  Many  theorists  make  a  distinction  between  judgment  itself,  and 
something that must be added to judgment in order to make it the sort of  thing that aims  
at truth. That something can be a further mental state like an intention or a second-order  
representation, or it might be the application of  some concept in one's reasoning or the  
fact that there is some norm with respect to which judgment is accountable. This is the 
wrong approach, or so I will argue. 
§9.4 Common-element objection
The minimalist view hasn't even been explicitly noticed as a viable option in the literature 
on the aim of  judgment. The reason why this is so is that all participants to the debate have  
been mislead by what  might  be  taken as  an objection to the  viability  of  a  minimalist  
approach  of  the  sort  I  favour.  The  objection  is  often  presented  not  so  much  as  an 
objection to some view,  but rather  as  a  set  of  platitudinous  remarks whose role  is  to  
introduce a discussion on the aim of  judgment. 
The common-element objection227, as we might call it, has the following structure. 
First, it is pointed out a fact about our way of  speaking about propositional attitudes. We 
speak about them as if  they had some element in common. Second, from this fact it is then  
inferred a point about our concept of  judgment and/or a point about the metaphysics of 
propositional attitudes. The point inferred is that propositional attitudes (or our concept of  
them) have an element in common (or ascribe to them a common element). Finally, it is 
argued  that  there  must  be  some  further  fact  about  judgment  that  accounts  for  the  
difference  between  judgment  and other  propositional  attitudes.  In  what  follows  I  will  
discuss in some details two slightly different presentations of  this objection. 
I  will  first  analyse Velleman's  presentation of  the  objection,  then I  will  present 
Railton’s version of  it. 
Velleman. Let's start with the linguistic fact. It is natural to think that judgment aims 
at truth, for when we judge we judge something to be true. This appears to be a quite  
platitudinous and potentially revealing sense in which judgment might be said to aim at  
truth. Yet, it is noticed, this can't be right. Here is how Velleman (2000) comments on this 
apparently innocuous thought. 
227This objection seems to be accepted by everyone in the debate. See for instance Velleman (2000), Vahid  
(2006), Steglich-Petersen (2006), Humberstone (1992), Railton (1997).
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“every instance of  believing is an instance of  believing something to be true, and this relation to  
the truth is sometimes confused with truth-directedness [viz.,  the idea that truth is  the aim of  
judgment].  But  in  bearing  this  particular  relation  to  the  truth,  belief  is  just  like  any  other  
propositional attitude, since wishing entails wishing something to be true, hoping entails hoping 
something to be true, desiring entails desiring something to be true, and so on. Hence the fact that 
believing entails believing-true doesn't set belief  apart from other attitudes, as truth-directedness is  
supposed to do”. p. 247. 
In this passage one can isolate many misleading ways of  approaching the issue of  the aim 
of  judgment. If  one starts non-prejudicially to wonder about the idea that when judging we  
want to judge the truth, a very natural starting point is to recognize that when we judge we  
do simply that: we judge something to be true. To judge is to take things to be in a certain 
way. If  one simply pays attention to the phenomena, without bothering too much about 
the way in which one tries to capture them linguistically, then it seems pretty obvious that  
judging is aimed at the truth in a sense which doesn't justify, if  one were to move at the 
theoretical level, the talk of  a relation between judgment and the truth. Judging simply is to 
judge how things are. The idea of  relation doesn't have a natural application here. It is 
natural,  however,  to  think  in  terms  of  a  relation,  whatever  that  might  turn  out  to  be, 
between judgment and the truth in the sense that there is a relation between what we judge  
to be the case and what is actually the case – what is the truth. But this is something like a  
relation of  correspondence (or lack thereof) between mind and world. It is a completely 
different phenomenon from the one we are trying to elucidate when we speak of  truth as 
the aim of  judgment.  So,  there  is  a  first  idea  that  is  initially  implausible  –  absent  any  
positive argument in its favour – in the passage from Velleman. We will see that thinking in 
terms  of  a  relation  between  two  things  is  using  a  kind  of  imagery  that  orients  our  
reflection towards the wrong venues.
The second point  to be noticed is  Velleman's  ambiguous  focus.  It is  not  clear 
whether his claim here merely concerns the way in which we speak about propositional  
attitudes,  or  whether  it  also  concerns  some  truth  about  these  propositional  attitudes  
themselves, a truth that might be evinced through phenomenological investigation rather 
than being  simply  accepted  on  linguistic  grounds  alone.  He speaks  of  the  relation  of  
entailment  between  belief  and  believing  something  to  be  true,  and  he  sees  the  same 
entailment relationship in other propositional attitudes, since wishing entails, as he puts it, 
wishing something to be true,  and so on.  Now, if  the claim is  just  meant  to notice a  
linguistic fact, I think that we all might agree with Velleman. Yet, if  this were the sole point  
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it wouldn't be very interesting.  Surely he means it to be also a conceptual point that goes 
beyond linguistic surface and maybe even a metaphysical point, namely a point about the 
nature of  judgment itself  and the other propositional attitudes. The problem is, however, 
that  it  is  unclear  how  one  can  justify  the  claim  as  a  conceptual  one  or  even  as  a 
metaphysical one. Surely, it can't be justified on linguistic grounds alone – I might say that I 
raise my hands, that I raise the standards, that I raise money, that I raise the volume, and 
that I raise my children, but this by itself  doesn't show that there is a common element in  
all  these  actions,  beside  the  fact  that  we  use  a  single  analogical  expressions  for  them. 
Unfortunately, Velleman doesn't give us anything beside the linguistic consideration as an 
argument for establishing something about the nature (or the concept) of  belief. How can 
we move beyond linguistic considerations in order to reach conceptual and metaphysical 
conclusions to the effect that there is some common to-be-true element between belief  and 
other attitudes? 
The natural and obvious way of  proceeding is to wonder whether the 'to-be-true' 
feature that is common to all ways of  speaking about propositional attitudes tracks some 
particular  feature  in  the  very  experience that  involves  these  attitudes.  So,  the  question  is 
whether judging something to be true is a phenomenon that shares something – the to-be-
true feature – with desiring something to be true, and with any other propositional attitudes,  
for that matter. For my part, I don't see any such common feature. When I judge that p I 
surely judge p to be true but the phenomenon of  judging something to be true is different 
from the phenomenon of  desiring something to be true. In one case,  p is taken as being 
really the case, whereas in the case of  desire, one is taking it to be a desirable state of  
affairs in a way that presupposes that  p  is  not already the case. So, even if  it  might be 
natural  for  us  to  say  that  judging is  judging something to be true  and that  desiring is  
desiring something to be true, the phenomena of  judging and desiring themselves do not  
share any recognizable common to-be-true component. 
Let us be clear on what I am arguing here. If  one keeps one's reflection at the level  
of  linguistic expression, as Velleman does, then one is invited to think that, first, there is a 
thing that all propositional attitudes have in common, and second, that this thing is what is 
captured by the fact that with all propositional attitudes it is possible to intelligibly say the 
following: 
believing is believing something to be true
wishing is wishing something to be true
hoping is hoping something to be true
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desiring is desiring something to be true 
… 
So, the linguistic pattern suggests that there is something that all these attitudes have in  
common, namely the  to-be-true component. But if  one focus on the  phenomenon that these 
expressions are meant to capture, then it is unclear whether one finds anything that can be 
recognized as being a common-element that captures the sense in which it is true that both  
in desiring and believing one is desiring and believing something to be true 228.
This point about phenomenology suggests that there is no metaphysical ground (in 
this case, phenomenological ground, since we are wondering about the nature of  judgment, 
namely the  conscious  act of  taking a proposition to be true in the way in which judgment 
does)  for  taking  the  linguistic  to-be-true  component  as  indicative  of  a  metaphysical 
conclusion. The same point is also true, I feel, about concept. What I understand when I  
think that judging is judging something to be true is significantly different from what I 
understand when I think that desiring is desiring something to be true. It is not the case 
that the to-be-true component is thought of  in the same way in the two thoughts. I am just 
thinking about two different things,  and not about  two ways  in which the same thing – 
namely the to-be-true component – can occur. Analogously, when I think the thought that I 
am raising my children and the thought that I am raising the volume I am not thinking two 
thoughts  that  are  composed by the  same concept  –  the  concept  of  raising.  I  am just  
thinking about two very different things. 
Notice  that  Velleman's  point  about  the  presence  of  this  common  to-be-true 
component in all propositional attitudes was used in order to argue that since the attitudes  
differ despite their having this common component, there must be some  further  element 
that  distinguishes  them.  But  if  we  reject  the  existence  of  this  common  to-be-true 
component,  then  we  have  no  pressure  to  judge  that  there  must  be  some  further 
component that distinguishes the propositional attitudes. Let us however concede for the 
sake  of  argument  this  point  to  Velleman,  and let's  see  how he moves  forward in  the  
development of  his view, for this will prove to be very instructive. 
This  is  how  Velleman  marks  the  difference  between  judgment  and  other 
propositional attitudes, like desire. He says: 
228One might be worried by my argument because it seems to locate the ambiguity in the listed expressions 
in the expression 'truth' itself. Yet, we don't want to say that 'truth' is ambiguous. But we need not commit  
ourselves to the claim that 'truth' is ambiguous in order to vindicate the claim that these expressions are 
saying different things. The ambiguity is in fact naturally located in the expression 'to be'. When we say  
that judging is judging something to be true, we are saying that it is already, or really true. It is true in being, 
as it were. But when we say that desiring is desiring something to be true, here we are not saying that p is 
true in being, already, but rather that we would like the world to be such that p is the case. Thus, in rejecting 
the common-element objection we are not committed to take 'true' and its cognates as ambiguous. 
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“Believing a proposition to be true entails regarding it as something that it is true, as truth already  
in being; whereas desiring a proposition to be true entails regarding it as something to be made true,  
as a truth-to-be”. p. 248-9
Interestingly, Velleman doesn't take that remark as casting doubts on his presumption that  
when we speak of  judging and hoping as judging and hoping something to be true we are  
speaking about some common element between them. He might have taken the obvious 
discovery  that  judgment  differs  from  desire  in  the  way  just  quoted  as  evidence  for 
refraining from taking the common way of  speaking about all propositional attitudes as 
evidence that there is such common element. Instead of  taking this natural road, he says  
that judging and desire have further different entailments. In the case of  judgment, judging 
something to be true  entails regarding it  as something that it  is  true,  whereas the same 
entailment doesn't exist in the case of  desire. 
In the case of  belief, according to Velleman, there is a  regarding-as-true component 
which is absent in the case of  desire. Yet, after having made that remark, he immediately 
notices that this component doesn't suffice for distinguishing belief  from other attitudes. 
“Whatever regarding-as-true turns out to be, it will still be involved in more than believing, since it  
will be involved, for example, in supposing or assuming, and in propositional imagining as well.  
These attitudes are cognitive, like belief, rather than conative, like desire. To imagine that  p  is to 
regard p as describing how things are, not as prescribing how they should be. Imagining is therefore 
a way of  regarding a proposition as true – or, to introduce a term, a way of  accepting a proposition. 
The question remains  how belief  differs from imagining  and the other cognitive  attitudes”.  p.  
250229. 
From this discussion Velleman concludes that the difference between these attitudes must  
be in the  aim  one has while having them. Using his technical vocabulary, the difference 
between  these  attitudes depends  on the aim with  which they  accept  a  proposition,  or 
regard it as true. 
“Assuming, for example, involves assuming a proposition for the sake of  argument, or for similar 
purposes, but it doesn't involve believing that proposition. … I suggest that this attitude is like a  
229Notice that this notion of  acceptance is technical – it amounts to take a proposition as true in a way that  
is supposed to be common to imagining, supposing, and judging. Velleman makes it clear that his notion 
of  acceptance is different, though connected with, the one discussed by Bratman (1992). See Vahvid  
(2006) for critical discussion of  Velleman's notion of  acceptance. 
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belief  because it is an acceptance, and that it is unlike a belief  because it is acceptance for the sake  
of  argument, whereas belief  is acceptance for the sake of  something else”. p. 251. 
Before  coming  to  the  details  of  his  positive  suggestion,  let's  evaluate  his  reason  for  
thinking  that  there  is  something as  a  regarding-as-true  component  which  is  shared by 
judgment and by the other alethically committed attitudes230. 
Velleman is now struck by the recognition of  another pattern in the way in which 
we speak of  some cognitive (as opposed to conative) attitudes: 
judging that p is to regard p as true
assuming that p is to regard p as true
supposing that p is to regard p as true
imagining that p is to regard p as true
… 
Admittedly, it is not the case that in desiring that p is the case we regard p as being the case. 
So, we seem to have found a difference, yet a difference which doesn't suffice to capture 
the specificity of  judgment, for judging shares a regarding-as-true component with other 
cognitive attitudes. 
Here the argument is exactly analogous to the one we saw about the to-be-true 
component. A linguistic pattern is noticed, and from this it is inferred that judgment has  
something  in  common  with  other  attitudes,  either  at  the  level  of  concepts,  or  of 
phenomenology, or at both levels. 
However,  speaking  of  this  common  taking,  or  this  common  regarding-as-true,  or 
acceptance, seems to be just a useful linguistic shortcut. We should not be led to think that  
there  really  is  this  common  component  just  because  superficial  linguistic  expression 
suggests that there is such component. Noticing the linguistic point doesn't by itself  tells 
us  anything about  the  phenomena themselves.  Surely,  there  is  more  similarity  between 
judging  and  assuming,  say,  than  between  judging  and  desiring.  But  if  we  look  at  the 
phenomena themselves I don't think we see anything substantial like a regarding-as-true as 
true component which is shared by assumptions, judgments, and acts of  imagination. To 
regard a proposition as true in the case of  a judgment is to take it as really true, whereas to  
regard  a  proposition  as  true  in  the  case  of  assumption  is  merely  to  pretend that  the  
proposition is true – it is to proceed as though it were true, that is, as though one were  
230I have relied on something like this regarding-as-true component in Chapter III, when I remarked that 
there is a category of  attitudes which consist in taking a proposition to be true, though I also insisted that  
they take their contents as true in ways that are more or less committal, as I put it in that occasion. In this  
Chapter the minimalist account of  the aim of  judgment makes clear the difference between judgment and 
other attitudes like supposing and assuming.
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effectively  judging  it  to  be  true.  It  is  not  as  if  the  phenomenology  of  judgment  and  
imagining, say, is identical in one component (or set thereof), and then there is some further 
component that distinguishes them. It is very hard to think of  things in this way because  
mental attitudes do not look like the sort of  things that can easily be treated in sum-parts  
terms. It is not that the sum 'judgment' include, as part, the feature to-regard-a-proposition-as-
true, and that somewhere else, in the sum 'judgment' there is the component: 'for the sake 
of  truth'. These are things that we can distinguish linguistically and conceptually for the  
sake of  clarity. But to give a phenomenological weight to these expressions on linguistic 
grounds  alone  is  methodologically  unsound,  and  simply  unjustified  given  the 
phenomenology itself. 
The same point seems to hold at the conceptual level. When I think that in judging  
I regard a proposition as true I am thinking something very different from what I am 
thinking when I think that by assuming a proposition I regard it as true. It doesn't seem to 
me that there is a single concept involved here – the concept of  regarding something as true 
– which picks out a  single  property. Velleman might have made his point speaking of  a 
common  taking-as-true component. 'Take' is an expression that can be used in order to 
express  many  different  concepts,  and  this  makes  clear  that  the  linguistic  commonality  
shouldn't  be  taken as indicating  any conceptual  common component.  At  least,  further 
argument is needed here to prove the point. 
To a first approximation, my view is that every attitude that consists in regarding a 
proposition as true exhibits a particular way of  regarding its proposition as true. This way 
of  presenting things might be taken as suggesting that there is then a common minimal  
element: the regarding-something-as-true component, or what Velleman calls acceptance. 
But this minimal element is not something that can be isolated from the particular way in  
which  it  gets  instantiated,  as  it  were.  It  is  like  noticing  that  all  faces  have  their  own 
particularities (my face is different from yours), and then trying to isolate the common 
element among them, namely the face itself, regardless of  its particular manifestation. But  
to think of  something like :-) is already to offer a  particular shape. The same occurs with 
judgment, supposing, assuming, imagining. There surely is some usefulness in noticing that 
unlike desires they all somehow amount to the act taking some proposition to be true. Yet, we 
need not bring home the utility of  this remark by saying that there is this common element  
– regarding-as-true or acceptance – that is shared by all of  them231. 
231Velleman explains the difference between judgment and other  cognitive attitudes by appealing to the 
different goals for the sake of  which these attitudes are had. One might think that a minimalist view like  
mine has no resources to explain the difference and the similarity between these attitudes. To discard the  
commitment to the picture 'acceptance + aim of  the acceptance' is not however to renounce offering a 
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So, I think that Velleman is wrong in thinking that there are these  to-be-true  and 
regarding-as-true  components that are shared by all  propositional  attitudes. These are just 
linguistic artefacts. Since he is wrong in thinking that there are such components, he looses  
the ground for arguing that we should explain the distinctive way in which judgment is 
truth-directed  by  introducing  some  further element  in  our  mind,  namely  some  sort  of 
aiming. Rather,  we can notice,  as the minimalist  does,  that the phenomenology of  our 
propositional attitudes is different, and that to judge just is to present a content as true, and 
it  is  to  do  in  a  way  that  doesn't  have  any  recognizable  phenomenological  element  in 
common with other propositional attitudes.
 One of  my argument for resisting the common-element objection is that there is 
no such common-element to be found in experience. Yet one might insist that it might be  
found at the conceptual level. As I already remarked, however, even if  we stick to what we 
seem  to  be  thinking  when  we  think  thoughts  expressed  by  using  the  to-be-true  or  
regarding-as-true component, still it seems that we are thinking different thoughts. When I  
think that judging is judging something to be true (or regarding it to be true) I am thinking 
about  judgment  in  a  very  different  way  from the  way  in  which  I  am thinking  about 
imagination when I think that imagining is imagining something to be true (or to represent 
something as true)232.  Anyway, if  one doesn't like arguments relying on introspection of 
thought (though notice that Velleman should rely on his own experience of  understanding 
of  the relevant expression in the same way in which I did), there is a simpler reply to the  
suggestion that Velleman's remarks might still be correct about our concepts  of  belief  and 
propositional attitudes. The reply is that our concepts might be wrong – they might be 
such as to embed false presuppositions about the nature of  the phenomena they refer to. If 
our concepts of  judgment and desire are such that they presuppose that there is some  
common-element between them, then let us just check whether the presupposition is true. 
characterization of  the  different  alethic  attitudes that  explain  how they differ  despite  their  common 
element.  Beside  attention to phenomenology  itself,  significant  insight  can be gained  by  showing the 
different webs of  commitments that characterise the different attitudes. I implicitly began to offer such 
characterisation in Chapter III,  where I  investigated the normative profile  of  judgment  and at times 
contrasted it with other attitudes like assumption and supposition. There I remarked that judging that p is 
committed to there being grounds for judging that p is true. Assuming that p is true, however, does not 
commit me to judge that there are grounds for judging that p is true. This is just an illustration of  how 
work on commitments through an investigation by the intelligibility method sheds light on the differences 
among these cognitive attitudes.
232I might have put the point in a less baroque way by saying that in the two thoughts I am ascribing  two 
different  properties  to judgment and imagination respectively. Yet, I do not even think that when we say 
that judging is judging something to be true (or to regard something as true) we are really ascribing a  
property to judgment – unless of  course we are speaking in a deflationary fashion such that an act of  
predication suffices to ascribe a property. Metaphysically speaking, I don't think there is any such robustly 
conceived property that is possessed by judgment such that this property can be captured by saying that 
judging is judging something to be true (or is to regard its content as true). The same applies  mutatis  
mutandis to imagination.
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It doesn't seem to be so. One might resist this reply by saying that all there is to our mind is  
just what we think of  it and what our concepts entail about it. This form of  anti-realism 
has several serious problems, chief  among them the fact that it is just impossible to believe 
it consistently (for discussion on this see Chapter VI). 
Railton. Railton (1997)233 also considers an objection to my view which is a version 
of  the common-element objection. Railton’s starting point for an analysis of  belief  as it  
relates to the aim of  truth is Moore paradox. He starts by noticing the oddness of
(1) h is true, but I don’t believe it. 
(2) I recognize that the evidence for h has become conclusive, so I don’t believe that h in 
the least. 
Then he asks: 
“What makes (1) – and perhaps by extension (2) as well – so odd? Various explanations have been  
proposed. One might start by noting that belief  is a propositional attitude partly characterized by its 
representation of  its object as true. “Belief  is believing true,” the saying goes. But this is too quick.  
For even the propositional attitude of  “pretending that h” amounts to “pretending that h is true” – 
such is the ‘believe’ in ‘make-believe.’ And there is nothing paradoxical about: 
(3)  h  is  true  (or:  I  recognize  that  the  evidence  that  h  is  true  has  become conclusive)  but  I’m 
pretending otherwise. 
So we must go further”. p. 296
Before seeing how he proposes to go further, let's evaluate his argument. Like Velleman's,  
Railton’s argument starts by offering a putative specific quality of  judgment that would put 
it apart from other propositional attitudes; then he notices that this putative specific quality  
is  also  present  in  other  propositional  attitudes;  yet,  judgment  differs  from  other 
propositional  attitudes  in  that  it  gives  rise  to  Moore's  paradox,  whereas  some  other 
attitudes don't. This suggests that there should be a further feature to be identified that 
would distinguish judgment from other attitudes. 
The structure of  Velleman's and Railton’s arguments is the same. They differ in 
some interesting details  though.  Railton seems to conceive of  the element  which is  in 
common between judgment  and other  attitudes in  a  way that  differs  from Velleman's.  
Velleman speaks of  judging/pretending that p as  entailing judging/pretending p to be true 
233He puts forward a similar argument in Railton (1994). I focus on Railton (1997) since here the argument  
is more developed. 
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(to-be-true component) and as entailing regarding p as true (acceptance or regarding-as-true 
component)234. Railton doesn't put the point in terms of  entailment. He says that “belief  is  
a propositional attitude partly characterized by its representation of  its object as true”. He 
then puts his point as a point about the metaphysics of  belief  itself, rather than our ways 
of  speaking (and thinking) about belief. 
The question is of  course whether he is right in claiming that both judgment and 
pretension are partly characterised by a representation of  their objects as true. Interestingly,  
he doesn't offer any argument for this claim. So, presumably, even if  he doesn't make the 
point by anchoring it to the way we speak about propositional attitudes, he would appeal to  
similar linguistic considerations in order to back up his argument. Here the same objection 
that I applied to Velleman's argument applies as well: what is the phenomenological ground 
for thinking that judgment represents its object as true in the same way in which pretending 
does? There is no such ground: pretending represents its object as true in a way that is 
cognizant of  the fact that its object is not really true, whereas judgment represents its object 
as true in a fully committal fashion, as it were. 
Let us take stock. I have argued that the common-element objection is unsound. 
Phenomenology  doesn't  vindicate  the  claim  that  there  is  a  common-element  like 
acceptance in common between judgment and other attitudes.  The argument moreover 
relies  on  a  methodologically  dubious  inference  from linguistic  practice  to  conclusions 
about  our  concepts  of  judgment  and the metaphysics  of  judgment.  This  removes the 
ground for thinking that we must posit some further mental state in order to explain why 
judgment aims at truth.
§9.5 Aiming as a second-order representation
The common-element argument has had a huge role in shaping philosophical reflection on 
the idea that truth is the constitutive aim of  judgment. By thinking that judgment and other  
attitudes share the fact of  regarding their contents as true, people have been led to posit a  
further  mental  ingredient  whose  role  is  to  make  judgment  the  sort  of  thing  that 
constitutively aims at truth. 
According to the  view under  discussion in this  paragraph,  what  makes  judging 
aiming at the truth in a way that distinguishes it from other attitudes is the fact that there is  
some further second-order representation to the  effect  that  the  first-order judgment is 
234A  minor  unimportant  difference  here  is  that  Railton  focuses  on  the  regarding-as-true  component, 
omitting discussion of  the to-be-true component. 
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aiming at the truth. I will focus on Rail ton’s version of  this view. 
After having concluded that both judgment and pretension are partly characterised 
by a representation of  their objects as true, he goes on to say what distinguishes judgment 
from pretension. 
“We might say this: a belief  that h “aims at” the truth of  h. A belief  that h necessarily “misses its 
target” when h is false, whereas a pretence that h does not. Beliefs are evaluable as true or false, and 
are false whenever their propositional objects are. To have mastered the distinction between belief 
and pretence is in part to understand this”. p. 296
This is surely right. It is true to say that a judgments are evaluable as true and false, whereas  
other propositional attitudes are not. Yet, this point alone doesn't explain in which sense 
judgment  differs  from  other  attitudes.  What  we  are  trying  to  do  here  is  to  offer  a 
phenomenological  characterization  of  the  phenomenon  of  judgment  and  of  related 
phenomena.  The  phenomenological  characterization  must  be  such  as  to  allow  us  to  
individuate what distinguishes judgment from other states. But mere subjugation to a norm, 
or mere  capacity to be evaluated  by a standard of  correctness is not by itself  a feature that 
should be evinced in  the phenomenology itself.  My present  judgment  that  p  might  be 
evaluated as  correct  and incorrect  according to some prudential  standard according to 
which having a certain mental  state is  correct  only if  having it  as  the consequence of  
making me happy. But the fact that we can evaluate our mental performances in this fashion 
need not be something to which our mental performances themselves are sensitive in such 
a way that the sensitivity is detectable in the experience. If  the truth is the standard of  
correctness of  judgment in the same sense, then this doesn't make any difference to the  
phenomenology and so doesn't distinguish judgment form other mental attitudes in the 
required way235. 
Railton says that by mastering the distinction between judgment and other attitudes 
we are understanding that judgments, but not other attitudes, are evaluated as correct if 
and only if  they are true. Surely, this feature about how we evaluate judgment seems to be 
central in our concept of  judgment236.  But unless this bit of  understanding is somehow 
reflected in our experience of  judgment and doxastic deliberation more broadly, the point 
does not suffice to distinguish judgment from other attitudes in their nature. It might be a  
235This objection should be reminiscent of  the challenges to weak constitutivism that I have discussed in 
Chapter VI. Many of  the arguments offered in this Chapter are particular applications of  the general 
challenges that I discussed in Chapter VI.
236But see discussion on transparency below. 
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point  about  concept,  but  as  such  it  doesn't  suffice  to  conclude  anything  about  the 
metaphysics of  judgment. 
Railton has something more to say that goes towards the desired direction. Though 
he is not very explicit about this issue, he seems to think that aiming at the truth involves  
some cognitive effort of  the agent, even a very minimal and quasi-automatic effort, some 
sort of  second-order thought or representation to the effect that in judging one is holding  
one's judgment as accountable to the truth only. Here are the relevant passages in which he 
expresses this idea: 
“In order for a propositional attitude to be an attitude of  belief, it cannot represent itself  as wholly 
unaccountable to truth or evidence”. p. 297
“It is part of  the price of  admission to belief  as a propositional attitude that one not represent one’s 
attitude as unaccountable to truth. Someone unwilling to pay this price – who, for example, insists  
that he will represent himself  as accepting propositions just as it suits his fancy and without any  
commitment to their truth – would not succeed in believing these propositions at all.” p. 297
“as  an  agent  you  must  possess  beliefs;  as  a  believer  you  must  represent  certain  of  your 
propositional  attitudes as  accountable to truth and as disciplined by truth-orientated norms (at 
least, in the limit); therefore, as an agent you must so represent at least some of  your attitudes,  
irrespective of  what other goals this might or might not serve.” 
“A self-representation of  certain of  one’s  attitudes as “aiming at” truth is  partially  constitutive  of 
belief,  which in turn is  partially  constitutive  of  agency.  Let us,  then,  call  this  sort  of  argument  a 
constitutive argument”. p. 298-9
The first  quotation might  be  read as suggesting  that  for  something to  be  a  judgment, 
instead of  something else, it (the judgment itself) must represent itself  as accountable to 
truth or evidence only237.  Taken literally,  I  don't  think it  makes much sense,  at  least  it  
doesn't make much sense on phenomenological grounds: judgments are representational 
mental acts, but they do not always (also) represent something about themselves. In the 
second  and  third  passage  he  locates  the  relevant  representational  component  at  the  
237The condition for believing that he actually presents in the first  and second passage is negative: one 
should  not  represent one's own mental attitude as unaccountable to truth-relevant considerations. Yet, 
from what he says in the third and fourth passage, it is constitutive of  belief  not only, negatively, the  
absence of  some representation, but also, positively, the presence of  some second order representation. 
This is why I read the passage as suggesting, however implicitly, the need for the relevant second-order 
representation. 
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personal level: it is the believer who somehow represents her attitudes as being accountable 
to the truth. Since he is a constitutivist, we should give a very strong reading of  this claim:  
namely that if  no such representation is present, one can't even have a judgment. This is 
plainly false. Beside the fact that it is unclear what this personal representation is supposed  
to  be,  it  is  surely  not  the  case  that  when  I  form  judgments  I  also  have  a  further  
recognizable representation to the effect that I am forming a mental state accountable to 
the truth. If  the further mental state is not meant to be phenomenologically salient, then I 
don't see why we should believe in its existence, and, more fundamentally, if  the further 
second-order representation is not phenomenologically salient, then it can't be constitutive 
of  the phenomenon of  judgment. 
Putting phenomenology aside, the presence of  these second-order representations 
is suspicious for other reasons. It is just unclear what sort of  mental acts they are. Surely,  
they can't be judgments. If  they were, judging would be impossible, for any judgment to be  
a judgment  will require the presence of  a further judgment whose content is  somehow  the 
representation of  the first-order judgment as being accountable on the truth, and this latter  
judgment will require a further judgment, and so on. Yet, if  it is not a judgment, then what  
is it? There are no candidates that easily come to mind – if  there were such candidates, 
then why Railton didn't mention them? 
Since the candidate second-order representations have to represent the mental state 
as accountable for the truth, it seems that it has to represent the mental state in such a way  
that it is true that it is accountable for the truth. Suppose that instead of  so representing  
the mental state it merely amounts to the supposition (or assumption, or imagination, or 
…) that it is accountable for the truth. In this case, one would not be seriously taking one's 
state as a judgment, for I might suppose that p while taking it to be false. So, if  it can't be a 
judgment  because  of  the  vicious  regress  problem,  it  must  at  least  be  some  sort  of  
protojudgment or quasi-perceptual state. Anyway, we are owed an account here, and absent  
any further clarification, the view is not credible. (Also, notice that the sole argument for 
the view is the common-element argument; once the argument is defused, we should not 
even feel the pressure to look for a further mental state. The peculiarity of  judgment might  
be located in the phenomenology of  judgment itself, like the minimalist view does, without 
feeling the theoretical pressure to appeal to some further ingredient, like a second-order 
mental state). 
The problem seems to be even more general. Let us grant for the sake of  argument 
that this second-order order representation might be properly representing as true that  
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judgment aims at truth, without needing to be itself  a judgment. Yet, in order to do its  
work, this second-order representation must represent its object as true. But then it is like 
judgment,  by  Rail  ton’s  own  lights,  by  sharing  with  it  this  common  element  –  the  
representing-as-true component. So, by Rail ton’s own lights, we need to postulate a further  
mental state which has the role of  distinguishing the first-order from the second-order  
representation. There must be some third-order representation whose role is to represent 
the second-order representation not as a judgment (that is, not as something that aims at 
the truth in the relevant sense), but as a quasi-judgment, or something of  the sort. Beside 
the fact that all this seems implausible on phenomenological grounds alone, it seems that 
we would be led to another even more contorted vicious regress that would make judging 
impossible. 
§9.6 Aiming as personally valuing
We have seen how Railton is led to traffic with second-order representations because he 
was led astray by the common-element objection. We are now going to see how Velleman238 
tries to distinguish judgment from other mental attitudes once he has convinced himself 
that he can't simply capture the sense in which truth is the aim of  judgment by appealing to 
the fact that judgment represents its object as true. We have seen that for Velleman there is  
one component which is shared by judgment and other alethically committed mental states  
like assuming and supposing. It is the component he calls acceptance. Now, Velleman's  
view is that what distinguishes judgment from other acceptance-involving attitudes is the 
sake for which one is accepting a proposition as true.
“Assuming, for example, involves assuming a proposition for the sake of  argument, or for similar 
purposes, but it doesn't involve believing that proposition. … I suggest that this attitude is like a  
belief  because it is an acceptance, and that it is unlike a belief  because it is acceptance for the sake  
of  argument, whereas belief  is acceptance for the sake of  something else”. p. 251. 
What is the sake for which we accept propositions as true when we make judgments? 
“What purposes or aims could acceptance have? Well, imagining involves regarding a proposition as  
true irrespective of  whether it is true – regarding it as true, that is, without trying to get its truth-
value right. Perhaps, then, believing involves regarding a proposition as true with the aim of  so 
238Here I am discussing the view defended in Velleman (2000).  But he has then changed his view and 
followed Shah's normativist account. We will see it later on. 
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regarding it only if  it really is. Thus, to believe a proposition is to accept it with the aim of  thereby 
accepting a truth”. p. 251.
What does it mean to aim in Velleman's picture?
“An acceptance has the aim of  being the acceptance of  a truth when it is regulated, either by the  
subject's intentions or by some other mechanisms in ways designed to ensure that it is true”. 
To accept a proposition as true with the aim of  accepting it only if  it is really true is the  
mark of  judgment. This aiming is ensured either by personal valuing (one's intentions) or by 
sub-personal valuing (some mechanism), where the two might be thought of  as end points  
of  a spectrum of  possibilities in which aiming might be realised. This is a form of  mixed  
account about the aim of  judgment which endorses a  teleological  account at both the 
personal and sub-personal level239. 
Now, for our purposes we might put on a side the sub-personal form of  aiming, 
since I am going to discuss it in a next paragraph, and we might also put on a side the idea  
of  a mixed account, and focus instead on the idea that aiming at truth is ensured by some 
form of  personal valuing240. Is it plausible to believe that it is constitutive of  judgment the 
fact of  being accompanied by some intention of  the agent? The account under discussion 
239A similar mixed account is also defended in Millar (2004, pp. 56ff).
240One  might  think  that  to  object  at  a  purely  sub-personal  teleological  view  and to  a  purely  personal  
teleological view will leave untouched the tenability of  a mixed account. However, this is not so, as it can 
be evinced if  consider each of  the four main forms that a mixed account can take.
First, suppose it is necessary for something to be a judgment that is accompanied by the relevant sub-
personal mechanism, though it is contingent whether there  also is the intention. This makes conscious 
intention redundant,  and so we are not given a  phenomenological  account that individuates  a  mark that 
differs the  experience  of  judging from the experience of  accepting a proposition as true for the sake of 
something else. 
Second, suppose, on the contrary, that it is simply necessary for something to be a judgment that it is 
either accompanied by a conscious intention of  by a sub-personal mechanism. In this case, we still don't  
have a suitable phenomenological account of  the difference between various forms of  acceptance. For, 
the conscious intention will then not be what necessarily distinguishes judgment from other mental states 
in experience, since an acceptance could be the sort of  acceptance that amounts to a judgment even if  there  
is no conscious intention that makes it having the phenomenology of  a judgment. 
Third, suppose it is necessary for something to be a judgment that it is accompanied by both a conscious  
intention and a suitable sub-personal mechanism. This is the only view that promises to be a constitutivist 
view of  the nature of  judgment, for it can capture its distinctiveness at the level of  phenomenology. This 
is why I discuss in the main text only the personal component, since to refuse its plausibility is sufficient  
to refuse the plausibility of  any mixed account. The main objection to this view (though see more in the 
main text) is that it is phenomenologically implausible, for there doesn't seem to be always an intention  
that accompanies the relevant judgment. Notice that this is in fact accepted by theorists favouring a mixed 
account, since the initial motivation for a mixed view is precisely the recognition that there might be plenty 
of  cases where one forms judgment without the relevant intentions.
Finally, if  one says that conscious intention is necessary for having a judgment, whereas sub-personal 
mechanisms are not necessary, then, again, we have the view that I discuss in the main text, and the  
problems that I discuss there.
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here sometimes goes under the name of  the teleological account of  the aim of  judgment241. 
This account understands the idea that truth is the aim of  judgment in terms of  some goal  
that the agent has by having the relevant intention to achieve that goal.  
A first observation to be made concerns the relationship between acceptance and 
the  relevant  intention.  If  accepting  a  proposition  as  true  can't  be  what  distinguishes  
judgment from other alethically committed attitudes, then it is unclear why an acceptance  
can  become a  judgment  just  by  adding  a  background intention  to  the  effect  that  the  
acceptance is done for the sake of  getting the truth. One picture can be the following. It is  
possible  to  have  states  of  acceptances  whose  nature  qua  judgments  (rather  than,  say, 
suppositions) is undecided until the relevant intention is in place. This view is implausible, 
for  we  don't  seem  to  have  free  floating  acceptances  that  are  indiscriminate  between 
judgments and other attitudes. Either I judge that p, or I suppose that p, or..., but it is not 
the case that I accept that  p  and wait to form the relevant intention in order to decide 
whether to judge that p or juste to suppose it242. 
Another picture can be the following. There never are free floating undecided states 
of  acceptance that wait the relevant intention that will turn them into fully determined 
mental states. There just are judgments and suppositions, so the fundamental mental states 
must be thought of  as complex states consisting in combinations of  acceptances plus the  
relevant intention. This view is implausible in many ways. I can't see in my case the relevant 
intention whenever I judge (or suppose, for that matter). We all know what it means to 
have intentions. The sort of  intention that I have when I decide to go to the super market 
is just not the sort of  mental state that I have whenever I form judgments243. 
Finally, there is another picture of  the interplay between acceptance and intentions. 
The first picture has it that there might be free floating states of  acceptances. The second 
picture denies that  and says that whenever  there is  an acceptance there  is  the relevant 
intention. Yet both picture agrees that for something to be  a judgment there must be the 
relevant intention that turns the acceptance into a judging form of  acceptance. A third 
241There are many authors who endose such teleological account of  the aim of  belief. See Steglich-Pertersen 
(2006), Vahid (2006), Velleman 2000, Hieronimy (2006). Whiting (2012). See Owen (2003), Shah (2003) 
and Kelly (2003) for objections to the teleological account on the ground that aims can be weighted,  
whereas truth can't. See Steglich-Petersen (2008) for an answer to this objection. See McHugh (2012) for  
a reply to Steglich-Pertersen (2008).
242Notice  that  here  the  notion  of  acceptance  that  we are  using  is  technical  and refers  to  the  putative 
regarding-as-true common element  that Velleman would have individuate thank to linguistic  analysis. 
Velleman himself  recognizes that his notion is technical and differs from Bratman's notion. Thus, there  
might be states of  acceptances of  the sort Bratman describes. But these states will also feature a further 
regarding-as-true component (that is,  acceptances in Velleman's sense) that will  turn the regarding-as-
true-component in an Bratmanian intention.
243See  Coté-Bouchard  (2016)  for  further  critical  discussion  of  the  idea  that  some  intention  or  desire  
systematically accompanies our beliefs. 
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picture  would  deny this  and would say that  there are  judgments independently of  the  
relevant intentions, though it would also insist that the intention is necessary in order to 
make  judgment  (or  its  acceptance-component)  aiming  at  truth.  Beside  the 
phenomenological  problems already mentioned, this view will  have the consequence of 
abandoning the claim that aiming at truth is constitutive of  judgment. For a judgment by 
itself  would not be the sort of  thing that aims at truth. Simply, it is the sort of  thing that is  
systematically accompanied by an intention that makes it aiming at truth. But this is  to  
abandon constitutivism about truth as the aim of  judgment.
Another way of  raising a problem to the teleological view will be to phrase the 
phenomenological considerations as raising a problem about self-knowledge. If  there is 
nothing distinctive to the  phenomenology of  judgment  itself  that  distinguishes it  from 
other  forms of  acceptances,  then how do we  know when we  are  judging rather  than 
assuming, say? We can't appeal to the simple fact that consciousness is self-consciousness,  
for even if  by judging one was also conscious of  being judging, judging by itself  is like  
supposition in that it is an acceptance of  some content as true, and thus they would have 
to be the same phenomena. We must then think that self-knowledge is here achieved by 
knowing whether one has the relevant intention. So, I know whether I am judging if  I  
know that  I  am intending to  accept  a  proposition  as true  for  the  particular  sake that  
distinguishes the acceptance of  a judgment from the acceptance of  a supposition. But this 
doesn't have any phenomenological plausibility. When I judge I need not know whether I 
intend to get the truth. This is true regardless of  the model of  self-knowledge we want to 
embrace. Neither do I have to observe the presence of  the relevant intention, nor do I have 
to make up my mind so as to have the relevant intention244. 
Maybe  one  further  reason  –  beside  the  adherence  to  the  common-element 
objection – why people are tempted to think that some intention must be present in the 
background  is  that  people  fail  to  distinguish  clearly  the  phenomenon  of  doxastic 
deliberation from the phenomenon of  judgment itself. When inquiring about an issue there 
seems to be some phenomenological  plausibility  in  the thought that  in  inquiring I  am 
intending to discover the truth about it. And so one takes that plausibility as involving the 
very output of  the process, namely judgment itself. But this is not correct. Judgment is 
judgment that things are in a certain way, and this minimally is all there fundamentally is to  
its being aimed at truth. Beside this, there might sometimes be the explicit intention to 
form a judgment about a certain issue, and so an intention to make a cognitive effort to  
244See Moran (2001) for some discussion of  the distinction between conceiving of  self-knowledge as an 
observation of  one's mind and conceiving of  self-knowledge as making up one's mind.
262
discover the truth about some issue. But these are two different phenomena. Intention to 
get the truth might accompanies inquiry or deliberation, not the nature of  the output of 
inquiry or deliberation, namely judgment. 
Beside  the  points  just  noticed,  there is  a  further puzzling feature  in  Velleman's 
account,  namely  the  fact  that  he  seems  to  be  more  concerned  with  our  concept  of  
judgment  rather  than  with  judgment  itself.  Here  is  what  he  says,  commenting  on the  
discovery that our concept of  judgment is such that judgment is correct only if  true, and 
incorrect if  false. 
“Our conceiving of  belief  as truth-directed doesn't necessarily settle the issue, however. Perhaps we 
could discover that the attitudes we call beliefs are actually regulated in ways designed to promote  
something other than their being true. Would we conclude that these attitudes weren't really beliefs,  
after all? Or would we revise our conception of  belief,  to reflect  its newly discovered aim?” p. 
278245. 
This passage clearly shows that Velleman is not a constitutivist about the aim of  judgment  
itself, for the existence of  the aim is not part of  the very nature of  judgment, but part of  
our  concept  of  it.  But  if  this  is  so,  one  has  failed  to  provide  a  phenomenological  
characterization that elucidates in which sense judgment itself  aims at truth. 
Ironically, Velleman points to the right evidence that would establish a fundamental  
sense in which truth is the constitutive aim of  judgment itself  – namely the fact that truth-
relevant considerations are the only considerations that shape our doxastic deliberations 
(this is exclusivity, a constitutive feature of  cognition, yet a distinct feature from the fact 
that to judge that p is to regard p as true). Commenting on the possibility that the attitudes 
we conceive of  as judgment might not be truth-regulated, he says:
“I think that introspection argues against this possibility. When we discern a gap between a belief  
and the truth, the belief  immediately becomes unsettled and begins to change. If  it persists, we 
form another belief  to close the gap, while reclassifying the recalcitrant cognition as an illusion or a  
bias. I cannot imagine evidence that would show this reclassification to be a mistake”. p. 278. 
But precisely because it is impossible to think of  such evidence, we should not make the 
245A similar cautionary remark is made by Railton (1994), and this seems to me to suggest that he is more  
concerned with the concept of  belief  rather than with belief  itself. “All this [referring to his discussion of 
truth as the constitutive standard of  correctness of  belief] should be taken with a grain of  salt. I have  
been speaking of  a folk notion, belief ”. p. 76. He suggests that his consideration about belief  might be  
proven wrong by scientific psychology. 
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aim of  judgment parasitic on our concepts. The truth-directedness of  judgment should be 
built  in  the  nature  of  judgment  itself,  but  this  can  be done  only  if  it  is  built  in  the 
phenomenological nature  of  judgment  itself,  for  anything  that  goes  beyond  the 
phenomenology might be conceptualised as contingently related to the phenomenology 
itself246. 
Let us take stock and compare the teleological account with the minimalist one.  
Minimalism about the aim of  judgment differs from the teleological account because it says 
that it is the nature of  judgment itself  that ensures that it is aimed at truth. According to 
the teleological account, as well as according to the account that appeals to second-order 
representations favoured by Railton, either it is some further mental state that explains why  
judgment aims at truth, or the explanation why judgment aims at truth is  delivered by 
saying that  judgment  is  a  complex states  composed of  a  state  of  acceptance plus  the 
relevant intention. Minimalism avoids any burden to appeal to some further mental state, 
and explains the relevant sense in which judgment aims at truth by noticing that to judge  
that p is to judge that p is true in the particularly committal way in which judgment regards 
its content to be true247. 
In order to further the understanding of  the distinction between minimalism and 
the teleological account, consider this comparison. Suppose I throw a ball in a field and the 
ball falls one meter on the left from a little bin whose existence I was completely unaware  
of.  Suppose that I then realise that there was a bin there. Can I understand myself  as 
246The point here is even more general. The fact that judgment  constitutively  aims  at truth can't be made 
parasitic on sub-personal mechanisms. It is conceivable that the underlying mechanisms change while the 
phenomenon of  judgment remains the same. Yet, it is unconceivable that the phenomenon of  judgment 
changes – for instance in that we can start judging on the basis of  recognized non-alethic grounds – while 
it remains the phenomenon of  judgment, rather the phenomenon of  some different thing. This means that 
it  can't  be  in  the  essence  of  judgments  themselves  the  fact  that  they  come  with  some  sub-personal 
mechanism.
This further shows that an accompanying intention or second-order representation can't be what makes it  
the case that truth is the constitutive aim of  judgment. For it  is  conceivable that I judge something  
without further representing it as being accountable to the truth only, or without further intending to 
judge that p if  and only if  p is true. Intention and second-order representations seem paradigmatically to 
be the sort of  things that might or might not be present while we judge. But since it is unconceivable that  
a judgment be not accountable to truth-relevant considerations only, then it follows that the fact that 
truth is the aim of  judgment can't be parasitic on the presence of  features that we might conceive as  
absent in our experience of  judgment.
247The sense in which judgment is directed at the truth according to the minimalist account does not appeal  
to the idea of  direction of  fit. I stand with Frost (2014)'s critical discussion of  the opposition between 
two directions of  fit. See Humberstone (1992) for an account of  the phenomenon of  direction of  fit  
according to which it amounts to the same phenomenon that Velleman is describing when he speaks of 
truth as the aim of  belief. “The present point, says Humberstone in order to sum up his account, is  
simply that unless one takes there to be a criterion of  success in the case of  an attitude towards the 
proposition that p, and, further, takes that criterion to be truth, then whatever else it may be, the attitude  
in  question is  not  that  of  belief.  So unless  the  attitude-holder  has what  we might  call  a  controlling  
background intention that his or her attitudinising is successful only if  its propositional content is true,  
then the attitude taken is not that of  belief ”. 
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having  failed  to dunk? No, at least not in any sense which is comparable to the sense in  
which one is failing if  one is judging what is false. Having noticed this point one might 
then wonder: what should I add to the mere throwing of  a ball in order to put the throw 
under the relevant norm norm? In the case of  a throw, the answer is quite obvious: I must 
intend, have the aim, of  getting the ball into the bin. So, here the intention is something that  
must be added to the physical movement of  throwing in order to make it susceptible of  
being judged incorrect or a failure in case I don't dunk. I think that people who think in 
terms of  the aim of  judgment in teleological terms have something like this model in mind 
when they feel themselves so comfortable in speaking of  aiming at the truth. But this looks 
like  one of  those cases where  a  conceptual  world which has its  home in a  context  is  
brought out of  context in order to understand another phenomenon that is not entirely  
hospitable to it. In the case of  judgment there is no distinction between the mere physical 
movement (throwing/judging) and the further aim that transforms the physical movement 
in the suitable intentional action that then deserves to be judged incorrect if  it is false, and  
correct  only  if  it  is  true.  The  judgment  is  already imbued  of  the  relevant  sort  of 
intentionality by itself.  In the case of  throwing a ball  we might think that even before 
explicitly aiming at dunking in the bin, I was already aiming at something, or intending to 
do something – something like throwing the ball in the field, or whatever have you. But in  
the case of  judgment not only there is no distinction between mere physical movement and 
intentional action construed by adding an aim to the physical movement; there is not even 
a  distinction  between judging as  an  intentional  action  with  some  aim and  judging as  an 
another intentional action with some other aim. It is not the case that there are judgments that 
have a certain aim, and judgments that have other aims. Judgment is what it is and it is  
already intentional in the relevant way – namely the particular way in which judging is  judging 
things to be thus-and-so –; there is no need to add some aiming in order to turn it into 
some thing that then deserves to be judged as correct if  and only if  it is true and incorrect 
otherwise. 
 
§9.7 Aiming as sub-personally valuing
A way of  detecting an element which is not common to judgment and other attitudes is to 
go to look for it  sub-personally,  namely at the level  of  the mechanisms that putatively  
ensure the production of  judgments and doxastic deliberation more generally248. Here is 
248Works that pursue this strategy are Bird (2007) and McHugh (2012b) Yamada (2010). It is not entirely  
clear to me whether they always have in mind truth as the aim of  judgment itself, rather than truth as the 
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Bird (2007)'s proposal about the idea that truth and knowledge are the aims of  judgment. 
“Cognitive faculties have essential functions, as do bodily organs and the like. The function of  the 
liver is to filter toxic impurities out the blood. Likewise the function of  the faculty of  belief  is to  
produce  truth⁄knowledge  (depending  which  you  think  the  aim is).  A  little  more  precisely,  the 
function of  the faculty is to supply true contents (or knowledge) for the purposes of  reasoning.  
Thus when engaged in practical deliberation whose outcome is an action, the function of  belief  is 
to supply inputs to that process, and furthermore its function is to supply true⁄known inputs, so 
that the output, the action, will be successful. This is analogous to the function of  the blood, which 
is to supply oxygen to the muscles and other organs, so that they may carry out their functions 
properly.  On this  view it  is  the  function of  the faculty that  provides  its  constitutive aim (this  
function⁄aim makes it the faculty that it is)”. p. 94. 
The idea of  function can here be understood in merely causal terms or in teleological ones. 
Neither  form  of  understanding  has  the  resources  however  to  articulate  what  we 
understand when we realise that to judge that p is to regard p as true. Causal relations put 
things one after  the  other  or in  counterfactual  relation  or  in  some sort  of  relation of 
production. But there is no temporal relation involved in the fact that judging that  p is to 
present  p  as  true.  Nor  is  there  any  relation  of  production  or  counterfactual  relation 
between  judging  and  (the  aim  of)  truth.  The  same  goes  for  teleological  conceptual 
resources. There is no need for the concept of  purpose in the articulation of  the insight 
that to judge that p is to present p as true. In judging that p I haven't a purpose to get things 
right.  Simply,  judgment  itself  is  the  form that  posits  how things  are.  The  process that 
eventually culminates with a judgment might be meaningfully said to be purposive. While  
inquiring, I  might do so with the intention of  getting the truth about some issue.  But  
judgment itself, the eventual output of  the process, doesn't feature any purposive element.  
(A minimalist will then have to say that speaking of  truth as the 'aim' of  judgment should  
be taken as metaphorical,  or maybe is a way of  speaking that we should abandon and  
relocate at the level of  inquiry, not at level of  its outputs). 
Independently of  the previous objection, there is another simple consideration that 
can be used to put on a side the sub-personal view. It is not the sort of  view that we are 
licensed to use in order to theorise about cognition when we proceed as phenomenologists.  
When doing phenomenology,  we are trying  to characterise  the  phenomena themselves. 
Nothing follows about  the  phenomena if  one mentions features that  are  not  given in 
aim of  the activity of  inquiry more generally.
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experience. 
One  might  try  to  construct  an  objection  to  phenomenological  method  on  the 
ground that it cannot avail itself  of  considerations about causation and functions that are 
otherwise  independently  motivated.  But  there  is  a  methodological  priority  of 
phenomenology  over  any  other  investigation.  In  the  present  context,  the  priority  is  
established as follows. Even if  one wanted to offer a naturalist account of  the fact that 
judgment aims at truth, one would first need a characterization of  the fact to be treated in  
naturalistic terms – namely a characterization of  judgment itself. Phenomenology provides 
this characterization, and the characterization provided is such that there is a basic sense in  
which the very phenomenon of  judgment is internally articulated in such a manner that it 
represents its content as true. This point about the phenomenology is independent on any 
further thesis about the function of  the mechanism that is supposed to ensure the process  
of  formation of  judgments.
§9.8 Aiming as metaphorical: normativism.
Normativists  hold that  speaking of  truth as  the  aim of  judgment  is  to  be  taken as  a  
metaphor249. The thesis they hold is that truth is rather the norm for judgment. The norm 
is typically taken as a norm of  correctness according to which to judge that p is correct if 
and only if  p is true. Correctness can then be understood in different ways, as a deontic 
property, as an evaluative one, as an ideal, or as a sui generis kind of  normative property 
that can't be reduced to more familiar ones250. 
Normativism takes two forms, regardless of  the particular content of  the norm 
and  the  normative  vocabulary  that  is  taken  to  be  needed  in  order  to  articulate  it.  
Conceptualists251 take it  that it  is  a constitutive feature of  our  concept  of  judgment that 
judgment is the sort of  thing that it is partly in virtue of  it being such that it is correct if  
and only if  its content is true. Essentialists252 takes it that it is part of  the nature of  judgment  
itself  that is it is the sort of  thing that it is in virtue of  the fact that it is correct if  and only 
if  it  is  true.   Both  versions  of  the  view  face  difficulties  that  can  be  solved  only  if  
constitutivism is grounded in the phenomenology of  judgment. 
249Lynch (2004), p. 499; Wedgwood, (2002), p. 267. 
250Deontic interpretations: Wedgwood (2002), Boghossian (2003), Shah (2003), Gibbard (2003); evaluative 
interpretations:  Sosa (2007),  Lynch (2009):  79–82, Fassio  (2011),  Jarvis  (2012),  McHugh (2012);  ideal 
interpretation: Engel (2013); sui generis interpretation Rosen (2001), McHugh (2014). Ferrari (ms) holds a 
pluralist view according to which truth is normative for belief  in a plurality of  ways. 
251Boghossian (2003); Engel (2004); Shah (2003), Shah & Velleman (2005)
252Wedgwood (2002), (2007). 
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Conceptualism. According to a conceptualism modelled on Shah (2003) and Shah & 
Velleman  (2005),  all  it  takes  for  one's  judgment  to  be  aimed  at  truth  is  for  it  to  be 
conceptualised as a judgment by the subject in deliberation. Crucially, by so conceptualising 
one's mental performance one is conceiving of  one's attitude as being subject to the truth 
norm of  correctness. This is what is meant to explain doxastic transparency – the fact that 
to wonder whether to judge that p is transparent to a wonder as to whether p is true –, and 
exclusivity  – the  fact  that  only  alethic  considerations count as  grounds for settling the  
question what to believe.
A first difficulty for the view is that when we deliberate we do not seem to bring 
into the deliberative process the concept of  judgment  (or the concept of  belief). It is rarely 
the case that I begin a deliberation by asking: what should I believe? Rather, I directly start  
paying attention at the issue itself. 
“Does my mental life end after my physical physical death? Well, if  I am reducible to a physical  
substratum, then all we seem to know about physics seems to entail that I would have to die as well. 
Yet, if  I am not reducible to a physical substratum, then maybe physical death by itself  doesn't  
entail mental death. But it all depends on whether my mental life is still dependent on it despite its  
not being reducible to physical stuff. If  I am so dependent then I might die when my body dies,  
even if  I am not identical with it. Anyway, if  I don't die, then what happens to me? …” 
This thinking process never involves the concept of  belief, nor the concept of  truth, for 
that matter. Yet, it has all the features of  doxastic deliberation. If  these concepts are not 
involved when we deliberate,  how is  it  that  they  are supposed to  explain  the fact  that 
judging aims at truth? 
Shah  (2003)  claims  that  one  needs  not  have  explicitly  before  one's  mind  the 
question 'what should I believe' in order to have one's stream of  thoughts  framed  by the 
question 'what should I believe?'. But he doesn't explain what does it take to have one's 
own question so implicitly framed. In the absence of  any positive reason to think that the  
concept of  judgment is somehow involved in deliberation without being explicitly present 
in the contents of  the judgments and questions of  the deliberation we lack a reason that  
we would need in order to make the conceptualist view worth of  belief. But Let us suppose  
here for the sake of  the argument that there is some plausible explanation. I will come back  
to  this  conceptualist  view  and  the  problem  about  deliberation  which  is  not  explicitly 
framed by the question 'what should I believe?' in §9.10 where I discuss how it tries to 
explain transparency and exclusivity.  I  think that  the  view is  objectionable  for  another 
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simple reason.  
Let us grant to the conceptualist that it is a matter of  conceptual necessity that we 
understand judging as aiming at the truth in such a way that a judgment is correct if  and 
only if  it  is  true253.  Let us also concede that it  is  in virtue of  the deployment of  that  
concept  in  deliberation  that  our  judgments  turn  out  to  be  responsive  to  alethic 
considerations only and more generally to be aimed at truth. This means that were we not 
to have this concept of  judgment we would not find judgment as accountable to the truth 
and truth-relevant considerations only. If  we didn't have that concept we would be capable 
of  using, for instance, practical considerations as ground for judging a given proposition to  
be true, something that it is impossible for us now. But for one thing concepts seem to be 
paradigmatically the sorts of  things that can be possessed or not, and there doesn't seem to 
be any obvious necessity  to possess the concept of  judgment that  we actually  possess  
according to the conceptualist version of  normativism, namely the concept of  a mental 
state  whose  standard  of  correctness  is  the  truth.  Moreover,  one  might  have  different 
opinions about judgement and as a result ending up having a different concept of  it. But  
this seems to clash with the fact that we might easily conceive how we can keep having  
judgments  even  if  we  change  our  concept  of  judgment.  To  say  the  very  least,  a  
conceptualist owes us an explanation of  why we can't but have this concept of  judgment. 
Or,  alternatively,  he  owes  us  an  explanation  of  why  it  would  be  impossible  to  have 
judgments that respect transparency and exclusivity were we to have a different concept of 
judgment. 
To make things  vivid,  take  a  person – a  philosopher  –  who becomes  strongly 
persuaded that whether a judgment is correct can be evaluated only by measuring the way 
in which a judgment satisfies non-epistemic aims, like moral ones254. This is not incredible. 
She is a philosopher who thinks that action is of  a single kind, say, and that mental action 
just is one way in which we can act. On this ground, she thinks that when deciding what to 
do one should weight all possible aims, and eventually she thinks that moral considerations  
are the most authoritative ones.  We might dogmatically  suppose that this person has a 
253I am myself  sceptical about this claim of  conceptual necessity, but I won't claim for it here. See Street  
(2009) for another sceptical voice and for criticisms to Shah's account of  the concept of  belief.
254See Street (2009) where she discusses the mental life of  an agent who takes prudential considerations as 
reasons for believing.  Though I concede that it can be conceived in the sense that there is no obvious 
conceptual error  in  the  description  of  the  scenario  (this  is  part  of  my  scepticism about  the  claim of 
conceptual necessity voiced by conceptualist versions of  normativism), I deny that it is conceivable in the 
stronger sense of  being a scenario that we can try to experience, the reason being that I take it that it is a  
necessary structure of  our experience that only alethic considerations count as grounds for judging (if  we 
would be capable of  experiencing judgments formed on the basis of  non-alethic grounds, it would not be 
a necessary feature of  experience that judgments can be grounded on alethic considerations only). More  
on this below.
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wrong conception of  judgment (for exclusivity holds, and only alethic considerations count 
as grounds for judging) and we might suppose that as a result she ends up having the  
wrong concept of  judgment. Yet, this person keeps judging all the same. 
Now, the conceptualist might want to reply that this person simply has a wrong 
conception of  judgment, while still having the right concept of  judgment and while unwittingly 
and unwillingly  applying  that  concept  to  her  doxastic  deliberation.  But  this  line  needs 
argument. It is not absurd to think that by starting to firmly think that judgment is not  
responsive  to  alethic  considerations  only  one  comes to  apply  other  concepts  in  one's 
doxastic deliberation. Yet, the end point of  a deliberation, and each intermediate step will 
still  be instances of  judging that aim at truth as judging does,  namely by regarding its 
content as true.
The conceptualist might perhaps concede the point and say that even though it is a 
necessary  feature  of  our  concept  of  judgment  that  it  is  subject  to the truth norm of 
correctness, it is not necessary to have that concept. As a result, she will maybe grant that 
were we to have different concepts, the way in which our  current  cognition is structured 
would change as well. Perhaps, in a mind occupied by different mental concepts, mental  
states will  display different necessities:  it  would no longer be the case that only alethic 
considerations count in doxastic deliberations. If  the conceptualist view is open to that 
possibility, then it fails to capture the basic sense in which judgment aims at truth, namely  
by being an act that represent its content as being truth in the particular committal way in  
which judgment does that. 
Essentialism. According to essentialists, to say that judgment aims at truth is to say 
that  it  is  constitutive of  judgment itself  (regardless  of  what our concept of  judgment 
entails) to evaluate it as correct only if  it is true. The problem with essentialism is that,  
unless it is grounded on a phenomenological account of  the idea that truth is the aim of 
judgment, it fails to answer the following question: what does ground the fact that this 
norm of  correctness applies to judgment?
One answer might be that the application of  this norm is a fundamental fact, not to 
be explained by appeal to anything else. Another approach might be to try somehow to 
naturalise this norm. A non-naturalist realist might ground the truth of  the norm in some 
irreducible domain of  normative properties. All this debate and effort is however beside 
the point. Phenomenology itself  provides all the resources we want in order to understand 
the normativity involved in judging and, particularly, in order to understand why the truth  
norm of  correctness holds. The relevant facts are, I think, the following. The fact that to 
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judge is to regard its content as true. Second, the fact that sometimes we recognize that  
what  we  judged  to  be  the  case  was  not  in  fact  the  case.  This  provides  us  with  the  
recognition that sometimes we fail to get things right. This failure gets to be conceptualised 
as an error because judging is judging that p is true in the particular way in which judging 
commits to the truth of  the content judged. There is no further external aim to judgment  
itself  that should be invoked in order to explain this feature. Nor is the norm something 
that goes beyond and explains the way in which judging aims at truth. Judging by itself 
aims at truth in the way in which it does; to speak of  a norm of  correctness is to speak of  
a consequence of  this fact, and not of  what this fact amounts to. It is not a way of  capturing this 
fact, nor is it a way of  explaining this fact, but it is rather a consequence of  it.
We can take another approach in order to appreciate that the normativist accounts 
are derivative accounts of  a much more basic phenomenon. Normativists want to explain 
the idea that judgment aims at truth by saying that judgment is under the jurisdiction of  a  
norm of  correctness. But how does this norm gets manifested in the phenomenology itself 
of  judgment? In the phenomenology we do not see norms. Yet we see things that explain  
the sense in which it is right to speak of  norms applying to our mental states and the sense 
in which it is legitimate for  us  to judge that our mental states should conform to norms. 
The  things  we  see  that  explain  the  relevant  sense  in  which  there  are  norms  for  our 
judgment are the basic feature that a fundamental theory of  the aim of  judgment is meant  
to capture. Hence, there is something more basic than norms in the nature of  judgment and 
it is natural to ground the correctness of  the truth-norm on these features, otherwise it  
would be incredible why the norm would be constitutive of  judgment. 
§9.9 A general problem for non-minimalist views of  the aim of  judgment
A minimalist view denies the necessity of  an explanation for the fact that truth is the aim 
of  judgment. The fact is a basic one about judgment in that it is in the very nature of  
judgment  to  be  a  representation  of  its  object  as  true  in  the  particular  way  in  which  
judgment does that. This 'particular way' is not to be captured by postulating some further 
mental state that would distinguish the way in which judgment represents its object as true  
from the way in which other propositional attitudes do. It is judgment itself  that has the  
form of  presenting its content as true in its own particular way.
All other views take it that there is a need for an explanation. The explanation is  
needed because they accept the common-element objection to minimalism. Interestingly, 
271
they then use their preferred explanation as a ground for explaining further phenomena,  
namely exclusivity, transparency, the impossibility of  judging at will, and the authority of 
epistemic norms. 
The  general  problem  with  such  explanatory  aspirations  is  that  they  lack  the 
resources to end the chain of  explanations. The point can be illustrated by considering 
each of  the proposals in turn. 
Teleological  accounts  like  the  one  endorsed  by  Velleman appeals  to  intentions. 
Judgment aims at truth because  it is formed with the additional intention to do so for the 
sake of  getting the truth. Even if  one assumes for the sake of  argument that this would  
have the form of  an explanation of  the sense in which truth is the aim of  judgment, the 
question is whether this can be the  end  of  the explanation. One natural question is why 
judgment  should  be accompanied with  that  particular  intention instead of  some other 
intention.  Why  is  it  that  by  judging  one  should  intend  to  get  the  truth  –  instead  of 
intending to get something else? Here one would like to appeal to the nature of  judgment 
itself  in order to answer – one would like to say that it is because judgment represents in 
the way it does its content as true. But this explanation can't be used, since the appeal to 
intention is precisely designed to explain the sense in which judging aims at truth. But then,  
if  one can't appeal to the nature of  judgment itself, how one could explain the fact that 
judgment is accompanied by the relevant intention to get the truth, instead of  some other 
intention? This remains mysterious.  
One might try to say that the fundamental fact that can't be explained any further is 
that  judgment  comes with  its  relevant  intention.  But  this  doesn't  have  the  form of  a  
fundamental fact that can't sustain an intelligible question for explanation. Notice that by 
'intention' teleologists mean the standard form of  intention that paradigmatically occur in 
practical contexts. But then it is legitimate to ask why that particular intention, and not  
some other intention, is  the only one that come along with judgment. This is  left as a  
mystery by the teleological account. 
One  way  out  is  to  say  that  the  relevant  explanation  occurs  sub-personally. 
Somehow,  our sub-personal  mechanism of  belief-formation is  such that judgments are 
always and only accompanied by its relevant intention. Even if  we conceded the possibility  
that it is the case, this account would still be a failure. For what we want to capture is the  
sense in which the phenomenon of  judging itself  is in some relevant sense aiming at truth.  
But phenomenologically speaking, the connection between intention and judgment, even if 
it would be ensured by some sub-personal mechanism, still is a contingent connection: as  
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the account is  construed,  intending to get the truth and judging are just  two different 
mental phenomena, and it would then have to be entirely possible to conceive of  them as  
occurring in isolation one from the other. But it doesn't seem to be conceivable to judge  
without being aiming at the truth. 
Another way out will be to say that the relevant intention that comes along with 
judgment is not an intention like the other typical intentions. We call it intention because it  
is relevantly similar to other intentions, yet it is a sui generis mental state. This would have 
to be argued for  by  the  proponent  of  the  teleological  account.  But  even if  one were 
capable of  making this claim coherent, it  would still  be possible to ask:  why is  it  that 
judgment is accompanied by this however special intention? The account still puts together 
two mental states, and it seems at least intelligible to ask why they are so combined. The  
problem is that one can't appeal to the nature of  either mental state in order to explain 
their connection, for the feature of  judgment that would explain why it is accompanied by  
the relevant intention is guaranteed precisely by the presence of  that intention. 
Railton’s proposal appeals to second-order representations. Judgment aims at truth 
because it is accompanied by some second-order representation to the effect that judgment  
is accountable to the truth only. Can this be the end of  the explanation? One is invited to  
ask:  but  why  is  it  that  judgment  is  accompanied  by  this  second-order  representation? 
Assuming that we can make sense of  the existence of  these second-order representations,  
they do seem to be the sort of  things that might be present even in other contexts. Why is  
it that a second-order representation of  the kind Railton describes shouldn't accompany 
also other mental states? It is natural to think that the same representation can accompany 
acts of  assuming a proposition to be true, where the second-order representation would 
have a different content from the one that accompanies judgment. After all, it is precisely 
because judgment and assumption have the same regarding-as-true component that we 
need to look for some further mental state. But then, the question becomes why judgment 
is  accompanied  by  a  second-order  representation  to  the  effect  that  judgement  is  
accountable to the truth only? Why not another mental content? Again, Railton cannot 
appeal to the nature of  judgment itself, because what would explain why judgment is so 
represented is a feature which is not present in judgment itself  but is rather ensured by the 
presence of  its relevant second-order representations. It is then not clear how this account 
can explain the phenomenon of  the aim of  judgment. 
Exactly the same problem arises for normativist accounts. Conceptualists have to 
explain  why  we  should  apply  a  given  concept  with  given  correctness-conditions  of 
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application and not some other concept. What is it that justifies us in applying the concept 
of  judgment that presupposes the truth-norm of  judgment to judgment itself ? Maybe our 
concept  is  wrong.  What  is  wrong  in  thinking  that  our  concept  of  judgment  might 
presuppose a falsity about the normativity of  judgment? The answer can't appeal to the 
nature  of  judgment  itself,  because  it  is  part  of  the  conceptualist  view  that  it  is  the 
application of  the relevant concept that makes it the case that judgment aims at truth in the  
sense  of  being  subject  to  the  relevant  truth  norm.  There  is  then  a  request  for  an 
explanation that it is not clear how the conceptualist can discharge. 
Metaphysical  accounts  need  to  explain  why  the  norm applies.  Since  they  can't 
appeal to the application of  concepts, they must appeal to the nature of  judgment itself.  
But even if  we were to assume, for the sake of  argument, that these views capture the 
sense in which truth is the aim of  judgment, they would still have further things to explain.  
And the problem is that it is unclear what are the resources to which they can appeal in  
order to perform the required explanations. Why is it that judgment must respect the truth-
norm? It can't be the nature of  judgment itself, for by hypothesis all that distinguishes it 
from  other  alethically  committed  mental  attitudes  like  assumption  and  supposition  is 
precisely  the  fact  that  it  is  subject  to  a  norm.  The  price  to  resist  the  request  for  an  
explanation is to be some sort of  realist about the normativity of  truth – it just is a fact  
that a judgment is correct if  and only if  its content is true. In this respect, a minimalist  
view doesn't have to buy into any form of  realism about norms, for it is making a point  
about  the  very  structure  of  judgment.  Whether  one  can  ground  normativity  on  this 
descriptive feature of  judgment is then a further question (to be addressed in the next  
Chapter).
In  this  respect,  the  minimalist  view  has  a  significant  advantage.  The  fact  that 
judgment aims at truth can't be explained any further, it is a fundamental basic fact about  
cognition. There is no explanatory burden for minimalism255.  Another advantage of  the 
view, as we will see, is that it can take as basic other facts that theorists of  the aim of  
judgment were supposed to be explaining. 
§9.10 Exclusivity 
255Well, of  course there are questions for an explanation that minimalism doesn't answer. Being a merely  
descriptive view of  the phenomenological  essence of  judgment, it doesn't  answer the questions 'why 
judgment is as it is and not otherwise?', or 'why is there judgment and not something else?'... but these  
questions are also open for  the other  non-minimalist  views.  The difference is that other  views must  
answer questions that the minimalist doesn't have to answer. 
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People become interested in the idea that truth is the constitutive aim of  judgment for  
several reasons. One of  them is the fact that this seems to explain a noteworthy feature of  
judgment that  goes under the name of  exclusivity,  namely the fact  that only evidential  
considerations seem to matter when we deliberate about what to judge. I can't appeal to 
pragmatic  considerations  in  order  to  decide  what  to  judge.  I  can  only  appeal  to 
considerations that speak in favour of  the truth of  p  in order to decide to judge that  p.  
What does minimalism have to say about exclusivity? 
The other views promised to offer an explanation of exclusivity. Minimalism doesn't 
offer any explanation and denies the need for an explanation. To think of  exclusivity as a 
phenomenon that  needs  to  be  explained  is  to  think  of  it  as  somehow derivative  and 
supervenient on other more basic phenomena. Minimalism denies that and take exclusivity 
to be a fundamental basic feature of  our cognitive phenomenology. 
Simply, to judge that p is to represent p as true. And simply, to judge that p on the 
basis of  some ground is to judge that  p  on the basis of  considerations that are taken as 
speaking in favour of  the truth of  p. To put in another way: the act of  taking something as 
a ground for judging that p just is the act of  taking something as speaking in favour of  the 
truth of  p. In order to introduce the minimalist view about exclusivity it is useful to first 
consider and show the problems of  a conceptualist view. A conceptualist view is different 
from minimalism in two significant ways: first, it  wants to offer an explanation of  why 
exclusivity  holds;  second,  the  explanation  doesn't  appeal  to  phenomenology  itself,  but 
makes exclusivity a feature that depends on our conceptual scheme. Let us see how the 
view is developed and motivated.
Shah's conceptualism about exclusivity. There are two phenomena that are often invoked 
to in  the literature  on the  nature of  cognition:  transparency and exclusivity.  To a first 
approximation, transparency consists in the fact that to ask question as to whether one 
should believe that p somehow boils down to a question as to whether p is true256, whereas 
exclusivity consists in the fact that only alethic considerations count as basis for forming 
judgments257. I think that the central and real phenomenon is exclusivity, not transparency, 
so I will start with a critical discussion of  a recent influential defence of  transparency due  
to Shah (2003).  Then I will  move to a defence and explanation of  exclusivity which is  
independent from transparency. Shah's paper might be read as identifying two features as 
256For discussion and endorsement of  transparency see See Setiya (2008), Shah and Velleman (2005), Shah 
(2006), Moran (2001), Evans (1982), Adler (2002).
257Exclusivity  is  accepted almost  by everyone.  See  Bennett  (1990),  Owens (2000),  (2003),  Kelly  (2002), 
(2003); Shah (2003), (2006), Shah and Velleman (2005), Steglich-Petersen (2006a), (2006b), (2008), (2009),  
Hieronymi (2008). For critical voices, see McHugh (forthcoming) and Sharadin (2015). I will comment on 
Sharadin's paper in what follows. 
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being the core of  the phenomenon of  transparency: 
1) To answer the question whether p is true is to settle the question whether to believe 
that p.
Here some passages where he describes the phenomenon : when we ask ourselves  
whether to  believe  that  p,  we “must … immediately recognize  that this question is 
settled by, and only by, answering the question whether p is true”. p. 447. 
“Within the perspective of  first-personal doxastic deliberation, that is, deliberation 
about what to believe,  one cannot separate the two questions.  What I mean by 
claiming that the two questions cannot be separated is that one cannot settle on an 
answer to the question whether to believe that p without taking oneself  to have 
answered the question whether p is true”. p. 447 
2) There is no inferential step between discovering the truth of  p and determining 
whether to believe that p 
“Truth is not an optional end for first-personal doxastic deliberation, providing an 
instrumental or extrinsic reason that an agent may take or leave at will. Otherwise  
there would be an inferential step between discovering the truth with respect to p 
and determining whether to believe that  p,  involving a bridge premise that it  is 
good (in whichever sense of  good one likes, moral, prudential, aesthetic, all- things-
considered, etc.) to believe the truth with respect to  p. But there is no such gap 
between the two questions within the first-personal deliberative perspective;  the 
question whether to believe that p seems to collapse into the question whether p is 
true”. p. 447
Feature (1) is false, and feature (2) is true but receives a wrong interpretation by Shah. Let's  
start with feature (1). There are two ways in which one can  ask  to oneself  the question 
whether to believe that  p.  One might ask it  in such a manner that one wants to know 
whether it is good or desirable to be in the state of  belief  that p. This question doesn't ask 
for grounds that speaks in favour of  the  truth of  p. Another spirit in which the question 
might be asked is indeed the one that Shah has in mind when he says that by asking that  
question  one  must  immediately  recognize  that  the  question  is  settled  by  and  only  by 
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answering the question whether p is true. I might ask the question whether to believe that p 
in such a manner that what I want to know is whether p is true. But, crucially, it seems that 
we have  both  possibilities. It is  intelligible  to  ask  both questions. Our conceptual resources 
make room for the intelligibility of  both questions.
With respect to point (2), the idea is that there is no inferential step that need to be 
performed between judging that p is  true and determining whether to believe that p. The 
relevant inferential step that is not present is one in which one wonders whether it is good 
(in whatever sense) to judge that  p, given that  p is true. So presented, we are not in the 
presence of  any relevant feature. Of  course there is no step between discovering that p is 
true and determining whether to judge that p, for by discovering p to be true one is already 
judging that p. In that sense, there is no inferential step. If  the point is however that it is  
not intelligible to wonder whether it is good or the thing-to-be-done (regardless of  the fact  
that I am already doing it) to judge that  p, then, as remarked above, this seems entirely 
possible. It is a possibility that we have to wonder whether it is a good state to be in one of  
judgment  with  respect  to  a  given  proposition.  There  are  plenty  of  dimensions  of 
evaluation with respect to which I can ask this question. So, we must look elsewhere.
This  discussion highlights  a  very  important  point,  which  is  connected with  the 
problems  highlighted  above  in  the  conceptualist  framework  defended  by  Shah  and 
Velleman,  among others.  We have  the  possibility  of  deploying in thought  concepts  of 
judgment,  truth,  deliberation,  goodness  and  related  concepts  that  are  such  that  it  is 
intelligible to ask for non-alethic reasons for judging. This possibility has therefore to be 
explained  at  the  level  of  thought.  Somehow,  whatever  the  details  turn  out  to  be,  our 
conceptual resources allow for the intelligibility of  such questions. 
Notice that Shah's strategy in his paper is to argue in favour of  exclusivity on the 
basis of  transparency. After having argued that transparency is a genuine phenomenon that 
occurs  whenever  we  deliberate258,  he  then  offers  a  conceptualist  explanation  of  it.  
258On Shah's understanding of  doxastic deliberation: “Deliberation of  any kind is framed by a question, 
whether it is what to do, what to believe, what to pretend, or whatever. This does not mean that an agent  
has to have the question at the forefront of  his mind, explicitly posing the question to himself, as it were; 
but unless his thinking manifests some recognition that this is the question that he is striving to answer,  
his stream of  thought would lack the direction or purpose required for it to be an instance of  deliberation 
about  what  to  do  or  believe  rather  than,  for  example,  a  stretch  of  directionless  cogitation.  The 
phenomenon of  transparency that  needs explaining occurs  within the context  of  deliberation that is  
structured by the question whether to believe that p. Transparency does not occur in non-deliberative contexts 
of  belief- formation, nor does it occur (at least in a sense that isn’t trivial) in deliberation whose sole 
question is  whether p is true.  So if  we are to account for transparency, what we need to explain is why  
deliberation that is  framed by the particular  question of  whether  to  believe  that  p  is  answered solely  by 
considerations relevant to answering the question whether p is true. We don’t also need to explain instances 
of  nondeliberative belief-formation or deliberation that is framed by some other question, because there 
is no phenomenon of  transparency that occurs in those cases.”. p. 466
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Transparency holds because when we deliberate we deploy our concept of  judgment, and 
our concept is such as to count as judgment only those performances that are exclusively 
responsive to alethic considerations. Thus, deploying our concepts in deliberation is what 
explains both transparency and exclusivity:
“My proposed avenue of  explanation thus comes into view when we recognize that transparency 
occurs only in the context of  asking oneself  what to believe. … What I suggest is that by framing his 
deliberation as answering to the question whether to believe that p, a disposition to be moved by 
considerations  that  he  regards  as  relevant  to  the  truth  of  p  and  a  disposition  blocking 
considerations  that  he  regards  as  irrelevant  to  the  truth  of  p  are  activated.  That  is,  part  of  
possessing the concept of  belief  involves being disposed in this way when one applies the concept 
to frame one’s reasoning”. p. 467
 
“My point has been to emphasize the relevance of  the trivial point that in order to deliberate about 
what to believe,  one needs to possess the concept of  belief,  and my proposal  is that it  is  the  
dispositions constitutive of  possessing the concept of  belief, and of  seeking to answer a question 
framed with that concept, that are responsible for the fact that only truth-regarding considerations  
move an agent in such deliberation.” P. 468
This explanation, however, can't be right, if  our conceptual resources make room for the 
intelligibility of  questions about the desirability of  having some judgments regardless of 
their truth. If  transparency doesn't hold, then we can't appeal to transparency in order to 
explain why exclusivity holds. 
One  might  try  to  rescue  transparency  by  saying  that  when  one  is  asking  the 
question with the “right” concepts transparency turns out being true. This is of  course 
correct – there is a manner of  asking the question 'what should I believe?' that makes it 
transparent to the question whether p is true –, yet if  the point is a mere conceptual one, 
and not one which tracks the nature of  our own mental states, then the view is explanatory 
wanting. Shah wants to explain why transparency holds by arguing that when we deliberate  
we deploy our concepts in such a manner that transparency holds. But, if  we can deploy 
our concepts differently, that is, in a manner the make it intelligible to ask for non-alethic 
reasons for judging, then there is an explanatory question that is left unanswered by the 
conceptualist. Why is it that even though at the level of  thought it is intelligible to ask for  
both  alethic  and  non-alethic  reasons  for  judging  (and  also  to  evaluate  our  judgments 
according to alethic and non-alethic standards), at the mental or phenomenological level it 
is impossible to rely on non-alethic reasons for judging? He might respond: as it turns out, 
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whenever  we  deliberate,  we  happen  to  deploy  exactly  those  concepts  that  make  it 
impossible to rely on non-alethic considerations as reasons for judging. But what we are 
asking for now is an explanation of  why we deploy exactly those concepts, and not other  
concepts. Why is it that we don't deploy concepts that would make it possible to rely on 
non-alethic  considerations  as  grounds  for  judging?  The  natural  answer,  the  one  which 
makes exclusivity a structural  feature of  cognition itself  that doesn't  depend upon our 
conceptualisation,  is  to  say  that  it  is  right  to  apply  concepts  that  exclude  non-alethic  
considerations in doxastic deliberation because doxastic deliberation is by itself constrained by 
alethic considerations only. But Shah and conceptualists in general can't avail themselves of  
this answer. Unless one grounds the correctness of  application of  the concepts that turn  
exclusivity true in the very phenomenology of  cognition, it will be mysterious  why  these 
concepts  end up being those  that  shape  and structure  our  cognition,  and so why our 
cognition is not shaped by the other conceptual resources that make room for non-alethic 
reasons for judgment. A conceptualist has no obvious resources to explain that259. 
The consequence of  this is that the conceptualist hasn't escaped what she wanted 
to escape,  namely the fact that truth is for judgment what any other aim is for action,  
namely something that can be contingently attached to it. The way of  moving away form this 
initial thought was to be constitutivist. But the source of  the constitutivism must be placed 
rightly  in  order  to  avoid  the  contingent  connection  between  the  aim  of  truth  and 
judgment.  If  one  builds  the  constitution  at  the  level  of  concept,  concepts  being  the 
paradigmatic things that can be lost, changed, abandoned in the light of  considerations that 
make us reject the presuppositions embedded in the concept and so on, then the account 
fails to provide the right sort of  necessary connection. The necessity can be of  the right 
sort  only  if  it  arises  from  the  nature  of  judgment  itself,  and  not  from our  concept 
application. 
Having argued against transparency, and against the attempt to ground exclusivity 
on transparency along with conceptualist explanatory lines, let me now move to my own 
minimalist  understanding  of  exclusivity.  We  will  then  come  back  to  a  conceptualist 
objection to minimalism.
Exclusivity. According to a minimalist understanding of  exclusivity, there are two 
259There  is  another  explanatory  problem for  conceptualist.  They  argue  that  we deploy  our  concept  of 
judgment in our doxastic deliberation. Yet, they are very explicit (see previous footnote) in saying that 
when we deliberate we do not explicitly entertain thoughts which feature the concept of  judgment. In 
fact, we very rarely do so. When we deliberate, we pay attention to the issue itself. Thus, it is quite ad hoc 
for a conceptualist to claim that even when we do not entertain a thought featuring the concept of  belief  
we do nonetheless bring to bear that concept in our deliberation. A minimalist doesn't need to make any  
such ad hoc move, for it builds in the nature of  phenomenology itself  the fact that exclusivity holds. See  
Zalabardo (2010) for other critical discussion on this point.
279
very different mental acts. One is the act of  taking something as a reason for an action. The 
other act is that of  taking something as a  ground  for judging. The former might take as 
reasons for actions considerations of  various kinds, that is, prudential, moral, aesthetic, and 
so on, yet it can't take alethic considerations into account as reasons for action. The latter  
can't take as grounds considerations that don't speak in favour of  the truth of  the p to be 
judged. The minimalist bit is the claim that this is so because the act of  taking something 
as  a  ground for  judging  is  the  act  of  forming the  judgment  that  p  on the basis  of  a 
consideration that is taken as speaking in its favour. It is in the very nature of  the act of 
taking something as a ground for judging that one takes the consideration that is taken as  
ground as a consideration that speaks in favour of  the truth of  the p to be judged. 
This however does not mean that I have to consciously judge that my grounds are 
alethically pertinent in order to rely on them in doxastic  deliberation.  Thus, this fact is  
compatible with relying on grounds for judging that however  as a matter of  fact  are not 
alethically  relevant.  This point  is  obvious:  I  might appeal  to grounds that  in  fact  have  
nothing to do with the judged proposition;  or I might appeal  to doxastic grounds that  
would have something to do if  only they were true (or justified), but they are not. Yet, by 
relying on them I am taking them as relevant for the truth of  p – for this is what taking 
them as grounds for judgment amounts to.
In order to appreciate in which sense this is a form of  minimalism we need to  
appreciate why there is something wrong in the idea that the fact that only alethic considerations  
can be taken as grounds for judging has to be explained. There are several reasons why people 
feel the need of  an explanation here. 
First, consider the very way in which the fact to be explained is framed. It is framed 
in such as was as to suggest that there is on the one hand a thing called 'ground' (or 'reason'  
…) and the other hand some sort of  performance, namely the act of  taking that thing as a 
ground or as a reason for judging. If  one starts to think in this way it is very natural to then  
wonder why only alethic considerations can be taken as grounds in the case of  judging.
In order to explain why it is so natural we should add a further bit to the picture.  
Once we have started thinking in terms of  two things, (grounds on the one hand, and the  
act of  taking them on the other) we might also find very natural to think that the two  
things do not always come together in all circumstances, and thus this leads us to wonder  
why they necessarily come together in the circumstance of  a deliberation about what to 
judge. 
Thus,  consider  the  ground itself  first.  The thought that  p might be  taken as a 
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ground for judging, but it also might be taken as a ground for performing other things. The 
thought that p might be taking as a reason for acting, and actions can be many things. Thus, 
one is led to think, exclusivity cannot come from the nature of  the ground, for the same 
thing can be taken as a ground for doing various different things. 
But now consider the very act of  taking something as a ground for judging. Here,  
again, one might notice that the very act takes different grounds in different circumstances, 
depending on what it is taking its ground for. Thus, I can take a proposition that has nothing 
to do with the truth of  p as a reason for supposing that p. I might take the fact that I like to 
imagine scenarios as a reason to suppose that I am immortal, and it might be the case that I  
am really immortal. But then, if  it is so, it seems that the very act of  taking something as a  
ground for doing something else can't be what explains exclusivity, since the very same act 
can be present elsewhere. 
The natural run of  thought, then, is to explain exclusivity – the fact that in the case 
of  judgment the act of  taking as a ground picks up only grounds that are relevant for the  
truth of  the judged content – by referring to some peculiarity of  the thing for which the act 
of  taking grounds  for  is  performed.  Thus,  it  must  be  something  about  the  nature  of 
judgment itself  that explains why only alethic considerations can be taken as grounds for 
judging. This something might be, for instance, the fact that judgment aims at truth (and 
this fact can then be explained, as we have seen, in various ways, or one can resist the  
temptation to offer an explanation, as the minimalist does). 
This sounds just the right way of  conceiving of  the issue. But it is not. The mistake 
is in thinking that there is something, the act of  taking a ground for doing something, that is 
shared by all performances that can be done on the basis of  some consideration that speaks 
in their favour260. The mistake is to think that the act of  taking something as a reason for 
acting is of  the same kind as the act of  taking something as a ground for judging. This  
equation is natural because there seems to be some initial superficial structural similarity in 
taking something as a reason for judging and in taking something as a reason for acting. In 
both cases there is something to be taken as ground (and, notice, the very same thing, like a 
proposition taken to be true, might be taken as ground in both deliberations), and there is a 
taking as a ground, and there is something for which something is taken as a ground. But,  
if  one looks at the phenomena themselves, there is no genuine similarity. 
Let us focus on a very simple case. I see a bottle in front of  me and judge that there 
260This error is also responsible for the way in which teleologist thinks of  the aim of  belief. To think that  
judgment is the sort of  thing that is done for the sake of  getting things right (or for the sake of  knowing, 
or what have you), is to think of  judgment as a performance which is relevantly like any other sort of  
action that can be done on the basis of  instrumental reasons. 
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is a bottle there. Here the judgment is continuously sustained by the experience of  the 
bottle.  It  is  like  a  direct  confrontation  with  the  fact  that  I  am judging  to  occur.  The 
experience is my ground for judging. Now take my decision to drink the bottle because I 
am thirsty. Here the fact  that I am thirsty is  my reason for grabbing the bottle.  There  
simply is no relevant similarity between my taking the experience as a ground for judging 
that there is a bottle and my taking my thirst as a reason for drinking.  If  you look at the  
phenomena themselves this is just plainly obvious. In the case of  judgment, the experience 
supports the act of  judgment because the experience is the confrontation with the very fact  
judged to occur (or so it seems to the subject). In the case of  action, the desire to drink 
doesn't make true anything, but is rather what prompts the subject to drink, eventually. It is  
only a bit of  philosophical reflection conducted in abstraction from experience itself  that 
leads one think that they are the same thing. 
But if  they are not the same thing, then there is no need for explaining exclusivity. 
It  just  is  a  datum.  It  is  not  that  there  is  a  single  act  which  takes  place in  action  and  
judgment (namely the act of  doing something for a reason), despite the fact that in one  
case  only  alethic  considerations  count  whereas  in  the  other  case  other  considerations 
count. Rather, there are two different acts: one is taking something as a ground for judging, the 
other is taking something as a reason for acting (I will use the talk of  'grounds' for judgment 
only, and the talk of  'reasons' for actions only). 
Once we have discharged the need for an explanation of  the difference by noticing 
that there are two different phenomena, is there still a need for an explanation? One might  
think:  fine,  the  act  of  taking  something  as  a  ground  for  judging  is  unique,  it  has  no 
counterpart in the case of  action; but, why is it that that act takes only alethic considerations 
as  grounds  for  judging?  Here  again  we  are  misguided  by  philosophical  analogies  into 
thinking that some explanation is needed. 
One misleading analogy. Suppose that we have been persuaded that the reason-act 
and the ground-act are just two very different sorts of  things. One might be puzzled by 
noticing the following.  The reason-act can take considerations of  different kinds as its 
reason: thus prudential reason, moral reasons, aesthetic reasons, and maybe others.  Why 
does the ground-act just take alethic grounds? But this question turns things the wrong way. 
It sorts out reasons and grounds by using the wrong categories. To see this, let us ask why 
should we sort things out in this way (using categories like alethic, aesthetic, prudential, 
moral, …). You can sort them out in different ways, by grouping instances of  reasons and 
grounds along with different categories. How do you choose one grouping rather than the 
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other? Moreover, is there anything that the alethic category can be contrasted with? The alethic 
qualification doesn't even seem as a classification of  the sort of  grounds appealed to – 
notice that there can't be any alethic reason for acting! Rather, speaking of  alethic ground is  
just a way of  speaking of  a sort of  thing that is used as a ground for judging. It is not that there 
is the using as a ground for judging on the one hand, and a vast category of  grounds on  
the other, a sub-class of  which, the supposed category of  alethic grounds, is picked out by  
the ground-act. Rather, if  we want to speak in this way, it is the very fact of  being taken as a  
ground by the ground-act that 'makes' a ground an alethic ground. 
This  mistake is also what explains why people think that  it  is  possible to form 
judgment  on the  basis  of  grounds  that  are  judged to  be fallible.  Think  of  a  case  of  
conclusive (or all-things-considered) reasons for action. There are various ways in which one 
can deliberate in action. One fairly simple case is instrumental deliberation, in which one 
takes for granted a given aim or desire and reason about what to do in order to achieve or 
satisfy it. In the case, there is a particular form of  gap that is simply not present in the case 
of  judgment. Once I have recognized that I have to do X in order to satisfy desire d, if  I 
have authorised my desire, for whatever reason, then I understand that I ought to do X. 
Yet, there is a gap here: I might fail to do X, for whatever reason. In the case of  truth, 
there is no such gap. Once I have recognized that the evidence is conclusive I  also have 
thereby judged that p is true – it is not possible to judge at the same time that the evidence is 
conclusive without judging that p is the case261. (Epistemic akrasia when conclusive grounds 
are involved is not possible).
Consider now a case in which one has not conclusive reasons for action, but only  
prima facie reasons. Here, one might very easily act because of  her pro tanto reasons for 
action, even if  the person is perfectly aware of  the fact that her reasons are just pro tanto;  
however,  one  can't  judge  that  p on  the  basis  of  less  then  conclusive  grounds  while  
comprehendingly judging that the grounds are not conclusive, and hence that p might be false. This 
disanalogy hinges on the difference between the  acts  of  appealing to  grounds, on the one 
hand,  and  reasons,  on  the  other.  They  simply  are  two different  things.  And the  act  of 
appealing to some consideration in order to judge, is such that it can't be comprehendingly 
261Perplexity: but it is possible to judge that p without judging that there are conclusive grounds for p. True, 
this happens most of  the time, for we almost never form judgment about grounds using complicated 
concept like 'ground' and 'conclusive', and also most of  the time we simply judge without deliberating too 
much.  But  this is  not a  problem.  For one thing judging that  p commits  one to judge that there are 
conclusive grounds for p. Second, my point is simply that if  one is deliberating about p and at some point 
ends up concluding that the grounds are conclusive, and if  one understands what he is judging, then he is 
ipso facto judging that p is true. But in fact, it almost never happen that one reaches a point in which one  
judges that the grounds are conclusive. Simply, one investigate an issue, and at some point the evidence  
leads her to conclude that p. As we saw in Chapter II, §2.2, it is a very specific act of  reflective distancing 
that leads one's mind to recognize things as grounds.
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performed if  the subject judges that the ground is not conclusive. 
This  has  a  further  important  consequence.  The  act  of  taking  something  as  a 
ground for something else is not an act that occurs in isolation from judgment. In fact it is  
part of  the very act of  judging – when I take something as a ground for something else I  
am thereby judging on that ground that p. This means that taking something as a ground is 
always taking something as a conclusive grounds, as being something that makes it certain 
that p. 
This point might be counterintuitive, let me explain it. We often say that we take 
several things as evidence in favour of  some claim. True, when we do so we are assessing 
evidence. We judge: this makes it probable that p; this speaks against p; this suggests that q, 
which in turn entails that f, which suggests with some probability, assuming that everything 
went as it typically does, that p; and so on and so forth. When we assess evidence in this 
way relative to a given p, we are not performing the act of  taking something as a ground for 
p. We are simply judging that something favours the truth of  p, in the many ways in which 
we can ordinarily conceptualise this favouring. But it is a further step to then judge that p 
on the basis of some ground. When we do so we are performing a very specific act. When 
performing it  we do not  conceptualise the ground as conclusive.  But we commit ourselves to 
conclusiveness of  ground in the sense that we can't keep judging that p if  we judge that it 
might be false, and the ground-act goes along with the act of  judgment – they are one and  
the same thing. 
Let me argue for the claim that the act of  judging and the act of  taking something 
as  the  ground  for  judging  are  the  same  thing.  First  point  to  be  noticed  in  order  to 
appreciate the difference is the just noticed fact that taking something as a ground for 
judging is not like judging that something is evidence for some proposition. Now, if  there is 
such thing as a judgment isolated from the act of  taking something as its ground, and if  
there is something like the act of  taking something as a ground for judging isolated from 
judging, then it must be possible to do the experience of  them in isolation one from the  
other.  I  personally  can't  put myself  in  a  position  of  having this  experience.  Can you? 
Consider  judgment  first.  To judge that  p  on no ground is  impossible.  It  is  completely 
arbitrary to judge that  p if  I have no ground for so judging. I might find myself  with an 
inclination to judge something, but as soon as I pay attention to the issue, unless I rely on 
some ground as the basis for taking p to be true I won't be judging that p. Now consider 
the  act  of  taking  something  as  a  ground  for  judging.  This  is  just  the  act  of  judging  
something on the basis of  a ground. It is impossible to experience it in isolation.
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Shah and others like him might be led to adopt a conceptualist view because they 
think that if  one makes exclusivity a metaphysical feature of  cognition, then it would be 
impossible to be irrational262. However, my view doesn't abolish our irrational nature. My 
point is not that  all our judgments  are formed on the basis of  good alethic grounds, nor my 
point is that all our dispositional beliefs are formed and maintained on the basis of  alethic 
grounds. My point is simply that when a judgment is formed is formed on the basis of  
grounds, it is formed on basis of  grounds that are taken as speaking in favour of  the truth 
of  p, for taking something as a ground for judging just is to treat something as speaking in  
favour of  the truth of  p. Yet, all this is compatible with the possibility of  wishful thinking. 
All sorts of  causal  truth-irrelevant factors might lead to the formation of  judgments. The 
grounds of  our judgment might be very bad, and have many truth-unrelated causal stories.  
The only point that my account would deny is the possibility of  free floating judgments  
which aren't  formed and sustained by some ground which are anchored, as it  were, to  
judgment,  by  the  fact  that  they  are  taken  as  the  ground  for  the  judgment.  This  is 
impossible, I suggest. 
To conclude this long discussion, it is useful to consider an objection to minimalism 
that comes from the conceptualist camp – an objection which maybe explains why people 
want to explain exclusivity on the basis of  our concept of  judgment. 
“Up to this  point,  my proposal  amounts to little  more than re-describing the phenomenon of  
transparency in a way that brings out the point that transparency is expressive of  a conceptual truth 
about belief. However, this is an important point that can easily be missed. An agent’s grasp of  this  
constitutive truth about belief  shows up phenomenologically in the way that the truth of  p appears 
to him as solely relevant to settling whether to believe that p. If  this constitutive truth about belief  were 
merely a metaphysical truth, then it would be possible for an agent to fail to appreciate it, and it  
would be possible for the truth about belief  to fail to influence his deliberation. But transparency is 
the consciously felt authority of  truth for belief  in any deliberation that aims to settle belief, so  
transparency can’t be the conscious face of  a merely metaphysical truth about belief. Transparency  
thus must express a conceptual truth about belief; a truth that an agent grasps merely in virtue of  
treating his deliberation as answering to the question of  whether to believe that p”. p. 468-9
This  view  turns  things  upside  down.  It  makes  phenomenology  dependent  on  our 
representational resources (on our concept of  judgment), instead of  explaining why we 
have  the  representational  resources  that  we  have  by  appealing  to  an  independently 
structured phenomenology. But beside the many problems that such a view should face,  
262“We need an account that explains why one can’t  conceive of  one’s activity as inquiry unless one is  
disposed to treat evidential considerations, and only evidential considerations, as reasons for belief, but 
without building this disposition into the metaphysics of  belief ” p. 465.
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the motivation for adopting it that we can extract from this passage is not a good one. He 
says that if  exclusivity were a metaphysical truth then it would be possible for an agent to  
fail to appreciate it, and as a result it would be possible for our deliberation to proceed in a  
way  that  isn't  responsive  to  alethic  considerations  only.  The  premise  is  true,  but  the  
conclusion simply doesn't follow from it. It is true that if  exclusivity is a metaphysical truth 
then it is possible for an agent to fail to appreciate it. This is nothing more than saying that  
it is possible for us to fail (as we surely did in the past, and as I did some years ago before I  
started to think about the present issue) to take notice of  the fact that exclusivity holds. But 
from this it doesn't follow that it would then be possible to cognize in a way that fails to  
respect exclusivity. If  exclusivity is a truth about the phenomenology, then it is the claim 
that we can't fail to reason otherwise, regardless of  whether we notice it or not.
An objection to exclusivity. According to Sharadin, there are cases in which exclusivity 
doesn't hold, and so we can rely on non-alethic reasons as grounds for judging. Here is his  
case:
“My counterexample works like this. Suppose that a teacher, Dan, is deliberating about whether to  
believe that his student, Able, will improve in the com- ing year. Suppose further that the following 
is true and that Dan knows it: 
Self-Fulfilling-Prophecy  [SFP]:  If  Dan  believes  that  Able  will  improve,  then  Able  will  be 
significantly more likely to improve.”
Sharadin adds to the case the assumption that Dan knows that SFP is not an evidential  
consideration. Plus we add two conditions: that the evidential grounds for believing that  
the student will improve is equally weight, and also that Dan has a strong desire that Able 
improves. Generalising his case, the sort of  consideration we are considering here has the 
following form: 
SFP: If  S believes that p, then p is likely to be true
Now, I don't find myself  in a position to see how could I form a judgment on the basis of  
the recognition that so forming it will make it probable that it will turn out to be true. This  
will hardly be perceived as a sound objection. After all, critics of  exclusivity might insist 
that they find the case possible, and maybe that they have actually have the experience of 
being in one of  these cases.  And they might even deny my phenomenological reports.  
286
Surely, more methodological work is to be done in order to prepare protocols for checking 
through phenomenological investigation phenomenological claims. In the absence of  such 
an established protocol, here are two reasons for resisting these cases.
First, there are two ways in which one can use SFP as a reason for believing: a case 
in which one consciously and comprehendingly takes SFP not to speak in favour of  p; 
another case in which one is not so conscious that SFP doesn't have anything to say in  
favour of  p. In the latter case, we simply fail to have an interesting objection to my claim 
that reflexive cognition respects exclusivity. I don't deny that we form judgments and belief  
in all irrational, sub-personal ways. These ways might involve non-evidential reasons. If  the 
former is the case, however, then it is really difficult to see how one could rely on SFP in  
order to judge that p. Again, however, here one might simply insist that one very easily see 
how to rely on SFP to judge that  p, even when one is fully aware of  the fact that SFP 
doesn't speak in favour of  the truth of  p. What puzzles me is that even if  we grant that 
somehow  the  mind  can  end  up  judging  p upon  having  considered  SFP  and  having 
understood that  it  is  good to judge  p given one's  desires (e.g.,  to see one's  student  to 
improve), still I don't see how one could keep judging that p if  one asks himself  whether p 
is true. 
Second, and perhaps more convincingly, even if  one grants that in very particular 
extraordinary cases (like those involving SFP) it is possible to form a judgment on the basis 
of  SFP,  this  phenomenon is  different  in  kind  from the phenomenon of  appealing  to 
ground in order to judge that p. Simply, appealing to a consideration that speaks in favour 
of  the truth of  p is different from appealing to a consideration that doesn't speak in favour 
of  p but in favour of  some other aim  a with respect to which the judgment that  p is 
instrumental. The distinction is not ad hoc or question-begging, but phenomenologically 
grounded. If  you look at what it takes to judge, you will see that there is this phenomenon 
that consists in taking some consideration as ground and by so doing as speaking in favour  
of  p,  and, if  the case of  SFP is genuine, one will  eventually see that  there  is  this other 
phenomenon which consists in forming a judgment on the basis of  the recognition that so 
doing will be beneficial for achieving some aim – like having one's students capacities and 
knowledge improved. The two phenomena are distinct, and this allows us to concentrate 
on judgment on the basis of  grounds, rather than judgment on the basis of  reasons, when 
dealing with the quest for truth. Even if  we grant that forming judgment on the basis of 
SFP  is  possible,  these  judgments  will  not  survive  an  inquiry  whose  overall  aim  is  to 
discover the truth and only the truth. This is because the judgment won't survive reflection, 
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one it is noticed that there is no evidence that favours it over incompatible propositions. 
Moreover, as Sharandin construes his case, one must strongly desire to achieve some aim in 
order to judge on the basis of  SFP (in the case here discussed the desire is to see one's  
students to improve). And as soon as this desire disappears, like when one is only inquiring 
into the truth, then one's judgement won't survive reflection. 
The phenomenological claim that there is a significant difference between reasons 
and grounds can also be used in order to make plausible the idea that the case people like 
Sharandin are finding intuitively possible are not cases in which one forms judgment or beliefs  
on  the  basis  of  SFP,  but  rather  some  other  cognitive  state,  like  supposition  or 
confidence263. He considers this objection, but claim that its prospects are very poor, given 
the difficulty of  making it in a non-question begging way, that is, without assuming from 
the outset that only alethic considerations can be that on the basis of  which judgments are  
formed. 
§9.11 Questioning aims at truth264
I have explained in what sense judging aims at truth. But in fact also questioning aims at  
truth.  Since  judging  and  questioning  are  the  fundamental  ingredients  of  cognition, 
cognition aims at truth265.
263Here matters are very complicated. In italian, there is a straightforward way of  describing the sort of  
mental state that one can form on the basis of  SFP aided by the desire to achieve some aim. The italian 
expression is 'essere fiduciosi'. It is a state whose best translation in English is probably being confident. It 
is a sort of  hope  which is also accompanied by some belief  that one's hope will probably be satisfied. 
However this mental state is not like a state of  judging that p. It is one thing to judge that a student will  
improve, and it is another thing to be confident that the student will improve. Also, the fact that all these  
putative  counterexamples  to  exclusivity  involves  putative  judgments  about  the  future  should  make us 
suspicious about their effectiveness. When we deal with the future, there is a sense in which it is not 
already the case whether  p or not  p. This sense might be responsible of  some people's impression that 
there are genuine counterexamples to exclusivity here. This point would need much more elaboration, but 
I must leave it as it is here. 
264The ideas presented in this paragraph are developed in more detail  in a paper in which I argue that  
questioning is a sui generis form of  desire which can't be captured by existing accounts of  the nature of 
desire. See Zanetti (ms5).
265Given the distinction I draw between  transcendental  valuing and  personal  valuing – a distinction which is 
typically overlooked – it is not easy to see whether there are other views in the literature that are in full  
agreement  with mine.  People tend to focus either  on the aim of  judgment/belief,  or on the aim of 
inquiry. It is not always clear to me how authors working on these issues understand the relationship 
between  the  aim  of  judgment/belief  and  the  aim  of  inquiry.  For  the  idea  that  truth  is  the  non-
instrumental aim of  inquiry, see, for instance, Alston (2005), David (2005), Goldman (1986; 1999), Foley  
(1987), Hempel (1965), Kvanvig (2003; forthcoming, 2009), Lynch (2004), Sosa (2003). For criticism of  
this view, see Brady (2009). The idea that inquiry aims at truth is largely taken for granted – though see  
below § for a Pragmatist take on the issue that might seem to deny this claim. Davidson (2005) and Rorty 
(1998), (2000) seem to deny that truth is the aim of  inquiry. For discussion of  Davidson and Rorty's 
denial of  truth as the aim of  inquiry, see Hookway (2007), Bilgrami (2000), Lynch (2005). For what is  
worth, I firmly distinguish between transcendental and personal valuing, and regard the question of  the  
aim of  cognition as concerning the transcendental  level,  whereas the question of  the aim of  inquiry 
responds to the question arising at the personal level. Thus, what I have been arguing for in this Chapter 
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What does it mean to say that questioning aims at truth? Questioning comes in two 
forms: either in an open question or in a closed question, in the sense defined in Chapter V.  
In the case of  closed questioning the point is clear. To  wonder  whether  p is to wonder 
whether p is true. When I doubt about p I am asking myself: is p really true? 
In the case of  open questioning it might be less obvious, because it is hard to put  
'true' and its cognates in the formulation of  an open question in the same way as we do  
when we formulate a  judgment  or  a  closed question.  But very  little  phenomenological 
reflection reveals the same point. Suppose you ask your favourite open question: 'What  
does it all mean, if  anything at all?'. Well in so asking you are asking the truth about this 
issue – the truth about the meaning, if  any, of  existence. 
Another way of  pointing your attention to the fact that in raising a question you are 
aiming at truth is by mentioning the fact that a question wants an answer. And an answer is 
a judgment, which is aimed at truth in the basic sense defined by minimalism. I don't mean 
to suggest that the truth-directedness of  questioning is parasitic in any way on the truth-
directnedness of  judgment. It is just an invitation to look closely at the relevant feature of 
the experience of  questioning: when you raise a question, you are waiting for an answer, 
and this is wanting an answer, and wanting an answer is wanting to know the truth about  
the issue that the question is raising. 
Suppose we wanted to raise the common-element objection against  minimalism 
when applied to the case of  questioning. The defender of  the objection might perhaps 
point out the fact that we can say that a question about p is a question about whether p is 
true, and that a perplexity about p is a perplexity about whether p is true, and that a request 
about  p  is a request about whether  p  is true, that a supposition about  p  is a supposition 
about whether p is true, that an opinion about p is an opinion about whether p is true, and 
so on. The arguer might then notice that there is a common element in all these cases – call 
it the whether-it-is-true component. Thus, one might then claim that we should posit some 
further element in order to explain the particular way in which question is directed or aims 
at the truth. Maybe this further element can be the intention to get the true answer, and 
not just any answer that might be otherwise valuable (say, because pleasurable). Or maybe 
one  might  say  that  one  needs  some  second-order  representation  that  represents  the 
question as making a request that can be satisfied only by true answers. But there is no  
need to look for this further element. The senses in which an opinion about p is an opinion 
should be seen as partially independent to the issue of  the aim of  inquiry. Yet, I think that no proper 
answer  to  the  latter  question  can  be  offered  if  one  looses  track  of  the  way  in  which  truth  is  the 
constitutive aim of  cognition. 
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about whether p is true and a question about p is a question about whether p is true are two 
completely different sense. Question aims at true in the particular way in which question 
does, namely by being a question. 
There  doesn't  seem  to  be  any  further  mental  state  beside  the  very  state  of 
questioning that might contribute to the particular way in which questioning is aimed at  
truth. The sort of  intention I have when I decide to work a little bit before going to sleep 
needs not to be present when I raise a question while I reflect on philosophical issues, for  
instance, or when I suddenly wonder where I left my keys before leaving my apartment.  
Yet, these further intentions to know the truth might be present. I might decide to solve a  
sudoku. Thus I might ask all sorts of  questions about the sudoku in order to solve it, that 
is, with the intention of  solving it. But this sort of  accompanying intention is not present  
all the time. Just asking a question is in itself  the request of  an answer, as it were; one  
needs not also to intend to have an answer, in order to want an answer through the act of  
asking a question. 
Interestingly, if  there is a non-metaphorical place for the expression of  intending to 
find out the truth, aiming at the truth, desiring to know the truth, this place is precisely that 
of  questioning. When I raise a question there is a sense in which I am really desiring to  
know the truth. Focusing on questioning gives us a paradigmatic understanding of  what it 
means to desire something. When I ask what is the weather like I want to know the truth  
about the weather. It is a desire that I have. But notice, and this is crucial, that the point  
here is not that there must be on the one hand the question – what is the weather like? - 
and  on the other hand, the desire – the desire to know what is the weather like. The very 
moment of  questioning is a form of  desire. In this sense it is a paradigmatic phenomenon for 
understanding what it means to desire something: because asking a question just is desiring an  
answer. 
One objection goes as follows. It is not true that the aim is to have  true  answers. 
The aim is to remove the question, and the question is removed by providing an answer to  
it, and the answer in order to be an answer need not be a true answer, but only an answer 
that the subject takes as the true one. Thus, the aim is not really having true judgments, but 
rather having judgments. 
This objection can be extracted from Charles Peirce's work. In 'Fixation of  Belief'  
(1877) he argues that enquiry is the struggle to move from the irritating266 state of  doubt to 
266“Doubt is uneasy and dissatisfied state from which we struggle to free ourselves and pass into the state of  
belief; while the latter is a calm and satisfactory state which we do not aim to avoid, or to change to a  
belief  in anything else. On the contrary, we cling tenaciously, not merely to believing, but to believing just 
what we do believe”. See also the work of Cardinal Mercier, who agrees in saying the doubt is painful. 
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the state of  belief267. If  this is so, then the aim is to avoid suffering, and to achieve the aim 
we should move from doubt to belief. If  this line was to be used to put pressure on the 
idea that truth is the constitutive aim of  cognition, one will have to try to argue from the 
fact  that doubt is  irritating and that mere belief  suffices to avoid the irritation,  to the  
conclusion that having true answers is not really the aim of  judgment268. 
To see our predicament as consisting in the mere struggle to remove suffering by 
coming to belief  is to take a detached perspective upon ourselves. Yet, not only it is an 
illusion to think that we can take this detached perspective (for in being in that perspective 
one  is  not  detached  from  its  aiming  to  get  the  truth  about  our  predicament  –  that  
perspective is nothing but a move in the game of  cognition), but it also leads to a failure to 
appreciate what is the internal intelligibility of  our struggle for the truth. As Peirce puts it,
“The most that can be maintained is, that we seek for a belief  that we shall think to be true. But we 
think each one of  our beliefs to be true, and, indeed, it is mere tautology to say so”.
The points, as I would rather prefer to phrase it, is that to judge is to present one's content 
There are two fundamental senses in which doubt is painful.   The most basic sense is that when one 
doubts one's mind haven't already taken a commitment. Another sense is that some doubts arise with 
respect to propositions that are central to one's own understanding of  oneself  and the world. If  I start to 
doubt some proposition I previously firmly believed and on which an important part of  my own self-
understanding depends it is natural that the doubt will be painful. To give a very simple example, if  I start  
doubting the existence of  God, and I am a committed believer, my consciousness will be shaken and I  
will suffer. The first sense in which doubt is painful is equally natural and known by many. The first sense  
of  doubt is more similar to the one Peirce describes as an  irritation – we might also be irritated about 
issues which are not of  vital importance for our life, and this occurs when there is some proposition 
whose truth-value is unsettled. But the latter sense, involving issues that are of  vital importance for the 
subject, goes beyond the mere irritation, and can be source of  profound suffering. If  you want to see this  
point clearly, think of  someone who, like Camus, finds herself  in an existential situation according to 
which “There is  only one really  serious  philosophical  question,  and that  is  suicide”  -  exept  that  the 
question is not merely philosophical, but painfully lived as one's own fundamental question. To speak of 
'irritation' is clearly to miss the phenomenon. See Camus (1955), p. 3.
267See Levi (2012) for a discussion of  Peirce's view of  inquiry. It is notoriously controversial to capture in 
exact terms Peirce's view on the aim of  inquiry. In part this difficulty depends on the fact that it is hard to 
have clear grasp of  Peirce's view truth itself. For some useful discussion, see Hookway (2000), (2007), 
Wiggins (2004), Misak (2007)
268Here is the full passage where one might try to extract the intention to present such an argument: 
“The irritation of  doubt causes a struggle to attain a state of  belief. I shall term this struggle  inquiry,  
though it must be admitted that this is sometimes not a very apt designation.The irritation of  doubt is the 
only immediate motive for the struggle to attain belief. It is certainly best for us that our beliefs should be 
such as may truly guide our actions so as to satisfy our desires; and this reflection will make us reject every 
belief  which does not seem to have been so formed as to insure this result. But it will only do so by  
creating a doubt in the place of  that belief. With the doubt, therefore, the struggle begins, and with the 
cessation of  doubt it ends. Hence, the sole object of  inquiry is the settlement of  opinion. We may fancy  
that this is not enough for us, and that we seek, not merely an opinion, but a true opinion. But put this  
fancy to the test, and it proves groundless; for as soon as a firm belief  is reached we are entirely satisfied,  
whether the belief  be true or false. And it is clear that nothing out of  the sphere of  our knowledge can be 
our object, for nothing which does not affect the mind can be the motive for mental effort. The most that 
can be maintained is, that we seek for a belief  that we shall think to be true. But we think each one of  our 
beliefs to be true, and, indeed, it is mere tautology to say so”.
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as true and to raise a question is to desire – in the form of  a question – to have a true  
answer. In this fundamental and basic sense cognition aims at truth: truth is the internal  
horizon  of  intelligibility,  as  it  were.  Therefore,  we  can't  maintain  that  the  real  aim of  
cognition  is  simply  related  to  the  aim of  avoiding  suffering  and achieving  tranquillity.  
Moreover,  the  suffering  associated  with  questioning  and  doubt  can  be  explained  by 
reference to the constitutive desire for the truth. The reason why we suffer when we have 
questions and doubts is because in having them we are expressing our ignorance of  the  
truth and the corresponding desire to have an answer to our questions and resolve our 
doubts. 
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Chapter X 
Constitutivism about Alethic Normativity
In the previous Chapter I have argued that truth is the constitutive aim of  cognition. I have 
offered a particular understanding of  the claim by endorsing a minimalist view. According 
to minimalism, there are three principal senses in which cognition aims at truth: judgment 
aims at truth is the sense that judging that  p presents its content as true in the particular 
way  in  which  judgment  does;  only  alethic  considerations  can  be  grounds  for  judging; 
questioning aims at truth in the sense that a question as to whether p is true posits a true 
answer as its form of  satisfaction. 
In  this  Chapter  I  will  rely  on  this  minimalist  view  in  order  to  provide  the 
foundation  for  alethic  normativity.  In  the  next  Chapter  I  will  rely  on the  view  about  
commitments defended in the previous Chapters  in  order to provide a foundation for 
epistemic normativity.  Both alethic and epistemic normativity are complex phenomena,  
and  it  will  be  a  substantial  task  of  these  chapters  to  unpack  the  several  normative 
dimensions that we might want to vindicate. 
The vindication I will seek here exploits an argumentative strategy that has been 
used  mostly  in  the  moral  domain  and  that  goes  under  the  label  of  constitutivism. 
Constitutivism is a view about the source of  normativity269, and is an instance of  the view I 
have  called  transcendental  constitutivism  in  the  Introduction  of  this  Dissertation.  It  tries  to 
account  for  normativity  through  the  following  steps.  First,  it  points  out  that  a  given 
practice  or activity  is  constitutively  aimed at  some goals,  or governed by some norms 
(constitutivity step). Second, it points out that that practice is inescapable in a suitable sense  
(inescapability step). Third, it argues that that constitutive norms and aims of  that suitably 
inescapable practice enjoy categorical  normativity,  or anyway a sort of  authority that is 
satisfactory  enough to provide a foundation for  the  normativity  we initially  wanted to 
account for (transcendental step). Fourth, it explains why the constitutive claims made at 
step one holds true (explanatory step).
Here I will pursue a similar strategy with respect to alethic normativity (and with  
respect to epistemic normativity in the next chapter). The first step of  the constitutivist  
269Constitutivists view are defended by Korsgaard (1996), (1997), (1999), (2002), Railton (1997), Millgram 
(1997), ch. 8, Schapiro (1999), Velleman (2000), (2004), (2009), and Rosati (2003). See Chapter VI for a 
discussion of  constitutivism about normativity, particularly for a discussion of  the distinction between 
weak and strong forms of  constitutivism.
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strategy  has  been  executed  in  the  previous  chapter,  where  I  argued  that  truth  is  the  
constitutive aim of  cognition. In this chapter I will execute the second and the third steps. 
The second step consists in showing that cognitive agency is suitably inescapable. The third 
step consists in showing that the sort of  inescapability and constitutivity enjoyed by truth 
grounds the desired forms of  alethic normativity. The fourth step is briefly touched upon 
at the end of  the Introduction, it is discussed in general terms in Chapter VI, and it is again 
discussed in the last paragraph of  the Dissertation.
Constitutivist  strategies have received a lot of  attention and criticisms in recent 
debates.  Some  of  the  most  important  criticisms  that  have  been  levelled  against 
constitutivism  in  moral  theory  apply  mutatis mutandis to  constitutivism  about  alethic 
normativity and to constitutivism about epistemic normativity. I will revise and respond to 
them in due course. I will concede a lot to these objections, and will end up offering a 
constitutivist view about alethic normativity according to which alethic normativity is of  a  
sui  generis  kind that  deserves to  be called  transcendental  for  several  reasons  that  will 
emerge as the discussion progresses. Crucially, I will argue that the sort of  alethic values  
and norms that constitutivism can ground do not belong to the category of  values and 
norms  that  can  be  conceptualised  as  instrumental  or  non-instrumental,  extrinsic  or 
intrinsic,  categorical  or  conditional.  Transcendental  values  and  norms  belong  to  an 
altogether different normative realm – they might be called transcendental because they 
govern the activity that makes it possible to be guided by values and norms that can be 
meaningfully  conceptualised  as  instrumental  or  non-instrumental,  extrinsic  or  intrinsic, 
categorical or conditional. 
One of  the central  contention of  the present chapter is  that constitutivists and 
detractors  haven't  paid  enough attention to the  distinctions between different kinds  of 
normative questions – and corresponding sceptical challenges – to which a constitutivist  
might  want  to  provide  an answer.  I  will  distinguish  three  main  kinds  of  questions.  A 
practical question about what to do; an evaluative one about what is good or desirable; and an 
existential one  about  what  is  valuable  or  meaningful.  I  will  argue  that  the  failure  to 
distinguish them has led to a failure to properly understand what a constitutivist account 
can plausibly promise to us.  In particular,  I will  argue that although constitutivism can  
provide some foundation with respect to our practical questions, it can't provide the source 
for justifying our evaluative and existential claims. The justification, if  any, must come from 
elsewhere.  However,  the  transcendental  layer  of  alethic  normativity  will  be  shown  to 
characterise  the  alethic  normative  profile  of  the  activity  which  is  the  condition  of 
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possibility for providing an answer to evaluative and existential questions and challenges.
Many of  the arguments against constitutivism that have been presented in recent  
literature  purport  to  show  that  a  constitutivist  strategy  can't  ground  the  categorical  
authority of  norms. Both sides of  the debate seem to presuppose that categorical authority 
is the issue. However, in this chapter I will argue that, with respect to alethic normativity at 
least,  constitutivism  is  best  understood  as  a  strategy  that  highlights  a  new  layer  of  
normativity, that is the one I call transcendental. Constitutivism properly understood shows 
that  at the foundations the sort of  normativity that we find is of  a sui generis kind. I 
suggest that the conclusions and points argued here ought to be taken into considerations 
by  other  constitutivist  theories  in  order  to  properly  understand  the  nature  of  their 
proposals. 
§10.1 Constitutivism about normativity
What is the aim of  a constitutivist theory about normativity? As I see it, a constitutivist is  
trying  to  answer  a  sceptical  challenge  to  the  effect  that  we  might  be  wrong  in  our 
normative judgments. The sceptical challenge here is not just (though it might also take the 
form of) an epistemological challenge to the effect that we don't know or aren't justified in  
believing the relevant normative claims that we want to claim. A sceptical challenge is any 
challenge against our pretension to know the truth about what is to be done, what is good  
and what is valuable, and the challenge might be presented in the form of  arguments for  
thinking that the purported truths are false, and not just that we are unjustified in believing  
them. Constitutivism thus aims to answer some sceptical challenge by showing that our 
normative judgments are true270.
Our normative judgments are answers to different questions. Here are three family 
of  questions the distinction among which will be very important in what follows:  practical 
questions, namely questions about what is to be done;  evaluative questions, namely questions 
about what is a good or a desirable state of  affairs;  existential questions, namely questions 
about what is valuable and meaningful. A sceptical challenge to normativity might target  
just one family of  answers to our normative questions (e.g., one might argue that there are  
270In  this  respect,  constitutivist  strategies  provide  ambitious transcendental  arguments,  starting  from 
fundamental facts about cognition or agency (constitutivity step), and inferring from them the truth of  
some normative proposition (transcendental step). There might be ways of  construing the constitutivist 
strategy as a modest transcendental arguments purporting to conclude, say, that we are justified in holding 
some normative proposition as true, or that belief  or commitment to some normative proposition is 
especially invulnerable for us. In this chapter I leave on a side a modest understanding of  the strategy and 
will rather try to provide an ambitious transcendental strategy.
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no final values, though there are instrumental reasons for action), or the whole normative  
realm (e.g., by arguing that our normative claims are all false). Analogously, a constitutivist  
might attempt to provide a foundation for answering all these questions, or only some of 
them. To anticipate, the theory I am going to provide offers the resources to dissolve the 
practical  question,  but  it  is  entirely  silent  with  respect  to the  evaluative  and existential 
questions and respective challenges.
In order to have a general grasp of  the way in which the constitutivist strategy tries  
to answer these questions, it is useful to think of  constitutivism as follows: 
Constitutivism about normativity: the view according to which some normative judgments271 are 
true in virtue of  what is constitutive of  a suitably inescapable practice or activity. 
So  understood,  there  are  different  parameters  the  variation  of  which  yields  different 
constitutivist views: 
• Kinds of  questions. Do we aim to answer practical, evaluative, or existential questions? 
• Normative  realms.  What  kind  of  normativity  are  we  trying  to  justify?  Are 
weconcerned with the alethic, the epistemic, or the moral realm? 
• Inescapability. What is the relevant kind of  inescapability that allows the constitutivist 
strategy to perform its job? 
• Practice or activity What is the relevant kind of  practice or activity that grounds our 
normative judgments?
The sort of  consitutitivism which I will be interested in here is concerned with the realm 
of  alethic  normativity,  and it  aims to  ground it  in  the  activity  of  cognitive  agency  or  
cognition for short.  The relevant sort  of  inescapability will  be what Ferrero (ms)  calls  
dialectical inescapability, namely the fact that in order to inquire about cognition we should  
rely on it. My constitutivism will answer some practical questions, though it won't have the  
resources to answer the evaluative and existential ones. 
§10.2 Alethic normativity
271Speaking in terms of  judgments might obscure the fact that to justify our normative judgments require, in 
most cases, to justify the authority of  some norms. When we deal with normativity what we are trying to 
justify is the fact that some norm is applicable to us. It seems to be quite standard to understand the 
desired validity of  a norm in terms of  its unconditionality upon the particular desires and preferences of  
the agent. This is how Ferrero (ms) puts it: “The objective validity of  the norms and reasons is a matter of 
their  unconditional  authority,  of  their  being  valid  irrespective  of  the  agent's  contingent  motives  and 
attitudes”, p. 4.
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What does it  mean to say that there is such thing as alethic normativity? What are the 
contents of  the norms and values we want to vindicate? Here is a list of  possible dimensions  
of  alethic normativity that we might want to vindicate. 
(1) To have true judgments is valuable (intrinsically/extrinsically, finally/instrumentally)
(2) A judgment that p is correct (if  and) only if  it is true 
(3) If  a proposition is true, I should judge it to be true
(4) I should judge a proposition to be true only if  it is true
(5) I am entitled to use only considerations that speak in favour of  the truth of  p in 
order to judge that p
(6) It is good/better/preferable to be a cognitive agent, rather than not being one
(7) I should make efforts to discover the truth about some subject-matter
 
I will have the occasion to say something more on all of  them in what follows. These are 
just candidate plausible senses in which truth might be normative, but some of  them might 
be revealed as unjustified as the investigation progresses. Most importantly, and relatedly, I 
will  argue  that  constitutivism  about  alethic  normativity  doesn't  have  the  resources  to 
vindicate all these senses in which truth might be normative. Particularly, I will argue that  
constitutivism doesn't have the resources to vindicate (1), (3), (6) and (7), though it has the 
resources in particular to explain why (2) and (5) are true. 
§10.3 The regress argument in favour of  constitutivism
Why should we want to appeal to constitutivism about normativity to begin with? One way 
of  motivating the appeal to constitutivism is by means of  a regress argument. Here is how 
a  prominent   constitutivist  like  Valleman introduces and motivates  the  view.  He starts 
asking: 
“[W]hat is the substantive criterion of  correctness for actions? What is it to act correctly?”. p. 125.
And he begins by considering the following natural proposal: 
“We can supply a criterion for correctness for any particular action by directing it at a contingent  
aim – an aim that is contingent in the sense that the action might or might not be directed at it  
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while still retaining its nature as an action”. p. 125
Yet, as he notices, this proposal has a problem. Here is how he puts it: 
“The problem is that if  an action can be apt or inapt only in relation to a contingent aim, then its 
justification  may seem to be  incomplete  until  the  aim itself  is  justified.  And according  to the  
present view, an aim is like an action in that it can be apt only in relation to a contingent aim –  
presumably a further aim – on which it therefore depends for its justification. I can justify flipping 
the switch as a means of  illuminating the room, and I can justify illuminating the room as a means 
of  finding my keys; and I can justify finding my keys as a means of  starting the car; not no matter  
how long I go on with such justifications, I will always feel obliged to go further, so as to justify the 
latest aim in the series, which will be a further but still contingent aim at which I happen to have 
directed my action. The present view therefore seems to yield a dilemma: the justification of  action  
must  either  lead to an infinite  regress  of  justifications  or  stop  short  at  a  contingent  aim that  
remains unjustified”. p. 126
This should be a familiar dialectic. The solution here would be to think that there is an aim 
which is constitutive of  action, so that satisfaction of  that aim is not to be pursued for the 
sake of  some further aim. 
The initial question about the criterion of  correctness for actions was of  course 
motivated by the need to know what to do. What should I do? This is the question to 
which we are going to answer by pointing the finger to those actions that are correct  
actions, using the adjective that Velleman selects for the evaluation of  actions. Appealing to 
contingent aims only – instrumental or hypothetical norms – won't do, because it doesn't  
offer the resources to  answer  the initial question (the assumption being that a regress of 
aims, or an arbitrary stopped choice won't constitute a satisfactory answers). Appealing to a 
constitutive aim here is thus meant to provide an answer about the 'what should I do?'  
question.  Surely,  if  a  given aim is really constitutive,  then,  if  its  being constitutive is  a  
source of  normativity, then it seems that I should have to pursue that aim. If  pursuing this  
aim then gives rise to a justification of  further norms, and thus gives normative authority 
to further contingent aims,  then the strategy might be rich enough to provide us with 
enough instructions about what to do. (This is a point about the extension of  the project.  
The project might be such that all it proves is that we should pursue the constitutive aim of 
action, but this will not give us any particular instruction about what we should do). 
Here is the form of  the solution to the problem for Velleman: 
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“The way to avoid  [the problem] would be to show that actions can be justified as such, in the  
manner  of  beliefs  –  justified  independently  of  any  contingent  aim  at  which  they  might  be  
directed”. p. 127 
And he specifies in a footnote: 
“My versions of  the kantian strategy concedes that actions must be justified in relation to an aim; it  
simply asserts that this aim is inherent in the nature of  actions and is consequently not contingent  
in relation to agency”. Footnote 13, p. 127. 
Thus,  as  these  quotations  make  clear,  the  justification  of  an  action  is  provided  by  
specifying the aim for the sake of  which the action should be done. Yet, not all aims are 
contingents, some of  them are constitutive of  agency, namely the activity we engage in  
when  we  decide  what  to  do  and  when  we  consequently  act.  The  idea  is  that  these 
constitutive aims block the regress of  justification of  the aim for the sake of  which an  
action should be done. The non-contingency of  the aim is, as Velleman makes clear, the 
crucial point which blocks the regress and is meant to offer the basic source from which 
further normativity can emerge. Does the discovery of  a non-contingent aim suffice for 
grounding normativity?
Interestingly, Velleman's argument for justifying the authority of  norms for actions 
is  inspired  by  the  nature  of  belief,  understood  according  to  his  teleological  account 
introduced in the previous chapter. It is in the nature of  belief  to be aimed at truth. Truth  
is the non-contingent aim of  belief  and as such it sets a criterion for correctness for belief.  
If  there is something analogous in the case of  action, then the regress problem is solved  
for there is some aim which needs not to be justified by appealing to some further aim,  
since this aim is  constitutive of  action. This  also invites  us to think of  what a similar 
regress argument in favour of  constitutivism about alethic normativity would look like.  
Suppose we were asking: what should I believe? What is the criterion for correct belief,  
namely  the  criterion  consideration  of  which  should  guide  my  doxastic  deliberation? 
Suppose one were to offer the following proposal: believe what makes you happy. Here, 
one would be in a position to ask: but why should I believe what makes me happy? And 
here someone might then propose the following: believe what makes you happy, for by so 
believing you can avoid suffering. And one might add: but why should I avoid suffering? 
And one might add: because once you have avoided your own suffering you will then be in 
a position to help others. But again: why should I help others? Because... Here we have the  
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regress of  aims. The constitutivist move is to say that all this regress is not needed or can 
be stopped, since there is an aim which is constitutive of  belief,  namely truth, and the 
constitutivity  of  the  aim sets  the standard for correct  believing and answers the  initial 
question about what to believe: believe what is true. The idea is that if  one keeps asking 
'why should I believe the truth?', one is not realising that she ought to believe the truth  
because this is the constitutive aim of  belief. The burder of  the constitutivist strategy is to 
explain  how  the  constitutivisty  of  the  aim  can  ground  the  corresponding  norm 
(transcendental  step).  In  order  to  make  the  transition,  constitutivists  appeal  to  a 
characteristic feature of  the practice or activity of  which the relevant normative dimension 
is constitutive (inescapability step).
§10.4 Constitutivism needs inescapability
As we have seen in the previous Chapter, cognition is structured in such a way that truth is 
the aim it desires to achieve through questioning and that can be achieved only in a very  
particular  fashion,  namely by forming judgments on the basis of  alethic considerations 
only. Can this suffice to ground alethic normativity? 
The constitutivist first attempt to do so might go along the following lines. Think 
of  cognition as a game, the game of  truth. The game as a whole is structured in such a  
fashion that one wants to have true answers to one's questions. Questioning aims at truth 
in the sense that to raise a question is to posit an answer, namely a judgment, as the form 
of  the satisfaction of  the particular form of  desire that questioning is. In this sense, having 
true answers is a constitutive aim of  that game. Moreover, there are constraints on the way 
in which you can achieve the aim of  the game, one of  which is captured by exclusivity, 
namely the fact that you can form judgments only by relying on alethic grounds272. To put 
272Analogy with games (and chess, in particular) is often invoked in the metanormative literature in order to 
clarify the basic concepts of  a metanormative theory. Here, some important distinctions to be kept in  
mind are the following. 
Distinction between  rules and  aims. The aim of  chess is to checkmate the opponent. The rules are the 
rules of  chess, the rules that say what you can do in the game of  chess. In the case of  the game of  truth, 
the aim is to have true judgments, and the rules are the constraints on how one can form true judgments,  
one constraint being that captured by exclusivity. 
Can one play chess without caring about the aim and without wanting to respect its rules? That is a  
debated question. In the case of  the game of  truth, as we will see, the answer to the analogous question is 
positive,  one  can  play the  game of  truth without  caring about  truth – provided that  caring is  here  
understood as a form of  personal  valuing (see previous Chapter IX, §9.1). One can be a cognitive agent 
even if  one doesn't (personally) want to respect exclusivity and even if  one doesn't (personally) want to 
have true beliefs. 
Is it enough to be committed to follow the rules of  chess in order to play chess, regardless of  whether 
one actually succeeds in following the rules? This is, again, a contested question. In the case of  the game  
of  truth the answer is negative. It is not enough to be committed to respect exclusivity in order to be  
playing the game. Exclusivity ought to be respected and it is in fact respected, otherwise there is no 
300
the points  together,  cognition is the game of  answering our questions on the basis of 
alethic grounds only. One doesn't count as playing the game of  truth – cognition – unless 
one respects exclusivity and aims at truth in the form of  questioning and judgments. 
On the ground that these are the constitutive features of  the game of  truth, one 
might want to conclude (transcendental step) that to play the game of  truth is to be subject 
to some norms like the following: one should judge only on the basis of  alethic grounds 
and one should judge a proposition to be true only if  it is true. Or, one might want to draw 
the  conclusion  that  within  the  game  of  truth,  truth  is  not  only  constitutively  valued  
(constitutivity step) but is also valuable  (transcendental step), it is not only constitutively 
desired (constitutivity step) but is also desirable (transcendental step). Or maybe one might 
want to put the point about the normativity of  truth in different ways. The important point  
to notice is that one might be tempted to conclude that truth is normative for cognition 
once one realises that truth is constitutively taken to be normative for cognition. 
But this transition might be challenged.  One273 challenge is clearly made by Enoch 
(2006), in which he compares agency with the game of  chess. It doesn't seem enough to 
take part to the game of  chess in order to give authority to the constitutive norms of  chess 
and to give authority to the aim of  chess. For I might have no reason whatsoever to play 
chess, and a result the lack of  reason to play chess would entail a lack of  reason to act 
according to the constitutive norms of  chess and a lack of  reason to pursue the aim of 
chess. This challenge grants the point that one is not playing the game of  chess unless one 
make moves according to the relevant constitutive norms. The challenges is that to play the 
game doesn't suffice by itself  to give normative authority to the constitutive norms. If  the 
game of  truth is analogous to the game of  chess in this way, then one needs a prior reason 
to play the game of  truth, in order to provide authority to the constitutive norms of  the 
game of  truth (only alethic considerations count), and in order to provide authority to the 
aim of  the game of  truth (having true judgments). In order for constitutive norms and for  
constitutive aims of  chess to be normative for me, I need to have a reason to play chess.  
Analogously: in order for constitutive norms and for constitutive aims of  cognitive agency 
to be normative for me, I need to have a  prior  reason to play the game of  truth. Thus: 
there is a normative truth which is not grounded in the constitutivist strategy but that is  
rather needed in order to ground the normativity of  constitutive norms themselves.  
The constitutivist  at  this  point has to find a significant  disanalogy between the 
reasoning or cognition, but something else. 
273There are several challenges to the transcendental step just described, and we will see the most serious of  
them in what follows.
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game of  chess and the game of  truth274. The disanalogy is that the game of  truth is special  
in that it is inescapable in a way in which the game of  chess is not (this is the second step of 
the constitutivist  strategy,  the  inescapability  step).  Strictly  speaking,  this is  not enough, 
though. For the constitutivist should also say that the request of  a reason to take part to a  
game in order to activate the constitutive normativity of  that game is a request that is  
reasonable in the case of  chess precisely because the game of  chess is not inescapable in  
the way in which the game of  truth is inescapable. And that is precisely the point of  a  
constitutivist: for an inescapable game there is no need to have a prior reason to be in it in  
order to activate its constitutive normativity because it is inescapable in the relevant way.
There are many things to be argued for and to be defended in this constitutivist 
line. First, one should explain what is the form of  inescapability that is enjoyed by the 
game of  truth. Second, one should argue that this form of  inescapability (and lack thereof  
in the case of  other escapable games like chess) is what explains why in the case of  chess,  
but not in the case of  cognition, we need a prior reason to enter into the game in order to 
activate its constitutive normativity. Both tasks face great difficulties, to which we will now 
turn275. 
§10.5 Varieties of  inescapability
As we have seen, it is a crucial step in the constitutivist strategy to show that the practice  
that is governed by constitutive norms is inescapable in a way that grounds the normativity  
of  these constitutive norms. This is arguably the most important and fundamental insight,  
if  it is a good one, of  constitutivism276. There are many kinds of  inescapability, not all of 
274Another option is to argue, like Silverstin (2014) does, that there is no need to have a reason to take part  
to a practice in order to activate its constitutive normativity, because mere participation in a practice is  
enough for having a reasons to value the aim of  the practice and to follow its constitutive norms. See  
Enoch (2010) for a reply to this suggestion. 
275It is instructive to notice that the motivation for constitutivism comes from a double threat of  regress. 
The first regress is the one that Velleman nicely notices and uses in order to motivate the thought that we  
should look for a constitutive aim: if  any aim that could possibly justify an action is contingent, then there  
would be a problem of  regress. But suppose that you find a constitutive aim for action. Then the question  
can still be: why engaging in action in the first place? Here, unless action is proved to be inescapable, there 
will still be a problem of  regress. For one would have to appeal to the constitutive norms of  another  
practice.  But  if  the practice is in turn found to be optional, then we will  have to appeal  to another 
practice, and so and so forth, unless of  course we find a practice which is inescapable in the required way 
that makes it unintelligible or just unnecessary to demand a reason to take part of  that practice. Compare 
with Ferrero (ms) for an alternative way of  presenting the regress.
276Most  constitutivist  are  explicit  about  that: Ferrero  (2009),  p.  304 “the success  of  this  [constitutivist] 
strategy  depends  on  establishing  (...)  that  we  cannot  but  be  agents,  that  agency  is  non-optional”; 
according to Katsafanas (2013) p. 47 the “core idea” of  constitutivism is that “the authority of  universal 
normative claims arises from a certain form of  inescapability”; Korsgaard’s (2009b), p. 32 “the laws of 
practical reason govern our actions because if  we don’t follow them we just aren’t acting, and acting is  
something  that  we  must  do.  A  constitutive  principle  for  an  inescapable  activity  is  unconditionally  
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which seem to be prima facie relevant for the constitutivist strategy. 
Ontological  and  metaphysical  escapability.  Cognition  is  not  ontologically  inescapable 
because there can be beings who do not cognize. It might be an open question whether 
these beings could amounts to  selves  (ways in  which  we  could have been).  Even if  the 
answer  to  this  open  question  will  turn  out  to  be  negative,  we  might  still  reasonably  
conceive of  creatures that fail to be cognitive agents. If  it were possible for selves like us to 
fail to cognize, then cognition will not only be ontologically escapable, but also, we might 
say, metaphysically escapable.
Biological escapability. Cognition is not biologically inescapable. Most of  the time, we 
are not cognitive agents. We sleep, we form beliefs unconsciously, we think wishfully and in  
self-deceptive manners, we mind wonder. This however is not to deny the plausible claim 
that in order to be the sort of  beings that we are we should have a suitable capacity to 
exercise cognition. The point of  saying that cognition is biologically escapable is to say that 
we can be (or have) the organisms that we are (or have) without being cognizing all the  
time277. 
Dialectical  inescapability.  The  fact  that  cognition  is  neither  ontologically  nor 
biologically inescapable is not taken as a threat to constitutivism. The relevant sense of  
inescapability,  constitutivists  argue,  is  that  cognition  is  dialectically  inescapable 278. 
Dialectical inescapability amounts to the fact that in order to ask any question and form 
any opinion about cognition one should rely on cognition itself, for asking a question and  
forming opinions is to exercise cognition. 
Suppose that one wonders what to think about cognition, and in particular wonder 
binding.”
277One way of  arguing that cognition is inescapable consists in arguing that agency is necessary in order to be 
the sort of  beings that we are, and that cognition is necessary for agency. Railton (1997) takes this line. 
“Consider how deeply implicated belief  is in our notion of  agency. An agent acts on intentions and plans,  
which constitutively  involve  beliefs  and are formed deliberatively  in  part  on the  basis  of  beliefs.  To  
replace  all  belief  with (say) wishing would be to form no intentions at  all.  Moreover, our notion of  
ourselves as agents extended over time constitutively involves memories and expectations. These, too, involve 
beliefs.  There is all  the difference in the world between believing that one is the father of  John,  or  
believing that one will experience the pains of  an unattended-to toothache, and pretending or merely 
supposing these things. To delete all forms of  belief  from your mental repertoire would leave you with no 
recognizable notion of  identity.” 58–59. 
This  is  not  however  the  most  significant  form  of  inescapability  given  the  aim  of  executing  the 
constitutivist strategy for grounding normativity. 
278I take the label 'dialectical inescapability' from Ferrero (ms). In Ferrero (2009) he put the point thus:  
“Agency is closed under the operation of  reflective rational assessment.  […] ordinary enterprises are 
never fully closed under reflection. There is always the possibility of  reflecting on their justification while 
standing outside of  them. Not so for rational agency. The constitutive features of  agency (no matter  
whether they are conceived as aims,  motives, capacities,  commitments,  etc.)  continue to operate even 
when the agent is assessing whether she is justified in her engagement in agency.” p. 308-9  This feature of 
cognitive agency is also noticed by Velleman (2000) pp. 30–1 and 142 and Velleman (2004) pp. 290 ff.; see 
also Railton (1997), p. 317, Rosati (2003), p. 522, and Rysiew’s (2002) p. 451. 
303
about  whether  one  should  exit  the  game  of  truth.  The  dialectical  inescapability  of 
cognition amounts to the fact that this wonder and the answers that it might give rise to are 
all  moves  within  the  game  of  cognition,  the  game  of  truth.  What  are  the  available 
candidate moves? 
First, one move is to provide arguments to the effect that the game of  truth should  
be escaped. Yet any such move will be a move within the game of  truth, and as such it will  
not  represent  any exit  from it.  What eventually  comes  after  that  move will  be a  move 
outside that game. But it won't be an exit. The last move I make within the game of  truth, a 
move whose content is something along the lines of  'I ought to go out of  it and I will' is  
still a move within the game of  truth. The moment immediately after this move, if  there is 
such moment, will already be outside the game of  truth. 
Second, one might try to suspend judgment about whether one should remain or 
abandon the game of  truth, yet this is another move within that game. For suspension of  
judgment would be a judgment about grounds, a judgment about what we have grounds to 
think about the issue whether we should belong or abandon the game of  truth, the game 
of  judging and questioning. 
Third, one might try to be open-minded about the issue and remain in a state of 
wonder about it. But wondering still is aimed at the truth. To wonder about p is to wonder 
about whether p is true, and to wonder about the answer of  an open question is to wonder 
about what is the true answer of  that question. 
Fourth, Pyrrhonian silence is an impossible stance, as argued in Chapter VI. Hence, 
there is no way of  moving outside the game of  truth by means of  entering in a pyrrhonian  
silent attitude, because there simply is no such attitude that we can occupy. 
Dialectical  inescapability  is  a  very  peculiar  feature  that  makes  cognition  a  very  
special activity. As Ferrero (2009), p. 308 notices “it is the locus where we adjudicate the 
merits  and demerits of  participating in any ordinary enterprise”.  All activities  with the 
exception of  cognition are  not  such that  an evaluation  of  their  credentials  involve  an 
engagement with them. To illustrate, the activity of  eating ice cream is not to be evaluated  
by itself. 
It is important to grasp what dialectical inescapability involves, and to distinguish it  
from the biological inescapability of  a given aim, namely the fact of  valuing that aim all the 
time. To see this, suppose that as a matter of  fact we are all desiring ice cream all the time. 
Why wouldn't the biological inescapability of  a desire for ice cream ground the norm that  
one should desire to eat ice cream and do what is required in order to achieve that aim, or  
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something like that? Suppose that ice cream were in fact something we value all the time 
because we desire it. Yet, we would have the possibility of  intelligibly asking with respect to 
it the following question: should I second this desire? Is it really valuable? Similar things  
apply  to  things  that  are  more  likely  to  be  unavoidably  desirable  given  our  natural 
constitution. Think of  survival or of  avoidance of  pain and search for pleasure. Even if  
survival and pleasure are persistent desires of  us, it is entirely intelligible to ask: should I  
follow them? The question is intelligible in such a way that even answering 'no' would be an  
intelligible and legitimate answer. In fact it is easy for us to imagine cases in which these 
unavoidable desires could be rejected for the sake of  other values, maybe even for the sake  
of  values we do not naturally desire to pursue. 
The same intelligibility does not seem to be present in the case of  truth. Can I 
intelligibly ask: should I care about the truth? Should I second the desire that this very 
questioning expresses? If  I am in a questioning attitude, I am valuing it. If  I answer 'yes' I  
am valuing it. If  I answer 'no' I am valuing it. If  I suspend judgment I am valuing it. There 
is no other available move. The only things that can happen is that I forget the issue and  
stop reasoning. 
A fundamental difference, then, between truth and ice cream, is that even if  the 
latter could always be present in my experience, it is something I can intelligibly reject,  
whereas the same doesn't  apply to truth.  The activity  of  seeking the truth is  the very 
activity that would make the rejection. The activity of  desiring ice cream is not the activity 
we use in order to evaluate ice cream's desirability! 
The  fact  that  cognition  is  so  special  in  that  it  is  dialectically  inescapable  is 
important, as we will see, in order to resist most objections that have been raised against  
the constitutivist strategy. Yet, as we will see, there are many objections that put pressure 
on the idea that dialectical inescapability suffice to ground alethic normativity and I will  
argue that  some  of  these objections are correct and that we should limit accordingly the 
foundational aspirations of  the constitutivist strategy.  
§10.6 Varieties of  challenges to constitutivism 
Having distinguished ways in which cognition is inescapable and ways in which it is not, we 
are now in a position to see potential objections to the constitutivist strategy. 
The most important challenges target the entailment from the the inescapability of 
a practice with constitutive norms and values to the claim that these norms and values are  
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genuine,  or really authoritative in the desired sense. (These are challenges that occur at 
what I have called the transcendental step).
To this family there belongs a family of  challenges that I would call the  cognitive 
shmagency objections. What is a cognitive shmagent? A cognitive shmagent is someone who is  
outside cognitive  agency  –  she  is  not  exercising  cognitive  agency  –  and  wonders  (or 
shwonders?) whether to enter into cognitive agency. Thinking about the possibility of  such 
a  standpoint  seems  to  put  pressure  on  the  viability  of  the  constitutivist  strategy  for  
grounding normativity. As we will see, there are many ways in which one can present the 
cognitive shmagency challenge. 
The  name  comes  from  Enoch  (2006)  and  (2010)  in  which  he  criticises 
constitutivism by raising what he called the shmagency objection. Enoch's focus in these 
papers  was  mainly  on  constitutivist  strategies  defended  as  foundations  for  practical 
normativity.  Yet,  the  objections  he levelled  are  structural,  and target  the  viability  of  a 
constitutivist  strategy in general,  regardless of  the specific  content that the norms and 
values it vindicates have. Hence, I will largely rely on the debate that Enoch's papers have  
generated, mostly in connection with moral theory, in order to frame the discussion of 
constitutivism as a strategy for justifying  alethic  normativity. Hereafter I will speak of  the 
cognitive  shmagency objection in order to refer to the particular form that the shmagency 
objection takes when it targets a constitutivist strategy which puts the foundation in the 
nature of  cognitive agency in particular, rather than in agency more generally279.  
Before proceeding to the analysis of  the many forms that the shmagency objection 
takes, it is important to note that the shmagency objection is not the only one that puts 
pressure  on the entailment  from the existence of  an inescapable practice  governed by 
constitutive norms and values to the authority of  these norms and values. There are other 
challenges that appeal to the impression that the mere fact that we find ourselves being  
cognitive agent is normatively arbitrary. Why the mere fact that it is inescapable for us to be  
cognitive  agents  does have any normative  relevance? These,  I  will  argue,  are  the most 
formidable challenges to the constitutivist strategy. Finally, and relatedly, there are other 
challenges to the entitlement that occurs at the transcendental step, and according to these 
challenges there are kinds of  sceptical  challenges that the constitutivist strategy cannot  
answer: particularly, there are dimensions of  normativity like what I will call the evaluative 
and existential one which can't be protected from a sceptical attack using the constitutivist  
279As we will see, the notion of  agency that constitutivists use is quite thin and general at the same time, and  
it often seems to reduce to what I here call cognitive agency, namely the sort of  agency that we exercise  
when we reason in a way that respect exclusivity. If  this is so, the following discussion is directly pertinent  
for other forms of  constitutivism in the practical realm. 
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strategy. 
§10.7 Do we need a reason to be agents rather than shmagents?
Recall that in order to have reasons to comply to the rules of  chess and to pursue its aim, it  
seems that I would have to have a prior chess-independent reason to play chess. Shouldn't I  
have a prior cognitive-independent reason to be a cognitive agent in order to make truth 
really  valuable  and  make  exclusivity  really  authoritative?  No,  this  is  because  cognitive 
agency is dialectically inescapable. In order to produce or have a reason to start playing the 
game of  truth I must already be playing it. Hence, there can't be any prior reason to be a 
cognitive agent, and the very demand for one such reason is not intelligible. 
The point is that it is not intelligible to raise the practical  question as to whether I 
should aim at the truth, because when I raise the question I am already aiming at the truth in 
the relevant sense specified by minimalism. Thus, to illustrate, if  the question is: should I 
judge in such a fashion that only alethic considerations count as grounds for judging?, then  
the question is answered by noticing that if  one is asking it then one is exercising cognition  
and so is judging in the only way in which she can judge, namely on the basis of  alethic  
grounds. Or, if  the question is:  should I want true answers to my questions?, then the  
question is answered by noticing that in asking that question one is wanting a true answer 
to it  because  asking  a  question  is  to want,  in  the  particular  way in  which  questioning 
represents a form of  desire, the true answer to it. There is no practical option that one can 
choose to take here, for in order to take any option – that is, to deliberate about what to do 
– one ought already to be exercising cognition.
There  is  another  form  of  practical  non-optionality  that  responds  to  a  slightly 
different kind of  question. If  the questions are: should I reason according to exclusivity? 
Should I want a true answers to my questions? Should I present the content of  a judgment 
as  true?  Should I  conduct  cognition in the  way in which  I  currently  conduct  it?  Why 
shouldn't I conduct it otherwise?... if  these are the questions, then the answer is that we are  
simply not free to choose how to cognize. This is the point of  saying that some norms and 
aims  are  constitutive  of  cognition  not  merely  in  the  sense  that  in  cognizing  we  are 
committed to follow them and pursue them, but rather in the stronger sense that we can  
cognize only if  we follow and pursue them in the way cognition does.
To sum up, the practical non-optionality of  cognition has two aspects.  The first 
hinges on dialectical inescapability and consists in the fact that in asking whether to  start 
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being a cognitive agent I am already one. The second hinges on the strong constitutivist  
claim that cognition has normative structural features in such a way that it doesn't make 
sense to ask how to cognize, for there is only one way in which one can cognize. 
The appeal to dialectical inescapability could be used for three purposes. One is to 
offer a reply to the sceptic by defusing the sceptical challenge. In this way, one shows that it 
doesn't make any sense to ask for a practical reason for entering into cognition. Another is 
to refute the sceptical challenge by explaining on the basis of  dialectical inescapability why 
one does positively possess a reason to enter into cognition. The third strategy is a particular 
instance of  a defusing strategy. The third strategy appeals to dialectical inescapability in 
order to show that it doesn't make any sense to ask for a reason to be a cognizer, for the  
issue of  being a cognizer is not the sort of  issue for which there could a reason – it doesn't  
belong to the space of  practical reason, as it were. This latter strategy slightly differs from 
the first defusing one, for the first might be done in such a way that one still believes that it  
makes sense to ask for reasons to be a cognizer, though it also points out that as it turns  
out there can't be any reason not to be one. This is still compatible with implementing the 
defusing  strategy  with  the  more  positive  strategy  that  also  shows  that  the  dialectical  
inescapability of  cognitive agency makes it somehow self-vindicating in that one can also 
possess a reason to be a cognizer given that she is already one. 
 I endorse the third strategy, and deny that there is anything like a positive reason to 
be a cognizer that can be extracted by relying on the fact that cognition is dialectically  
inescapable (or by relying on any other fact, for that matter). The dialectical inescapability  
of  cognition  shows  that  the  question  whether  to  enter  into  cognition  cannot  raise  a 
genuine practical question. The question, understood as practical, is dissolved, rather than 
answered.  
§10.8 Cognitive  Shmagency objection I.  It is possible  for us to be cognitive  shmagents and  
shwonder whether to be cognitive agents or cognitive shmagents
One objection to the constitutivist strategy is the following. It is granted the claim that 
truth is  the  constitutive aim of  cognition.  Yet,  it  is  denied the  claim that  cognition is  
inescapable in the required sense. In particular, it contends that it is entirely possible for us 
to  shwonder  whether  to  be  cognitive  agents  or  cognitive  shmagents.  Since  this  is  a 
possibility that we have, we need a previous reason (or shmreason?) to be cognitive agents 
rather than cognitive  shmagents.  Constitutivism can't  account  for that  reason, hence it  
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comes  too  late,  and  doesn't  provide  us  the  foundation  for  normativity280.  (This  is  a 
challenge that occurs at the inescapability step).
Now, I think that we should simply deny the claim that it is possible for us to be  
cognitive shmagents in  the sense that  is  required in order to have an objection to the 
constitutivist  strategy.  Surely,  the  point  here  is  not  that  we  might  fail  at  times  to  be  
cognitive agents. It is obvious that we often so fail (this is the sense in which cognition is  
not biologically inescapable). Yet, the possibility of  wishful thinking or of  belief-formation 
which occurs sub-consciously is not a threat to the claim that cognition is inescapable in  
the dialectical sense – in the sense that it is by engaging in cognition that we can evaluate  
what is the truth about cognition. 
So, the kind of  failure to be cognizers that is required in order to have the objection  
should  possess  the  following  features:  it  should  show  that  there  are  cases  in  which 
something that we can recognise as a deliberation about some issue takes place, is governed 
by something that is  recognizable as a wonder without properly being one,  and has as 
output something that is recognizable as a judgment without really being one. Moreover,  
the judgment should issue as a result of  the deliberation in such a manner that it is formed 
on the basis of  some ground without this ground being an alethic one (or without this 
ground being only an alethic one). So, it should be something recognizable as cognition 
without really being one. The important point is that it issues in something like a judgment  
that  the  subject  can  then endorse  in  order  to decide  (or  shdecide?)  to be  a  cognitive  
shmagent instead of  a cognitive agent. 
Now, I don't think that we can make sense of  this possibility. We could have tried 
to make sense of  it if  it were possible to judge on the basis of  non-alethic grounds, but  
this is not possible. We might think that this is a possibility because we know that wishful 
280Ferrero (2009) notices that if  it is true that cognitive agency is optional as the possibility for us of  being a 
shmagent is meant to imply, then we would have open up again the regress that was stopped by claiming 
that cognitive agency is inescapable.  “The shmagency objection is even more general in scope than it 
might appear at first. The objection can be extended to undermine all forms of  constitutivism, even those 
that are not centred on agency. If  Enoch is right that agency is optional, the same appears to hold of  
shmagency as well. The question whether there is reason to be an agent rather than a shmagent is thus to 
be adjudicated outside of  both agency and shmagency. This adjudication is a move in a distinct enterprise, 
one that provides a standpoint external to both agency and shmagency. Let’s call it ‘uberagency.’ 
Could constitutivism be relocated at the level of  uberagency, of  the more comprehensive enterprise that 
includes both agency and shmagency as optional sub-enterprises? The problem is that an Enoch-style 
objection could still be moved to this kind of  constitutivism. Couldn’t we always imagine the existence of 
shm-uberagents,  subjects  who  are  indifferent  to  the  constitutive  standards  of  uberagency?  That  is, 
subjects  who  would  be  bound  by  the  standards  of  uberagency  only  if  they  had  an  independently  
established reason to be uberagents? The same move used to show that agency is optional can thus be 
used to show that uberagency is optional. Moving at an even higher level would not help because the 
move could be repeated ad infinitum.  The possibility of  this regress shows that,  pace constitutivism, 
appeal to the constitutive standards of  any enterprise (be it agency, uberagency, or what have you) could 
never account for any categorical ought”. p. 307-8
309
thinking,  self-deception, and all  sort of  irrational belief-formations take place. Since we 
know that they take place we also know that we might have formed in such manners the 
quasi-judgment  that  these  processes  of  belief-formation are  preferable  than those  that 
occur when we are reflexive,  namely those processes that respect  exclusivity.  But these 
processes simply can't make judgment stable  reflexively, and it is in reflection that the last 
word about the truth takes place (see Chapter VI, §6.3, and Chapter XII, §12.4). There is 
no  wondering  what  to  judge  when  we  are  not  reflexive.  Hence,  there  is  no  cognitive 
shmagency  in  the  required  sense  that  would  make  sense  of  a  situation  in  which  we 
shwonder or wonder whether to be cognitive agents or cognitive shmagents281. 
§10.9 Cognitive Shmagency Objection II. It is not possible for us to be cognitive shmagents, yet 
it is conceivable the existence of  a cognitive shmagent 
Let us grant that we can't wonder whether to be a cognitive agent or shmagent unless we 
are engaging in cognitive agency. Still, the objection goes, it is  conceivable the existence of 
someone who can raise that challenge as a cognitive shmagent. That would be a cognitive 
shmagent who is capable of  shwondering whether to be a shmagent or an agent. Since this  
cognitive shmagent is conceivable, somehow it follows that we have a problem. We should 
now check whether  this  cognitive  shmagent  is  really  conceivable,  and also whether  its  
conceivability will have any impact on the question whether we have a reason to be agents 
rather than shmagents.
First, what sort of  conceivability, if  any, can we grant to this objection? Here the 
sort of  conceivability that we can be reasonably asked to grant is simply that there doesn't  
seem to be any conceptual absurdity in the description of  this scenario. It is not obvious that 
this scenario is conceptually impossible. Yet, we can't grant to the objection the possibility  
of  conceiving such a shmagent in the sense that we can imagine what it would be like to be  
such a shmagent. If  it were a possibility for us to so imagine, we could raise the shwonder  
ourselves, but we can't. 
Though it is not obvious that the scenario is conceptually absurd, I think that there  
are grounds to think that it is. After all, since we can't know what it feels like to be such a 
shmagent, and since the sort of  phenomena of  questioning, judgment, grounds, and so on 
281For more on this line of  reply and the connection between this sort of  objection to constitutivism and 
the distinction between weak and strong constitutivism, see §6.3, Chapter VI. The crucial move here is to 
rely on the phenomenological distinction between reflexive and unreflexive cognition, to argue that strong 
constitutivism about  alethic  normativity  holds  in  the  case  of  reflexive  cognition,  and  to  argue  that  
reflexive cognition is the place where  we  deliberate. Reflexive cognition must authorize the verdicts of 
unreflexive cognition, but not the other way around.
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which are under investigation here have their nature exhausted by their phenomenology, it  
seems that we can't really use our concepts of  question, judgment, and grounds in order to 
give  any  recognizable  meaning  to  concepts  of  shmquestion,  shmjudgment,  and 
shmgrounds, because our concepts are anchored in the very phenomenology of  cognition. 
I understand what it is to wonder about whether to be an agent because I know what it is  
to wonder by having the relevant phenomenology. But then, since the concept of  wonder 
that I am using to describe the scenario is anchored to the phenomenology of  wondering, 
how could I conceptualise a different wondering without being capable of  associating any 
experience to it? It seems that the only way we can describe (or have the impression of  
being describing) the possibility of  such a shmagent is by using concepts of  judgment, 
questioning and grounds that are captured by their functional role, rather than by their  
phenomenological core. This would probably allow us to make sense of  the scenario282. 
Even though I am inclined to deny the conceptual consistency of  the scenario, let 
us grant it for the sake of  the argument. A first thing to ask about the scenario is whether 
this 'someone' who is raising the shwonder or who is shreasoning about whether to be a 
cognitive  agent  or  a  shmagent  is  someone  who is  recognizable  as  a  self  like  us  or  is 
someone who should be conceptualised as an altogether different creature. The question is 
whether such a shmagent is something that we might have been, or rather something that a 
completely different creature might be. If  we can't make sense of  this creature as a possible  
version of  our self then it is unclear how that can make it normatively arbitrary for us the 
fact that we are engaged in cognition and thus regard as having authority the aim of  truth  
and the norms that we follow in order to form judgments. The fact that other creatures are 
completely different in their motivational set doesn't typically put any pressure to the prima 
facie desirability of  things that are taken as being good for us. (The fact that a plant can't  
love doesn't put any pressure to the value of  love for creatures who are capable of  love).  
So, the defender of  the shmagency objection needs arguments here in order to use his  
scenario so conceived. (We will see one such argument in what follows, when we move 
from practical questions to question about goodness and value). 
But let us even assume that here we are describing a scenario in which there is a 
possible version of  our  self  that  has the capacity to be a shmagent (and to be such a 
shmagent in the way in which the objection of  the previous paragraph required in order to  
pose a challenge to the constitutivist). What does this establish? Nothing, I think. The fact  
that there is someone for which it is an open practical question whether to be a shmagent or 
282Ferrero (ms) takes it that such a shmagent is not conceptually conceivable, though he doesn't try to argue 
for that claim in the way I have suggested here.
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